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THE SOUTHERN PACIFIC, 
1901-1985 
D O N L . H O F S O M M E R 
Foreword by R I C H A R D C . O V E R T O N 
"We have bought not only a railroad, but an empire," 
E. H . Harriman declared in 1901, when he assumed 
control of the company that Frank Norris had called 
"The Octopus." To the Southern Pacific railroad's di -
versified traffic and high earnings, Harriman added 
abundant financial resources and the business acumen 
needed to manage and expand a giant enterprise. From 
that point, the SP played a crucial role in the economic 
development of the American West. 
Don L. Hofsommer chronicles the twentieth-century 
history of the transportation colossus, right up to the 
combination of the Southern Pacific Company with 
Santa Fe Industries and the application for the merger of 
SP's rail lines into the new Santa Fe Southern Pacific 
Corporation. With unrestricted access to SP's files and 
entree to corporate officers and employees, Hofsommer 
has compiled not only a comprehensive scholarly record 
of the railroad, but also a satisfyingly detailed business 
history. 
He devotes particular attention to the managerial de-
cisions made as the company diversified its operations 
beyond transportation enterprises. He evaluates suc-
cessive management teams and implicitly compares SP's 
performance with that of its premier competitors. In 
weighing the company's record as a "corporate citizen" 
and analyzing its decision to diversify, Hofsommer inter-
prets the company's story in the context of regional and 
national patterns and of the service area SP influences so 
greatly. 
From this wealth of detail, generously illustrated with 
photographs every railroad fan wi l l treasure, grows the 
story of merger, double-tracking and trunk lines, right-
of-way and passenger volume, Sunset Route and Pros-
perity Special, cab-forward locomotives and Morgan 
steamships. It is a story that those who love the history 
of the West, of entrepreneurial and corporate America, 
and, most of all, of railroads wi l l relish. 
" W i t h this study of the Southern Pacific Don Hofsom-
mer makes a major contribution to the literature of 
American railroading. The scope of his research is im-
pressive; few company histories can match the depth of 
his documentation. Hofsommer offers fresh, revealing 
insights into the 20th-century strategies and operations 
of one of the nation's great railroads. Moreover, he pro-
vides a brisk and entertaining narrat ive ."—H. Roger 
Grant 
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Foreword 
W O U L D anyone in his or her right mind set out 
to write a single-volume history covering the 
twentieth-century story of the massive trans-
port complex known casually as "Espee," the 
Southern Pacific—especially if that history 
had to be researched, written, revised, and 
published within an outside limit of five years? 
The offhand answer would have to be " N o . " 
Why? In 1935, to pick a representative date, 
Espee's steam and electric lines, truck and bus 
operations, plus its maritime system sprawled 
across a wide domain from Portland, San 
Francisco, and Los Angeles on the west, to 
New Orleans on the south, to Saint Louis in 
the Heartlands, and, by sea, on to Norfolk, 
Baltimore, and New York. 
The mere thought of fitting the history of 
such a vast complex into a single volume is stag-
gering. Yet the "bargain" was struck. Espee's 
Chairman Benjamin F. Biaggini promised Pro-
fessor Donovan L. Hofsommer that the com-
pany's records would be made available and 
that the requisite research, writing, and pub-
lication of "a fair assessment" would have fi-
nancial support from SP. The author was given 
freedom to tell the story as he saw it, the com-
pany retaining only the right to state its own 
views in a clearly labeled footnote if it wished 
to do so. Both parties to the agreement rec-
ognized that academic freedom, as well as 
academic responsibility, constituted the es-
sence of the arrangement between scholar and 
corporation. 
Reassured by these mutual commitments, 
Hofsommer has completed a text notable for 
both its substance and its style. His product 
does not pretend to be the final word on the 
subject; he closes his introduction by saying: 
" M y fond hope is that this book will point the 
way for further investigation into particu-
larized areas of SP's remarkable past." This 
modest statement represents an honest ap-
proach to an honest undertaking. 
Hofsommer's study is a treasure house of in-
formation about the Southern Pacific Com-
pany. Based firmly on original sources, many 
of them not previously available, it covers the 
story of the parent company as well as the 
evolution and growing pains of its many sub-
sidiaries. His account follows a generally chro-
nological pattern, but every relevant topic has 
received careful attention. Beyond the text, 
but hardly less important, illustrations and 
maps are, as one would expect, well chosen 
and superbly presented. 
In passing, it is worth remembering that 
existing SP source records revealing top-level 
decision making are measured in tons. Small 
wonder that heavy reliance has had to be 
placed on judicious summary and sampling. 
Technical terms have had to be carefully ex-
plained. Yet the story breathes and moves; 
monotony is avoided by changes of pace and a 
generous (but restrained) use of analogy and 
anecdote. Indeed, this book is a joy to read. It 
wil l surely charm the general reader and en-
lighten even the most sophisticated specialist 
in railway history. 
An organization as large, as venerable, and 
as essential to the nation as SP inevitably 
attracts its share of adverse criticism. In re-
spect to such matters, Hofsommer assumes 
the role of investigative reporter. For example, 
he reminds us that in the early 1960s, Espee, 
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as well as Santa Fe and Great Northern, sought 
to control Western Pacific, which had a longer 
but more efficient main stem than SP between 
Salt Lake City and San Francisco. Ultimately 
the ICC decreed that WP should remain inde-
pendent. "Strangely, however," Hofsommer 
observes, "the SP was lethargic and ineffec-
tive in advancing opportunities on its eastern 
front." The Chicago & Eastern Illinois, he 
says, might have been a valuable partner for 
SP's Cotton Belt, but in San Francisco conven-
tional wisdom prevailed not to press the mat-
ter. "In retrospect," Hofsommer concludes, 
that "decision was a monumental blunder." 
This blunt observation is typical, not excep-
tional. Although the author frankly expresses 
his view that overall SP has done a creditable 
job down through the years, he does not hesi-
tate to note clearly the less happy occurrences. 
The author's central and pervasive theme is 
that the SP, over the years, has been able to 
adapt to and surmount the rapidly changing 
challenges of the transportation industry. Since 
1900 successive leaders have coped with booms 
and busts, radical advances in technology, 
basic new developments in labor and public 
relations, shifting political trends, and any 
number of emergency situations. The com-
pany, for example, made heroic efforts to make 
passenger service both distinguished and re-
munerative, only to find that financial salva-
tion lay, if anywhere, in further diversification. 
Hofsommer does not try to make instant 
history out of the events of the last fifteen 
years or so. He fully appreciates the impor-
tance of perspective and is guided accordingly. 
He is perfectly willing to take a stand, but in-
sists on labeling it as tentative if that's what it 
is. Throughout the book, he has compiled and 
digested the record; it is now up to those who 
read it to evaluate its significance. 
Richard C. Overton 
Manchester Center, Vermont 
September 4, 1985 
Preface 
E A R L Y in 1981 senior officers of the Southern 
Pacific contemplated the merits of having a his-
tory of the company prepared and then made 
available to the public. In the end, they decided 
to support two studies. The first would cover 
the earlier period, up to 1930, and would be a 
developmental history detailing the impact of 
the SP on its service area. There would be some 
topical as well as chronological overlap, they 
agreed, with the second, which would be es-
sentially a history of the company itself during 
the twentieth century. Richard J. Orsi, pro-
fessor of history at California State University-
Hayward, was chosen for volume one; I, for 
volume two. 
The entire undertaking reflects a particu-
larly enlightened corporate policy. "What 
we want from you," Chairman Benjamin F. 
Biaggini told me on May 28, 1981, "is a fair 
assessment." I took him at his word and over 
the next many months never found reason to 
doubt his sincerity or that of his subordinates. 
Indeed, all company archives were opened 
to me, and personnel from one end of the 
property to the other were uniformly cordial 
and candid. Moreover, I retained editorial 
control; the company had the right to review 
the manuscript with the corollary right to en-
ter a contrary explanatory footnote in the 
case of conflicting interpretations. None was 
requested. 
This is, then, a twentieth-century history of 
the Southern Pacific Company and its subsidi-
aries, and to a lesser extent, their service areas. 
The focus is on SP's senior managers and on 
the decisions they made—how they were made, 
why they were made, and their results. I have 
felt an obligation to describe, to the best of 
my ability, the context in which these men 
worked and to seek an understanding of their 
motives, aspirations, and policies. I have also 
implicitly compared successive management 
teams against standards set by E . H . Har-
riman (1901 —1909), implicitly compared SP's 
railroads with their premier competitors, and 
probed SP's record as a corporate citizen. Not 
surprisingly, I have found a company with 
strengths and weaknesses, one that has tasted 
the sweetness of triumph and the bitterness of 
failure. Yet on the whole, the SP has enjoyed a 
significant, exciting, and profitable existence 
that does credit to its owners, managers, and 
employees. 
Given the restrictions of time, the need to 
compress the lengthy twentieth-century story 
into a single volume, and given the company's 
multifaceted activities, ranging from steam-
ships and pipelines, trunk railroads and com-
munication satellites to leasing, real estate, 
and insurance companies, I have not been able 
to cover all aspects in the detail preferred. 
Moreover, the body of available source mate-
rials proved rich to the point of frustration 
and forced me to exercise a degree of subjec-
tive judgment in the selecting and sampling 
process. As a consequence, this study is, in a 
sense, a "snapshot" view of the Southern Pa-
cific experience in this century, but my fond 
hope is that it will motivate others to report 
on particular elements of SP's remarkable past. 
This volume would not have been possible 
without the sincere interest and assistance of 
scores of persons within and without the com-
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pany. Although most of the support material 
has come from internal records and oral his-
tory, important archival materials have also 
been used. In this regard, I wish to thank 
W. Thomas White, James J. H i l l Reference L i -
brary, Saint Paul; Helen M . Rowland, Asso-
ciation of American Railroads, Washington, 
D . C . ; and Hilary Cummings, University of 
Oregon Library, Eugene. The staff at Har-
vard's Baker Library also showed me every 
courtesy during the time I spent there. 
Among others outside the SP family who 
provided materials or otherwise helped me 
were Arthur L. Lloyd, G . B. Aydelott, Harry E. 
Hammer, Martin M . Pomphrey, Robert E. 
Gehrt, Fred A. Stindt, Prime F. Osborn, 
W. Averell Harriman, James R. Sullivan, David 
P. Morgan, John W. Barriger, John B. McCal l , 
Russ E. Frame, and Ken Longe. Photographs 
were provided or processed by Richard E. 
Wilkinson, Bill Robertson, Harry M . William-
son, Bart C. Nadeau, James E. Sanders, and 
Peter H . Whitney, among others. The fine maps 
were prepared by John L. Hodson and John R. 
Signor. 
From trainmen at Strang, Texas, to engine 
crews at Klamath Falls, Oregon, I was warmly 
received by all hands in every department 
and at every subsidiary. These included L. M . 
Phelps, Andrew Anderson, Stan August, 
Gloria G . Pacis, Anne E. Xanders, James A . 
Loveland, Robert A . Sederholm, Gerald D. 
Pera, Natalia W. Allen, Robert B. Hoppe, 
George Kraus, A . A . Adams, Joe L . Bart, 
Antonio Aleman, Henry M . Ortiz, B. B. Arro, 
R. E. Dipprey, George H . Durbala, Earl L. 
Eckhoff, Merle Kelly, J. W Lynch, Michael E. 
McGinley, O . R. Thurston, Robert G . Thrus-
ton, W. Theo Eskew, J. G . Montfort, Thor H . 
Sjostrand, Thomas D. Ellen, Dale D . Holder, 
Conrad Weil, Kris K. Perez, Henry M . Chidgey, 
Ed N . Brown, Diane L. Young, Don H . Skelton, 
Dorane Humphrey, B. B. Garrett, W. H . Hud-
son, Jackye Vandenberg, Jimmy L. Bates, 
Ed P. Ahearn, Judy A. Holm, Randolph Karr, 
Marshall Hamil , Duane M . Autrey, John Mac-
Donald Smith, Don E. Enright, A l G . Rich-
ards, and C. E. Lamb. 
The operating departments of SPTCo and 
St. Louis Southwestern saw to it that I got a 
firsthand look at their railroads. Those who 
assisted in this way included Lon P. Marsh, 
Mel J. Eshler, Dan L. Andreason, H . Declan 
Brown, Douglas F. Dupre, W. Brendt Eckardt, 
Jim R. Efaw, H . David Fischer, Jack L. Fuller, 
Art M . Henson, Robert G . Huff, Michael 
L. Irvine, David K. Medley, Ken A. Moore, 
Tom P. Russell, Ed J. Seil, C . R. Urbick, Le-
Roy Williams, Gary A. Greblo, John J. Tier-
ney, W.J . Lacy, Roy G . McWhirter, Larry 
L. Phipps, Michael D. Ongerth, Charles T. 
Babers, W. C. Hoenig, Michael L. Burke, and 
Peter K. Baumhefner. 
Several persons within the company and 
others in the railroad industry were joined by 
several academics who read all or parts of the 
manuscript and offered their own special in-
sights and constructive criticisms. In this, spe-
cial thanks go to Lynn D. Farrar, Rollin D . 
Bredenberg, Lloyd G . Simpson, Allen D. 
DeMoss, Richard D. Spence, Harry M . W i l -
liamson, W. Theo Eskew, Thomas C. Buckley, 
Lewis M . Phelps, Andrew Anderson, David F. 
Myrick, Robert I. Melbo, Michael D. Ongerth, 
John MacDonald Smith, Donald J. Russell, 
Benjamin F. Biaggini, Robert D. Krebs, Ed P. 
Ahearn, Guerdon S. Sines, Richard L. Tower, 
Arthur L. Lloyd, Thomas J. Lamphier, David 
P. Morgan, Keith L. Bryant, Richard C. Over-
ton, Albro Martin, H . Roger Grant, and 
Leland L. Sage. 
During the course of research and writing I 
was favored with materials, encouragement, 
wise counsel, and in a host of other ways by 
several who went far beyond the call of duty. 
Donald J. Russell inevitably responded with 
enthusiasm and candor to my every question 
during more than a dozen interviews; it was 
the same with Harold J. McKenzie; the door 
to the office of Robert D. Krebs was always 
open; Rollin D. Bredenberg, J. Earl Hare, 
L. Jack Jenkins, Robert R. McClanahan, Rob-
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ert I. Melbo, and James T. McNamara pro-
vided generous travel opportunities and other-
wise gave their cheery assistance; Lynn D. 
Farrar, Thomas C. Buckley, Allen D . DeMoss, 
Jim Johnson, Gary A . Laakso, Robert D. M c -
Intyre, David F. Myrick, and Kenneth W. Jones 
graciously responded to endless requests and 
even more questions. Throughout all, Jana 
McClendon turned in her usual stellar perfor-
mance by transcribing my illegible handwrit-
ing into clean manuscript. 
Most of all, I am indebted to Ben Biaggini, 
who authorized the project. 
Finally, I am grateful to my wife and family 
whose tolerance seems inexhaustible. To all of 
the above, and to any others whom I might 
have regretably overlooked, I am indebted. 
For errors of fact and for infelicities of style 
that remain, I alone am responsible. 
Don L. Hofsommer 
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C H A P T E R I 
Promontory Prelude 
" . . . the celebration at Promontory was for 
them [the Big Four] the beginning rather 
than the end of a great task."—Robert Glass 
Cleland, A History of California 
T H E simple message was dispatched at 12.147 
P . M . : "Done." That unusually brief telegraphic 
notice on May 10, 1869, setoff what may have 
been the most widespread celebration the 
United States had witnessed to that time. Fifty 
tugboats whistled salutes as they paraded 
along the lakefront in Chicago; New Yorkers 
shouted with glee at the conclusion of a 100-
gun salute; the national capital staged ban-
quets, parades, and a spectacular fireworks 
display; and, prayers and toasts were inter-
mingled throughout the thirty-seven states 
and territories. Asa Whitney the aging vision-
ary must have smiled; Bret Harte pondered 
what the locomotives said as they faced each 
other head to head. The locomotives, of course, 
were Central Pacific's Jupiter and Union Pa-
cific's 119, and the event that gave such plea-
sure to Whitney and his fellow citizens was 
the completion of the country's first transcon-
tinental railroad. The rails joined at Promon-
tory, a desolate, windswept, and heretofore 
unremarked spot in what became the state of 
Utah—some 690 miles east of Sacramento 
and 1,086 miles west of the Missouri River. 1 
Whitney had been arguing for such a rail-
road since the mid-1840s. The matter was in-
extricably linked with sectional tensions re-
lated to slavery or the extension of it, however, 
and little, other than military surveys and 
a lot of talk, was accomplished during the 
1850s. Yet public support for such an enter-
prise became evident. The i 8 6 0 platforms of 
the Republican party and the Democratic can-
didates—Douglas as well as Breckinridge— 
included planks urging the construction of "a 
Pacific Railroad." The Civi l War intensified 
interest, at least in the North and on the part 
of the federal government, and resulted in the 
passage of important legislation designed to 
promote such a line. The Pacific Railroad Act 
of 1862 and a similar act in 1864 spelled out a 
policy of cooperative enterprise that autho-
rized governmental support for two private 
companies, the Union Pacific Railroad (UP), 
building from the east, and the Central Pacific 
Railroad (CP), from the west. Even with such 
support, it was an awesome physical, not to 
mention financial, undertaking. Few thought 
it would be readily accomplished; Gen. W. T. 
Sherman had not expected the project to be 
completed in his lifetime although he thought 
it likely his grandchildren would one day ride 
the cars between America's heartland and the 
Pacific Ocean. But now it was done. Out of 
the ashes of the house divided came this great 
national triumph; the country was united by 
thin but effective bands of iron. 2 
Promoters of the Union Pacific had antici-
pated that a single company, theirs, would 
build the entire line. They were surprised and 
not a little displeased that four audacious Cali-
fornians upstaged them by forming the Cen-
tral Pacific Rail Road Company on June 28, 
18 61, and then convincing the Congress and 
President Lincoln to authorize two companies, 
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not one, to build the line and share in gov-
ernment support. The four, Charles Crocker, 
Mark Hopkins, Collis Potter Huntington, and 
Leland Stanford, initially had neither the tech-
nical knowledge nor the massive capital sup-
port required to construct such a railway. Yet 
they were determined men who, as they gained 
success, took on the label "Big Four." Their 
greatest early asset proved to be Theodore D. 
Judah, who conceived the idea of conquering 
the Sierra Nevada and who surveyed and 
championed the famous Donner Pass route, 
which eventually was selected. Judah, sad 
to say, did not live to see the undertaking 
completed.' 
The Big Four could ill afford to waste time 
celebrating the driving of the Golden Spike at 
Promontory. They and the CP were deeply 
in debt, and there was little reason to expect 
that circumstances soon would change. Com-
pletion of the Suez Canal in 1869 drained 
traffic to the Orient that the railroaders had 
counted on, and Nevada business declined as 
the silver mining industry lapsed into a long 
depression. Moreover, California itself was 
largely underpopulated and capital poor. The 
Big Four quickly learned that it was a danger-
ous business to build a railroad ahead of the 
frontier. On the other hand, they understood 
that rail lines could and would expand busi-
ness and agricultural opportunities, so they 
plunged ahead. 
The Central Pacific was recast twice in 1870 
to absorb other lines. By then it had forged an 
agreement with the Union Pacific to purchase 
47.5 miles of its track from Promontory east 
to the established community of Ogden. This 
made good sense, as Promontory was a poor 
junction for the two roads. The CP also ac-
quired and completed the 151-mile Western 
Pacific Railroad (not to be confused with a 
later independent company of the same name), 
which had a line from Oakland to Brighton 
(near Sacramento) via Niles with a branch 
from Niles to San Jose. Additional mileage 
was acquired near Lathrop, between Roseville 
and Chico, from the California & Oregon 
Railroad and in and around Oakland, where 
a ferry operation was included. In this fashion 
CP forged a through line from Oakland over 
the Coast Range (Altamont Pass) to Sacra-
mento and Ogden. 4 
San Francisco—queen city of the Bay Area, 
gateway to the Far East, and a logical tar-
get for the Big Four—had been reached, if 
indirectly, when the associates acquired the 
Southern Pacific Railroad in mid-1868. That 
company had acceded to the San Francisco & 
San Jose Rail Road, whose lines linked the 
two important peninsula cities of its corporate 
namesake. Another important addition fol-
lowed. The California Pacific Railroad, which 
owned a water-level route in competition with 
the Central Pacific's Altamont line between 
Oakland and Sacramento, came into the fold 
of the Big Four during 1876. 5 
Not all mileage was acquired by purchase; 
much was constructed on behalf of both the 
CP and SP. By the end of the 1870s, lines 
pointed northward toward Oregon and south-
ward along the coast. Additionally, during 
that decade the Big Four pushed a major ar-
tery down the San Joaquin Valley through 
Merced, Fresno, Bakersfield, and Mojave and 
then over the Tehachapis and through the San 
Fernando tunnel to Los Angeles. A l l of this was 
impressive enough, but orders were passed to 
company engineers for even more construc-
tion. To capture new territory and to forestall 
competition, Huntington and his associates 
drove rails east from Los Angeles to Yuma, 
reaching that point on the Colorado River in 
1877. Construction resumed after only a brief 
pause. Crews labored through the hot, dry 
country of Arizona and New Mexico territo-
ries to reach the Rio Grande at El Paso, Texas, 
on May 19, 1881. 6 
Meanwhile, Huntington had emerged as the 
major figure among the Big Four (now down to 
three—Mark Hopkins had died in 1878) and 
had involved himself personally and on behalf 
of his associates in the railroad affairs of Texas. 
There he persuaded the owners of the Gal-
veston, Harrisburg & San Antonio Railway 
Promontory Prelude 
( GH&SA) , which had recently opened a route 
from Houston to San Antonio, to push west 
for a connection with the Southern Pacific at 
El Paso. During the summer of 1881, crews 
from El Paso and from San Antonio began to 
close the gap; they met at the west bank of the 
Pecos River on January 12, 1883. The degree 
of financial involvement in the G H & S A by the 
SP or Huntington himself at this early date is 
not clear. However, the Southern Develop-
ment Company was responsible for the actual 
construction of the San Antonio—El Paso line, 
and it was paid in bonds and capital stock of 
the G H & S A . 7 
Texans are quick to point out that Southern 
Pacific's earliest antecedent derived not from 
California but from the Lone Star State. The 
Buffalo Bayou, Brazos & Colorado Railway 
(BBB&C), chartered in 1850, placed in service 
a 20-mile route from Harrisburg to Stafford 
during 1853. This mileage, west of Houston, 
eventually passed to the G H & S A , which itself 
would become an integral part of the SP. As 
such, the B B B & C represented the first con-
struction of any trackage that became the 
Southern Pacific.8 
There was even more to be done, and Hunt-
ington was equal to the task. Between 1852 
and 1881 several companies in Texas and 
Louisiana, including the Sabine, Galveston 
Bay Railroad & Lumber Company (later 
styled the Texas & New Orleans Railroad); 
the Louisiana Western Railroad; Morgan's 
Louisiana & Texas Railroad & Steamship 
Company; and the New Orleans, Opelousas 
& Great Western Railroad built end-to-end 
lines that, taken together, formed a through 
route linking Houston and New Orleans. 
Each one passed, in time, to the hands of the 
Southern Pacific. The first through passenger 
trains to operate between Los Angeles and 
New Orleans left their respective terminals on 
February 5, 1883. This important new artery 
was properly christened the Sunset Route. 9 
Huntington's hand moved broadly across 
Texas, and soon he and his associates owned, 
leased, or otherwise controlled not only the 
5 
G H & S A — w h i c h itself would acquire numer-
ous additional companies—but also the New 
York, Texas & Mexican Railroad, the Gulf, 
Western Texas & Pacific Railway, the Sabine 
& East Texas Railway, and the Houston & 
Texas Central Railway. More followed. The 
Houston & Shreveport Railroad and the Hous-
ton, East & West Texas Railway, forming a 
completed route from Houston to Shreveport, 
came into the Huntington camp on May 8, 
1893. The reward was sweet. By 1900 the SP 
was the premier carrier in Texas in terms of 
miles operated.1 0 
It was much the same in Oregon and Cali-
fornia. Between 1872 and 1887 the Central 
Pacific finished a route from Red Bluff to the 
California-Oregon border; additional con-
struction in 1887 saw the line reach Ashland, 
Oregon. Two companies, the Oregon & Cali-
fornia Railroad and the Oregon Central Rail-
road, both originally independent but soon a 
part of the Southern Pacific, provided an ex-
tension through Eugene and Salem to Port-
land. Other important additions included a 
Tracy-Fresno line, completed during the sum-
mer of 1892, and Soledad to Saugus, built 
between 1886 and 1901, which provided a 
"Coast Line" route between the Bay Area and 
Los Angeles. Finally, the SP fleshed out its 
operations in the Los Angeles Basin with a 
spaghetti-like system of branches and feeders.11 
Although the Central Pacific, its leased lines, 
and, later, the Southern Pacific Railroad were 
from the beginning under unified control, 
Huntington and his associates felt the need to 
simplify the corporate structure and met to 
discuss the matter in New York during 1884. 
A suggestion that all lines theretofore ac-
quired be consolidated into one company was 
inexplicably rejected. However, they did agree 
to formation of the Southern Pacific Com-
pany, incorporated under the laws of Kentucky 
on March 17 of that year. Securities of the 
Southern Pacific Railroad Company and its 
subsidiaries (including properties in Texas and 
Louisiana then controlled) were exchanged 
for those of the new firm, and in the following 
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season the properties of the Central Pacific 
were leased for operation to the newly orga-
nized company. Then, in 1899, the Central Pa-
cific Railroad itself was reorganized as the 
Central Pacific Railway. In that process vir-
tually all holders of CP stock chose to receive 
stock and bonds of the Southern Pacific Com-
pany. The "new" CP then issued all of its stock 
to the Southern Pacific Company, which con-
tinued to operate the properties as lessee. A n 
important ramification of these proceedings 
was that the federal government, which had 
loaned its bonds to CP in the amount of $58 
million for construction of the original trans-
continental line between Sacramento and 
Ogden, received payment in full with interest.12 
C. P. Huntington could not rest; he was an 
early advocate of a true, single-company trans-
continental railroad. In addition to his well-
known activities on behalf of the CP and SP, 
Huntington was also associated with the 
Chesapeake & Ohio Railroad, becoming its 
president in 18 69 . His transcontinental dreams 
matured during the 1870s, and in 1882 he 
told a reporter in Louisville, Kentucky, that 
"our plans have grown as we advanced and 
now we will connect ocean with ocean." He 
did not spell out the precise route; he may 
have been thinking of an eastern connection 
for the Sunset Route from Los Angeles to 
New Orleans, or he may have been referring 
to his dream of a new line from Memphis 
through Albuquerque and on to a connection 
with an existing SP line in California—uti-
lizing assets of the Atlantic & Pacific (A&P). 
The Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe and the St. 
Louis & San Francisco, of course, and not 
Huntington, ultimately acceded to the Atlan-
tic & Pacific. Huntington and his associates 
had discussed in 1884 the possibility of form-
ing a through line from San Francisco to New-
port News, Virginia, but as Huntington re-
called, his associates "d id not think well of i t ." 
One can only speculate as to the history of 
American railroading if they had. 1 3 
Nevertheless, the Big Four had created a 
truly prodigious enterprise. They transformed 
C o l l i s Potter H u n t i n g t o n shortly before his death 
on August 13, 1900. 
California and much of the West and did so in 
an excitingly brief time. Their railroad opera-
tions opened many opportunities for the gen-
eral public and provided direct employment 
for thousands. Indeed, they became wealthy 
themselves. The citizenry, however, was not 
uniformly appreciative. Many persons, for 
reasons of fantasy as much as fact, came to 
dislike the Big Four and, consequently, the 
Southern Pacific. The writer Frank Norris 
gave the railroad a particularly onerous label: 
The Octopus. It is unlikely that the company 
ever had the power that many ascribed to it. 
Still, as the nineteenth century passed into the 
twentieth, the SP was a railroad to be reck-
oned with: it controlled 8,206 route miles 
stretching from Portland to New Orleans, 
linking with the Union Pacific to form the 
Overland Route via Ogden, owned impres-
sive operations throughout California, and 
boasted its own steamship company linking 
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New York and other points with the railroad 
at New Orleans. 1 4 
Impressive as the Southern Pacific was at the 
turn of the century, it needed a constant and 
growing source of cash to develop the prop-
erty fully. That would not come from the Big 
Four. Mark Hopkins had died in 1878 and 
was followed in death by Crocker in 1888 and 
Stanford in 1893. On August 13, 1900, the 
most talented railroader of the four, Collis P. 
Huntington, joined them. 1 5 
C H A P T E R 2 
Enter Edward Henry Harriman 
"We have bought not only a railroad, but an 
empire."—Edward Henry Harriman 
B E C A U S E the inherent and strategic value of 
the Southern Pacific was well recognized by 
the investment and transportation commu-
nities, there was keen interest in the proper-
ties even before Huntington died. Edward 
Henry Harriman was one of many who were 
captivated by the opportunities presented by 
the SP. Harriman had implored Huntington to 
sell him his interest, but the old man stead-
fastly refused. Death finally released Hunt-
ington's grip. However, Speyer &C Company, 
SP's financial agents, continued to resist Harri-
man's overtures. Fully determined, Harriman 
ordered the Union Pacific Railroad, which 
he controlled, to buy SP stock. Yet, unless 
he could secure that which Huntington had 
willed his wife and nephew, there was no hope 
that he could gain similar control of the South-
ern Pacific.1 
The opportunity Harriman yearned for de-
veloped in 1901 when Edwin Hawley, an in-
timate business associate of Huntington's, 
pledged his own holdings and openly advo-
cated the sale of the estate's stock to the Union 
Pacific. In the end, Hawley and not Speyer &c 
Company prevailed. By March 31, 1901, the 
UP owned 3 8 percent of SP stock—20 percent 
acquired from the Huntington estate and the 
remainder purchased by Kuhn, Loeb & Com-
pany, bankers for the Union Pacific, on the 
open market or by private sale. Harriman 
later increased UP's holdings in SP to 46 per-
cent. With 38 percent, Harriman claimed con-
trol; with just under half, the matter was be-
yond question. "We have finally landed the 
Southern Pacific bird," exulted Jacob Schiff, a 
friend and associate of Harriman. 2 
Western control of the Southern Pacific and 
its heritage of freedom from "eastern entangle-
ments" evaporated with the sale of the Hunt-
ington shares to Harriman interests. Yet the 
railroad was in good hands, yea, excellent 
hands. Of Harriman, contemporaries and later 
historians have said that he was "the foremost 
railroad economist of the day"; "the most 
powerful figure in the railroad situation in the 
United States"; "the most competent railroad 
man in the wor ld" ; "the greatest railroad man 
since railroads began"; "the greatest of all 
American railroad leaders."' 
There was nothing to predict that E. H . 
Harriman would ultimately emerge at the cen-
ter of railroad affairs in this country. He 
was born on February 25, 1848, the son of 
the Reverend M r . Orlando and Mrs. Cornelia 
Harriman. School did not yield the reward 
young Harriman was seeking, and he left it at 
the tender age of fourteen to become an office 
boy for the Wall Street house of D . C. Hays. 
He quickly became familiar with the bro-
kerage business and, when he was twenty-
two, purchased a seat on the New York Stock 
Exchange. Fortune was kind to him. Promi-
nent customers sought his talents, and the 
firm of E. H . Harriman & Company grew ac-
cordingly. Good fortune also followed him in 
marriage. During the late 1870s Harriman 
was attracted to Mary Williamson Averell, a 
pleasant young lady from a prominent Og-
densburg, New York, family. Mary's father 
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was a leading banker of the community and 
also president of the Ogdensburg & Lake 
Champlain Railroad. His marriage to her in 
1879 not only provided Harriman with a 
charming and talented mate but also intro-
duced him to the opportunities provided by 
the railroad industry.4 
During the next two decades Harriman 
moved from relative obscurity to national 
prominence. In 1881 he acquired an interest 
in a tiny railroad in upstate New York; two 
years later he was elected to the directory 
of the prestigious Illinois Central Railroad; 
and in 1887 he became vice-president of that 
company. He jousted successfully with J. P. 
Morgan for control of the Dubuque & Sioux 
City Railroad and bested him again over plans 
for reorganization of the Erie. A l l of this, it 
seems, was preparatory for his forthcoming 
campaigns in the West.5 
The fabled Union Pacific, with which the 
Central Pacific had been joined in 1869 to 
effect the nation's first transcontinental artery, 
had been victimized by the Credit Mobilier 
scandal, increased regional competition, peri-
odically inadequate management, and the hu-
miliation of a bankruptcy that stripped the 
road of important outlets and productive 
branches. Most observers had come to see it as 
a broken-down property—"two dirt ballasted 
streaks of rust," according to one source, and 
"a melancholy imitation of a railroad," ac-
cording to another. Sidney Dillon was slightly 
more charitable; he called it an "apple tree 
without a l imb." J. P. Morgan, a member of an 
early reorganization committee, declared the 
case hopeless. His was the prevailing view.6 
A few saw it otherwise. New reorganization 
efforts implied hope through a new and power-
ful transcontinental alliance that would link 
the UP with the Chicago & North Western 
and the New York Central. The respected 
Gen. Grenville M . Dodge asserted that the 
road's organization was good and that its physi-
cal condition was as good as any carrier west of 
the Missouri River. Another respected rail-
roader, Charles E. Perkins of the Chicago, Bur-
lington & Quincy Railroad, likewise thought 
the UP a worthy plum. He and others pur-
chased "some hundreds of shares" of it and in 
1893 suggested to James J. H i l l that it might 
be wise to make "up a party now to buy a 
good block of it with the view of making the 
property a paying one on a neutral basis." 
(The emphasis is Perkins's.) H i l l and Perkins 
failed to act, however, and so did C. P. Hunt-
ington, who also studied the possibility dur-
ing the early 1890s. 7 
Harriman, too, had seen promise in the UP. 
He told Otto H . Kahn that the Union Pacific 
was "intrinsically worth as much as St. Paul 
[the C M & S t P ] , and with good management it 
will get there." Initially, Harriman wanted to 
unite the Illinois Central with the UP, but 
eventually, for whatever reason, he gave up on 
that prospect. In any event, Harriman in-
vested in the UP, became a director of the reor-
ganized company on December 6, 1897, a 
member of its executive committee shortly 
thereafter, and chairman of that powerful 
body in May, 1898. The decisiveness that 
characterized his style for the remainder of his 
life was soon manifest. In 1898 he requested 
and received authorization from the UP board 
to spend no less than $25 million to rehabili-
tate the road. One season later he saw to the 
acquisition of the Oregon Railroad & Navi-
gation Company and the reacquisition of the 
Oregon Short Line; in this way UP increased 
its mileage from 2,848 to 5,391 and recovered 
its West Coast outlet at Portland. The meta-
morphosis was as astonishing for its swiftness 
as for its completeness. Harriman, according 
to one writer, had "given to the West an en-
tirely new Union Pacific." John W. Gates said 
in 1901 that the UP was "the most magnifi-
cent railroad property in the w o r l d . " 8 
Relations between the Southern Pacific and 
the Union Pacific in the nineteenth century 
had always been unpredictable and not always 
cordial. A n official of the neighboring Denver 
& Rio Grande Railroad (D&RG) in 1883 
commented that "one day the Union Pacific 
and the Central Pacific are like two chums in 
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bed, the next day they are like two cats hang-
ing over a clothes line." Goodwill was clearly 
absent in 1885 when a rate dispute between 
the two companies resulted in the loss of the 
Pacific mail subsidy. Angry at this, UP officials 
diverted westbound traffic away from the Cen-
tral Pacific to their own Oregon Short Line; 
Huntington retaliated by exacting local rates 
on traffic that the Central Pacific interchanged 
with the UP at Ogden. Peace returned in 1890 
when the quarreling carriers signed a compli-
cated agreement essentially pledging that they 
would, insofar as the law allowed, favor each 
other. Both, of course, were further bound by 
federal statutes that designated the Overland 
Route (Council Bluffs—Oakland via Ogden) 
as one continuous line available for all time to 
"the business and necessities of" the Ameri-
can people. A Supreme Court decision like-
wise affirmed that the UP was forever guaran-
teed "a connection with the Central Pacific 
upon terms as favorable as might be given any 
other connection." 9 
Each company nevertheless looked out for 
its own best interests. That included studies, 
plans, and even strategies designated to tap 
the territory of the other. Collis P. Hunting-
ton, in 1870, could have purchased the stra-
tegically located Utah Central, which if ex-
tended eastward to a connection with the 
Kansas Pacific—as was then rumored—would 
have structured a through line from Pacific 
tidewater to the Missouri River and would 
have challenged the very existence of the UP. 
Huntington, for reasons that are unknown, 
failed to act on the matter. For its part, the 
Union Pacific considered extension westward 
from Ogden to San Francisco, and its manage-
ment ultimately authorized construction of 
the Oregon Short Line from Ogden to the 
Northwest because, in part, it feared Hunt-
ington would, as Sidney Dillon said, "shut 
down the gate at Ogden" and divert SP traffic 
to the Sunset Route. To fail in expansion to-
ward Oregon would have, Dillon allowed, 
dead-ended the UP in Utah. The Union Pacific 
was also concerned that the newly completed 
Northern Pacific would drain traffic through 
incursions into UP country and that the fledg-
ling Denver & Rio Grande would similarly di-
vert business by building its own line west-
ward from Utah. Accordingly, the UP acted to 
thwart what it thought to be D & R G plans by 
purchasing an obscure and otherwise irrele-
vant short line in Nevada that, Dillon had 
heard, would be used to connect the Rio Grande 
with the Central Pacific. 1 0 
The tiny Denver & Rio Grande clearly could 
not be ignored, for it constantly kept the cal-
drons brewing. A decision was made, perhaps 
as early as 1880, by Rio Grande management 
to push that company from Colorado into 
Utah with the idea that it would, in fact, be-
come a mighty link in a new Pacific rail chain. 
With that in mind, the Rio Grande and the 
much larger Chicago, Burlington & Quincy 
Railroad (CB&Q) during the summer of 1881 
entered into an agreement whereby the Bur-
lington & Missouri River ( B & M R ) , a C B & Q 
satellite, was to complete a line into Denver 
from the east and the D & R G was to push its 
line to Salt Lake City and then Ogden for a 
connection with the Central Pacific. Ironi-
cally, the Rio Grande in 1880 had anticipated 
the construction of its own line through cen-
tral Utah to Los Angeles. Its agreement with 
Chicago, Burlington & Quincy thus served to 
redefine the Rio Grande's goals away from 
Southern California toward Salt Lake City 
and Ogden. Connecting service began in May, 
1883, when the Rio Grande Western Rail-
way, a friendly associate of the Denver & Rio 
Grande, completed its road into Ogden. Ear-
lier memoranda guaranteed through ship-
ments from the Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe 
at Pueblo and the B & M R at Denver over the 
Denver & Rio Grande—Rio Grande Western 
to Central Pacific rails at Ogden. The Union 
Pacific, not surprisingly, fought to undermine 
the new operation but failed." 
The redoubtable William Jackson Palmer, 
president of the Rio Grande Western, person-
ally solicited and authorized reconnaissance 
of various routes to the Pacific between 1891 
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and 1901. The San Francisco Chronicle of 
November 5, 1891, boldly proclaimed that 
"the Rio Grande Western is sure to build to 
San Francisco" over a route that, the paper 
had to admit, had not yet been defined. The 
line, of course, was not built, but public specu-
lation in the matter persisted.1 2 
The Denver & Rio Grande itself continued 
to look westward. It scoured the area but did 
not find a suitable route across the badlands 
of southern Utah from Durango, Colorado. 
Nevertheless, it did eventually construct a 
standard-gauge line from Durango to Farm-
ington, New Mexico—possibly with the idea 
that it would be used as part of a new through 
route to Los Angeles via Gallup. The Rio 
Grande's dream of reaching California or at 
least another connection with the Southern 
Pacific ultimately failed to materialize.1 3 
The plans and dreams of still other aspi-
rants further shaped or modified the strategies 
of the Union Pacific and SP. The Chicago, Bur-
lington & Quincy in 1876 inquired of the CP 
as to its impartiality in the event the Bur-
lington built west to Ogden. The same com-
pany in 1883 made line locations west of Den-
ver and accelerated its plans with property 
acquisitions in 1885 — 86. During the latter 
part of the same decade the C B & Q also con-
ducted surveys west of the Rockies with the 
idea of extending its operation to Salt Lake 
City and even into the Pacific Northwest. The 
Burlington was not alone in hopes of tapping 
California trade directly or through a friendly 
connection with the SP. Jay Gould, for in-
stance, once threatened to build his Kansas 
Pacific Railroad to a junction with the Cen-
tral Pacific. Moreover, the Colorado Midland 
Railway aspired to build an independent line 
from Colorado Springs to Salt Lake City, and 
in 1887 it had surveyors looking for such a 
route in Utah. (The plan, strange to say, sur-
faced again in the second decade of the twenti-
eth century.) Finally, the Railway Review for 
March 31, 1888, reported that the Chicago & 
North Western System planned to extend its 
recently opened Casper, Wyoming, line to a 
connection with the Central Pacific at Ogden 
and possibly on to Los Angeles. 1 4 
Construction of competing rail routes into 
California was not a prospect warmly re-
ceived by SP's management, but it obviously 
perceived no similar threat in additional east-
ern connections at Ogden. The Union Pacific 
viewed such competition otherwise. Harri-
man understood the implications. The UP was 
flanked on one side by the growing power of 
the H i l l Lines, and on the other by SP's Sunset 
Route, the Gould empire, and the increasingly 
important Santa Fe. Moreover, UP's crucial 
connection at Ogden was always subject to 
competitive attack as well as potentially un-
friendly action by the SP. Most importantly, 
there was the possibility after Huntington's 
death that the SP would fall into hands un-
alterably hostile to the interests of the Union 
Pacific. Harriman was properly concerned. He 
had succeeded in making the Union Pacific an 
admirable property, and he had regained its 
Oregon Short Line outlet to the Pacific. Yet it 
was inadequate. Harriman had one overarch-
ing need: the SP. Nothing less would suffice. 
While he lived, of course, C. P. Huntington 
held Harriman at bay. He resisted the efforts 
of Harriman to secure common management 
of the two properties, just as he had resisted 
Jay Gould in an earlier day; he declined to sell 
just the Central Pacific to Harriman; and he 
even refused to sign an agreement guarantee-
ing the Harriman road perpetual access to the 
Pacific. Like Harriman, Huntington had bold-
ness and vision. If either road would take over 
the other, Huntington must have thought, it 
would be the Southern Pacific that would ac-
cede to the Union Pacific. 1 5 
But Collis Potter Huntington died suddenly 
on August 13, 1900. Four days later, at 11:00 
A . M . , employees of the Southern Pacific stood 
at silence for a full seven minutes in honor of 
the man. A l l trains, boats, and ships paused, 
company offices were hushed, and even the 
telegraph instruments fell silent. His fellow 
directors on the SP called him "one of the 
greatest men of his generation." It was hardly 
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an overstatement. Huntington was a man 
of awe-inspiring talent and tenacity. His la-
bors—joined by and supported by his associ-
ates—resulted in accomplishments so rapid 
and dramatic as to tax comprehension.1 6 
Early in 1901, at Harriman's recommen-
dation, the board of directors of the Union 
Pacific moved to take advantage of the op-
portunity now presented. It authorized the is-
suance of convertible bonds secured by several 
hundred miles of improved road as well as 
bonds of the Oregon Short Line and stock of 
both the Oregon Short Line and the Oregon 
Railroad & Navigation Company. In this way 
the Union Pacific—Harriman—raised money 
to acquire stock control of the SP and uni-
fied the two great companies under a single 
management.17 
Harriman offered several arguments to jus-
tify the massive new association. He told 
Union Pacific stockholders that control of the 
Southern Pacific was strategically necessary 
"to maintain and protect the position of the 
system and to safeguard its future against 
combinations of other lines, which might 
divert much business by changes in exist-
ing channels of transportation." On another 
occasion Harriman contended that the UP 
purchased control of the SP "not because it 
needed the additional mileage, but rather that 
it might indirectly acquire the Central Pacific 
and a direct outlet to the Pacific Coast." Nei-
ther the report to shareholders nor Harri-
man's assertion—even the two in combina-
tion—represented the whole truth. Clearly, 
Harriman was scrambling to protect heavy 
investments in and massive expenditures 
made for improvements of the Union Pacific. 
Furthermore, acquisition of the SP neutral-
ized Central Pacific's advantages over the UP, 
curtailed competition from the Denver &C 
Rio Grande, and rendered impotent plans or 
hopes of the Burlington, the Chicago & North 
Western, or the Colorado Midland to connect 
without prejudice at Ogden or any other loca-
tion with the SP. There was some short-term 
disagreement on Wall Street, but as one ob-
server put it, "the majority opinion seems to 
be that it wil l be a good thing for the Union 
Pacific." 1 8 
There were other, equally understandable 
reasons why Harriman wanted the SP. The 
Southern Pacific was an astonishingly large 
operation by comparison with other carriers 
at the time. Indeed, it was, as Harriman's biog-
rapher observed, "the greatest transportation 
system in the world." Unlike the Union Pa-
cific, which was forced to rely primarily on 
transcontinental traffic for its livelihood, SP 
boasted a desirable and diversified traffic mix, 
long average hauls, and high average earnings. 
"Lacking the Southern Pacific," said trans-
portation observer Frank H . Spearman, "the 
Union Pacific never had been and never could 
be a great railway." When Harriman gained 
control of the UP he "really got hold of the 
transcontinental traffic dog; in the Southern 
Pacific he got the traffic dog itself." Harriman 
understood as much. "We have bought not 
only a railroad, but an empire," he declared. 1 9 
After Harriman rehabilitated the Union Pa-
cific, the SP, in terms of its physical condition, 
was not at par. However, the property was, 
to quote William Hood, SP's respected chief 
engineer, in "suitable condition for its traf-
fic." Other assessments corroborated Hood's. 
After Chauncey M . Depew and Cornelius Van-
derbilt had toured the SP in 1896, they told 
Huntington they were "much impressed by 
the evidences of system and completeness in 
all the appointments, and by the perfection 
of your roadbed." Huntington was no doubt 
pleased to receive such compliments, but he 
was not one to rest on his laurels. Consider-
able line improvement and plans for more of 
the same typified the SP in his last years. To 
be sure, many of the improvements that oc-
curred during the Harriman years originated 
in the Huntington era and could be completed 
expeditiously.2 0 
Harriman's control of both the SP and the 
Union Pacific represented, in truth, a radical 
change in the railroad situation of the West. 
He would work to knit the two giants into 
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a fine—perhaps the finest—U.S. rail system. 
He would seek to reduce curvature, to lower 
grades, and to improve rolling stock. Harri-
man had not only access to necessary financial 
resources but, in addition, all skills necessary 
to oversee and manage a giant enterprise. The 
writer Burton K. Kendrick said that in com-
parison to Harriman, "the Vanderbilts, the 
Goulds, the Garrets, the Huntingtons, rep-
resent the parochial period of our railroad 
history." The earlier leaders had, Hendrick ar-
gued, "consolidated small railroad principali-
ties into kingdoms." Harriman, on the other 
hand, federalized "their kingdoms into an em-
pire." William Hood, who worked under both 
Huntington and Harriman and who admired 
both, thought Harriman's power a positive 
good. "It is exceedingly fortunate for the ter-
ritory served by the Southern Pacific Lines 
that E. H . Harriman acquired control and 
gave of his abilities for the benefit of this rail-
road and its patrons," said Hood. If Harriman 
had not followed Huntington in the leader-
ship of SP, Hood believed, "there would have 
been a delay of many years in the development 
of the resources of the Great West." 2 1 
Internal changes at SP came quickly. Charles 
M . Hayes, who had succeeded C. P. Hunting-
ton as president, survived only briefly under 
Harriman, who on September 26, 1901, as-
sumed that office himself. The chairman of the 
board of directors after Huntington's death, 
Charles H . Tweed, held that position into 
1902, at which time the office was abolished; 
Tweed remained on the board, however. A n -
other personality from the Huntington days, 
Edwin Hawley—the man who had arranged 
sale of the Huntington estate shares to Har-
riman interests—was given a seat on the SP 
board and served on its executive committee. 
Nevertheless, his term was brief since Har-
riman, who was also chairman of the execu-
tive committee, would not take Hawley fully 
into his confidence. The composition of the 
board itself changed radically. Only Henry E. 
Huntington, Collis's nephew, saw continuous 
service through the Harriman years. If Har-
riman substantially altered the composition of 
E d w a r d H e n r y H a r r i m a n loved nothing if not a 
challenge. 
the SP board, he chose another course with its 
top officers. Most of them retained their posi-
tions, and several were moved to the highest 
positions in the combined system.2 2 
Harriman immediately made good a pledge 
to spend money in the amount necessary to 
realize Southern Pacific's potential. Early plans 
focused on the Central Pacific line from Rose-
ville, California, to Ogden, Utah. The board 
authorized expenditures of $18 million, and 
when Julius Kruttschnitt, under whose super-
vision the money would be spent, asked Harri-
man what speed should be made in the prose-
cution of the task, Harriman replied, "Spend 
it in a week if you can." Not all of the money 
was allocated to improvement of the Overland 
Route, but Harriman promised that the most 
impressive changes would occur there.2 1 
Harriman's immediate purpose was to make 
the Central Pacific capable of carrying as much 
freight between Ogden and San Francisco 
Enter Edward Henry Harriman T 5 
The Lucin Cut-off, which was placed in service on March 8, 1904, cost over $8 million. Side-dump cars, 
known as "battleships," carried eighty-ton payloads. 
as the Union Pacific could handle between 
Ogden and Council Bluffs. Of particular con-
cern was the portion between Reno and Ogden, 
where the road was burdened by excessive 
curvature and intolerable grades—the heavi-
est of which were located east of Lucin, north 
of the Great Salt Lake. In Nevada alone, 221 
of Central Pacific's 433 miles of main track 
were relocated to reduce grades and curva-
ture. For the entire route, 321 miles of new 
main track were built. When completed, it 
was 50.89 miles shorter, had 12,736 degrees 
less curvature, and maximum grades for the 
reconstructed portions were reduced to about 
twenty-one feet to the mile (0.4 percent).24 
The most impressive aspect of the Central 
Pacific project was the construction of the 
Lucin Cut-off. Like virtually all of the major 
betterment programs executed during the 
Harriman years, it had been on the drawing 
boards before Huntington died. In 1898, after 
he had considered and rejected a new Wells, 
Nevada—to—Salt Lake City route, Hunting-
ton ordered William Hood to make studies 
and surveys for a cut-off to Ogden. The issue 
was in limbo pending a suitable settlement 
with the federal government over Central Pa-
cific's construction debts, but when that issue 
was resolved in 1899, Hood went forward 
with plans for right-of-way acquisition and 
the procurement of massive steam shovels.25 
In November, 1899, the company an-
nounced further and even more spectacular 
plans—for a mammoth pile trestle across 
Great Salt Lake. Engineers were already tak-
ing soundings. Huntington believed that the 
cross-lake trestle was feasible because, in his 
view, the level of the lake would continue to 
drop because streams feeding it were increas-
ingly tapped for irrigation purposes. Har-
riman, though, was initially unconvinced that 
the lake's level would drop, and plans for the 
trestle were shelved until he changed his mind 
in mid-1902. The first piles were driven on 
August 21, 1902. 2 6 
Meanwhile, work had already commenced 
on the new grades leading to the lake from 
Lucin, on the west, and Ogden, on the east. 
Special trains brought E. H . Harriman (second from left) and other dignitaries to a Thanksgiving Day cele-
bration at Midlake. The Lucin Cut-off involved building 102.9 miles of new railroad. 
Three hundred huge side-dump cars known as 
"battleships" were purchased for the enter-
prise; they were commonly loaded with eighty 
tons of payload. A constant problem resulted 
from the need to supply water—in the amount 
of 500,000 gallons daily—for the locomotives, 
pile drivers, steam shovels, and boats employed 
on the project. Much of it was hauled from 
Deeth, Nevada, to Lakeside, 145 miles. 2 7 
The cross-lake venture comprised over 15 
miles of filled embankments and 23 miles of 
temporary and permanent trestles. The lake 
bottom was at once unstable and treacherous; 
there were times when it appeared that fills 
and trestles alike would be swallowed up in 
mud. Perseverance was required. At one time 
3,000 men and nineteen pile drivers were 
at work. On October 26, 1903, after 535 
miles of piling (if placed end to end) had been 
driven, the bridgemen finished their work. 
Three trains brought dignitaries, including 
E. H . Harriman and William Hood (who had 
designed the Lucin Cut-off and executed its 
construction) to a Thanksgiving Day celebra-
tion at Midlake, or Camp N o . 23, as it was 
then known. 2 8 
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Here was something worth celebrating. The 
Lucin project had involved building 102.9 
miles of new railroad and had cost $8,359 
million. It was clearly the most striking of 
Harriman's achievements in modernizing the 
Central Pacific line and was also one of the 
most remarkable and courageous engineer-
ing accomplishments of the time. The trestle, 
in particular, caught the public's attention. 
"The Salt Lake [sic] cut-off is certainly a bold 
piece of engineering and well worth seeing," 
Thomas A. Edison wrote enthusiastically in a 
letter to the company. The Lucin Cut-off was 
officially placed in service on March 8, 1904. 2 9 
A similar project was known as the Bay 
Shore Cut-off. This one, built at the astonish-
ing cost of nearly $1 million per mile, replaced 
the old line built in 1863 between San Fran-
cisco and San Bruno. Feasibility studies had 
been made as early as 1873 a n d again in 
1878. Subsequently, land was purchased for 
right-of-way, but SP management eventually 
concluded that traffic volume would not jus-
tify such a massive expenditure. Then, in 
1899, while the construction of the Coast 
Line via Santa Barbara was going forward, the 
Bay Shore Cut-off project was resuscitated. 
Huntington's death postponed it again, but 
Harriman was easily convinced of the mer-
its. Construction began in October, 1904. It 
proved a difficult bit of work involving exten-
sive grading, the construction of heavy bridg-
ing, and the boring of five tunnels aggregating 
nearly 10,000 feet. In the end, however, the 
Bay Shore Cut-off provided the SP with an en-
tirely new, handsome, double-track main-line 
into the heart of San Francisco. It was opened 
for traffic on December 8, 1907. 3 0 
Still another project undertaken by Hunt-
ington and completed by Harriman was the 
Montalvo Cut-off. When in the 1880s SP 
management had determined to build its rail-
road into Santa Barbara from Los Angeles 
(the southern end of the Coast Line), two 
routes were considered, and both were deemed 
desirable in terms of local traffic. The one 
selected for immediate construction, Sau-
gus-Montalvo-Santa Barbara, could be built 
faster and more inexpensively than the other, 
Burbank-Montalvo—Santa Barbara. Later 
on, when the Coast Line (San Jose—San Luis 
Obispo-Santa Barbara) was nearing com-
pletion, C. P. Huntington directed his engi-
neering department to proceed with the M o n -
talvo Cut-off. When placed in service on 
March 20, 1904, it featured an impressive 
alignment—facilitated in part by the Chats-
worth, Santa Susana, and Simi tunnels—and 
was the short route between Santa Barbara 
and Los Angeles." 
The Lucin, Bay Shore, and Montalvo proj-
ects represented monuments to the philoso-
phies and foresightedness of both Huntington 
and Harriman. Each understood the need to 
reduce distances, grades, and curvatures. Each 
man also understood the savings in operat-
ing expenses facilitated by these improve-
ments—8 to 10 percent on the money in-
vested in them.' 2 
One seemingly prosaic element of Harri-
man's progressive program of improvements 
merits special consideration. In 1901 the SP 
had a bare 50 miles of block signal protection 
along its massive plant. A plan to increase 
such was soon instituted; by mid-1907, a total 
BAYSHORE 
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The Bay Shore Cut-off was another massive construction project undertaken by Huntington and completed 
by Harriman. It required five tunnels, aggregating nearly ten thousand feet in length. 
of 1,263 miles of road were thus protected, 
and plans called for an additional 360 miles. 
Signaling of this type, Harriman matter-of-
factly observed, would "give additional safety 
and despatch to the movement of trains." The 
Southern Pacific under Harriman became the 
industry leader in terms of miles of line pro-
tected by automatic block signals." 
On the great trunk routes and, indeed, across 
the breadth and width of the SP, Harriman 
spent money to make the road all it was ca-
pable of. New sidings were built and old ones 
were lengthened; new ties (27 million of them 
during the Harriman years) were inserted; 
millions of tons of ballast were dumped; heav-
ier rail was installed; stronger bridges re-
placed weaker ones; real estate was acquired 
for new terminals; portions of the Overland 
Route in California and Nevada were double-
tracked; and facilities of all types were ac-
quired. Harriman was—could there be any 
doubt?—a planner and a builder.' 4 
C H A P T E R 3 
The Napoleon of Railroading 
"The way to save money is to spend it 
wisely and productively."—Edward Henry 
Harriman 
T H E impact of Edward Henry Harriman on 
the Southern Pacific was both immediate and 
long term. What motivated this extraordinary 
man? What were his principles, his beliefs? 
What was his business philosophy? What was 
his style? 
Religion and the institutional church were 
important to Harriman. He was born the son 
of an Episcopalian rector, was reared in an ec-
clesiastical environment, and was, as his son 
W. Averell Harriman recalled, "very quietly 
religious, not ostentatious about i t ." He had 
no time for those whom he labeled "fair-
weather Christians." Rather, he urged that re-
sponsibility did not end with oneself but ex-
tended to those over whom one had influence. 
This belief led Harriman to an activist role. 
His best-known efforts were on behalf of New 
York's Tompkins Square Boy's Club, an unusu-
ally successful venture that served thousands. 
He also participated in campaigns against sa-
loons and in various charitable enterprises.1 
Harriman firmly believed that a man is duty-
bound to leave a property in better condition 
than he found it. For him it was a matter of 
moral principle as well as a cardinal rule of 
business practice. He saw railroads as public 
service properties that required constant infu-
sions of capital if they were to handle traffic 
efficiently and thus contribute properly to the 
development of the continent. At the same 
time, Harriman understood that if his lines 
were in superior condition, they would attract 
additional traffic at the expense of less well-
equipped competitors. A hallmark of his phi-
losophy was to build up and not tear down; 
railroads under his control were uniformly 
better off as a result of his stewardship.2 
Few railroaders of the time better under-
stood the fact that additional net income 
could be derived by reducing the cost of trans-
portation, and that costs could be reduced by 
acquiring higher capacity cars and larger and 
more efficient locomotives. Implementing this 
policy on the Harriman Lines increased the 
carrying capacity of trains without damaging 
operating ratios and reflected a basic tenet 
of Harriman's philosophy. "The way to save 
money is to spend it wisely and productively," 
he once observed. This did not mean squan-
dering resources; it did mean spending freely 
when doing so would promote earning power 
and increase revenue. Harriman particularly 
favored spending during periods when money 
was cheap but counseled against borrowing 
"from the substance of a road." 3 
Harriman was not averse to investing large 
sums of his personal fortune in projects he 
felt were worthy, and he had an amazing abil-
ity to persuade others to join him. Jacob A . 
Schiff, James Stillman, Henry H . Rogers, 
William Rockefeller, William K. Vanderbilt, 
and Henry C. Frick were among those who at 
one time or another associated themselves 
with Harriman's ventures. Several banking and 
insurance firms provided additional monies; 
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Harriman relied in particular on Kuhn, Loeb 
& Company and National City Bank. With 
his fiduciary standing well established, he 
moved with increased boldness and vigor. His 
policy was to use the credit of his stronger 
properties to advance the capacity of newly 
acquired or weaker ones. This tactic, as it 
developed, was especially beneficial to the 
Southern Pacific. The SP, of course, was hardly 
weak, but on its own it could not have gener-
ated the $242 million that Harriman spent on 
the property during his brief tenure.4 
Some thought Harriman's spending policies 
were extravagant—especially when compared 
with his seemingly parsimonious dividend 
policy. Harriman believed that the railroad's 
main business was to serve the public and 
shippers and that this responsibility had to be 
put ahead of the payment of dividends to 
shareholders. Thus, SP's earnings were typi-
cally put into improvements rather than divi-
dends. Not surprisingly, there were those who 
disapproved of that policy. Indeed, it excited 
the active opposition of James R. Keene and 
others, who formed a pool of SP stock with 
the idea of forcing Harriman to declare 
dividends. Litigation followed, but Keene 
was defeated. Harriman relented somewhat, 
however. A 2.5 percent dividend on common 
stock was paid in 1906; 5.25 percent in 1907; 
6 percent in 1908 and 1909. 5 
Harriman believed that American society 
would best be served by private enterprise rail-
roads created to provide inexpensive, efficient, 
and dependable transportation. The public 
generally agreed. However, to facilitate such 
service, all carriers, Harriman argued, had to 
insist on rates that were compensatory and, in 
conformity with long-established patterns, 
based on what traffic would bear; such rate 
making, of course, rested on studied assump-
tions by railroad management regarding the 
ability of shippers to pay and yet stay in busi-
ness. Such an approach, however, took on an 
unfortunate and onerous meaning; many if 
not most Americans interpreted "al l the traffic 
will bear" as a policy to squeeze the last dollar 
from a forlorn and helpless public. Never-
theless, "costs-plus-profit" rates would have 
had a deleterious effect on most small ship-
pers and infant industries. For that reason, 
Harriman and other railroad leaders often 
chose to formulate artificially low rates to 
create new traffic and new markets—rates 
that were ultimately beneficial to shippers and 
carriers alike. 
On balance, Harriman's policy of rate mak-
ing was fair. He knew that it was not possible 
for a railroad to separate its own interests 
from those of its patrons. If a railroad failed to 
build up its service territory, it would, in effect, 
make that same territory less competitive and 
thus threaten the prosperity of the transporta-
tion company itself. Harriman faced the issue 
squarely: 
It would be suicidal for a railroad company to 
throttle or paralyze the industries along its lines 
by charging exorbitant rates. Even if there is no di-
rect competition by parallel roads, every industrial 
plant located along a line of railroad is competing 
with plants located on other lines, and every rail-
road is forced to make sure low and reasonable 
rates as will permit the industries in the territory 
tributary to it to make sales in competitive mar-
kets, and thus furnish the traffic from which the 
railroad company derives its earnings. 
Harriman, in effect, laid a tremendous wager 
on the future of "h is" territory—the West. He 
doubtless would have lost that wager had the 
Harriman Lines charged its customers ruin-
ous rates.6 
For E. H . Harriman, the essence of life was 
planning, creating, and building. He pos-
sessed an active imagination and saw vividly 
into a future whose needs he anticipated. In 
1904 he bluntly told President Theodore 
Roosevelt that the massive improvement pro-
gram of the nation's railroads in the preceding 
several years would in fact prove to be woefully 
inadequate to meet their future needs. He pre-
dicted that every single-track operation in the 
country would eventually have to be double 
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tracked. He might be faulted for having failed 
to foresee the rise of the auto and the compe-
tition it would represent, but this example 
nevertheless illustrates Harriman's ability to 
think in large terms and his willingness to 
plan in advance.7 
Harriman's abilities and strategies brought 
him handsome financial rewards; as a conse-
quence of his wealth, there were those who 
despised him. Yet Harriman had achieved fi-
nancial independence early; at the apex of his 
life money meant little to him except for the 
power that it gave him for constructive works. 
Money, he said, was simply the reflection of a 
successful undertaking; satisfaction should 
not come merely from the accumulation of 
money but rather from the warm feeling of a 
job well done. He told a San Antonio news-
paperman that he and his railroad associates 
were " i n the attitude of the deeply interested 
professional man or scientist who prose-
cutes his work, not alone for the money they 
can make out of it, but for the beautiful ser-
vice they can render." Although his statement 
sounded trite and self-serving, Harriman was 
sincere.8 
Like most successful men, Harriman was 
devoted to specific values. He despised waste, 
worshiped efficiency, and was impatient with 
stupidity in all forms. His word was good 
to friend and foe alike. This slight, walrus-
mustached man, frail during his later years, 
was not one to seek conflict, but neither did 
he avoid it. In all cases he was considered a 
"fair fighter." 9 
Other qualities further characterized Har-
riman. He was bold, sagacious, and self-
assured. Julius Kruttschnitt thought Harriman 
had "the most wonderful intellect" he had 
ever known; SP's W. F. Herrin likewise mar-
veled at his quick and nimble mind. He had an 
insatiable thirst for information, asked blunt 
questions that were difficult to evade, and 
could quickly reduce a multitude of facts to 
the nub. He did not believe it necessary to 
have all details of a plan perfected before pro-
ceeding. Harriman gave the naturalist John 
Muir a full dose of his philosophy when he felt 
his friend was overplanning and brooding too 
much over a book project. "The trouble with 
you," Harriman told Muir , "is that you are 
too slow in your beginnings. . . . Begin, begin, 
begin!" The advice was vintage Harriman. 
The great railroader always began boldly, and 
he could balance his realism with the fruits of 
his remarkable imagination. Complementing 
all this was his ability to successfully conduct 
affairs on a large scale.'" 
Investment banker Otto Kahn and railroad 
builder Grenville Dodge were among many 
who marveled at Harriman's ability to bring 
others around to his way of thinking. Dodge 
referred to it as Harriman's "great power in ar-
gument." Kahn recalled the lucidity of his ar-
guments, his indomitable persistence, and his 
good judgment. Harriman himself saw it as 
an ability to harmonize varying opinions. 
Others thought of it, rather, as his capacity to 
"Harrimanize." 1 ' 
Harriman loved a challenge. He was at his 
best when confronted with a seemingly im-
possible problem. It was, in a sense, a matter 
of sport; he pitted his mental powers and per-
sonality against physical tasks or talented 
rivals. The rewards were intrinsic; a sense of 
accomplishment, mastery, and the successful 
exercise of power. 1 2 
Harriman firmly believed in the voluntary 
consolidation of railroads, in the need to form 
railway territories or baronial districts, and in 
the necessity of the overlords to cooperate in a 
community of interests. He despised unstable 
rate structures and destructive competition— 
both of which, he considered, were anti-
thetical to the best interests of the public and 
the railroads themselves. This led Harriman 
to push for regional domination and to pro-
mote use of the most efficient and expeditious 
routes under his command. Some saw in his 
work only the threat of monopoly, and they 
came to fear both Harriman and the philoso-
phies he advocated.1 3 
Harriman's difficulties with the public were 
ofttimes self-inflicted. Indeed, this nervous, 
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rapid-fire, little man seemingly had little sense 
of good public relations. His friend Otto Kahn 
thought Harriman took unnecessary chances 
with his reputation. He was brutally frank, 
brusque to the point of being rude, and had 
little regard for appearances. Consequently, 
although he did not set out to offend others, 
he did so with reckless abandon. He made 
needless enemies by simply rubbing people 
the wrong way. Such behavior paid negative 
dividends at a time when the average citizen 
was increasingly concerned about the growing 
size and power of basic industries and those 
who controlled them. Harriman would have 
profited from Kahn's advice: " A man, espe-
cially a man at the head of a great corpora-
tion, must not only do right, but he must be 
very careful to avoid even appearances tend-
ing to arouse the suspicion of his not doing 
right." Like it or not, Kahn observed, a man 
holding power and a conspicuous place in so-
ciety is a legitimate object for public scrutiny. 
Harriman was unmoved. After playing into 
the hands of his detractors, he remained char-
acteristically aloof. The railroader regarded 
public controversy as a waste of time. "Let 
them kick," he said of his opponents. "They 
have the advantage because they tell lies about 
me, and I won't about them. . . . The people 
always find out what's what in the end, and 
I can wait . . . I need my time to do things." 
His was a noble and honorable position, but 
naive. Some thought his silence represented 
indifference to public opinion; others felt his 
lack of response proved any accusation, how-
ever utterly foolish. 1 4 
Harriman was not silent, however, in the 
matter of safety. Indeed, safety and its increase 
was a hallmark of Harriman's philosophy. His 
approach was to spend money—"like water," 
according to one contemporary—on advanced 
signal systems and other devices designed to 
enhance safe passage. Material changes, how-
ever, were inadequate in and of themselves; 
human error also had to be reckoned with. 
Harriman's operating personnel eventually 
discerned that threatening a violator of safety 
rules with his job did little good, since labor 
was relatively scarce and all the man had 
to do, if dismissed, was locate another job. 
"Surprise testing" of operating personnel was 
more effective in reducing violations but, 
ironically, did little to diminish accidents. 
Management naturally was puzzled but re-
mained no less interested in isolating responsi-
bility for each accident, particularly serious 
ones. Boards of inquiry, consisting of the divi-
sion superintendent, master mechanic, and 
resident engineer, were always empaneled for 
such. Yet each of these officers had investments 
in both turf and ego and thus could rarely be 
relied on to render impartial assessment. A se-
rious and independent voice was added to the 
traditional committee when the Harriman 
Lines did the unthinkable—it tapped the pub-
lic for outsiders, in no way connected with the 
railroad. "Cause unknown" reports were no 
longer accepted, nor were split decisions. If 
a committee could not reach a unanimous 
verdict, a new committee made up of gen-
eral officers, was formed. If this group also 
rendered an unacceptable report, an outside 
and unbiased expert was employed. Internal 
objections to the new procedures were great 
at first but gradually were overcome. The 
number of accidents as well as the loss of life 
and property per incident was materially re-
duced on the combined Southern Pacific-
Union Pacific system as a consequence of 
these policies and Harriman's vigorous inter-
est in safety.15 
The term "Harriman Lines" defined no cor-
poration or combination of firms but was 
merely a familiar designation of those proper-
ties over which Harriman held control. A l l 
such companies maintained legal indepen-
dence but, as a practical matter, each was op-
erated rather like an autonomous division of a 
larger system, and each retained its own vice-
president and general manager who was in 
charge of that particular line. Harriman's new 
organizational structure employed the me-
chanics of creative tension: He wanted to 
bring the various entities into close relation-
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ship but, at the same time, grant to them 
maximum independence. It would require a 
delicate balancing act. Yet, if successful, it 
would bring maximum efficiency, and Harri-
man admired that above all. 
Why did Harriman not simply fold all of 
these railroad properties into one? There were 
several reasons. First, Harriman was not con-
vinced that one man could manage or even 
perform responsibly in the management of 
even a single major department in a transpor-
tation company as large as his would be if 
fully merged. Second, because of a variety of 
circumstances he thought numerous of his 
properties could be managed more efficiently 
on a local basis. Third, neither Harriman sin-
gly nor he and his financial associates together 
could command monetary resources adequate 
to acquire equity fully in every property. 
Fourth, any attempt to thus merge the proper-
ties during the early part of the twentieth 
century would have been, at best, a public re-
lations disaster since the national mood gener-
ally feared such "bigness." Finally, given the 
political climate of the time, and the growing 
gulf between Harriman and Theodore Roose-
velt, merger would have invited an antitrust 
action by the "Trust Buster." 1 6 
Otto Kahn once recalled that Collis Hunt-
ington's admonition on the business of manag-
ing a great property was simple and direct: 
"Watch the details. Then the whole organiza-
tion will watch the details." Kahn also re-
called the advice of another eminently suc-
cessful person on the same subject: "Don't 
waste your strength on non-essentials. Never 
do yourself what you can hire someone else to 
do equally well for you." Harriman's style was 
somewhere between these two, depending on 
the time and issue. He could divide labor and 
fix responsibility in a most effective way. On 
the other hand, he clearly kept close watch on 
all important matters and, as those who re-
called his inspection trips said, the smaller 
ones, too. 1 7 
Opinions regarding Harriman's style and 
his very persona varied greatly. That he was a 
born leader is beyond dispute. Neither is there 
question that he was imperious—although he 
mellowed in later years. " H e was rather small 
in stature," son Averell remembered, but "he 
dominated a room whenever he was in it, in a 
quiet way." Otto Kahn admired his "gen-
eralship." So did C. C. Goodwin, a wester-
ner, who considered Harriman "a general in 
marshaling both his forces and his finances." 
George Kennan thought "his genius was the 
genius of a Bismarck, of a Roman Caesar." 
Goodwin thought him "a statesman in fore-
seeing the effects that would follow certain 
causes." Others offered less charitable inter-
pretations of Harriman's imperiousness. His 
good friend Otto Kahn admitted that some of 
Harriman's associates chafed under "his un-
disguised autocracy." A contemporary writer 
called him "a tyrant, harsh and overbearing, 
absolutely without tact . . . the sovereign, the 
dictator." A similar assessment labeled him 
"Napoleonic—small, forceful, enduring, vic-
torious, believing himself appointed by Provi-
dence." Even the writer of a sterile government 
report noted that Harriman exercised powers 
that were "well-nigh absolute." Those who 
were put off or those who were genuinely of-
fended by his style likely embraced the view 
of the writer C. M . Keys: " H i s idea of co-
operation is that all men shall assist him in 
carrying out his plans. His conception of har-
mony . . . is that no man shall lift up his voice 
and object to the dictum. . . . " 1 8 
Nevertheless, one of Harriman's most strik-
ing talents as a successful executive was his 
ability to attract strong and able men to his 
employ. Moreover, once in the Harriman fold, 
subordinates were not likely to leave. They 
were loyal to Harriman because he was loyal 
to them. The way to reward faithfulness and 
loyalty, he knew, was not by discharging old 
hands. He had a kind word for those who 
were trying to succeed and encouraged those 
in whom he saw strength and potential. On 
the other hand, he was intolerant of incom-
petence and weeded out those in whom he 
saw no prospects. He hired college graduates, 
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of course, but was not impressed by a per-
son simply because he attended a fashion-
able school or possessed prestigious degrees. 
Rather, he was impressed by the person who, 
irrespective of educational background, could 
reason, plan, execute—he was impressed by 
those who could be trusted to handle assigned 
duties. He chose executives from among those 
thoroughly tested and seasoned officers who 
had learned their business "from the ground 
up." Harriman always desired officers who 
looked to the future, who contributed new 
and practical ideas that would make the Har-
riman Lines even more efficient. His subordi-
nates, he observed on one occasion, must be 
provided with adequate and accurate informa-
tion but must never be covered up with paper 
work. Once, when he saw an officer at a desk 
littered with paper, he said: "I want to find 
him leaning back in his chair with his feet on 
the desk—thinking! thinking!" 1 9 
Perhaps the most remarkable of Harriman's 
traits as a businessman was his facility to 
organize his vast holdings into a workable and 
efficient system. In the case of the Southern 
Pacific and Union Pacific, he planned for a 
generally common directorate, with the two 
companies operated by a combined manage-
ment. Solicitation for traffic was to be accom-
plished by common agents. There was no pre-
cedent in the nation's railroad history for such 
a massive undertaking. The Harriman organi-
zation would preside over 18,000 miles of 
track; many thought it an impossible task. 
But it worked. Harriman's combined Southern 
Pacific-Union Pacific system functioned won-
derfully, in no small part because of its ex-
cellent organization. It was by 1909, accord-
ing to one observer, the peer "of the standard 
railways of the East." Harriman considered 
the issue matter-of-factly: "If an obstruction 
should come in the path of a well-organized 
railroad company there would be no noise 
made about it; the company would just go to 
work and overcome i t . " 2 0 
Central to success for such an undertaking 
was Harriman himself. He had to be self-
If Harriman was the "Napoleon of railroading," 
Julius Kruttschnitt was the "Von Moltke of trans-
portation." 
confident enough to allow individual free-
dom and initiative at lower levels, to give full 
authority to subordinates, to leave detail to 
others, to stand behind all of them, and not be 
afraid to take responsibility for their deci-
sions. Most of all, he had to pick his highest 
executives with the greatest care. Harriman 
was up to all of it. The truest mark of this man 
is found in his selection of top officers for the 
combined system. Interestingly, he chose not 
from properties that he had known longer— 
the Illinois Central and the Union Pacific, for 
instance—but, rather, from the Southern Pa-
cific. He picked for the combined system 
Julius Kruttschnitt, John C. Stubbs, Robert S. 
Lovett, and William Mahl , among others.2 1 
If some thought Harriman the Napoleon of 
railroading, others considered Kruttschnitt 
the Von Moltke of transportation. Born on 
July 30, 1854, at New Orleans, Kruttschnitt 
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graduated from Washington and Lee Uni-
versity with a degree in civil engineering. 
He taught for five years, then realized his 
boyhood ambition of becoming a railroader 
when in 1878 he entered the employ of Mor-
gan's Louisiana & Texas Railroad & Steam-
ship Company. In 1887 he became general 
manager of SP's Texas & Louisiana Lines. At 
the time Harriman tapped him, he was vice-
president and general manager for the entire 
Southern Pacific Company. 2 2 
John C. Stubbs was born at Ashland, Ohio, 
in 1847 and began his railroad career twenty-
two years later as chief clerk in Central Pa-
cific's general freight office at Sacramento. He 
was promoted several times by the Central 
Pacific before being transferred to the South-
ern Pacific in 1885. Stubbs was third vice-
president and in charge of the traffic depart-
ment for SP in 1901. 2 3 
Another outstanding talent Harriman found 
at the SP was Robert S. Lovett. A Texan, born 
at San Jacinto in i 8 6 0 , Lovett became local at-
torney for the Houston, East & West Texas 
Railway in 1884. He represented the Southern 
Pacific in Texas and served as president of the 
Houston & Texas Central Railroad before 
Harriman appointed him vice-president and 
general counsel for the combined roads. 2 4 
Of all those selected from the SP ranks for 
service in the top management of the new 
system, William Mahl had the broadest ex-
perience in the industry. Born in Germany in 
1843, Mahl worked in the mechanical depart-
ment of the Louisville & Nashville and then 
held various positions in the operating, ac-
counting, and purchasing departments of the 
Louisville, Cincinnati &C Lexington Railway. 
Huntington hired him in 1882; in 1901 he 
was vice-president and comptroller for the SP. 
Ability, industry, and integrity were attributes 
generally ascribed to M a h l ; many considered 
him the country's finest railway comptroller. 
Harriman placed him in charge of expen-
ditures for the Southern Pacific—Union Pacific 
as well as several other of his enterprises.25 
Yet another prominent member of Harri-
Robert S. Lovett began his career with the South-
ern Pacific on the T & L Lines. Eventually he went 
on to head the Union Pacific. 
man's management team was William Hood. 
Although Harriman did not establish a cen-
tral engineering department for the combined 
system, his esteem for SP's chief engineer was 
clear: Hood retained his position throughout 
Harriman's tenure and was in charge of SP's 
massive upgrading program during those same 
years. Hood was born in 1846 at Concord, 
New Hampshire, graduated from Dartmouth 
College, entered the service of the Central Pa-
cific's engineering department in 1867, and 
rose rapidly through the ranks. 2 6 
In general, Harriman felt the need to place 
officers of the combined companies where 
they would be closest to their duties. His of-
fice and those of Lovett and Mahl were in 
New York—the financial center of the coun-
try. Hood remained in San Francisco. Krutt-
schnitt and Stubbs, however, were moved to 
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William Hood was in charge of the SP's massive 
upgrading program. 
Chicago in 1904, when Harriman established 
a unique management system by authorizing 
two new positions: director of maintenance 
and operations, to which Kruttschnitt was ap-
pointed, and traffic director, the position for 
Stubbs. By creating these new positions, Har-
riman in effect delegated administrative con-
trol and supervision of the combined com-
panies to these trusted lieutenants. They 
shared adjoining offices in Chicago—mid-
point between the railroads themselves and 
the New York headquarters—and answered 
directly to the president. 
Traditionally, the operating department of a 
railroad was responsible for providing trans-
portation facilities and running the trains 
while the traffic department was charged with 
selling the service. Not surprisingly, in those 
days before any meaningful modal competi-
tion, the operating department was the apple 
of any railroad's eye and its operating chief, its 
major domo. That person on the combined 
Southern Pacific—Union Pacific was, of course, 
Julius Kruttschnitt. His responsibilities in-
cluded bringing the operation of the sepa-
rate lines under central authority, overseeing 
the general managers, otherwise defining au-
thority, and authorizing new construction. 
Recommendations for physical changes ordi-
narily originated with division superinten-
dents or general managers, but neither of 
these could authorize construction. A l l such 
suggestions were forwarded to the Chicago 
office, where Kruttschnitt reviewed them, 
turned them down, or approved them and 
sent them on to Harriman for his assess-
ment. The system was not without fault. De-
lays and local frustration were inevitable, but 
in this process both Harriman and Krutt-
schnitt gained an important overview of con-
struction and repair activity across the length 
of the combined roads. Once plans were ap-
proved, an Authority for Expenditure (AFE) 
was issued and purchase could be made or 
work commence. AFEs expired yearly; their 
annual sum gave Harriman and Kruttschnitt 
still another means by which to proctor their 
projects.2 7 
Kruttschnitt received additional data in sev-
eral ways. One took the form of a monthly 
"information letter" from each of his five gen-
eral managers. A small statistical bureau like-
wise provided important materials. This bu-
reau also supervised and checked accounting 
procedures and prescribed methods and forms 
for accounts.2 8 
Harriman agreed that adequate and accu-
rate information was essential for manage-
ment to make proper judgments, but he was 
concerned that Kruttschnitt, "being so far 
from the direct operations of the properties," 
would unintentionally "establish a corre-
sponding bureau." Harriman reminded Krutt-
schnitt that "every letter you require one of 
the subordinate officers to write to you incurs 
some effort on his part." Consequently, said 
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Harriman and his subordinates made frequent inspections of the sprawling Southern Pacific. This inspec-
tion train is headed west from Ogden toward the new Lucin Cut-off. 
Harriman, "the necessity for such correspon-
dence should be reduced to a minimum." 
Harriman saw another potential problem for 
Kruttschnitt. He feared that his director of 
maintenance and operations would lose touch 
with the realities of his operation, and so he 
issued an oblique order: "I presume you . . . 
will spend some time in going out over the 
various lines and keep things smooth. . . . " 2 9 
Harriman's devotion to efficiency led him to 
insist on common standards, central purchas-
ing, and pooling of equipment for the proper-
ties under his control. Although these policies 
offended the "this-is-the-way-we-have-always-
done-it" mentality, firmly entrenched on the 
various lines, the efficiencies resulting from 
implementation of the new standards were re-
markable. Common standards for structures, 
equipment, stationery, and even operating 
rules were eventually drawn up and adopted. 
Before standardization, fifty different patterns 
of switch frogs were used on the Harriman 
Lines; after standardization, only four were 
used. Changes were not formulated lightly. 
Common standards were adopted only af-
ter thorough investigation and discussion by 
the department heads and general managers. 
Kruttschnitt had final authority. Specifications 
were drawn following his approval, and the 
new standards became common to all lines— 
subject to revision and review, of course, as 
they were implemented and after the test of 
time. Temptations to overdo were great, espe-
cially for Harriman. A case in point involved 
his desire for uniform classes of locomotives on 
both the Southern Pacific and Union Pacific. 
This was impractical because of dissimilar 
operating conditions, said Kruttschnitt, and 
would impair rather than increase efficiency. 
Harriman fortunately yielded to Kruttschnitt's 
better judgment in this matter."1 
So that the lines could make the most of 
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common standards, a director of purchases 
was appointed and his office established in 
New York City. W. V. S. Thorn, who held this 
position, pointed out the advantages of com-
mon standards and centralized purchasing as 
he saw them: 
(1) The number of items for inventory was 
substantially reduced. 
(2) Standardized equipment was interchange-
able and thus inventory stocks were fur-
ther reduced. 
(3) Larger volume orders resulted in lower 
unit costs. 
(4) Downtime on equipment was reduced 
because of interchangeable parts for 
equipment. 
(5) Standardized equipment could be expedi-
tiously moved from division to division 
according to need. 3 1 
Pooling of equipment, particularly freight 
equipment, was likewise a requisite for the 
efficient operation of the combined proper-
ties. It was utterly foolish for the Southern Pa-
cific, for instance, to haul empty or bad-order 
freight cars hundreds of miles simply to re-
turn them to the Union Pacific. To remedy 
that glaring inefficiency, general managers re-
ceived detailed daily reports on the location of 
equipment in their regions; this information 
was then condensed and forwarded to Krutt-
schnitt's office three times monthly. A l l hands 
were ordered to use commonly owned cars in 
the most advantageous way. As a consequence 
of these pooling arrangements, the number 
of empty car miles on the combined system 
was reduced by 54 million miles in just two 
years.3 2 
Kruttschnitt's counterpart, and the man in 
charge of the traffic department and sales for 
the combined properties, was John C. Stubbs. 
Harriman involved himself in matters of traffic 
very little, leaving Stubbs with practically a 
free hand. Stubbs viewed his responsibilities 
as being threefold: to build volume through 
sales; to make rates and divisions; and to ar-
range with Kruttschnitt for the most expedi-
tious and economical routing of traffic among 
the various options provided by the South-
ern Pacific—Union Pacific system. As a prac-
tical matter, transcontinental traffic moving 
to or from locations south of a line from 
Buffalo—Pittsburgh—Cincinnati—Cairo was 
routed via SP's Sunset Route; traffic to or from 
points above that line was dispatched via the 
Ogden Gateway. Stubbs's subordinates thus 
solicited and routed business accordingly. It 
was simply a matter of efficiency. The com-
bined system provided new sales opportuni-
ties for both the Southern Pacific and Union 
Pacific and, just as importantly, for shippers 
located along their lines. A n example was the 
establishment of rates on dried fruits, fresh 
vegetables, and citrus from points in Califor-
nia to the Canadian provinces of Alberta, 
Saskatchewan, and Manitoba via Harriman's 
SP and Oregon Railroad & Navigation com-
panies, then to the Spokane International, and 
on for delivery by the Canadian Pacific. Over 
700 carloads of new business moved annually 
as a result of these arrangements, benefiting 
carriers and producers alike. 3 3 
Two other important officers, the chief engi-
neer and the superintendent of motive power, 
were really Kruttschnitt's assistants. Both re-
ported directly to him but their jurisdiction 
was mixed—"concurrent," Kruttschnitt said, 
with division superintendents. The chief engi-
neer was responsible for all new construction, 
contracts for construction, inspections and 
maintenance of bridges, signal systems, and 
interlocking plants; the operation of tie-
preserving plants, and recommendations for 
the appointment of division engineers. It was 
much the same for the superintendent of mo-
tive power. He was in charge of the general 
shops and all things pertaining to equipment, 
power plants, and tools. He was also respon-
sible for recommendations to the posts of di-
vision master mechanic, division foremen, 
and traveling engineer.34 
Responsibilities for division superinten-
dents were many, but their powers were de-
fined simply by Kruttschnitt: "They shall ex-
ercise upon their respective divisions the same 
authority as is exercised by the Vice President 
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and General Manager over the entire prop-
erty. . . . The control over all matters under 
their jurisdiction shall be complete." The divi-
sions, as a consequence, became small fiefs 
ruled by a feudal lord—the superintendent. 
These men reported to a general manager who 
then reported to Kruttschnitt.' 5 
The general auditor for the combined sys-
tem was located at Omaha. However, even 
here, too, the division superintendent held 
sway since division accounting departments 
were his responsibility and its personnel were 
on his payroll. ' 6 
A l l of this was a reflection of the "unit" sys-
tem, introduced by Major C. D . Hine. Central 
to it was the idea of "home rule," which en-
couraged individuality and initiative. Krutt-
schnitt nevertheless expected the divisions to 
cooperate and he demanded that superinten-
dents visit other units and exchange informa-
tion. He also expected his superintendents to 
spend fifteen days per month on the road. 
That, however, presented problems, for the 
superintendent's chief clerk, who tradition-
ally handled the office in his absence, had 
no executive authority. Thus, the unit idea 
was broadened to include assistant superin-
tendents who, like the superintendent, had 
division-wide authority. Each of these served 
four- to six-month terms as senior assistant to 
the superintendent; they handled correspon-
dence, served as the superintendent's adminis-
trative assistant, and acted for him when he 
was away from the office. The rotation of as-
sistant superintendents gave them excellent 
experience as well as an overview of the entire 
operation of the division. It similarly provided 
the company with a pool of experienced talent 
and at the same time provided junior officers 
with better chances for advancement. Not all 
components of the unit plan were new, but the 
Harriman Lines were early in their break with 
traditional practices and departmental proce-
dures and early in their embrace of advanced 
systems.37 
Harriman prized education. He encouraged 
his companies to hire college graduates, but 
he also conducted a constant internal cam-
paign to locate nonlettered talent. He per-
ceived that the college man brought to his job 
not only the knowledge acquired through for-
mal education but, more importantly, an on-
going ability to learn. On the other hand, 
Harriman no doubt subscribed to a general 
complaint regarding college graduates of the 
period—that they lacked backbone and that 
they were disinclined to involve themselves in 
the dirt and grime of the railroad business. Of 
particular note was his policy of placing "em-
ployee students" on each of the Harriman 
Lines operating divisions. These men, usually 
degree-holders, underwent a rigorous, forty-
two-month program of work, instruction, and 
reading designed to prepare them for ad-
vanced positions. Each man spent time in sta-
tion service and in the maintenance of way, 
stores, mechanical, accounting, and signal de-
partments; each served a lengthy on-the-job 
stint with a trainmaster. A l l were graded and 
subject to minimum requirements. Students 
were paid from $80 to $100 per month during 
the training period. Others, if Harriman's 
managers detected aptitude in them, were re-
cruited from the ranks and "dri l led." Arith-
metic skills were a minimum requirement for 
selection.3 8 
Education was promoted on the Harriman 
Lines in other ways. If a man on one division 
developed a new policy or program that top 
management ultimately adopted, he was de-
tailed as a special representative to all divi-
sions where he introduced it. Always alert to 
the danger of provincialism and territorial 
despotism that threatened both logic and sys-
tem procedures, Harriman and his managerial 
lieutenants insisted that division officers be dis-
patched on periodic fifteen-day tours of other 
portions of the property. Additionally, general 
officers met semiannually at various cities 
along the line so that they could be exposed to 
regional differences and problems. Harriman 
was particularly desirous that his subordinates 
be well informed in all matters pertaining to 
the company and that they concern them-
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selves in corporate matters well beyond the 
confines of their immediate responsibilities.3 9 
The value of history and the constant need 
for communication were corollaries to Har-
riman's views on education. He had no inten-
tion of being captive to the past, nor did he 
have time for nostalgia. And he worried not at 
all about his own place in history. His was a 
practical view. He would be instructed by the 
past, but he insisted on "looking forward as 
well as backward." It was the same with con-
temporary information. A sophisticated sys-
tem was necessary to facilitate the constant 
and essential flow of information to and 
from all points along the vast expanse of the 
Harriman Lines. Information on crop condi-
tions and commercial forecasts were gathered 
by local agents and funneled to division of-
fices and then to the general headquarters, 
where weekly dispatches were assembled for 
the executive officers and board of direc-
tors. Press reports were gathered and passed 
along in similar fashion. This upward flow of 
information kept all levels of management 
apprised regarding traffic developments and 
the public's view of various issues, including 
those related to the Harriman Lines. Down-
ward communications ordinarily involved sug-
gestions and advice along with occasional 
instructions. 4 0 
Harriman's concerns were not restricted to 
his managerial subordinates but extended to 
contract employees as well. For a man of con-
siderable means, he had an impressive ability 
to empathize with the ordinary workmen on 
his properties. He paid good wages, studied 
H a r r i m a n hoped that clubs established by the 
company w o u l d counteract the influence of sa-
loons and at the same time increase morale , effi-
ciency, and safe w o r k i n g habits. 
their needs, and urged programs for pensions, 
hospitals, educational plans, and employees' 
clubs. He was especially concerned about the 
need of operating personnel at division points 
in remote western regions for recreation. He 
established clubs, maintained by the company, 
where employees at "away from home ter-
minals" could dine, bathe, sleep, or engage 
in billiards or cards. Such an environment, 
Harriman hoped, would counteract the influ-
ence of the ubiquitous saloons and at the same 
time increase morale, efficiency, and safe work-
ing habits. 4 1 
The Napoleon of railroading? The label 
seems fitting. Like Napoleon, Edward H . Har-
riman was imperfect, but like Napoleon, the 
great railroader had qualities of leadership 
adequate to earn an impressive niche in history. 
C H A P T E R 4 
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"He has made travel safer, swifter and more 
comfortable from the Rivers to the Pacific 
Ocean. By his methods he has contributed 
largely to the growth of the whole South 
Pacific Coast in wealth and commercial 
l i fe . "—C. M . Keys, "Harriman IV" 
E D W A R D H . Harriman loved nothing if not a 
contest. That was fortunate since he was con-
fronted by several during his last years. These 
included challenges to the Harriman Lines 
from other railroads, natural disasters, and a 
changing national mood styled the Progres-
sive Era. 
The first problem occurred in lower Califor-
nia when the Colorado River threatened pro-
ductivity of the newly opened Imperial Valley 
and trackage of SP's vital Sunset Route. Until a 
plan for irrigation had been implemented, the 
Imperial Valley was a soul-repelling desert, 
imprisoned by mountains, and essentially 
devoid of human life. Water, diverted from 
the Colorado, changed that. Earlier efforts 
had not matured, but in 1901 the California 
Development Company opened a seam in 
the bank of the river near Yuma and a small 
amount of water was delivered by canal to irri-
gable land in Mexico. During the following 
season it was also made available in the Impe-
rial Valley.1 
A l l went well at first. Then, in the fall of 
1904, another intake was opened southwest of 
Yuma in Mexico, but heavy rains and resultant 
floods prevented its planned closure; in short 
order the entire flow of the river passed 
through the cut. A crisis was at hand. Itiner-
ant waters rushed into and across the Salton 
Sink through canals and normally dry stream-
beds instead of emptying southward into the 
Gulf of California by way of its usual course. 
The investments made by those who had pio-
neered the valley were obviously threatened, 
but the California Development Company it-
self had not adequate resources to meet the 
emergency. Its officers anxiously sought assis-
tance from the Southern Pacific's Julius Krutt-
schnitt, but he declined to provide financial 
support.2 
Harriman himself interceded, however, and 
agreed to loan the development company 
$200,000 on condition that its capital stock 
be placed in the hands of a trustee named 
by the SP and that its management be as-
sumed by the railroad. Consequently, on 
June 20, 1905, the SP took control; Epes Ran-
dolph, a man familiar with the country, was 
named president. Randolph had reservations. 
Frankly, he was not convinced that Harriman 
understood the implications of the deal. Ran-
dolph bluntly told Harriman that he was "not 
merely making a loan of $200,000, but was 
getting behind a most difficult undertaking 
of indefinite magnitude." If it was simply a 
matter of money, Randolph said, " i t would be 
very much cheaper to raise the grade of the 
Southern Pacific track to an elevation above 
sea level and let the Valley become a sea." 
Harriman asked how many persons lived in 
the affected area and wondered if they would 
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lose their homes. Randolph estimated that 
15,000 were vulnerable and said their domi-
ciles "certainly" would be lost. Harriman con-
sidered the matter briefly and then, with char-
acteristic directness, asked Randolph if he 
was convinced that he could "stop that river." 
Randolph replied, "I am," but added, "I can-
not say how much it wil l cost." Harriman did 
not hesitate: " G o ahead," he ordered.3 
Harriman was, of course, looking after SP's 
interests, but he was also attentive to the 
needs of those who had settled the Imperial 
Valley. In his view, railroads were public ser-
vice properties that had distinct social obliga-
tions. The response of the SP to this crisis, a 
response dictated by Harriman himself, re-
flected these beliefs. 
During the seasons of 1905 and 1906 the 
SP engaged in repeated if heartbreaking at-
tempts to return the Colorado to its banks 
and keep it there and at the same time to pro-
vide adequate water for irrigation. The major 
crevasse was closed on November 6, 1906, but 
several days later heavy rains resulted in new 
flooding and another break, through which 
the destructive waters roared. The Salton Sea 
rose at the rate of seven inches per day and 
gradually covered 400 square miles. SP engi-
neers made new grades for the Sunset Route 
at higher ground on five occasions during 
1906 alone.4 
It was enough to frustrate even the most in-
domitable soul. Harriman, Randolph later re-
called, reluctantly determined that "he had 
done about his share toward saving the valley 
from destruction." Harriman believed the 
U.S. Reclamation Service should now turn its 
hand to the new break; residents of the area 
urgently wired President Theodore Roosevelt 
asking for relief. Roosevelt responded by say-
ing that the Reclamation Service could not act 
without congressional authority, that Con-
gress had just adjourned for the holidays, and 
that, in any event, the federal government 
could not act without the concurrence of the 
Mexican government. Haste was necessary. 
Roosevelt asked Harriman to act indepen-
dently, "to close the break at once," and prom-
ised that he would request compensation from 
Congress.5 
Harriman agreed and ordered a veritable 
army to attack the problem. Earlier efforts 
and arrangements finally paid off. A labor 
force composed of Indians, Mexicans, and 
itinerant Americans was already on hand. So 
were commissary facilities, dredges, and pile 
drivers. Mexican authorities agreed to place 
the entire region under martial law and to ban 
liquor from all camps. A branch railroad, al-
ready in place, brought additional forces and 
material. Five quarries—one as far away as 
Colton, some two hundred miles distant— 
began to load riprap and gravel. Battleship 
cars, used earlier at Lucin, were ladened with 
heavy payloads and dispatched on trains that 
had precedence over all others on the Sunset 
Route. Other high-speed trains brought pil-
ing from the farthest corners of SP's domain. 
Company engineers prepared plans to bolster 
existing levees and to build a double trestle-
work from which the battleships could drop 
their cargo.6 
Work went forward around the clock. The 
first trestle was completed on January 27, 
1907. Over the next fifteen days, 600 men 
dumped 2,626 carloads of rock, gravel, and 
clay into the swirling waters. On February 10, 
at 11:00 P . M . , the break was closed and water 
again returned to the old channel.7 
In all, the SP built 17 miles of railway, 15.6 
miles of levee, and 2,250 feet of dam; it had 
placed or handled 1,545,000 cubic yards of 
material. The cost was staggering. The SP had 
already advanced $1,490 million to the Cali-
fornia Development Company and, at the re-
quest of Theodore Roosevelt, spent another 
$1,663 million in finally conquering the way-
ward Colorado. 8 
In 1905 Harriman had been able to tell SP 
shareholders that the company's properties 
had been "free from serious losses or damages 
by floods and fires." Because of the severe 
flooding of the Colorado he was unable to say 
as much in 1906. Neither could he report that 
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The heartbreaking efforts to stem the Colorado River flow were finally rewarded on February 10, 1907. 
the property or its service area had been spared 
by fire. At 5:13 a.m. on Apri l 18 , 1906, the San 
Francisco Bay area was subjected to a severe 
4 8-second tremor, part of a general earth-
quake that shook the coast from Oregon to 
Mexico. The temblor itself would not have 
ruined the city, but unfortunately small, sepa-
rate fires combined in less than five hours to 
form a conflagration that remained essentially 
unchecked for seventy-two hours. By then, the 
homes of at least 200,000 were gone, as was 
much of the city's business and commercial 
district.9 
Harriman was immediately advised of the 
tragedy by SP officials in San Francisco who, 
under trying conditions, did their best to keep 
him informed during the day. General officers 
met at the Merchants Exchange Building for 
a conference at 9:00 A . M . to ascertain dam-
age to the company's property and to prepare 
contingency plans. Like virtually all San Fran-
ciscans, they believed that the fires "would 
not prove serious," although as a precaution 
they did order freight and passenger equip-
ment moved to safer locations. But the fires 
were serious and eventually destroyed the of-
fice building at Fourth and Townsend as well 
as the offices in the Merchants Building. Lost 
were most of the company's books, vouchers, 
accounts, records, undelivered paychecks, and 
the l ike. 1 0 
The SP hospital at Fourteenth and Mission 
streets received little damage from the earth-
quake and thus became a haven for 250 vic-
tims who had sustained injury elsewhere. By 
early evening of the eighteenth the hospital, 
however, was threatened by fire; consequently, 
its patients were evacuated by way of "dead" 
streetcars pulled by horses to the car barns of 
the United Railroads of San Francisco. These 
facilities, too, were threatened the following 
day and another evacuation was necessary— 
this time by special SP passenger train to San 
Mateo, where authorities had readied a large 
athletic hall. Patients who were SP employees 
were moved again a few days later to the com-
pany hospital at Sacramento." 
Harriman himself left New York for San 
Francisco on the morning of the nineteenth. 
Before that, he telegraphed officers of the com-
bined systems "directing them to act quickly 
and to co-operate with officers in charge at 
San Francisco in doing all that could be done 
to relieve the distress." Before the first awful 
day had ended, all forces of the Southern Pa-
cific and Union Pacific were actively engaged 
in that relief work. 1 2 
Such efforts took many forms. SP's chief 
counsel, W. F. Herrin, became the company's 
liaison with military, state, and city authori-
ties, who met daily at Fort Mason. Telegraph 
operators from the SP were loaned to the hard-
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pressed Western Union Company; its lines 
were restored collaterally with those of the SP. 
Throughout the downtown area, company 
track gangs worked furiously to build tempo-
rary facilities on street surfaces in order for 
trains to haul out debris and then bring in 
building materials." 
SP's passenger department was called on for 
a variety of special duties. Its representatives 
handled hundreds of inquiries, particularly 
from railway offices in the East, regarding 
missing persons. The department also estab-
lished information bureaus at several loca-
tions in the most heavily damaged areas of the 
city and kept them posted with the latest news 
by means of horseback riders and auto cou-
riers dispatched from the SP's temporary head-
quarters at the Ferry Building. Putting down 
rumors and restoring confidence were con-
comitant duties. An active rumor that Har-
riman planned the permanent removal of SP's 
headquarters from San Francisco as a result 
of the fire was quickly quelled. "San Fran-
cisco, the Imperishable" and "Progress" were 
two publications utilized by SP's passenger de-
partment in an effort to restore confidence in 
the city and to promote its rebuilding. On 
April zo the department began furnishing the 
Associated Press and local newspapers with 
information regarding the resumption of regu-
lar train service.1 4 
A l l other departments contributed similarly. 
Operating officers limited all inbound freight 
trains to from ten to fifteen cars so that they 
could "make passenger train time," and for 
thirty-five days following the quake the SP 
handled without charge over 1,600 carloads 
of relief supplies and 224,000 passengers. On 
April 19, the day of heaviest travel, 1,073 c a r ~ 
loads of refugees were transported. Gasoline 
from the stores department was furnished 
to emergency vehicles; the same department 
issued free explosives at the request of the 
San Francisco Fire Department. Furthermore, 
all of SP's freight sheds in San Francisco 
were tendered for the immediate relief of the 
homeless.15 
The company's transbay ferries remarkably 
maintained regular twenty-minute schedules 
throughout—except for a brief period when 
fresh boiler water could not be supplied to 
them. SP's river steamers and extra ferry boats 
were also used to take passengers from out-
lying wharves and landings to the Oakland 
side of the bay, and three of its steamers were 
placed at the disposal of the Army Quarter-
master Department. 1 6 
Finally, the worst was over. Harriman took 
particular and rightful pride in the perfor-
mance of SP's personnel. Given the fact that 
there was no warning and thus no way to pre-
pare for the disaster, Harriman thought it 
nearly miraculous "that such a large traffic 
could be handled under these trying condi-
tions without serious injury to any person." 
He was uncharacteristically effusive. "The 
perfect discipline maintained by the work-
ing staff of the Company," he told its share-
holders, "reflects most highly on its organiza-
tion, and the prompt and efficient service 
rendered contributed largely to the feeling of 
courage and confidence with which the people 
of San Francisco faced this calamity." 1 7 
He cautioned, however, that much remained 
"to be done before the city could be rehabili-
tated" but pledged that it would "be not only 
the duty but the pleasure of the Company to 
continue in all legitimate ways its assistance in 
restoring and rebuilding the city." This new 
San Francisco would be, he freely predicted, 
"larger, more beautiful, stronger and more in-
viting in every way than the one whose ashes 
now cover nearly twelve square miles." 1 8 
This was not lost on observers near and far. 
Railway World said editorially, "When San 
Francisco was laid in ashes, it was M r . Har-
riman who took personal charge of the situa-
tion. . . . It was primarily due to his organiz-
ing genius and energy that San Francisco so 
quickly rallied from its great disaster." The 
far-off New York Times noted that a "large 
fraction of the city's populace were for a con-
siderable period dependent for their very lives 
on the course persued by the Southern Pacific 
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SP's fleet of ferry boats maintained their schedules throughout the frantic period following the temblor and 
fire. The Berkeley, shown here, entered service in 1898. 
. . . " and considered the course chosen by 
the company "to have been the best of busi-
ness." Even as late as 1954 the company and 
its president were honored in remembrance. 
"The tireless zeal with which E. H . Harriman 
served old San Francisco was equalled only by 
the inspiration he supplied to the rebuilding of 
the new," said the 1906 Club in honoring 
Harriman with a posthumous award. 1 9 
Harriman faced many other challenges on 
the SP during the 1900s, although none were 
as dramatic or immediately newsworthy as 
the Colorado River break and the San Fran-
cisco earthquake. For instance, the matter of 
expanding or strengthening Harriman's rail-
road barony was important, in both short-
and long-range prospects. Harriman under-
stood that there were few remaining areas to 
pioneer, but he was determined to expand 
into those that were open to him or that he 
considered a rightful part of his service area. 
In one case, however, he failed to secure im-
portant gateway opportunities, gain local traf-
fic from an area already known for its agri-
cultural productivity, and at the same time, 
tweak the ego of his major rival, James J. H i l l . 
Harriman, of course, long had been associ-
ated with the Illinois Central Railroad (IC) 
and remained a powerful member of its direc-
torate until his death. At essentially the same 
time that he undertook the reorganization of 
the Union Pacific, the Illinois Central had au-
thorized the construction of a new line from 
near Fort Dodge, Iowa, to Council Bluffs and 
Omaha—thus forging an important con-
nection between the two roads controlled by 
Harriman. Rumors in the industry simultane-
ously suggested that the IC would purchase 
the Minneapolis & St. Louis Railroad 
(M&StL) . Much of M&StL 's stock was held 
by Collis P. Huntington, and one of his trusted 
associates, Edwin Hawley, was its president. 
Appearances if not hard historical data urge 
that Huntington and Hawley were attempting 
to make the M & S t L attractive to Harriman 
and that he was responding favorably. In 1900 
the IC also extended a principal branch reach-
ing from Waterloo to the northern boundary 
of Iowa on to Albert Lea, Minnesota, and a 
connection there with the Minneapolis & St. 
Louis. In the same season Hawley was driv-
ing a new M & S t L line through western Iowa 
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Harriman was rightfully proud of the part the SP played in rebuilding San Francisco following the earth-
quake and fire. Indeed, the company threw its full resources into the campaign. 
that, if completed to Council Bluffs, as he 
promised, would be the short route between 
the Twin Cities and the easternmost point of 
the Union Pacific. 2 0 
After Huntington died in 1900, Hawley 
was the intermediary who facilitated the sale 
of the Huntington interests in the South-
ern Pacific to Harriman, and he likewise at-
tempted to sell the Minneapolis & St. Louis to 
Harriman, who agreed to study the matter. 
Others were watching. In 1903 J. P. Morgan 
reminded James J. H i l l of the "importance of 
this road and its terminals." Morgan said he 
could gain control of the M & S t L and the 
Iowa Central (another Hawley road to which 
the M & S t L was connected at Albert Lea) be-
cause Hawley was "short and must have re-
lief." Morgan was willing to do this on behalf 
of the " C B & Q or Northern Pacific or jointly" 
and warned H i l l that Harriman and Stuyve-
sant Fish (president of the Illinois Central) 
were aware of this prospect. H i l l hedged; he 
was not interested in the Iowa Central. Mor-
gan argued that the H i l l Lines could "throw 
upon the Iowa Central the traffic needed to 
make it pay" and considered the M&StL 's 
terminal facilities in the Twin Cities worth 
the entire price if only to keep it away from 
others. "What would be the result if the 
Illinois Central or Union Pacific should get 
them?" he wondered. H i l l decided he would 
go halfway. The Iowa Central, he reaffirmed, 
was "too great a burden," but he agreed to 
place the Minneapolis & St. Louis with the 
Northern Pacific if Morgan could acquire it 
independently.21 
In the end, neither Harriman nor H i l l moved 
to acquire the Hawley roads. H i l l missed an 
opportunity to acquire valuable trackage in 
the Twin Cities and to block potential inva-
sion. Harriman, who ordinarily favored ac-
quisition of existing properties to gain new 
territory, failed to exercise such a policy in 
this case. His reasons, unfortunately, are lost 
to history. 
If Harriman and H i l l avoided territorial 
conflict in the Twin Cities area, they failed 
miserably to do so in Oregon, where each felt 
vested. H i l l claimed rights by way of Northern 
Pacific's line between Seattle, Tacorna, and 
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Harriman and Hawley in Iowa 
Portland and later by virtue of the Spokane, 
Portland & Seattle Railway, which followed 
the north bank of the Columbia River. Har-
riman, on the other hand, felt Oregon was his 
province because of SP's extensive network in 
the western portion of the state and by way of 
the Oregon Railroad & Navigation Company 
( O R & N ) , which reached Portland by hugging 
the south bank of the Columbia. 
A brainchild of the redoubtable Henry 
Villard, the O R & N had been organized on 
June 13, 1879, with, Villard thought, the firm 
and friendly backing of the Union Pacific, 
which saw in the new company a means to 
avoid Central Pacific's domination at Ogden. 
However, C. P. Huntington had threatened re-
taliation against the Union Pacific if it or one 
of its subsidiaries built to the planned junc-
tion with the Oregon Railroad & Navigation 
Company on the Oregon-Idaho boundary. As 
a consequence, the O R & N was forced to go it 
alone, but to good advantage, since Henry 
Villard soon expanded his power, at least 
temporarily, to include the Northern Pacific, 
a transcontinental line, which utilized Ore-
gon Railroad & Navigation to gain Pacific 
shores. Moreover, the UP soon ignored Hunt-
ington's warning and authorized one of its 
subsidiaries, the Oregon Short Line, to com-
plete a route to a connection with the O R & N . 
Although it completed its own road over the 
Cascades to the Pacific at Tacoma in 1887, the 
Northern Pacific, to forestall wasteful dupli-
cation of construction, agreed with the Union 
Pacific, through its Oregon Short Line, to a 
joint lease of the O R & N . 2 2 
Railroad matters in the Pacific Northwest 
became rather more confused over the next 
decade. In 1893 the Union Pacific suffered se-
vere financial reverses and, partly in conse-
Trump Cards 39 
quence, lost control of both the Oregon Short 
Line and the Oregon Railroad & Navigation 
Company. Adrift and in financial difficulties 
themselves, they were appointed separate re-
ceivers two years later; both railroads were, 
as a result, independent of Union Pacific and 
of each other. That situation changed shortly 
when in March, 1897, the Oregon Short Line 
took over Oregon Railroad & Navigation and 
then itself reverted to the Union Pacific camp 
as a consequence of Harriman's skillful ma-
neuvering. Meanwhile, the Great Northern 
Railway, under the aegis of James J. H i l l , com-
pleted its own independent line from the 
Upper Midwest to Puget Sound in 1893 — 
adding greatly to the woes of neighboring 
Northern Pacific. Indeed, H i l l soon gathered 
that important company into his own camp; 
Great Northern and Northern Pacific hence-
forth were known as the H i l l Lines. A l l of this 
set the stage for more than a decade of tilting 
between Harriman and H i l l . 
H i l l understandably wished to keep options 
open in regard to Northern Pacific's joint lease 
of the Oregon Railroad & Navigation Com-
pany and, for that matter, the entire service 
area. He urged Harriman and his associates 
not to "inaugurate policies that would end in 
unnecessary construction of additional rail-
road" for, as H i l l maintained, "the country is 
now supplied with all the railway facilities 
necessary for years to come." He was particu-
larly fretful regarding the O R & N ' s joint lease, 
now subject to Harriman's considerations. "I 
do not think we should be compelled to either 
abandon our share of that [Portland] business 
or be forced to build a line of our own," wor-
ried H i l l . A face-to-face discussion was neces-
sary. Harriman, H i l l , Charles S. Mellen, Jacob 
H . Schiff, and others thus met at Northern Pa-
cific's New York headquarters on October 3, 
1898, for the purpose of considering the Ore-
gon Railroad & Navigation's lease and the 
broader issues of traffic and territorial domin-
ion in the Pacific Northwest. Each man pro-
fessed to admire harmony, but each clearly 
sought to protect or expand his own interests. 
Since the Great Northern had no independent 
line from Spokane to Portland, H i l l sought 
parity between the Spokane, Washington, and 
Huntington, Oregon, gateways. The N P rep-
resentative, C. H . Coster, argued that the 
Oregon Railroad & Navigation Company 
ought to be "an independent company," but, 
under Harriman's guidance, he charged, it had 
become a Union Pacific satellite. Harriman, 
however, contended that the O R & N "should 
be used in the interest of all three companies," 
i.e., the Union Pacific, Great Northern, and 
Northern Pacific. On the other hand, he 
pointedly asserted that he did "not want to di-
vide territory," an indirect warning that he did 
not expect others to divide territory, either. 
NP's Coster suggested that, to "avoid quarrels 
and trouble," the parties should establish 
territorial boundaries and then agree "that 
we not go into certain territory." Coster 
and Charles Mellen quickly added, however, 
that within this context the Northern Pacific 
should be allowed to build a Missoula, M o n -
tana—Pasco, Washington, cut-off through the 
Bitterroot Mountains over Lolo Pass. H i l l 
defended the plan as one that would reduce 
both miles and grades. Harriman suspected, 
though, that the N P wanted to gain local traf-
fic west of Lewiston, Idaho, as much as it 
wanted a more efficient route. And he re-
mained obdurate in the matter of "territorial 
division." The meeting settled little. 2 ' 
Matters shifted by degree. H i l l pressed Har-
riman for joint ownership instead of joint 
lease of the Oregon Railroad 5c Navigation 
Company, but Harriman presently insisted on 
the desirability of the UP having "its own line 
to Portland." H i l l sweetened the pot. The 
Northern Pacific, he said, "would be willing 
to arrange for the business of the Union Pa-
cific to go over its lines between Portland and 
Puget Sound" if Harriman would agree to give 
the Northern Pacific and Great Northern "the 
same rights and benefits" on the O R & N "as 
would accrue under separate lines owned by 
each." In other words, H i l l was willing to give 
Harriman access to Seattle over the Northern 
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Pacific from Portland in exchange for joint 
ownership of Oregon Railroad & Navigation 
and use of it by the Northern Pacific and the 
Great Northern as well as the Union Pacific. 
Failing in that, H i l l threatened to act indepen-
dently. "I think that with five million dollars I 
could build a much better line from our road 
[the Great Northern at Spokane] into Port-
land and with say two million more reach the 
most productive sections of the Navigation 
Company." Harriman was unmoved. H i l l was 
forced to bide his time. Eventually, when Har-
riman acted to acquire control of the South-
ern Pacific, a business associate of Hill's sug-
gested that " i t was just the right time . . . to 
go ahead and build the line on the north side 
of the Columbia." H i l l instead persisted in 
efforts with Harriman to obtain traffic ar-
rangements satisfactory to both the Union Pa-
cific, on the one hand, and the Great North-
ern and the Northern Pacific, on the other. By 
the summer of 1904 H i l l thought he had a 
deal with Harriman by which his roads would 
send their business over the O R & N , that the 
H i l l companies would have their own respec-
tive terminals in Portland—so that, as he said, 
the Navigation line "had only to hitch its en-
gines to the cars and pull the trains." Har-
riman backed out. It infuriated H i l l . In a very 
real way, then, it was Harriman as much as 
H i l l who was responsible for the creation 
of the Spokane, Portland & Seattle Railway 
(SP&S). 2 4 
Originally chartered as the Portland & 
Seattle Railway in 1905, Hill 's new rail-
road was rechristened three years later as the 
Spokane, Portland & Seattle. Neither pre-
cisely defined the company's purpose: to link 
Spokane with Portland. H i l l never intended 
that the line reach Seattle. Rather, he had the 
Northern Pacific double track its route be-
tween Seattle and Portland to handle ex-
panded business. Earthwork on the SP&S be-
gan in 1906, but it proved to be more difficult 
and significantly more expensive than H i l l 
had estimated back in 1899 when he said it 
could be built for $5 million. By 1906 he was 
estimating its cost at $40 to $45 million, and 
four years later H i l l considered that at least 
$10 million had been misspent on the project. 
" O n the whole it is the most unsatisfactory 
thing that has ever occurred in my experi-
ence," he lamented. The SP&S was opened in 
sections between 1907 and 1909 and was 
owned in equal portions by the Great North-
ern and the Northern Pacific. H i l l finally had 
independent access to Portland from the east 
on a direct route. 2 5 
Unfortunately for Harriman, the Spokane, 
Portland & Seattle was not the only H i l l project 
to annoy him in Oregon. Both men under-
stood the traffic potential of central Oregon 
and the strategic value of the Deschutes River 
Canyon, and both moved to advance their 
own claims to each. Harriman's effort took 
the form of the Deschutes Railroad, a subsidi-
ary of the Oregon Railroad & Navigation 
Company, and Hill's the Oregon Trunk Rail-
way, a satellite of the SP&S. Each focused on 
the route south from the Columbia River to 
Bend via the Deschutes River Canyon, and 
each sparred for advantage. Activity ceased 
temporarily in the aftermath of the Panic of 
1907, but two years later H i l l pressed on. 
There simply was no room in certain sections 
of the canyon for two railroads, and even-
tually, an accommodation was reached under 
which the two companies used a single track 
through these. The Oregon Trunk was opened 
for service from Fallbridge, Washington (later 
renamed Wishram), to Bend on November 1, 
1911. Southern Pacific officials in San Fran-
cisco were not amused. They knew that H i l l 
projected the Oregon Trunk on to Klamath 
Falls and even west to Medford. They won-
dered: Was his goal really San Francisco? 2 6 
There were other contentious issues be-
tween the two giants of the industry. One of 
these involved Harriman's growing desire 
to reach Seattle from Portland and, follow-
ing his usual policy, his wish to reach Puget 
Sound without building a new line. During 
the mid-1900s Northern Pacific's Howard 
Elliott tentatively agreed to grant the Union 
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Pacific trackage rights between South Tacoma 
and Vancouver, Washington, but withdrew 
the offer before Harriman could ratify it. In 
1908 Harriman approached H i l l himself who, 
of course, had, a few years earlier in the 
Oregon Railroad & Navigation matter, of-
fered Harriman trackage rights over the NP's 
line the entire distance from Portland to Puget 
Sound. (Interestingly, H i l l , as early as 1890, 
had proposed joint ownership of a Portland-
Seattle line to Union Pacific's William H . 
Holcomb.) H i l l initially suggested to Har-
riman that the Northern Pacific, Union Pa-
cific, and Great Northern be equally inter-
ested by lease or purchase of NP's Portland-
Seattle line and that it then be operated by an 
independent company for the benefit of all. 
Harriman countered by offering $7 million for 
j oint ownership of only the Tacoma-Vancouver 
(Washington) section. Northern Pacific attor-
neys then advised that none of this was pos-
sible because of congressional land-grant 
and mortgage restrictions. In any event, 
NP's board eventually turned down Har-
riman's proposition. 2 7 
Harriman persisted, and he was not with-
out ammunition. Hill's forces were well aware 
of the problems between the two powers in the 
Deschutes River area: that Harriman was 
pushing an SP road northward from Califor-
nia toward Klamath Falls, Oregon; that Har-
riman was contemplating a cross-state route 
in Oregon; and that Harriman engineers had 
already surveyed a line between Portland and 
Seattle. Harriman thought the time ripe for 
action. In 1909 he told Julius Kruttschnitt to 
solicit bids on a first-class, low-grade line be-
tween Vancouver and Tacoma. Matters moved 
quickly. On May 21, 1909, at Harriman's 
home, a memo of agreement was forged by 
which the Oregon & Washington Railroad 
( O & W , a Union Pacific subsidiary) and the 
Great Northern were to be given "joint and 
equal use of the Northern Pacific" between 
Vancouver and South Tacoma. A contract to 
this end took effect on July 1, 1909, and joint 
use began on January 1, 1910. Additional 
construction and joint ownership with the 
Chicago, Milwaukee & Puget Sound Rail-
way of another segment took the Harriman 
Lines on to Seattle. A l l parties professed to be 
pleased. Even the Northern Pacific asserted 
in 1911 that the "arrangements . . . have 
worked advantageously to all parties and to 
the publ ic . " 2 8 
The SP's involvement in this matter, on the 
one hand, and the lack of it, on the other, 
were curious. When arrangements nearly had 
been completed with the Northern Pacific on 
the joint track agreement, its management de-
manded that the Union Pacific and the South-
ern Pacific "jointly and severally guarantee the 
performance" of the contract with the Oregon 
& Washington Railroad because, the North-
ern Pacific said, the O & W was, in fact, a 
wholly owned subsidiary of the Union Pacific 
and could at its pleasure be reduced to a con-
dition of financial irresponsibility. Harriman 
agreed to this on behalf of the Union Pacific 
and the Southern Pacific because, as he and 
Robert S. Lovett contended, the Puget Sound 
extension was considered beneficial to both 
companies. The arrangement was certainly 
beneficial to the Union Pacific, but the con-
tract, insofar as the SP was concerned, in-
volved it in an obligation without considera-
tion. The Southern Pacific was not even given 
the option of trackage rights over the North-
ern Pacific to Tacoma and, in fact, all that was 
immediately obvious by way of benefit to it 
was a friendly connection to and from Puget 
Sound in the form of UP's Oregon & Washing-
ton Railroad. Nobody knew it at the time, but 
the contract held unpleasant ramifications for 
the SP. 2 9 
Elsewhere, Harriman and H i l l tilted for 
control of the territory south of Astoria, Ore-
gon, to Tillamook Bay. At stake was not 
only valuable traffic if Tillamook developed 
as a port but also the absolute guarantee of 
heavy timber and lumber business from the 
impressive stand of fir that typified the region. 
To secure the area on behalf of the SP, the 
impressive-sounding Pacific Railway & Navi-
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gation Company was formed on October 16, 
1905. Construction began immediately at 
Hillsboro, west of Portland on SP's West Side 
Branch, and from Tillamook the following 
year. H i l l was slow to respond, but eventually 
he sent his trusted engineer, John F. Stevens, to 
investigate the region. Stevens was enthusi-
astic and so was H i l l . A Great Northern line 
from Astoria to Tillamook would take two 
years to build and would require one 6,000-
foot tunnel and two or three shorter ones, but 
the promise of traffic in lumber products was 
so great that the investment would, H i l l en-
thused, "pay from two to three times as much 
as the extension of branch lines east of the 
main range of the Rocky Mountains." Never-
theless, H i l l , for reasons not recorded, failed 
to prosecute construction. Meanwhile, the SP, 
which had the jump on him from the begin-
ning in this venture, slowed its activity, finally 
placing the completed Tillamook Branch in 
operation on January 1, 1912. 3 0 
Other Southern Pacific activity in Oregon 
during the Harriman era was undertaken with 
an eye toward frustrating Hill's options, flesh-
ing out the system, and reducing grades and 
curvature. The entire issue of stock and bonds 
of the Corvallis & Eastern Railway—142 
miles, reaching eastward from the coast at Ya-
quina to Corvallis, Albany, and Idanha—was 
acquired during fiscal 1907. The Corvallis & 
Eastern, which ran at right angles to SP's gen-
eral north-south orientation in Oregon, once 
considered eastward expansion all the way to 
the Oregon Railroad & Navigation line. The 
new property furnished valuable feeder traffic 
to the SP. More important than the Corvallis 
& Eastern in terms of ultimate utility was the 
beginning of what eventually would be the 
Natron Cut-off, or SP's Cascade line; the Cali-
fornia Northeastern Railway was organized in 
1905 for the purpose of prosecuting this ven-
ture. It then acquired the 22-mile railroad of 
the Weed Lumber Company extending from 
Weed, California, 27 miles north of Duns-
muir, to Grass Lake. Subsequently, between 
1906 and 1909, the California Northeast-
ern completed construction from Grass Lake, 
California, to Klamath Falls, Oregon. In a col-
lateral development, the Oregon Eastern Rail-
way was formed on August 22, 1905, in order 
to foster construction of the Natron Cut-off 
from the Oregon end. Work went slowly. Only 
34 miles were completed by mid-1912, and 
the longed-for line over the Cascades—one 
that would seal off competition, yield lucrative 
traffic, and avoid the difficult operation over 
SP's older Siskiyou Line—was to remain on 
hold for several years." 
Harriman's attention also focused on other 
areas of SP's sprawling domain. During the 
mid-1900s Harriman approved construction 
designed to solidify SP's competitive position 
in eastern California and western Nevada. He 
had attempted to acquire the fabled Virginia 
& Truckee Railroad (V&T) but, rebuffed in 
this and not wanting to share Tonopah busi-
ness with the V & T , determined to drive a new 
north-south line through the region. To this 
end, the Nevada & California Railway was 
chartered on Apri l 7, 1905; it was authorized 
to construct and operate a line from Hazen, 
Nevada, a station on the Central Pacific's 
Overland Line east of Reno, to Mojave, 
located on Southern Pacific's Sacramento-
Los Angeles route in southeastern California. 
On May 11, 1905, the Nevada & California 
purchased from parent Southern Pacific the 
assets of the narrow-gauge Carson & Colo-
rado Railroad, which had been acquired by 
the SP in 1900. A "third-rail" operation 
on the northern portion of the Carson & 
Colorado allowed it to serve as the required 
link between Nevada & California's Hazen-
Churchill and Mojave-Owenyo lines. The 
completed route was turned over to operation 
on October 22, 1910. 3 2 
Harriman faced another adversary—the 
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway (ATSc 
SF)—in the Southwest. If skirmishing with 
the Santa Fe was new for Harriman, it cer-
tainly was not for the SP. Much earlier, in 
1881, the Santa Fe had driven its main line 
to a junction with SP's Sunset Route at Dem-
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ing, in New Mexico Territory. The Santa Fe 
hoped to gather significant overhead traffic via 
Deming, but C. P. Huntington initially refused 
to make rates of any type and then modified 
his position only enough to, as Santa Fe saw 
it, establish charges that were exorbitant. In 
an attempt to outflank the SP, the Santa Fe 
then built to deep water at Guaymas, Mexico, 
but the venture was not financially satisfac-
tory. As a consequence, Santa Fe management 
determined to attack the Southern Pacific in 
its heartland—California." 
The Atlantic & Pacific Railroad, then con-
trolled jointly by the A T & S F and the St. Louis 
& San Francisco Railway, had rights to the 
thirty-fifth-parallel route, but its congres-
sional charter pledged a connection with the 
SP at the eastern California border for any 
new line to San Francisco. Managements of 
both the Santa Fe and the Frisco agreed that 
this charter provision could be challenged and 
raised money for penetration into California. 
However, Huntington—whose Golden State 
empire was thereby threatened by the Santa 
Fe—and Jay Gould—whose Texas & Pacific 
venture was similarly menaced—joined forces 
to buy a controlling interest in the Frisco and 
thus share in Atlantic & Pacific's rights. In 
that way Santa Fe found itself checkmated. A 
compromise of sorts was arranged. The SP, 
at that time building southeastward from 
Mojave, would not go, Huntington agreed, 
beyond Needles, California—242.5 miles— 
and the Santa Fe, through the Atlantic & Pa-
cific, would forge a junction there with the SP 
and not penetrate California with its own line. 
Service via Needles was begun in August, 
1883, but the arrangement quickly proved un-
satisfactory from Santa Fe's point of view 
since the SP, for its part, vowed not to short-
haul itself and continued to favor the Over-
land and Sunset routes.'4 
The stalemate was short-lived. Santa Fe's 
management threatened construction of a line 
parallel to SP's; Huntington was forced to ca-
pitulate. He agreed to a "lease and contract 
of sale" arrangement under which the At-
lantic & Pacific (AT&SF) gained immediate 
possession and later acquired as payment in 
kind the Mojave-Needles route. The SP agreed 
to handle Atlantic & Pacific business above 
Mojave into San Francisco on a coordinated 
basis, and the Atlantic & Pacific promised not 
to purchase terminal facilities in the Bay Area. 
On the other hand, Santa Fe management had 
other arrows in its California quiver. It reached 
San Diego by way of acquisition and new con-
struction in 1885 and two years later drove its 
own line into Los Angeles. That was not the 
end of it. The Santa Fe acquired the locally 
owned San Francisco & San Joaquin Valley 
Railroad between Stockton and Bakersfield 
in 1898, gained trackage rights from the SP 
over the Tehachapis between Mojave and 
Bakersfield, and in 1900 finished its own new 
line from Stockton to Point Richmond on San 
Francisco Bay. The Southern Pacific's monop-
oly in California, if ever it existed, was surely 
shattered by the time E. H . Harriman came to 
lead its affairs.'5 
The circumstance of the two powerful car-
riers in Arizona Territory was roughly analo-
gous. The SP had enjoyed a monopoly there 
very briefly before the Atlantic & Pacific 
(Santa Fe) built its distant if parallel line across 
the northern portion of the area. Peace be-
tween the two was threatened in 1895 when 
an independent road was completed between 
Ashfork, on Atlantic & Pacific's main line 
west of Flagstaff, and Phoenix, in the south 
central portion of the territory, above the 
Sunset Route. SP's management was even 
more concerned when this property passed 
to the A T & S F in 1901 and became thor-
oughly alarmed when the Santa Fe announced 
an extension of it, as the Phoenix & Eastern 
Railroad, toward the southeast into what SP 
assumed was its preserve. The matter was not 
unimportant. If Santa Fe's Phoenix & Eastern 
were to reach Benson, it would, of course, 
have an opportunity to exchange traffic with 
the SP, but it would more likely forge agree-
ments with a competitor—the El Paso & 
Southwestern Railroad, which was itself com-
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pleting a line roughly parallel with the SP be-
tween the Rio Grande River and Tucson and 
which offered alternate routing opportunities 
via El Paso. 3 6 
Harriman in early 1902 asked the Santa Fe 
to stop building into what he considered SP's 
service area. His request was ignored. The 
Phoenix & Eastern built nearly 100 miles of 
road toward Benson in 1903 and 1904, initi-
ating service to Winkelman on September 28, 
1904. Another Santa Fe affiliate pledged con-
struction of a cut-off linking Phoenix with the 
A T & S F main line near Cadiz, in southeastern 
California. The independent El Paso & South-
western, as might be expected, urged swift 
completion of this cut-off as well as extension 
of the Phoenix & Eastern to Benson. With 
those lines in place, the El Paso & Southwest-
ern stood to share in lucrative overhead traffic. 
Harriman was not amused by the prospect.3 7 
These matters soon became related to others 
in Northern California, where the SP and the 
Santa Fe were also squabbling over territorial 
rights. Each had acquired formerly indepen-
dent but disjointed rail operations northwest 
of the Bay Area between San Francisco and 
Eureka, but the northern segment, owned by 
the Santa Fe, and the southern, owned by SP, 
were of little value to either of the giants un-
less connected by new construction—which 
would be expensive because of the character 
of the country involved. Harriman counseled 
cooperation in the spirit of community inter-
est. It was slow to come. The Santa Fe appar-
ently was willing to sell the Phoenix & East-
ern to the SP but insisted on resolution of the 
Northern California issue at the same time. 
Harriman would not hear of it. 
The entire matter reached a boiling point 
when the Santa Fe announced plans to extend 
the Phoenix & Eastern from its end-of-tracks 
to a junction with the A T & S F line at Deming, 
New Mexico Territory. If completed, the route 
would give the Santa Fe a low-grade through 
route from El Paso to Phoenix and, if the 
Phoenix cut-off was similarly finished, on into 
California. Construction in Arizona would 
take the Phoenix & Eastern through the nar-
row canyon of the Gila River, one that Hunt-
ington and his engineers had known of and 
the very one they had expected to use even-
tually in a line relocation designed to reduce 
operating costs on the Sunset Route. To 
counter the AT&SF, Harriman ordered crea-
tion of an SP satellite, the Arizona Eastern 
Railroad, designed, not surprisingly, to build a 
low-grade line across Arizona through, of 
course, the valley of the G i l a . 3 8 
Epes Randolph was placed in charge. He 
quickly but quietly located two engineer corps 
in "that portion of the canyon where con-
struction would be the most difficult" and 
then, on March 14, 1904, filed requisite maps 
with the Tucson Land Office. Representatives 
of the Santa Fe's Phoenix & Eastern arrived 
a little over two hours later with their own 
maps covering the "same territory." The issue 
quickly went before the territorial courts; 
Randolph anticipated "no possible chance of 
defeat" because the SP's Arizona Eastern con-
trolled the "most strategic ground" by "prior 
location" and because the Arizona Eastern 
had filed its papers in advance of those pre-
sented by the Phoenix & Eastern. The A r i -
zona Eastern's case, as Randolph predicted, 
was eventually sustained by the local courts, 
but the Santa Fe determined to make an ap-
peal before the U.S. Supreme Court. Mean-
while, Harriman elected to play trump cards. 3 9 
Early in the fall of 1904, Harriman advised 
Santa Fe's E. P. Ripley that he and several 
others had purchased $30 million of Atchison, 
Topeka & Santa Fe stock, or 14 percent of the 
total. Under Santa Fe's cumulative system of 
voting, Harriman could place four representa-
tives on its board but chose to seat only two, 
Henry C. Frick and Henry H . Rogers. Resolu-
tion of the Arizona and California problems 
came quickly. In the next year the Santa Fe 
agreed to sell, and the SP agreed to buy, the 
Phoenix & Eastern at cost plus 4.5 percent in-
terest. Both companies also agreed to recipro-
cal trackage rights—between Phoenix and 
Deming over the new line for the Santa Fe and 
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between Phoenix and Mojave over the cut-off 
for the SP. (These agreements were never ex-
cuted.) Harriman and Ripley likewise cove-
nanted that in the future the SP would not 
build into the territory north of Phoenix and 
the Santa Fe would not engage in construction 
south of that location. 4 0 
Disposition of the operations northwest of 
San Francisco followed a similar pattern. On 
January 8, 1907, the Southern Pacific and the 
Santa Fe formed a new company, the North-
western Pacific Railroad, of which the parent 
companies each owned half. The two then 
vested the Northwestern Pacific with several 
smaller lines and, with new construction link-
ing them, formed a through route serving the 
northern coastal and redwood-bearing areas 
of California. It was an example of Harri-
man's belief that relationships between rail-
roads would be bettered by dealing "more 
frankly with each other" and by operating 
them "not for the purpose of destroying one 
another but to help one another." 4 1 
Harriman was impressed with the Santa Fe 
itself and apparently would have pursued its 
acquisition had it not been for the threat of 
antitrust action by the Roosevelt administra-
tion. As it developed, the Harriman interests 
sold their holdings in 1906, although Frick 
and Rogers remained on the Santa Fe board 
until their respective deaths. Interestingly, the 
Union Pacific, also in 1906, through its Ore-
gon Short Line acquired over $10 million in 
Santa Fe's preferred issue, but this, too, was 
sold after three years.4 2 
The development of the Southern Pacific 
Railroad Company of Mexico (SPdeMex) was 
likewise intertwined in the histories of the 
Southern Pacific and Santa Fe companies. 
When it found SP an unenthusiastic connec-
tion for its recently completed line to Deming, 
New Mexico Territory, back in 1881, the 
Santa Fe had gambled on an extension to tide-
water in Mexico. This took the form of the 
Sonora Railway from the Arizona-Sonora 
boundary to Guaymas, on the Gulf of Califor-
nia, and the New Mexico & Arizona Railroad 
between Benson and Nogales in Arizona Ter-
ritory (SP granted Santa Fe trackage rights 
from Deming to Benson). The venture was not 
successful for Santa Fe and, in 1898, as a part 
of the Mojave-Needles agreement, the SP 
leased the Sonora and the New Mexico & Ar-
izona operations.4 3 
The Southern Pacific gradually expanded 
this Mexican adventure during the Harriman 
years. In 1902 it acquired from the Green 
Consolidated Copper Company the Cananea, 
Yaqui River & Pacific Railroad, which pos-
sessed several concessions from the Mexican 
government to construct mileage in that coun-
try. The SP itself gained a concession to con-
struct a line of road from an undesignated 
point convenient on the Cananea line to a 
junction with the National Railways of Mex-
ico between San Marcos and Guadalajara. 
Work began near Guaymas at Empalme in 
1905, and crews reached Navojoa, 117 miles 
south, two years later. A l l concessions, rights, 
and properties in Mexico were consolidated 
and transferred to the SPdeMex upon its in-
corporation on June 24, 1909. 4 4 
The SP during the Harriman era engaged in 
still other construction projects or property 
acquisitions. Its Texas and Louisiana subsidi-
aries engaged themselves in extensive fleshing 
out between 1902 and 1907. And, in 1903, 
the SP purchased 50 percent of the capital 
stock of the Pacific Electric Railway, which 
was expanding a vast network of electric trac-
tion throughout the Los Angeles Basin. 4 5 
Yet another major Harriman venture in 
Southern California, but one in which the SP 
was not directly involved, was the acquisition 
of lines and rights that brought the Union Pa-
cific into Los Angeles. That company had 
early contemplated a line from Ogden and 
Salt Lake City to Los Angeles, and certain 
rights-of-way were purchased to that end, but 
the deadly panic of 1893 prevented its full de-
velopment. In 1900 Montana's Senator W i l -
liam A . Clark and others who had interest in a 
local line, the Los Angeles Terminal Railway, 
announced their intention to tie that concern 
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with a new one of interregional importance— 
the San Pedro, Los Angeles & Salt Lake Rail-
road, established, as its corporate title urged, 
to link Los Angeles and its port with Salt Lake 
City and connections there with the Union 
Pacific as well as the Denver & Rio Grande. 
The implications of the Clark road were not 
lost on Harriman, who met the interloper 
with competitive construction and litiga-
tion. Parallel lines clearly were not justified, 
and Clark's company simply could not prevail 
against Harriman's power. Compromise fol-
lowed. The partly completed lines of each 
were consolidated, retaining the Clark name— 
San Pedro, Los Angeles & Salt Lake—but 
managed by Harriman's men. It was opened 
for through traffic in 1905. The threat to the 
Harriman Lines from Clark's road was obvi-
ated. The San Pedro Road adopted SP's rates 
as its own on local traffic that was subject to 
competition with the Southern Pacific. 4 6 
Harriman was not always victorious in 
warding off intruders. H i l l had challenged him 
with varying success in Oregon, and the Santa 
Fe had not been without accomplishment in 
the Southwest. Harriman failed completely, 
however, to prevent invasion by George Jay 
Gould's Western Pacific. 
When he died in 1892, Jay Gould had con-
trolled several railroads that passed to the 
management of his son, George, who appar-
ently embraced his father's dream of a true 
transcontinental system under one flag. Cen-
tral to such a plan, as the Goulds saw it, was 
the Denver & Rio Grande Railroad. As a re-
sult, George Gould saw to it that additional 
Rio Grande stock was acquired by his Mis-
souri Pacific, with which the D & R G con-
nected at Pueblo, Colorado. More acquisi-
tions followed. By folding the Rio Grande 
Western into the D & R G George Gould, by 
the summer of 1901, had a friendly line of 
railroad from Saint Louis to Ogden. Rio 
Grande's historic link to the Bay Area via 
the Central Pacific seemed assured, Gould 
thought, although its control had by now 
passed to Harriman. Relations between Har-
riman and Gould at the turn of the century 
and shortly thereafter were, after all, friendly 
and, according to one source, "rather inti-
mate." Both were directors of the Chicago, 
Burlington & Quincy; Harriman served on 
the boards of Gould's Rio Grande Western 
and his Denver & Rio Grande; and Gould 
was a member of the executive committee for 
SP's directorate and also a member of Union 
Pacific's board. 4 7 
Trouble, nevertheless, was not slow in bud-
ding. The Union Pacific had long since re-
sented the presence of the Rio Grande at 
Ogden because, during the Huntington era, 
the Central Pacific had allowed and even en-
couraged through rate agreements with UP's 
competition. Harriman, who after 1901 con-
trolled the historic Overland Route, under-
standably determined not to allow short-
hauling of his own lines and thus demanded 
local instead of through rates for business in-
terchanged with the Rio Grande at Ogden. 
This had the immediate consequence of di-
verting a larger tonnage to the Union Pacific 
and away from the Gould System. Prosperity 
for the Rio Grande was further subverted 
when Harriman succeeded in capturing Sena-
tor Clark's San Pedro line—one that, had it re-
mained independent, surely would have bene-
fited the Gould system against Harriman's 
Union Pacific. 4 8 
Whether Gould felt penned-in by Harriman 
at Ogden (and El Paso, too, on SP's Sunset 
Route), or whether he hoped to make real his 
father's dream of a true transcontinental rail-
road, Gould ultimately concluded to strike 
out on his own for the Pacific. To this end, the 
Western Pacific (WP) Railway was incorpo-
rated on March 6, 1903, for the purpose of 
building a new line of road from the Bay Area 
to Salt Lake City. Its financial sponsorship was 
publicly shrouded but, although he denied his 
involvement, Gould's name was usually at-
tached to it. The charade was all the more bi-
zarre because Gould and Harriman served on 
each other's boards. Finally, in 1905 each re-
signed from the other's directorate after Gould 
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publicly admitted that he was fully behind the 
Western Pacific venture; Harriman pledged to 
do all he could to prevent the reality of a 
Gould line between Utah and San Francisco 
Bay. Part of Harriman's response was pique— 
he was jealous of his domain; part of it was 
Harriman's feeling that Gould had betrayed 
him. Yet there was another aspect. Harriman 
recognized what the American public gener-
ally did not: that destructive competition 
made the rate structure unstable and resulted 
in practices that were not in the interests of 
the railroads themselves or the public at large. 
For him the Western Pacific was an arche-
typical example of wasteful duplication of 
facilities. 4 9 
Although the Southern Pacific made every 
effort to prevent the interloper from obtaining 
a waterfront terminal at Oakland, and Har-
riman missed no tricks in a heavy-handed 
campaign to forestall its construction, work 
on the Western Pacific went forward. The fi-
nancial burden for the effort was thrown to 
Gould's Rio Grande, although its own capac-
ity was suspect. California aspirations were 
not new, of course, to that company. William 
J. Palmer, president of the Rio Grande West-
ern, had authorized reconnaissance of various 
routes to the Pacific between 1891 and 1901, 
and the D & R G itself had studied a potential 
westward route from Durango, Colorado. 
N o w it would have its wish, if only indirectly. 
In the Western Pacific endeavor the Rio Grande 
and presumably the entire Gould System 
would profit from valuable transcontinental 
traffic secured at the expense of the Harriman 
Lines. It was a promise adequate to spur the 
efforts of all of Gould's forces. Western Pacific 
engineers staked out a low-level route through 
the Sierra at an elevation of 5,000 feet—one 
that Grenville M . Dodge had examined much 
earlier and, as he recalled, "the Union Pacific 
would have built [in the late 1860s] if it had 
not been for the progress of the Central Pacific 
East." Regular freight operations on the West-
ern Pacific began on December 1, 1909; pas-
senger service, the following August. 5 0 
The Western Pacific was derided at the SP 
and elsewhere as the "Wobbly Pacific," and in 
a sense it deserved the epithet. Costs of con-
structing and equipping the WP proved to be 
double the estimates and revenues were slack. 
In short order the Gould empire collapsed; 
both the Western Pacific and the Rio Grande 
slid into receivership. Contemporary observ-
ers were not gentle with Gould. One said, 
"His preeminent characteristic is indecision of 
character. . . . He is a good deal of a dreamer 
but he lacks the physical force, the 'nerve,' to 
see his operations through." He was known as 
the "sick man of Wall Street." Neither have 
historians been kind: Gould had a "weakness 
for aggression" and displayed "faulty field-
generalship" that "forced him to build west of 
Salt Lake City," according to an historian of 
the Rio Grande. Yet the Western Pacific re-
mained in place. Nobody then could have 
foreseen the ironic circumstance and strangely 
strategic importance that the "Wobbly" would 
assume in the era of the mega-merger, several 
decades later.51 
Throughout this period the very character 
of the United States was changing. The num-
ber of people in the country, their average age, 
average per capita income, and gross national 
product all increased. So did capital invest-
ment. Henry Morgenthau proclaimed that the 
decade from 1896 to 1906 "was the period of 
the most gigantic expansion of business in all 
. . . history. . . . The cry everywhere was for 
money—more money—and yet more money." 
A n astonishing array of huge industries 
sprouted abroad the land, but corporate pros-
perity was uneven during the first decade of 
the twentieth century. There were three eco-
nomic downturns, the worst being the short-
lived panic of 1907, although the overall 
trend was upward. A l l was not well, however. 
Workers' productivity increased markedly, but 
real wages of labor remained virtually stable. 
Moreover, the average citizen was increasingly 
concerned over the size, power, and concen-
tration of the country's great industries as well 
as those who owned and managed them. This, 
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after all, was the decade that witnessed the 
formation of United States Steel, the country's 
first billion-dollar corporation. 5 2 
This was also the decade of the Northern Se-
curities case, in which Harriman and James J. 
H i l l were the leading participants. To pro-
mote longer hauls for his Great Northern and 
Northern Pacific companies and to eliminate 
handling by intermediate carriers between the 
Twin Cities and eastern roads at Chicago, H i l l 
had seen to the acquisition of the Chicago, 
Burlington & Quincy, a handsomely located 
and marvelously managed property. In addi-
tion to its Chicago-Minneapolis line, however, 
the Burlington also had a route stretching 
from Omaha to Denver and served a territory 
that lay between Harriman's Overland Route 
and his Kansas Pacific line. The two men 
talked of a combined purchase but could not 
agree; the Chicago, Burlington & Quincy 
thus passed to H i l l , its stock held by the Great 
Northern and the Northern Pacific. Harriman 
thereupon began the purchase of Northern 
Pacific stock with the idea of getting at the 
Burlington by way of the back door. H i l l re-
sponded with a campaign of his own. North-
ern Pacific stock rose to $1,000 per share on 
the market, a small panic developed, and in 
the end H i l l and his banker, J. P. Morgan, 
agreed to include Harriman in the creation of 
Northern Securities, a massive holding com-
pany formed in 1901. Nevertheless, three 
years later the Supreme Court ordered the dis-
solution of Northern Securities; the decision 
caused consternation in the business world 
but was widely applauded by the general 
public. 5 3 
Attitudes hardened. The idea grew popular 
that corporations were greedy and without so-
cial responsibility, that business leaders were 
at best selfish and at worst dishonest, that 
management exploited labor, and that the 
rich grew richer while the poor grew poorer, 
and the big got bigger and the small grew 
smaller. 
Much of this focused on the nation's rail-
roads, which, for the brief era of the steamcar 
civilization, suffered virtually no modal com-
petition. Every citizen had an immediate and 
unavoidable contact with the railroads. The 
public—rightly or wrongly—gradually came 
to perceive that the country had a "railroad 
problem"; the issue was a constant in its po-
litical debates. Westerners and others became 
concerned that those who controlled the car-
riers lived in the East and were absentee land-
lords or alien powers. Furthermore, critics 
noted, the gross incomes of the larger rail-
roads frequently were larger than those of the 
states they served. It mattered little if these 
were really problems or not; the public per-
ceived them as problems and responded ac-
cordingly. One of the country's overarching 
values, its citizens believed, was competition. 
Yet in the railroad industry true competition 
was virtually impossible except where parallel 
lines served the same communities, and even 
this could result in circumstances counterpro-
ductive to all. In many parts of the country, 
particularly the West, there was inadequate 
business to support side-by-side lines. When 
they were constructed, they resulted in over-
capacity, waste of capital, and ultimately 
higher rates for customers.54 
Theodore Roosevelt, who acceded to the 
presidency after the assassination of William 
McKinley in 1901, accurately discerned that 
the relatively sudden emergence of huge cor-
porations ("trusts") ran contrary to the view 
of ordinary citizens, who felt that such con-
centration of private power was inconsistent 
with individualistic free enterprise. Not sur-
prisingly, the public—and Roosevelt, too, 
after their unfortunate falling out—focused 
on Harriman as the archvillain. His melding 
of the SP and Union Pacific had been the most 
significant combination of railroad properties 
made to that time; the Harriman Lines were 
"the best-run and most thoroughly integrated 
of the railroad combinations" of the time; and 
Harriman himself was "the unquestioned 
leader of the American railroad industry." 
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Roosevelt and much of the public, however, 
had come to think of Harriman as an "un-
desirable citizen." 5 5 
If he did not actually order the Interstate 
Commerce Commission to investigate Harri-
man and his railroad interests, Roosevelt cer-
tainly approved and applauded such action. 
Formally styled an inquiry into "The Consoli-
dation and Combination of Carriers," it did 
not include all carriers, consolidations, and 
combinations and, in reality, was a thinly veiled 
attack on Harriman himself. It provided a 
stage for his detractors—"the Harriman Ex-
termination League," said Otto Kahn. 5 6 
Unfortunately for himself, for his proper-
ties, and for the industry at large, Harriman 
in his frankness played into the hands of his 
opponents. The recent 10 percent dividend 
on Union Pacific stock not only amazed the 
financial world but for the general public 
"proved" charges that rail rates were no less 
than exorbitant. Shortly thereafter, Harriman 
made what his friend Otto Kahn called "the 
one serious mistake" of his career. Follow-
ing the dissolution of the Northern Securities 
Company ordered by the U.S. Supreme Court 
in 1904, Harriman decided to sell Northern 
Pacific stock held by the UP. The impressive 
profits thus earned, Harriman decided, should 
be reinvested to the advantage of the Union 
Pacific. To him, that meant acquiring stock in 
other railroads. Consequently, by 1909, the 
UP owned stock in more than ten of the coun-
try's best known carriers. Harriman saw it 
simply as a change of investments. For the 
public, however, it appeared as bald-faced 
attempt to establish a gigantic and illegal 
monopoly. Kahn thought Harriman's decision 
a public relations disaster. It was that and 
more. 5 7 
Harriman was categorically impolitic as a 
witness before the hearing. On the one hand, 
he stoutly defended his view that economic 
reasons required the voluntary consolidation 
of the railroads, but on the other he was 
unwilling to defend himself against either 
straightforward accusations or innuendo; his 
demeanor was one of impatience, resentment, 
and defiance. When asked to answer certain 
questions regarding stock transactions, he 
properly refused and the Supreme Court sus-
tained his rights—but the damage was enor-
mous. It was not so much what he said or did 
not say; rather, it was Harriman's bearing that 
stood him convicted before the public. Times 
had changed. It was no longer the Gilded Age, 
it was the Progressive Era. Harriman, usually 
a shrewd observer, had failed to note the shift. 
This time he was his own enemy.58 
Given the political mood of the time, the 
commission's recommendations, if regret-
table, were predictable. Among other things, 
the ICC urged that surplus funds be "ex-
pended in developing the country and build-
ing feeder lines instead of in stock acqui-
sition." There was more, much more, that 
involved the Harriman Lines directly. It was 
"contrary to public policy," said the ICC, "for 
one railroad to acquire control of parallel or 
competing lines." The implications were omi-
nous. Rumors quickly urged that the govern-
ment would in one way or another seek to dis-
solve the strong ties that Harriman had forged 
between the Southern Pacific and the Union 
Pacific. 5 9 
Harriman appeared undaunted. "I've been 
a pack horse all my life," he commented; "I 
guess I can pack this too." Certainly his work 
went on. He approved plans for the Dum-
barton Point bridge south of Oakland in San 
Francisco Bay and urged SP engineers to seek 
governmental permission for yet another and 
more impressive structure across San Fran-
cisco Bay. At the same time he contemplated 
an underwater tube through which trains 
could pass between San Francisco and Oak-
land, an elevated railway in San Francisco be-
tween the passenger station at Third and 
Townsend and the Ferry Building, and a mas-
sive tunnel in the Sierra. He likewise encour-
aged a variety of electrification projects in the 
Bay Area and in Oregon as well as hydro-
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electric generating possibilities in the moun-
tains. He pondered a line extension from A r i -
zona to Durango, Colorado, and planned a 
light-grade route from Kansas City to Deni-
son, Texas, and corollary upgrading of SP's 
Houston & Texas Central from Denison all 
the way to Houston. On a more theoretical 
level, Harriman advocated broadening all 
standard-gauge railroads to six feet in order to 
improve efficiency. Unfortunately, much of this 
remained unfinished business. Edward Henry 
Harriman died on September 9, 1909. 6 0 
His measure was taken broadly. On the SP, 
trains paused briefly as a manner of respect 
but then, as Harriman would have had it, 
moved off on their appointed rounds. He was 
mourned variously as the "last individualist," 
the "world's greatest railroad man," and "one 
who played the game of life upon a large 
scale." Otto Kahn was not blind to his short-
comings but believed Harriman's "faults were 
largely those of his generation." The editor of 
the Illinois Central Magazine considered Har-
riman "at once the best loved and the most 
misunderstood man of his generation." His 
peers on the Union Pacific board of directors 
thought him "one of the most remarkable 
men this country has ever produced and cer-
tainly the greatest man of his generation," and 
the directors of the Southern Pacific pointed 
with pride to what they considered his crown-
ing achievement: " A record of development 
and organization in railroad affairs without 
parallel, which will live as an important part 
of the industrial history of the country, a last-
ing monument to his memory." 6 1 
Raw statistics do not adequately tell the 
story of Harriman's years at the Southern Pa-
cific, but they imply much. 
1901 1909 
Route miles, 
rail 9,016.9 9,976.5 
Route miles, 
water 5,365.0 5,385.0 
Second track 
(miles) 107.3 228.8 
Sidings (miles) 2,104.5 3,199-5 
Total receipts $81,107,672 $120,521,908 
Operating ratio 63.56 66.34 
Locomotives 
(average 
weight, tons) 5i-9 71.06 
Passenger cars 1,261 i , 7 7 i 
Freight cars 35,709 44,578 
Freight cars 
(average ca-
pacity, tons) 26.88 37-58 
During Harriman's tenure the SP purchased 
918 new locomotives (net gain of 540), 930 
new passenger cars (net gain of 510), and 
25,447 n e w freight cars (net gain of 8,859). 
Much of this reflected the burgeoning econ-
omy, particularly in SP's service area, and the 
increase in the average capacity of freight cars 
and the average weight in locomotives is ex-
plained in part by advanced standards. Yet 
these acquisitions also mirrored Harriman's 
devotion to efficiency and his understanding 
that it was necessary to spend money in order 
to make it. His mark was clear and Frank 
Spearman saw it as such: "The Union Pacific 
Railroad—and the same can be said of the 
Southern Pacific—is the peer physically of the 
standard railway lines of the East." 6 2 
C H A P T E R 5 
The Wide-Awake West 
"The West Needs More People—More People 
Need to Come West."—Salt Lake City and 
the State of Utah 
H A R R I M A N was dead and, as John Moody ob-
served, "the wizard touch was clearly gone." 
Grenville M . Dodge concurred but added an 
optimistic note: "It is fortunate that he built 
up and organized the properties so completely 
and efficiently that it wil l not be difficult to 
find someone in them to take his place and 
carry out his plans. . . ." It was true that Har-
riman's excellent management team of Robert 
Lovett, Julius Kruttschnitt, John Stubbs, W i l -
liam Hood, and William Mahl—led now by 
Lovett—remained in place. It was also true 
that many if not most of Harriman's policies 
would go forward as if he were still alive. 
However, the country was becoming more en-
tranced with what it thought was progressive 
reform. Lovett's job, difficult enough follow-
ing in the shadow of Harriman, was sure to be 
exacerbated by a significantly changed politi-
cal circumstance.1 
Even before Harriman's death the Roosevelt 
Administration, on February i , 1908, had 
brought suit under the Sherman Antitrust Act, 
contending that Union Pacific's control of 
Southern Pacific through majority stock own-
ership was in violation of the law. At issue was 
the matter of competition or, as the govern-
ment asserted, the lack of it between the 
Southern Pacific and Union Pacific after Har-
riman combined them in 1901. The govern-
ment's contention that the two roads had en-
gaged in aggressive competition before that 
time was beyond debate. However, its view 
that none existed thereafter was suspect, at 
best. Federal lawyers pointed out that trans-
continental traffic moving via Ogden earned 
only a 30 percent division for the SP, whereas 
such business handled via its steamship line 
and Sunset Route could earn 100 percent of 
the tariff. Logic, they implied, favored the 
single line. It was not as simple as that. A for-
mula, based on rules of efficiency, had long 
since applied to the movement of transcon-
tinental business on the Harriman Lines: 
shipments to or from points above Buffalo, 
Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, and Cairo moved via 
Ogden, and those below by way of the Sunset 
Route. In fact, of business moving through 
Ogden and El Paso gateways—in other words 
by way of the Overland Route and the Sunset 
Route—a full 53 percent moved via Ogden 
during fiscal 1912. 2 
Company attorneys argued, in rebuttal, 
that combination of the properties was right 
and proper because it was by way of stock ac-
quisition rather than contract or other agree-
ment. This contention, however meritorious, 
was unimportant. The issue, pure and simple, 
was competition. The lower court saw it thus 
and, although it found little between the Og-
den and Sunset routes, dismissed the case on 
June 11, 1911. 3 
Senior officers of the Harriman Lines won-
dered nervously if that would end the matter. 
Eventually they decided to seek a face-to-face 
meeting with President William Howard Taft. 
The youthful W. Averell Harriman, who had 
met Taft in 1905 when they sailed together 
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aboard a specially scheduled Pacific M a i l 
steamship from the Far East, joined Robert 
Lovett early in 1912 for a visit with the presi-
dent "about keeping the railroads together." 
Taft listened courteously but told his visitors 
that he would not interfere with the consid-
erations of his attorney general, George W. 
Wickersham. The implication was ominous: a 
political decision and not an economic deci-
sion would govern the fate of the combined 
Southern Pacific and Union Pacific.4 
Shortly thereafter the government appealed 
to the U.S. Supreme Court, and on December 
2, 1912, that body handed down a momen-
tous decision. The court held that, although 
the amount of business that was competitive 
between the Overland and Sunset routes was 
small compared with total transcontinental 
traffic, the two companies nevertheless were 
competitors for substantial traffic. Conse-
quently, said the court, combination of the 
two was in contravention to the Sherman Act. 
Moreover, the court added an important cor-
ollary. Nothing in its decision, it said, should 
prevent the government or any other party of 
interest from presenting a plan to the lower 
court that would effect a continuity of op-
eration from the Missouri River to San Fran-
cisco as, suggested the justices, was contem-
plated under the Pacific Railroad acts. The 
court's decision brought immediate trauma to 
the Southern Pacific, but its implications were 
even worse.5 
Although disposition of Southern Pacific 
shares held by Union Pacific (in its own name 
or through its Oregon Short Line) was a prob-
lem not resolved for several months, internal 
divorcement proceedings began immediately. 
Joint traffic offices and solicitation agreements 
were terminated at the end of January, 1913, 
less than two months after the court's deci-
sion. New office facilities were easily located, 
but a more pressing problem involved person-
nel. Who would go to the Union Pacific and 
who would remain with the SP? Another 
among a plethora of nagging questions that 
required immediate response involved pooled 
equipment. Julius Kruttschnitt observed that 
if the historic pool was dissolved, each of the 
roads would have to provide more equipment 
to perform the same amount of carriage and, 
of course, new equipment could not be ac-
quired instantaneously. On the other hand, it 
would not be that much of a problem, E. E. 
Calvin contended, since pooling of equipment 
had "been of greater advantage to the Union 
Pacific" than to the SP. In any event, the ar-
rangement ended on Apri l 1, 1913. Yet an-
other crucial decision involved the appoint-
ment of executive officers. Robert S. Lovett, 
whose railroad origins were with the SP, 
elected to retain his position as chairman of 
the Union Pacific's executive committee, but 
in the main those who had been with the SP 
before 1901 returned. Chairman of the new 
executive committee was Julius Kruttschnitt; 
William Sproule, named president in 1911, re-
tained that position. 6 
Earlier in 1913 a fire had destroyed the Eq-
uitable Life Assurance Society building at 120 
Broadway in New York and with it Harriman's 
papers as well as executive office files, minutes 
of the Union Pacific and Southern Pacific 
board of directors, and the minutes of the ex-
ecutive committees. Records held by Julius 
Kruttschnitt and moved from Chicago to new 
offices at 165 Broadway in New York only 
days before the Equitable Fire immediately be-
came invaluable. As the managements of the 
two companies went through divorcement 
proceedings as a result of the court's decree, 
these files were painstakingly evaluated, and 
those "which seemed to relate purely to UP 
matters were turned over to that company." 7 
A consummately peculiar chapter in SP's 
history then unfolded. A n agreement was 
made between the two companies for the can-
cellation of Southern Pacific's lease of the Cen-
tral Pacific, sale of that historic entity to the 
Union Pacific, and the granting to Union Pa-
cific of important trackage rights and other 
concessions. There was nothing in this that 
was advantageous to the Southern Pacific. 
Rather, as SP's top officers said, darkly, it was 
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Julius Kruttschnitt {right) was assisted during the 
hard days of divorcement and unmerger proceed-
ings by Paul Shoup [left) and William Sproule 
[center). 
a condition demanded by the attorney general 
in settlement of the Supreme Court's decision 
separating the Southern Pacific from the Union 
Pacific. Indeed, the SP was told privately by 
the attorney general that unless it voluntarily 
terminated its control of the Central Pacific, 
the government would institute legal proceed-
ings to accomplish such. The merits or lack of 
merits in the government's position aside, 
there were other reasons why the SP agreed to 
mutilation. The company was still controlled 
by Union Pacific and it remained, after all, 
under combined management until February 
i , 1913; independence of thought was not yet 
an option. Moreover, SP management worried 
over the prospect of Union Pacific's dumping 
its huge block of SP stock on the market at 
one time. It also considered that SP's credit 
would be severely clouded by any suit from 
the attorney general's office. SP's management 
viewed its situation much as would a man 
who has a gun at his head. "Southern Pacific 
. . . would not consent to the severance of the 
Central Pacific from its lines . . . if left to its 
own w i l l , " said William Sproule. Yet that was 
not an alternative early in 1913. Thus SP 
yielded, quietly if reluctantly, as Sproule said, 
"simply as an expedient." 8 
Many essential features of the plan to divest 
the Central Pacific in favor of the Union Pa-
cific required approval of the California Rail-
road Commission, a body recently strength-
ened in its regulatory power and composed of 
men appointed by Governor Hiram Johnson, 
hardly known as a friend of the Southern Pa-
cific. Ironically, however, that body, the pesky 
Western Pacific Railway, the ornery San Fran-
cisco Chronicle, and the rebellious California 
public all combined to provide the SP with 
lifesaving support. 
The Western Pacific insisted on a variety of 
concessions should the Union Pacific be suc-
cessful in its quest of Central Pacific, and the 
Railroad Commission concurred. More im-
portantly, the commissioners called attention 
to the fact that the U.S. attorney general had 
interjected a new and crucial requirement not 
specifically cited by the Supreme Court—that 
the Southern Pacific sell the stock of the Cen-
tral Pacific to the UP. Coupled with Union Pa-
cific's own powerful arteries to both Portland 
and Los Angeles, the Central Pacific in UP 
hands would, the commissioners worried, re-
duce the Southern Pacific to the status of "an 
inferior road" and leave California with "one 
dominant line [the UP] and one much im-
paired line" [the SP]. Privately, the commis-
sioners went further: they would, insofar as 
their power extended, oppose any severance 
of the Central Pacific from the SP.9 
In a succession of hotly worded editorials 
the San Francisco Chronicle charged the U.S. 
attorney general with "bullheaded obstinacy" 
for pursuing a plan for "the certain, direct 
and serious injury to the people of Califor-
nia." Under the pretense "of serving the pub-
lic the government has injured the public," 
roared the editorialist. "By compelling the di-
vorce of the Union and Southern Pacific pig-
headed officials have done mischief enough," 
but now, continued the exasperated writer, 
the government wished to take the SP "by the 
throat and tear from it one of its largest assets, 
the Central Pacific Railroad." It amounted to 
"robbing the stockholders of the Southern Pa-
cific, whether they like it or not." The govern-
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merit's efforts "could not be too heartily or 
emphatically condemned" for, if successful, 
" i t would weaken the Southern Pacific, whose 
greatest interests lie in the development of 
California. 1 0 
It was an unusual if pleasant position for 
the Southern Pacific, which had not so long 
before been labeled as an octopus by a rela-
tively well-known novelist. Yet the public opin-
ion in California clearly was that Southern Pa-
cific was being victimized by the government, 
and prevailing sentiment was against Central 
Pacific's divorcement. This was just as cer-
tainly not a matter of stockholder power. In 
early 1913, only 196 Californians held equity 
in the SP, and none had more than 1,000 
shares. Collectively, they controlled a mere 
one-half of 1 percent of the total issue." 
A l l of the major western carriers watched 
the contest with interest. The Union Pacific it-
self worried about SP's plans for the routing of 
traffic once it gained independence, but its 
fears were groundless; the SP pledged to so-
licit traffic above Santa Barbara on the Coast 
Line and Mojave on the Valley Line preferen-
tially via Ogden. The A T & S F was similarly 
concerned. It dispatched W. B. Storey to San 
Francisco as a firsthand observer. The Western 
Pacific was also anxious to protect its interests 
against the giant rivals. And even the Kansas 
City, Mexico & Orient Railway, which was 
about to forge a potentially important con-
nection with the Sunset Route at Alpine, 
Texas, wondered if new circumstances might 
work to its advantage. Most optimistic was 
the Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific, which 
saw a grand opportunity to expand transcon-
tinental volume by way of El Paso and the 
Golden State Route. 1 2 
Meanwhile, Union Pacific's management 
agonized over two critical and related ques-
tions. Should it press energetically for acqui-
sition of the Central Pacific, which it des-
perately wanted? What method should be 
employed in the disposal of its SP stock? 
The Union Pacific was deeply troubled by 
the continuing opposition of the California 
Railroad Commission to separation of Central 
Pacific from SP. After thorough consideration 
it announced on March 15, 1913, that a new 
program for the divorcement, one that would 
look at the CP matter differently, would have 
to be designed. There was a nearly audible 
sigh of relief in San Francisco." 
Meanwhile, the government decided not to 
allow the Union Pacific to implement a pro 
rata program for distribution of its SP shares 
to UP stockholders. Alternative plans were 
considered and, finally, approval was won for 
a complicated proposal that took effect early 
in July. As a consequence, those shares of 
SP held by UP's Oregon Short Line were ex-
changed for shares in the Baltimore & Ohio 
Railroad held by the Pennsylvania Railroad; 
those held directly by the Union Pacific were 
transferred to the Central Trust Company of 
New York as trustee. Undramatically, the Har-
riman era at Southern Pacific ended. 1 4 
Internally, opposition among company of-
ficers to the government's attempt to dispos-
sess SP of the Central Pacific grew after the SP 
gained independence of management in Feb-
ruary, 1913. Initially they had been shocked 
by the idea, then stoically accepted it, then be-
came mutually discontent and, finally, out-
right assertive. Early correspondence among 
the principals at SP bears no emotion but 
merely reflects their going about what they 
perceived as necessary routine under the cir-
cumstances. In May, Sproule cautiously ad-
mitted that he hoped "we will be able to retain 
the Central Pacific," but one month later SP's 
William F. Herrin could contain himself no 
longer: the government's action was, he said, 
"unconscionable . . . in view of the history of 
the Central Pacific and its unified ownership 
at all times with the Southern Pacific." Simply 
stated, Herrin thought the government's "vex-
ing us" was "absolute in its inequity and in-
justice." Herrin reflected a growing sentiment 
among company executives—a sentiment that 
was much more vigorously enunciated after 
the Union Pacific disposed of its SP stock in 
July. Two months later Sproule told an Ore-
Wide-Awake West 55 
gon journalist that the divorcement process 
had been completed, but that the SP would re-
sist any further attempt "to dispossess it of the 
Central Pacific," and that the CP was "not for 
sale at any price." Sproule admitted that the 
SP had "prospered under" Harriman's stew-
ardship but added, correctly if defensively, 
"we would have done so anyway." He chas-
tised the several attorneys general who had 
made mischief for the Harriman Lines and 
hoped that the incumbent, James C. McReyn-
olds, would "be so busy that he will forget 
about the Central Pacific." This statement 
brought an immediate rebuke from Julius 
Kruttschnitt, who disapproved of any "public 
criticism" of the attorney general and urged 
Sproule to "let sleeping dogs lie." A few days 
later, however, Kruttschnitt himself pledged a 
"fight to retain the Central Pacific if the gov-
ernment" brought suit. 1 5 
A fight was the last thing the SP needed at 
the moment. There was skepticism in many 
quarters as to the SP's ability to compete out-
side of the Harriman Lines' umbrella-like pro-
tection and, at least briefly, with the quality of 
SP's management. There were other concerns. 
SP's indebtedness to the Union Pacific was well 
known, as was its need for equipment follow-
ing cancellation of its longstanding pooling 
agreement with Union Pacific. The mood was 
grim. Sproule was moved to exhort "a l l hands 
to steady down and row the boat." He ur-
gently demanded that the traffic department 
get to work "everywhere drumming the trade 
vigorously." The entire SP family, he urged, 
should "work most actively to improve our 
earnings and keep down our expenditures." 
The situation was critical; a dispute with the 
government or the UP in regard to the Central 
Pacific would be most untimely. Kruttschnitt 
was convinced, nevertheless, that a fight was 
coming. He was right. On February n , 1914, 
the government renewed its attack by filing 
suit to force the SP to sell its stock in Central 
Pacific. 1 6 
The unmerger issue had already consumed 
a half-dozen years and, amazingly, was to last 
another nine. It hung over the Southern Pa-
cific like a pall; it unnecessarily sapped the 
company's resources and diverted the talents 
of its management; it resulted in the unhappy 
delay, postponement, and in some cases even-
tual cancellation of improvements that would 
have made the Southern Pacific a more effec-
tive and efficient carrier in the face of chal-
lenges from other railroads as well as new 
modal competition. The government's pro-
ceedings were no doubt well-intentioned, but 
they were also wrongheaded. In the end they 
were equally counterproductive for SP's cur-
rent and future shareholders, employees, and 
patrons. Meanwhile, the railroad continued 
to function during the difficult years 1910 to 
1920. It grew, if slowly, and continued, if un-
evenly, to mature. 
Some, but not all, of SP's expansion and im-
provement program after Harriman's death in 
1909 represented his legacy. This was the case 
on the historic Overland Route, where a pro-
gram of installing a second main track be-
tween Oakland and Ogden was under way. At 
the end of 1912, 167 miles had been finished 
and another 112 miles were in varying states 
of completion. N o authorization had been 
made for the remaining 505 miles, and, sad to 
say, none would be forthcoming until the un-
merger matter was resolved. 1 7 
SP's program of construction and acqui-
sition in Arizona likewise moved haltingly. 
Plans to link the Phoenix-Christmas line with 
the Bowie-Globe Branch (the Gila Valley, 
Globe & Northern Railway, an affiliate) as 
part of a new low-grade relocation of the Sun-
set Route was shelved permanently when the 
federal Reclamation Service built a dam in 
Gila Canyon between San Carlos and Christ-
mas. Plans for the western portion of this, be-
tween Phoenix and Yuma, proceeded, at least 
between Phoenix and Hassayampa, about 40 
miles, which was placed in service by the A r i -
zona Eastern during fiscal 1911. The program 
for the remaining segment toward Yuma was 
postponed, though. South of Tucson, a sub-
sidiary of the SP acquired a tiny independent 
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road, completed a short construction project, 
and by utilizing trackage of the former New 
Mexico & Arizona Railroad (leased from the 
Santa Fe since 1898 and soon to be acquired 
outright), began service to Nogales on the 
Mexican border effective June 19, 1910. In 
the same season, a half-dozen subsidiaries in 
Arizona were consolidated under the flag of 
the Arizona Eastern Railroad. 1 8 
During the years 1902—11, the SP also 
completed an interesting U-shaped route from 
Niland, California, south through the Impe-
rial Valley to the international boundary at 
Calexico, then looping into Mexico for over 
50 miles before rejoining the Sunset Route 
just west of Yuma. A portion of this route had 
been used earlier during the Colorado River 
crisis, and all of it was operated by the Inter-
California Railway under lease from the SP. 1 9 
The situation in the northwestern part of 
SP's service area was analogous to that in its 
southwestern section. Some plans matured, 
others did not. Construction of the Tillamook 
Branch, begun in 1905, was finally concluded 
in 1911, and regular operations commenced 
on January 1, 1912. A heavy volume of fine 
forest products moved to market over this 
new feeder, and for several years summer 
passenger specials handled eager patrons to 
popular vacation spots at or near Tillamook. 
Elsewhere, however, work on the important 
Natron Cut-off remained on hold pending the 
outcome of unmerger proceedings.20 
Another major undertaking in Oregon, one 
that not only garnered remunerative traffic but 
also sealed off rail competition, was the Coos 
Bay Branch. SP's interest dated from 1906, 
when it purchased the tiny but strategically lo-
cated Coos Bay, Roseburg & Eastern Railroad 
&C Navigation Company, which owned a 28-
mile pike in the Coos Bay area. The new prop-
erty was not connected to other rail carriers, 
and none were close at hand, but the SP 
offered connecting service to San Francisco 
and Portland by way of its S.S. Breakwater. SP 
then projected a new road between Drain, on 
the Siskiyou Line south of Eugene and above 
Roseburg, and the newly acquired property 
near Coos Bay. Work on the 82-mile Oregon 
Western Railway, as it was called, continued 
from 1907 through 1910, but it was later 
abandoned and the material salvaged. For 
whatever reason—strategic, most likely—SP's 
interests were redirected in favor of a dog-
legged line running westward from Eugene 
and then southward to Coos Bay, 120 miles. 
To prosecute this venture, SP established the 
Willamette Pacific Railroad on June 14, 1911. 
Grading was commenced in a few months, 
but it was not until five years later that the line 
was opened to traffic over its entire route. A 
celebration to honor the Southern Pacific for 
introducing "Coos Bay to the Wor ld" began 
on August 24, 1916 and ran for three days. 
There was good reason to salute this achieve-
ment. The area was one of the richest un-
developed sections in the country, and Coos 
Bay itself was a wonderful natural harbor, 
possibly the finest between San Francisco and 
Puget Sound. Railroad transportation was sure 
to foster enhancement of the entire region. 2 1 
Harassment by the H i l l Lines in Oregon 
continued, however, and, under SP's con-
stricted circumstance, it seems strange that 
James J. H i l l did not seek further advantage 
there. He did acquire the Oregon Electric 
Railway in 1910. That company had a line 
parallel with the SP from Portland to Albany 
and, under Hill's leadership, was extended to 
Eugene in 1912. SP's traffic department had 
wanted the company to buy the Oregon Elec-
tric before it passed to H i l l , but because Ore-
gon Electric competed side-by-side with the 
SP, company attorneys considered that its ac-
quisition was likely illegal under the Sherman 
Antitrust Act. Kruttschnitt chafed under what 
he considered an invasion of the "territory 
served by us in the Willamette Valley" and 
hoped one day to "have an opportunity to bal-
ance the account." More troubling psycho-
logically than otherwise was Hill's Pacific & 
Eastern Railway, a 32-mile pest located in 
southwestern Oregon, not connected to the 
rest of his empire nor anywhere near it. A n -
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The Coos Bay Branch in Oregon garnered remunerative traffic and also sealed off rail competition. From the 
Coos Bay Times, April 8, 1916. 
other relatively unimportant H i l l operation 
involved the United Railways Company, a 
tiny interurban route serving metropolitan 
Portland. 2 2 
Relations with the Santa Fe during this pe-
riod were, if not cordial, at least stable. On 
December 27, 1911, the SP sold to the Santa 
Fe the Mojave-Needles line, which had been 
under lease to it since 1898. At the same time 
the AT&SF, in exchange for this trackage, 
conveyed to the SP the New Mexico & A r i -
zona Railroad, which owned the line from 
Benson to Nogales, and the Sonora Railway, 
which held the line from Nogales to Guay-
mas, Mexico. These former Santa Fe proper-
ties had been leased by the SP since 1898. 
(The Sonora Railway passed to the Southern 
Pacific of Mexico on June 30, 1912.) To the 
north, the heavy construction required to link 
the disconnected entities of the jointly owned 
Northwestern Pacific Railroad was completed 
on October 23, 1914, and through passenger 
service between San Francisco and Eureka be-
gan a few days later.2 3 
Fortune did not smile on the Southern Pa-
cific of Mexico. The revolutionary movement 
in Mexico affected its construction plans 
and even its operations. Bridges, trestles, and 
other properties were destroyed during the 
years 1910 to 1916. The situation so deterio-
rated during that period that the SPdeMex 
was only "open for traffic from time to time." 
Losses were compounded by that country's 
"generally demoralized business conditions" 
and a resulting loss of revenue as well as slow-
ness on the part of the government in satisfy-
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In 1916, under a series of compromise agreements, the SP advanced the monies necessary to complete the 
San Diego & Arizona. An inspection train is shown here at the second crossing of the Tijuana River. 
ing reparations and payments by the military 
for its transportation charges. Conditions im-
proved late in the decade but not sufficiently to 
warrant completion of planned construction. 2 4 
Yet another colorful element of Southern 
Pacific's history involved the San Diego & A r i -
zona Railway (later the San Diego & Arizona 
Eastern Railway). Early railroad planners pre-
dicted that San Diego would be the western 
terminus of a transcontinental line, but the 
surprising growth of Los Angeles, due in large 
measure to its successful campaign to lure the 
SP, changed all that. San Diego did receive rail 
services of the Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe 
but, much to its chagrin, by way of a spur, and 
the Santa Fe increasingly concerned itself with 
Los Angeles. SP's interest in reaching San D i -
ego dated from 1902 when Julius Kruttschnitt 
ordered William Hood to make a thorough 
study for an outlet to the east, striking the 
Inter-California Railway near El Centro. 2 5 
A n arrangement was made at E. H . Harri-
man's behest between the SP and John D. and 
A . B. Spreckels, under which the Spreckels in-
terests were to organize the company. This 
was done on December 15, 1906; SP's partici-
pation and backing were not immediately di-
vulged to the public. Grading began in Sep-
tember, 1907, and continued until Harriman's 
death in 1909. SP's management then had a 
change of heart and suspended support. The 
Spreckels interests determined to carry out 
the venture on their own and in September, 
1910, agreed to purchase SP's investment. 
Later, however, the Spreckels forces came to 
feel betrayed, and, in fact, the SP had acted 
badly in the matter. Lengthy litigation re-
sulted. Finally, in 1916 a series of compromise 
agreements resulted in SP's advancing monies 
necessary to complete the road, which was to 
be owned equally by the Spreckels interests 
and SP. The reasons for SP's decision to com-
promise were complex and involved moral, fi-
nancial, and policy considerations. There was 
great concern, for instance, in the company's 
general offices that the territory to be served 
was ripe for invasion by the Union Pacific, the 
Santa Fe, or even the Rock Island. 2 6 
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In any event, through internal merger, line 
construction from both ends, and lease of a 
short piece of SP trackage, the route was 
opened for through service on December i , 
1919. The route led southeastward from San 
Diego to Tijuana, where it crossed into Mex-
ico, continued in a generally easterly direc-
tion, crossed back into the United States 44 
miles later, passed over the summit of the 
Coast Range, and then dropped into the Im-
perial Valley. Much of it was characterized by 
rugged, mountainous country requiring a 
profile of stiff grades and difficult curvature. 
Of particular note was the construction 
through Carrizo Gorge—which a New York 
writer labeled "one of the seven wonders of 
America"—where much tunneling was re-
quired to defeat the narrow canyon and steep 
cliffs. The line in Mexico was technically the 
property of the Tijuana & Tecate Railway, a 
wholly owned subsidiary. San Diego & A r i -
zona trains reached El Centro and Calexico 
from Seeley by way of the SP line; through 
business to and from Yuma was carried over 
the Inter-California. In any event, the San 
Diego & Arizona provided what its incor-
porators dreamed—a shorter rail route from 
San Diego to the east that at the same time 
served the burgeoning Imperial Valley. 2 7 
Another construction project involved a 
branch from the Overland Route at Fernley, 
Nevada, northwestwardly to Susanville and 
Westwood, California. Its ultimate strategic 
value was obscured because it began and 
ended in a remote region. Begun as a project 
of the Fernley & Lassen Railway to tap re-
munerative business from the Red River Lum-
ber Company but actually accomplished by 
the Central Pacific, the line was opened to 
Susanville in 1913 and to Westwood the next 
year. 2 8 
During the first two decades of the twen-
tieth century the Southern Pacific moved vig-
orously into the field of electric traction. For 
instance, in 1903 it acquired 50 percent inter-
est in the Pacific Electric Railway (PE), and 
on November 1, 1910, it purchased the re-
mainder. The Pacific Electric itself owned sev-
eral subsidiaries, and these in addition to 
other lines in the Los Angeles Basin owned by 
the SP were consolidated under PE's charter. 
Three years later Pacific Electric advertised it-
self as "the largest electric railway system in 
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the world," running " 2300 scheduled interur-
ban trains daily to points of interest in South-
ern California." In 1912, it operated just 
under 600 route miles and, as the "Wonder-
land Trolley Trai l , " it offered an "economical, 
quick, and satisfactory way to see the South-
land." Several tours were available, among 
them the "Orange Empire Trolley Trip," a 
175-mile tour through "Orange Land," at only 
$3.50 per ticket. Pacific Electric promised 
"competent guides, comfortable service, and 
reserved seats" for this and other excursions.2 9 
Other formerly independent electric trac-
tion operations in California were acquired 
during the same period. These included the 
Stockton Electric Railroad, the Peninsular 
Railway in Palo Alto and San Jose, the Visalia 
Electric Railroad in and around Visalia, the 
Fresno Traction Company, and the San Jose 
Railroads serving San Jose and Santa Clara. 
These provided passenger and also effective 
pick-up and distribution services that were 
beneficial to the public and the corporate par-
ent as wel l . 3 0 
Farther north in the Golden State, the SP, at 
Harriman's direction in 1908, made plans for 
the electrification of its suburban network 
connecting Oakland, Alameda, and Berkeley 
with its cross-bay ferry operations at Oakland 
Mole and Alameda Mole. When completed in 
1912, SP's system was the first in the nation to 
embrace a high-voltage D C overhead system; 
power was generated at the company's Fruit-
vale plant and distributed to substations at 
West Oakland and Berkeley. The initial rolling 
stock of 60 steel multiple-unit cars was even-
tually increased to 140 as business increased.31 
Active consideration was given in 1912 for 
a dramatic program to expand SP's electrified 
operations in the Bay Area. Early in that year 
Thomas Ahearn, an operating officer, pointed 
out that the "main line down the Peninsula" 
from San Francisco to San Jose was "taxed to 
handle present business" and suggested, by 
way of relief, electrification of "the old line" 
plus use of the already electrified Peninsular 
Railway and additional construction if neces-
The Pacific Electric bu i ld ing in Los Angeles. 
sary to "handle the commutation business 
down the Peninsula" and "relieve the present 
steam line." Ahearn also urged extension of 
East Bay electrified suburban operation by 
way of new construction to Hayward and San 
Jose in order to similarly relieve pressure on 
the existing steam line between Oakland and 
San Jose. Ahearn, in reality, was advocating 
electrification of a horseshoe-shaped system 
reaching all the way from Berkeley, in the East 
Bay, to San Jose and back up the west side to 
San Francisco. 3 2 
Ahearn won the support of his superior, 
E. E. Calvin, at least for the San Francisco-
San Jose segment. Calvin observed that elec-
trification would facilitate more flexible ser-
vice, lower employee numbers, release fifty 
coaches and ten locomotives, and reduce the 
steam-powered commuter trains to only the 
heaviest San Francisco—San Jose "expresses." 
Paul Shoup, president of Pacific Electric, like-
wise supported the proposal and urged haste 
in implementation lest a situation develop like 
that in Oregon where Hill's Oregon Electric 
had invaded the Willamette Valley. The esti-
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SP's East Bay electric operation connected Oakland, Alameda, and Berkeley with its cross-bay ferry opera-
tions. Business was brisk. This view shows the approach to the Oakland Mole in 1911. 
Ticket clerks at the Ferry Building in 1907 were a busy lot, indeed. 
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mated cost for electrification of the Peninsula 
line was $4 million; William Sproule signed 
the "authority for expenditure" on December 
11, 1912. N o monies were spent, however. 
The project died, the result of uncertainties 
occasioned by the government's unmerger 
proceedings." 
At the same time, SP's management gave 
thoughtful consideration to the creation of 
a separate corporation vested with all of SP's 
electric operations as well as its ferry boat 
business. William Sproule likely belied the 
prejudice of a steam railroader as he assessed 
the matter. "The operation of electric lines is," 
he told W. F. Herrin, "very much of a streetcar 
business." On the other hand, Sproule ac-
knowledged that "the methods and organiza-
tion of steam railroads are too cumbersome 
and not flexible enough to fit electric trac-
tion." However, Paul Shoup, whose devotion 
to electrification was clear, doubted the value 
of combining the various and disjointed seg-
ments. His concerns were various and com-
plex, but he was particularly bothered by the 
possibility that combination might invite ad-
ditional government regulation and by the 
even more likely possibility of union griev-
ances and demand for increased wages among 
those employed by what might be styled 
"Southern Pacific Electric Company." Shoup 
carried the argument. Thoughts of combina-
tion died accordingly.'4 
In Oregon an enterprising electrical engi-
neer by the name of Alvadore Welch had long 
dreamed of forging an electrified railroad 
from Portland to California. To this end he ac-
quired several streetcar lines and labeled his 
collection the Portland, Eugene & Eastern 
Railway. Unfortunately for him, he had not 
adequate financial resources. E. H . Harriman 
soon purchased his heavily mortgaged lines; 
he and his successors used the Portland, Eu-
gene & Eastern as a vehicle to combat Hill's 
growing influence in the greater Portland area 
and to capture for itself a larger dominion. In 
1914, on January 17, electric service began on 
the West Side loop from Portland to Oswego, 
Newburg, Saint Joseph, and back by way of 
Forest Grove and Hillsboro. The equipment 
used in the new service was composed of 
forty-eight passenger and combination cars 
outfitted at the nearby Beaverton Shops and 
were copies of those used at Oakland. Painted 
in a smart red color, they were, not surpris-
ingly, called the "big Red Electrics." 3 5 
Portland, Eugene & Eastern's president, 
Robert E. Strahorn, promised an eager public 
that his company had "outlined extensive 
plans for further work in Oregon." Strahorn 
was true to his word. He urged further elec-
trification—from Whiteson, south of Saint 
Joseph and McMinnvil le and where the elec-
trification currently ended, to Corvallis and 
Eugene as well as between Salem and Dallas. 
A l l of this, he told William Sproule, could be 
accomplished inexpensively and would "vastly 
increase local business." Sproule was im-
pressed with the net income of 33^ per train 
mile from electric operations in Oregon dur-
ing the summer of 1914, but because of SP's 
impaired ability resulting from the unmerger 
confusion, Sproule concluded that it was im-
possible "to extend the P E & E to Corvallis or 
any where else at this time." Sproule did mod-
ify his position later, however, to facilitate 
electrification to Corvallis, but catenary never 
reached Eugene on the Portland, Eugene & 
Eastern. 3 6 
Southern Pacific's management also inter-
ested itself in electrification of a very different 
character. Beginning in 1903 and lasting for 
ten years, SP officers studied the feasibility of 
electrifying the company's mountain lines 
over the Siskiyous in Oregon and the Sierra 
and Tehachapis in California. The initial as-
sessments were made by both General Electric 
and Westinghouse, and their reports were fa-
vorable. SP thereupon began its own review, 
principally under the direction of Allen H . 
Babcock. After detailed analysis, Babcock con-
cluded that there was not "a reasonable chance 
for profitable electrification" on either the Sis-
kiyou or Sierra line. Study of electrification 
for the Tehachapi route began in 1912 when 
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Santa Fe's E. P. Ripley, who was then consider-
ing a similar possibility for his road between 
Trinidad, Colorado, and Raton, New Mexico, 
asked Julius Kruttschnitt to look into the 
matter.'7 
Kruttschnitt told Ripley in reply that "be-
fore the development of the Mallet locomotive 
the question offered some attractions but the 
possible economies were so much reduced" 
by them that, in regard to the Sierra and 
Siskiyous, "consideration of the matter was 
dropped." There was another problem. The 
railroad would be obliged by the power sup-
plier to stand the expense of a high peak load 
because the movement of trains tended to 
bunch and could not be spread evenly over a 
twenty-four-hour period. For these reasons 
the SP had opted for additional Mallets and 
double track instead of electrification. Never-
theless, Kruttschnitt was willing to consider 
the issue as it applied to the Tehachapis. Ne-
gotiations were conducted with Pacific Power 
& Light, which agreed to provide the nec-
essary electricity on a long-term basis and 
offered a rather attractive rate. Paul Shoup, 
however, was at best lukewarm to the pro-
posal, although he did point out that the cost 
of oil for fueling steam locomotives was likely 
to rise over twenty years whereas the power 
company's proposal would make that factor a 
constant if the electrification proposal became 
a reality. Babcock's appraisal was more direct: 
" O n the basis of present traffic . . . electri-
fication of this division would not be justi-
fied from a financial viewpoint, whether 
the power" was generated by a plant owned 
by the railroad or purchased from a sup-
plier. Kruttschnitt duly reported this to Ripley, 
who was both "quite surprised" and "disap-
pointed." He wondered if the investigation 
had "been undertaken by somebody who was 
prejudiced against the change." It was not 
likely; Babcock was SP's electrical engineer. 
Moreover, it is worth noting that Ripley's 
Santa Fe chose not to electrify its own route 
over Raton Pass.38 
The dramatic surge in population through-
out SP's service area, but particularly in Cali-
fornia, resulted in a concomitant increase in 
the company's passenger offerings. These were 
as diverse as the territory's requirements. Eigh-
teen weekday trains plied in each direction be-
tween San Francisco and San Jose; additional 
commuter service was provided between Los 
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In terms of continuous service, the oldest of the SP's name trains was the Sunset Limited. 
Angeles and Pasadena, San Bernardino, Col-
ton, and Riverside. Locals and mixed trains 
served other constituencies, but the pride of 
the company was in its growing fleet of named 
trains. The oldest of these in terms of continu-
ous service, beginning its life in November, 
1884, was a delightful train initially labeled 
Sunset Express and later Sunset Limited. It 
served, as its name implied, the Sunset Route, 
which, as SP advertised during cold seasons in 
the North, was "the summer way on a winter 
day." Additionally, the SP and its leased lines 
in Texas for several years joined with the 
Southern Railway, West Point Route, and 
Louisville & Nashville to advertise what they 
called the "Washington-Sunset Route" for di-
rect connections through the cooperating car-
riers at New Orleans from Washington, At-
lanta, and Montgomery for all points on the 
Sunset Route as well as California's Valley and 
Coast lines. Additional premier passenger ser-
vice over the western portion of SP's Sunset 
Route was provided by the "sleeping cars 
only" Golden State Limited, a gem of a train 
begun in 1902 and sponsored jointly by the 
SP, Rock Island, and El Paso 8c Southwestern 
between Los Angeles and Chicago via El 
Paso. 3 9 
The Overland Route, however, traditionally 
claimed the company's greatest attention, and 
this was reflected in its passenger service 
there. Three daily trains in each direction dur-
ing 1906 were expanded to four "over the 
Main Highway . . . via the famous Lucin Cut-
Off" a year later. The flagship train among 
them was appropriately named the Overland 
Limited—a superb all-Pullman "De L u x e — 
Extra Fare Train—Electric Lighted." It fea-
tured a buffet club car with barbershop, 
shower bath, and valet services in addition to 
a drawing room compartment car with l i -
brary, stenographer, ladies' maid, newspapers, 
and the latest stock market reports. As a name 
train, the Overland dated from 1887 on the 
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Union Pacific but only 1899 on the SP. Inter-
estingly, SP kept its options open, even during 
the years of Union Pacific control, by handling 
scheduled cars over the Overland Route from 
several carriers out of Chicago, Omaha, Den-
ver, and Saint Louis. 4 0 
On other of the company's routes there was 
a heavy volume of business to and from San 
Jose, Monterey, Tracy, and Sacramento. Ore-
gon traffic was not as impressive, but the SP 
nevertheless provided impeccable service on 
the Shasta Express, later the Shasta Lim-
ited—a "de luxe daily extra fare train" with 
surprisingly fine amenities.41 
The requirements of passenger carriage put 
a special strain on SP's terminal facilities, at 
San Francisco and Los Angeles in particular. 
A new facility for San Francisco, near the 
Ferry Building on Market Street, was under 
consideration before the 1906 earthquake 
and fire, but construction of it was thereafter 
postponed and eventually canceled. William 
Sproule correctly perceived the growing r i -
valry between the two California cities and 
warned Julius Kruttschnitt that it would not 
be politic for the SP "to erect a depot in one 
city and not the other." Finally, by the summer 
of 1912 the company was able to announce 
that new stations were authorized for both. 
There was great pleasure in Los Angeles when 
on June 12, 1915, gates were opened at the 
impressive Central Station, but the mood was 
mixed a few weeks later when SP's Third & 
Townsend Street terminal entered service. Pen-
insula commuters were indignant that the 
company had chosen to make a heavy invest-
ment at that location instead of closer to the 
business district. As one journalist said, "This 
peninsula controversy will never be settled un-
til it is settled on the basis of a Market Street 
terminal." 4 2 
Improvements in rolling stock also typified 
SP's operations. In 1906 the SP placed in ser-
vice its first all-steel passenger car and four 
years later commenced a policy of acquiring 
only steel equipment for passenger operations. 
At the end of fiscal 1913, SP owned 2,292 pas-
Trie Shasta Express, later called the Shasta Lim-
ited, offered fine amenities. 
senger cars; of these, 738, or fully 32 percent, 
were of steel construction. 4' 
The acquisition of all-steel equipment, con-
struction of new stations, and the location of 
downtown ticket offices handy for busy pa-
trons were necessary ingredients if the SP was 
to deal effectively in the business of passenger 
carriage and to ward off increasing competi-
tive attacks. These took the form of the West-
ern Pacific interloper and other steam rail 
competitors, interurban electric lines, and, 
more importantly, motor vehicles. The con-
tinued growth of population in SP country 
notwithstanding, a decline in the volume of 
through and local passengers on the SP began 
in 1914 and continued through 1916, but re-
bounded during World War I to a peak in 
1919. As it developed, the 1914—16 experi-
ence and not that of the war years and 1919 
was a harbinger.4 4 
Revenues derived from passenger opera-
tions were extremely important to SP's income 
statement in those years. That aspect of the 
business was also implicitly understood to be 
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SP's 3rd & Townsend Street station in San Francisco opened during the summer of 1915. 
the company's advertising, public relations, 
and promotional arm. A classic example of 
this interconnection involved San Francisco's 
Panama-Pacific Exposition in 1915. Located 
near Fort Mason, the 635-acre extravaganza 
attracted more than 13 million sightseers. 
Southern Pacific, a California-oriented com-
pany, predictably felt obliged to eclipse all 
other rail competitors, and it did so. SP subsi-
dized the Exposition, offered incentive rates to 
attract visiting crowds, and constructed an 
award-winning Renaissance-style building to 
showcase itself. The Southern Pacific Build-
ing, as it was known, was opened with gala 
festivities on March 10; a general holiday was 
declared by the company, and over 8,500 ac-
tive and retired employees attended. Inside 
was the "Sunset Theatre," which hosted i l -
lustrated lectures and pipe organ recitals; a 
diorama called "The Road of a Thousand 
Wonders" made up of scenes from along SP's 
famous Sunset, Overland, and Shasta routes; 
a reading room where "newspapers from 
principal cities were on file"; and women's 
and men's restrooms. There were "no charges 
of any k ind , " boasted SP. Nearby, in the Trans-
portation Building, the company proudly dis-
played its tiny and elderly 4-2-4T, C. P. Hunt-
ington, next to a modern 2-8-8-2 Mallet. For 
the SP, and the other carriers, too, the Exposi-
tion provided an opportunity to stage a popu-
lar industrial exhibit in home territory. It was 
successful in that and also in stimulating ex-
traordinary passenger revenues.45 
SP's advertisement of California was hardly 
restricted to the Exposition. Indeed, that was 
a year-round project. "In the good old sum-
mer time," said the SP, California was "where 
the flowers are sweetest, the waters are clear-
est, the skies are bluest, and the joys are keen-
est." On the other hand, "winter travel to and 
from California" was also a pleasure if, of 
course, one traveled on the Southern Pacific 
with its "automatic block signals, smokeless 
comfort with oil-burning locomotives, direct 
service, and perfect roadbed." California, the 
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SP pledged to prospective tourists, had any-
thing a person could want: ocean beaches, 
missions, mountain and seaside resorts, big 
trees, and beautiful agricultural valleys. "De-
scriptive California literature free on request," 
the SP always promised. 4 6 
A n important adjunct to SP's double-edged 
policy of promoting its service area while pro-
moting itself was its sponsorship of Sunset 
Magazine. Begun in May, 1898, the aim of 
Sunset was to present "information concern-
ing the great states of California, Oregon, Ne-
vada, Texas, Louisiana, and the territories of 
Arizona and New Mexico—a rich and inex-
haustible field over which the dawn of future 
commercial and industrial importance is just 
breaking." Named for SP's well-known Sunset 
Limited, the magazine was initially edited by 
a small staff in the passenger department. Edi-
torially it was concerned with the challenges 
and opportunities of the West; its contents re-
flected the spirit of the time. The first issue 
contained, not surprisingly, an article on Yo-
semite Valley. Its writers were also intrigued 
with auto transportation and later reported 
on the dawn of the air age. Among its con-
tributors were Bret Harte, Jack London, John 
Muir , Sinclair Lewis, and even SP's own Paul 
Shoup. Advertisers eager to find placement in 
Sunset included, for instance, Cadillac, Ford, 
the Palace and Del Monte hotels, Victor Talk-
ing Machines, Bon Ton Corsets, and Jell-O. 
Neither did Sunset hesitate to advertise itself. 
It was, it said, the magazine that told "by 
story and picture all about the Pacific Coast 
and the Wide-Awake West," available for only 
15 0 per copy at newsstands or $ 1.5 o yearly by 
mail. SP sold Sunset in 1914. Today it is the 
property of the Lane Publishing Company and 
remains the West's oldest popular magazine.4 7 
The Southern Pacific throughout the first 
three decades of the twentieth century ener-
getically lured colonists to its service area. 
This was not new but rather the continuation 
of a program begun early in the company's 
history by the Big Four, who clearly under-
stood that the development of local freight 
and passenger traffic—so important to SP's fi-
nancial health—depended on a productive 
population located along its lines. As early as 
1875 a company broadside asserted Califor-
nia's advantages: "The Laborer's Paradise!! 
Salubrious Climate, Fertile Soil, Large Labor 
Returns, N o Severe Winters, N o Lost Time, 
N o Blight or Insect Pests." Migrants were 
offered tickets at " low rates." Furthermore, 
during the late 1880s and early 1890s, the SP 
sent five-car "California on Wheels" trains 
throughout the Middle West with exhibits of 
California products and agricutural displays 
from various California regions. It was a pio-
neer method of advertising and an important 
factor in attracting home-seekers.48 
Sunset Magazine during the years 1909 
through 1913 conducted its own large-scale 
campaign in cooperation with on-line coun-
ties and municipalities, which joined its 
Homeseekers Bureau in issuing thousands of 
beautiful booklets ballyhooing their respective 
territories. These were distributed by the rail-
road, chambers of commerce, boards of trade, 
county supervisors, and other agencies.49 
The railroad itself engineered still other 
campaigns. A series of booklets, as diverse as 
California Fishing and The New Arizona, 
were published by the SP and placed on trains, 
in depots, and otherwise made available to the 
general public by mail. Particular stress was 
laid on the Sacramento, San Joaquin, Impe-
rial, Coachella, and Indian Wells valleys, west-
ern and southern Oregon, and southern and 
central Arizona. Amazingly, over 80 million 
pieces of literature promoting the Pacific coast 
states were distributed between 1912 and 
1922. 5 0 
Additional efforts to colonize Southern Pa-
cific country were expended in western Eu-
rope. These included, for example, participa-
tion and advertising at the Paris Fair of 1900 
and the Royal Galleries of London in 1910. 
The reception was enthusiastic. Those enticed 
to migrate were urged to seek the assistance of 
SP's European representative, who could, the 
company promised, arrange "through ticket-
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The SP engaged in a strong campaign of colonization, and it developed an enthusiastic symbiotic relation-
ship with its agricultural shippers. 
ing" with any steamship company that had 
service to Atlantic or Gulf Coast ports. "To 
meet their personal needs for a reasonable 
length of time," SP urged, immigrants should 
have at least twenty-five dollars in cash when 
they arrive in the New World. 5 ' 
Other campaigns were conducted closer to 
home. Twice each year, in the spring and in 
the fall, SP agents sold one-way colonist tick-
ets to aspiring candidates who sought new op-
portunity along the Sunset Route west of El 
Paso and the Overland Route west of Og-
den. Rates in 1901 were reasonable: $30.00 
from Chicago, $25.50 from Mississippi River 
points, and $25.00 from Council Bluffs or 
Sioux City. A decade later the tariffs were only 
slightly higher. Ten-day stopovers were al-
lowed at any station in California, Utah, Ne-
vada, Arizona, and at Deming and Lordsburg 
in New Mexico. Before the inexpensive pro-
motional rates were suspended in 1916, an 
amazing total of 798,824 persons availed 
themselves of them. 5 2 
The Southern Pacific understandably en-
couraged a strong symbiotic relationship with 
its agricultural shippers. To this end, it worked 
actively with existing agricultural agencies 
such as the Farm Bureau, the Grange, the 
Farmers Union, various schools, and civic or-
ganizations to promote the welfare of hus-
bandry. The company also hired its own agri-
cultural agents to conduct soil surveys, set 
standards for production, develop irrigation 
districts, and instruct growers in the best 
methods of cultivation. It likewise sponsored 
food demonstration and promotion trains and 
supported local projects such as Fresno's Rai-
sin Festival and California's Orange Day. 5 ' 
The development of fresh fruit and vege-
table production and SP's involvement in sup-
port, particularly in the states of Oregon, 
California, and later Arizona, was impres-
sive. Indeed, the prosperity of this important 
new industry was dependent on the efficient 
and economical transportation offered by the 
Southern Pacific, and, in turn, the SP's income 
statement reflected the importance of such 
traffic tendered by the growers. By 1914 Cali-
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fornia's fruit industry was responsible for 
more of SP's gross revenue from that state 
than any other commodity group. 5 4 
Indeed, California held the focus. Interstate 
shipments of produce from that state began in 
1869 but amounted to a mere thirty-three 
tons. Nine years later SP convinced the Union 
Pacific and its eastern connections to handle 
"not more than two cars per day of California 
fruit" on passenger trains to New York City. 
Then, on June 24, 1886, the SP dispatched the 
first special fruit train from Sacramento; in 
the same year Boston received its first carload 
of California fruit. As volume grew, so did the 
need for sophisticated equipment. Boxcars 
were replaced by ventilator cars, which them-
selves were replaced by refrigerator cars in 
this carriage. Cooperation flourished. To pro-
mote sales of California citrus, the SP joined 
the California Fruit Growers Exchange in an 
advertising campaign in which each party 
paid an equal share. The two found other 
ways to assist each other. A n experimental 
marketing campaign focused on the state of 
Iowa. "Oranges for Health—California for 
Wealth" was the wisdom spread throughout 
that state before specially bannered trains ar-
rived there with Sunkist lemons and oranges. 
Each train was accompanied by a messenger 
who, upon arrival at scheduled locations, had 
the news telegraphed ahead. A 50 percent in-
crease in sales was the result for the growers, 
and a fine increase in traffic was the reward for 
SP. The promise of continuing demand was re-
ward for both. 5 5 
Production and consumption of western 
produce leaped. By 1916 over one billion 
oranges were shipped annually from Cali-
fornia. Citrus, however, was not the only 
commodity rolling east to hungry markets. 
Strawberries, peaches, watermelons, apples, 
potatoes, pears, apricots, grapes, figs, cher-
ries, onions, asparagus, and cantaloupe joined 
the parade—often in special trains. The rates 
were reasonable: $1 to $1.15 per hundred-
weight (phw) to Chicago, slightly more to the 
East Coast. 5 6 
The SP found still other ways to promote 
the welfare of growers while promoting its 
own well-being. The infant table grape indus-
try provides an example. SP allowed one stop 
in transit for grapes, packed in barrels and 
billed in carload lots, for growers who might 
discover that the market had fallen after the 
car had been loaded. In that way the grower 
could stall sale and delivery in the hope that 
the market would rise. The SP also allowed 
part unloading at stop-in-transit points east of 
Colorado. None of this was immediately re-
warding for the SP but represented the com-
pany's gamble that the grape industry would 
make market inroads and thus generate regu-
lar traffic for years to come. 5 7 
To more expeditiously handle the mush-
rooming growth of perishables business, the 
Southern Pacific joined the Union Pacific on 
an equal basis in forming the Pacific Fruit Ex-
press Company. PFE commenced operations 
on October 1, 1907, with a fleet of 6,600 new 
refrigerator cars. It was charged with the re-
sponsibility of operating and maintaining cars 
and services for perishable shippers on both 
lines. Although owned in equal shares by the 
SP and the UP, PFE loadings were made mostly 
on the SP and moved eastbound to Ogden for 
forwarding by the Union Pacific. Business was 
good. PFE handled 70,000 carloads of Pacific 
Coast perishables in 1913 alone. Four years 
later it was, during some weeks, billing 300 
cars daily. 5 8 
The very nature of perishables traffic de-
manded the most expeditious handling, which 
only the railroads at that time could provide. 
On the other hand, much business that was 
not time-sensitive was susceptible to the com-
petition of water carriers, a problem exacer-
bated for the SP and other railroads by the 
opening of the Panama Canal in 1914. Julius 
Kruttschnitt anticipated the need to reduce 
operating costs on SP's Sunset Route in order 
for the company to more adequately meet the 
threat. He contemplated "a reciprocal track-
age agreement" with the Atchison, Topeka & 
Santa Fe using the most efficient lines of the 
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The SP joined the Union Pacific on an equal basis to form the Pacific Fruit Express Company. Business was 
good; PFE handled seventy thousand carloads of Pacific Coast perishables in 1913 alone. Here a fruit block 
is just east of Roseville, California. 
two roads between Galveston and San Fran-
cisco via Mojave. He also planned extensive 
grade reductions in Texas on the 122-mile 
route between San Antonio and Glidden. Sad 
to say, nothing came of the joint venture, the 
Texas project was postponed, and other pro-
posals for upgrading the SP to meet steamship 
competition were put off or canceled because 
of the uncertainties presented by the un-
merger matter. The negative impact of the 
Panama Canal on the SP was consequently 
greater than it should have been.5 9 
One issue that would not long be post-
poned involved the location of general offices 
in San Francisco. Space in the Flood Building, 
rebuilt after the 1906 earthquake and fire, 
was both inadequate and expensive. More-
over, SP's lease was subject to expiration in 
1917. Relocation studies began in 1913; three 
years later SP announced the construction of a 
new ten-story, E-shaped general office build-
ing on the south side of Market Street near the 
Ferry Building. Of Class A construction, the 
new structure rested on 60 lineal miles of pil-
ing driven to a depth of 130 feet and was 
ready for occupancy in September, 1917. 
Each office in the building faced daylight. The 
company boasted that the 280,000-square-
foot structure was "one of the largest of-
fice buildings west of Chicago." It cost 
$ I , 8 7 8 , 8 8 I . 6 0 
The matter of safety, so forcefully advanced 
by E. H . Harriman, continued to be of great 
interest to his successors at SP. The company's 
management actively promoted a campaign of 
"Safety First" among its employees, made 
"generous expenditures for safety devices," 
and enthusiastically reported as much to the 
shareholders. When the derailment of a mixed 
train in June, 1914, cost a passenger his life, it 
was the first fatality among patrons in nearly 
six years. Indeed, SP's record in accident pre-
vention earned for it the American Museum 
of Safety's first annual E. H . Harriman Gold 
Medal in 1913. Safety campaigns, of course, 
were not directed solely toward the secure 
passage of patrons; they also focused on safe 
habits among workers. Small wonder. Rail-
roading was a dangerous business. From 1908 
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through 1914 SP employees who lost their 
lives in service numbered 123. 6 1 
Safety was only one of many themes stressed 
by the Bulletin, SP's company publication, 
which issued its first number on November 
20, 1913. Other topics were predictable and 
reflected the business and management ethos 
of the times: loyalty to the company, means by 
which a person could improve himself within 
the company, and opportunities for employees 
to solicit business on behalf of the company. 
The Bulletin also contained stories dealing 
with events and circumstances that involved 
the railroad, stories related to vacation and 
tourist travel to locations on the SP, as well 
as notices regarding SP passenger trains and 
those operated by principal connections. The 
new magazine also provided a vehicle for 
management to disseminate information and 
for it to communicate the company's side of 
stories (such as unmerger) to employees.62 
Like railroad managers elsewhere during 
those years, SP's general officers were forced to 
spend an increased portion of their time on 
issues that were inextricably linked—rates, 
regulation, demands of labor, and dividends. 
The public, whether its complaints against 
railroads were based on fact or not, demanded 
and succeeded in gaining additional federal 
regulation of the carriers. The Elkins Act of 
1903 and the Hepburn Act of 1906 greatly in-
creased the powers of the Interstate Com-
merce Commission. The carriers, as a conse-
quence, lost the ability to set rates and thus 
regulate their own income. Julius Kruttschnitt 
blasted "the demagogues and the well inten-
tioned though unenlightened reformers," who 
together were responsible for the passage of 
"many unreasonable laws . . . which serve no 
public good and which add unnecessarily to 
the cost of operation." William Sproule tried 
to put a better face on it: "The era of regulation 
had definitely arrived. The principle of regula-
tion is accepted. The question of what is good 
in regulation and what is bad in regulation re-
mains debatable," however.6 3 
Unfortunately, difficulties with SP's contract 
employees and with labor's demands acceler-
ated during the teens. In 1911 the company 
experienced a general strike but broke it by 
hiring replacements for those who left. Strikes 
elsewhere were no more successful. Organized 
labor then adopted a new tack: it sought fed-
eral legislation to attain its goals. Premier 
among them was the demand for an eight-
hour day, in reality a demand for time-and-a-
half rates for work over eight hours. The 
Adamson Act in 1916 guaranteed it . 6 4 
Earlier legislation had curbed the railroads' 
ability to control its income; the Adamson 
Act, in essence, eliminated the carriers' ability 
to control outgo. Parity might have been 
achieved if the ICC had allowed rates to rise in 
relation to costs. Alas, it was not to be. In 
1918 alone on the SP, revenues gained from 
paltry rate increases failed to cover increased 
operating expenses by a whopping $14 mil-
lion. SP's operating ratio jumped from 62.2 in 
1917 to a disappointing 85.8 in 1920. The 
entire matter resulted in the flow of invest-
ment capital away from the railroad industry. 
This, in turn, resulted in what Albro Martin 
has called the demise of the spirit of enterprise 
in the industry—a loss that sapped the energy 
of that crucial sector, diminished its capacity 
to offer cost-effective service in a transporta-
tion world that was increasingly subject to 
modal alternatives. Under the circumstance, 
SP's ability to present its shareholders with 
a regular annual dividend of 6 percent was 
remarkable. 6 5 
Events growing out of the assassination of 
Archduke Franz Ferdinand on June 28, 1914, 
quickly had impact not just in Europe but the 
entire world. At home, and on the SP, the 
initial result was a most unpleasant war de-
pression. This economic downturn—linked 
directly to the outbreak of World War I— 
coupled with the loss of traffic resulting from 
the opening of the Panama Canal combined to 
sharply reduce SP revenue in 1914 and 1915. 6 6 
The situation then changed dramatically. 
Europe at war soon craved American produc-
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Events growing out of the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand finally drew the United States into 
World War I. 
tion; as a consequence, domestic depression 
turned to prosperity. Industrial activity stimu-
lated by the war in 1916 and 1917 plus in-
creased traffic resulting from diversion of 
ships from the Panama route to transatlantic 
service caused a leap in revenues. The heavy 
flow of traffic was increased further when the 
United States declared itself to war early in 
Apri l , 1917. The industry moved immediately 
to deal with new challenges by creating what 
it called the Railroads' War Board. This agency 
pledged to support the war effort by running 
the country's several and independent carriers 
as a "continental railway system," by organiz-
ing carpools, and by eliminating duplication 
of services. But problems were great. War traf-
fic generally moved in one direction—east— 
and when Atlantic seaboard port facilities 
and ocean transport proved inadequate, rail 
cars simply became warehouses. A severe car 
shortage was the consequence. The war en-
flamed an already difficult imbalance—one 
reflected by the example of Central Pacific's 
car 83622, which was absent from home rails 
for over seven years.6 7 
With William Sproule as chairman of the 
Western Department of the Railroads' War 
Board, the SP took a special interest in the 
success of this voluntary association. Sproule 
promised that public convenience would be 
subordinate to national need, that government 
interests would have first call on all transpor-
tation facilities, and that the company would 
diligently seek to render efficient service. The 
movement of troops, especially, presented 
problems. Thousands of trains were required 
to move the "new national army" and N a -
tional Guard troops to cantonments around 
the country. A case in point involved the 
movement of 18,500 men to Camp Lewis, 
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Washington, during the fall of 1917. This re-
quired several trains of mixed equipment, in-
cluding baggage and stock cars; it confronted 
the commissary department with the problem 
of serving 40,000 meals en route. The under-
taking required the cooperation of the Red 
Cross and civic organizations at twenty-two 
on-line points where the men were detrained 
and partook of open-air barbecues and other 
home-cooked meals. SP's dining car fleet was 
simply inadequate to the swell of such traffic.6 8 
SP's San Francisco Committee of the Com-
mission on Car Service meanwhile tackled the 
matter of efficient use of freight equipment. 
This committee forcefully urged shippers to 
use car space fully. "You need it. Your neighbor 
needs it. Uncle Sam must have it ," was the 
resolute message of that group. "Transporta-
tion Wi l l Win the War," it reminded. Com-
pany agents also urged consignees to unload 
cars promptly, to notify the company when 
this was accomplished, to pool shipments, to 
load cars promptly, and to load them to ca-
pacity or even "ten per cent above." The re-
sponse was gratifying. Company auditors dis-
covered that SP equipment was doing thrice 
the service of only three years earlier. 6 9 
Yet even this was inadequate. On December 
1, 1917, the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion recommended to President Woodrow 
Wilson that the federal government take pos-
session of the railroads. Wilson agreed; on 
December 28 control passed to the U.S. Rail-
road Administration and to William G . M c -
Adoo, director general. McAdoo promised 
stringent control and centralized management 
of routing and distribution of freight traffic as 
well as joint use of terminals, shops, and 
equipment. Kruttschnitt was understandably 
nervous about the new arrangement. There 
was nothing in the history of American rail-
roading parallel to the new federal control; 
for that matter, however, there was nothing in 
American experience like its involvement in 
"the Great War." Kruttschnitt would keep a 
stiff upper lip. He reminded all employees that 
they should "continue to perform their cus-
tomary duties and to obey orders" of the regu-
latory bodies, and he "earnestly requested" 
that all hands "maintain the character of ser-
vice on the Southern Pacific Lines so as to 
keep them in the highest rank of American 
railroads." 7 0 
McAdoo was firm. He expected "every pos-
sible effort to increase efficiency" as well as 
the "hearty cooperation" of SP officers and di-
rectors. Indeed, in McAdoo's view, it was "ob-
ligatory upon every officer and employee . . . 
to apply himself with unreserved energy and 
unquestioned loyalty to his work." It was a 
matter of patriotism. Railroaders, he said, 
were "just as important . . . in winning the 
war as the men in uniform who are fighting in 
the trenches." Only through "united effort, 
unselfish service, and effective work" could 
this war be won and "America's future be se-
cured." The USRA's rallying cry was direct: 
"First of A l l , Win the War." William R. Sproule 
and W. R. Scott, among others at SP, were ap-
pointed by the USRA to positions of responsi-
bility in the administration of the company's 
affairs.7 1 
There was, to be sure, discomfort among 
virtually all railroad managers regarding gov-
ernment control. Critics of the industry inter-
preted this feeling as disloyalty, but when the 
San Francisco Examiner suggested that rail-
road officials hampered efforts of the USRA, 
William Sproule saw red. "Every officer of this 
company," he exploded in a letter to Julius 
Kruttschnitt, "believes it to be his duty as a 
citizen, besides being his duty as a railroad 
man, to do at this time everything that can be 
done to make the operations of this railroad 
a success." Sproule was still upset when he 
addressed the San Francisco Transportation 
Club a few weeks later. Such accusations were 
false, deceitful, and traitorous, he said. 7 2 
Common control by the USRA brought no-
table changes. Ticket offices in several cities 
were consolidated; traffic solicitation offices 
were closed; SP's Oakland Pier became a joint 
operation with Western Pacific and Santa Fe; 
the SP ferry operation now served WP and 
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A T & S F patrons in addition to its own; con-
gestion on the Sunset Route between Yuma 
and El Paso was relieved in part by using the 
parallel El Paso & Southwestern as a double-
track line; and SP's Bulletin became the 
Southern Pacific—Western Pacific Bulletin. 
Under pressure from the USRA, the SP and 
the Western Pacific, which for some years be-
fore federal control had been discussing the 
matter, also agreed to forge a 182-mile paired-
track operation between Weso, two miles east 
of Winnemucca, and Alazon, four miles west 
of Wells, in Nevada. 7 3 
"Waste and extravagance are Germany's si-
lent allies," said the editor of the Bulletin dur-
ing the summer of 1918. His views reflected 
the wisdom of the day. The country, in prose-
cution of its war effort, after all, was devoted 
to both conservation and efficiency. Stenog-
raphers were urged to get the fullest use of 
carbon sheets; station agents were counseled 
to exercise the greatest care in saving and stor-
ing scrap wood; firemen were called upon to 
save fuel; engineers were warned against wast-
ing boiler water; and section laborers were en-
couraged to cultivate "war gardens" along 
company rights-of-way. A l l employees were 
asked to "Hooverize" on stationery supplies. 
The ongoing campaign against lost and dam-
aged freight now became a patriotic duty. 
Consequently, the director general caused to 
be established a bureau to check all cases of 
pilferage, false claims, or embezzlement; steal-
ing from the railroad during World War I was 
viewed as stealing from the government. The 
National Council of Defense also asked sta-
tion agents in California to assist in locating 
idle land capable of growing wheat. At the 
same time, SP's commissary department an-
nounced that, in accordance with a request 
from food administrator Herbert Hoover, the 
company would suspend the use of baked 
goods made from wheat flour on all diners. 
Director General McAdoo reflected the con-
servation movement as well as the country's 
move toward prohibition when he banned the 
sale of "liquor and intoxicants of every char-
The editor of the Bulletin was gripped with pa-
triotic fervor. 
acter in dining cars, restaurants, and railroad 
stations." The country even determined to 
conserve sunlight; federal daylight savings leg-
islation went into effect on March 31, 1918. 7 4 
SP employees found an amazing variety of 
ways to serve the national effort. Most re-
mained on the job as part of what one officer 
called "the great industrial army." In San 
Francisco they packed the Columbia Theatre 
on "Southern Pacific Night" to see Pershing's 
Crusaders, and across the system they saved 
khaki and gray knitted articles "for the boys 
in the field" and otherwise supported the Red 
Cross and the Red Cross Auxiliary. Others 
volunteered or were drafted. Nearly 3,000 
from SP's Pacific Lines family served in the 
armed forces; forty-six died in action. A stan-
dard service flag with numerals indicating the 
number of SP employees then in the service 
was proudly placed in prominent display at 
the company's general office building. 7 5 
A l l could participate and contribute in at 
least one way—through the Liberty Bond and 
War Savings Stamp programs. The SP ad-
vanced up to 25 percent of annual salaries to 
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Williamson. 
those employees who wished to use that money 
for the purchase of Liberty Bonds; the com-
pany was reimbursed through monthly deduc-
tions. There were several drives. Over 50,000 
SP employees joined to purchase $5,218,500 
in bonds during one campaign alone. The 
USRA encouraged competition in this re-
gard and among specified western roads—the 
Santa Fe, the Union Pacific, the Rock Island, 
and the Milwaukee—SP's employees almost 
always subscribed more on a percentage basis 
and in net dollars. The company itself sub-
scribed to at least $19 million. It also found 
more prosaic ways to encourage the cam-
paigns. "Save Your Child from Autocracy and 
Poverty. Buy War Savings Stamps" and "Hal t 
the Hun. Buy War Savings Stamps" were the 
injunctions of campaign posters plastered on 
the walls of depot waiting rooms across the 
system. Such stamps, in denominations of 25 £ 
and $5.00, were sold in the general office 
building by the company librarian, who re-
ported sales of $2,000 weekly. 7 6 
The editor of the Bulletin was especially en-
ergetic in boosting the Liberty Bond cam-
paigns. " H e who is not actively for America in 
these days is against her," he bellowed. "Idle 
money is enemy money," and, he continued, 
"idle men and women are giving comfort to 
the enemy." The editor mirrored the patriotic 
fervor of the time. Not surprisingly, his views 
darkened as the war progressed. In 1917 he 
joked that the Kaiser was "facing red signals 
all around him and is headed for the derail," 
but later he approvingly reported the story 
from an off-line city where a deputy sheriff 
took it upon himself to post his personal mes-
sage: "This is an American town. Don't criti-
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cize our President or our Government. If you 
don't like our country, go back to your own 
country. If you have no country, go to hell ." 
The editor urgently exhorted his readers to 
know Germany for what it was—"the mighti-
est outlaw nation in history," one that heart-
ily embraced "incredible barbarous doctrines 
and vicious teachings." At home each citizen 
should, he said, "weigh each question on the 
scales of Americanism, and if it doesn't mea-
sure up discard it at once." The editor was 
not alone in his growing hysteria. Americans 
increasingly shed their idealism in favor of 
xenophobia and other fashionable irresponsi-
bilities. On the SP a formal program of "Ameri-
canization" fortunately embraced a positive 
policy of education instead of hateful discrimi-
nation. On the Los Angeles and Tucson divi-
sion "school cars" and portable schoolhouses 
provided educational opportunities for the 
children of SP track laborers who, in the main, 
were foreign born. "The children are taught 
respect for the American flag, American his-
tory, and our constitution," reported the edi-
tor of the Bulletin. "This is a mighty good 
movement," he concluded. 7 7 
The war, of course, brought a boom econ-
omy for the United States. Traffic on the SP re-
flected it. Material of war represented an im-
pressive portion, since it took four tons to 
maintain a single soldier in France. On the SP 
military shipments were as diverse as Oregon's 
Tillamook County cheese, northern Califor-
nia's timber products (for "the construction 
of war plants and aeroplanes"), and steel for 
the Pacific Coast's shipbuilding industry. The 
railroad itself was at the highest state of 
mobilization. 7 8 
Then, suddenly, the war ended; an armistice 
was declared on November 11, 1918. Service-
men who had left their jobs at the SP, who for-
tunately survived the conflict and who re-
mained " i n competent physical and mental 
condition," reclaimed their jobs with full se-
niority and pension rights. On Labor Day, 
1919, for an hour and twenty minutes SP's 
ferryboats "stood at attention" in their slips as 
the U.S. fleet passed through San Francisco 
Bay. It seemed a fitting salute to the "war to 
end all wars" and to all who had served in i t . 7 9 
Meanwhile, the railroad industry's nervous-
ness with the USRA turned to fear as elements 
of the country's citizenry clamored loudly for 
outright ownership of the railroads by the fed-
eral government. Director General McAdoo 
himself suggested five years of government 
control following the end of hostilities, and 
the Hearst and other newspapers began to 
beat the same drum. SP's management was 
caught flatfooted by this turn of events. It had 
assumed that railroads under federal control 
would be returned to their owners within 
twenty-one months after the end of the war, as 
the law provided. Now it seemed that events 
might turn out otherwise. 
Indecision among SP's top officers was the 
immediate result. Epes Randolph urged that a 
campaign be started on behalf of the railroads 
to retain their properties but thought it really 
"a fight between the substantial citizenship on 
the one hand and the laborites and the irre-
sponsible politicians on the other." He hoped 
that railroad officers would be able to stay in 
the background. Frank Karr, Pacific Electric's 
chief counsel, suggested that railroad mana-
gers quickly formulate and "advocate a con-
crete form of proposed legislation" that would 
"protect the owners, employees, and the pub-
l ic . " A program of public awareness and edu-
cation was advocated by Paul Shoup. Krutt-
schnitt encouraged open discussion among 
senior officers, for, as he told them, the matter 
was "of the most vital importance." Gradually 
a consensus took shape: Railroads should not 
seek to escape regulation in matters reason-
ably demanded by the public but should, in-
stead, attempt to bring about a more scien-
tific, orderly, and just system.8 0 
It is questionable if the Esch-Cummins or 
Transportation Act of 1920 resulted in the 
kind of system idealized by SP's senior officers. 
However, under its provisions the carriers at 
least were returned to private management 
effective March 1, 19 20 . 8 1 
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That did not end the matter. Government 
management had been essentially satisfactory 
from the standpoint of moving traffic but it 
had been otherwise from the point of mainte-
nance. Rolling stock, which had been pooled 
for efficiency by the USRA, had not been ade-
quately maintained by "foreign" roads, and 
locomotives had been pushed to the limit dur-
ing the war years. Kruttschnitt was particu-
larly vexed by the condition of SP's lines in 
Texas and Louisiana. Tie renewals there had 
been grossly neglected, and damage and in-
efficiencies were the result. There was an ad-
ditional problem. The SP wanted Washing-
ton authorities to prosecute a claim against 
the German government for "war risk insur-
ance"—in the amount of $42,347.22. 8 2 
The problems of World War I and the USRA 
became bittersweet memories as time passed. 
However, other events afforded SP managers 
no relief from problems—chief among them 
was "unmerger." 
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Unmerger 
"If the impending hardship of having one's 
life work ruthlessly destroyed for no public 
benefit does not enlist your sympathy in our 
behalf, may I hope that it will at least deter 
you from helping those who seek, and have 
long sought, to destroy the Southern Pacific 
body and to dismember and feast upon it 
before even its corpse is cold."—Julius Krutt-
schnitt, 1922., to Gen. Charles G. Dawes 
N E I T H E R the Wilson administration nor the 
Union Pacific Railroad had been happy with 
the agreement made in 1913 whereby the 
Southern Pacific was divorced from the UP. At 
issue was the Central Pacific Railway, which 
represented not just SP's part of the Overland 
Route but also other important arteries, feed-
ers, and terminal facilities. The government 
ostensibly was concerned with the matter of 
competition; the Union Pacific, clearly, with 
reacquiring at least a part of Harriman's for-
mer SP empire and expanding its dominion as 
a result. 
As 1913 passed to 1914, Julius Kruttschnitt 
and other senior officials at the SP were in-
creasingly certain that the government would 
involve itself again in the company's fortunes. 
Early in January, 1914, Kruttschnitt suggested 
to William Sproule that "the present is a pecu-
liarly propitious time" to mobilize public 
opinion and governmental leaders in Califor-
nia on behalf of the SP. In this way, Krutt-
schnitt thought, the Wilson administration 
might be dissuaded from its apparent unto-
ward intentions. There would be no problem 
generating enthusiasm among most Califor-
nians, who continued in their love-hate rela-
tionship with the SP; they saw the company 
both as an octopus, and as their own local 
road. In the main, Californians agreed with 
Kruttschnitt's argument that the SP and the 
Central Pacific were, in fact, "interdependent, 
having been conceived, constructed and oper-
ated as one connected whole." Neither 
company, promised Kruttschnitt, was self-
sufficient. The prospect of a weakened South-
ern Pacific thoroughly alarmed the directors 
of the San Francisco Chamber of Commerce, 
who unanimously resolved that any proposed 
suit by the government to dispossess the SP of 
Central Pacific was not in the public interest. 
Across the continent, New York's Financial 
America approvingly reported on the "de-
termined opposition by Californians to un-
merging." 1 
The Wilson administration was unmoved. 
On February 11, 1914, Attorney General J. C. 
McReynolds brought suit in the U.S. district 
court to separate the Central Pacific from the 
Southern Pacific because, he argued, their 
union was in violation of the Sherman Anti-
trust Act of 1890 as well as the Pacific Rail-
road Acts of the 1860s. 2 
The suit created an extremely murky en-
vironment in which SP's management had to 
operate. One day before the government an-
Unmerger 79 
nounced its intentions, the SP had begun the 
sale of convertible bonds among company 
stockholders; the suit had an understandably 
chilling effect. Said one blunt Louisville share-
holder, "I have no desire to increase my hold-
ings in the Southern Pacific Company, either 
in stock or bonds, if a suit is to be brought by 
the Attorney General to divorce the Southern 
Pacific and the Central Pacific." Programs for 
improvements and expansion, confused since 
the government's decision in 1908 to separate 
SP from Union Pacific, were now in disarray. 
Among primary projects thus affected were 
the Natron Cut-off in Oregon and the pro-
gram to double-track the Overland Route all 
the way from Sacramento to Ogden. Competi-
tive conditions in central California posed an-
other problem. Independent carriers there, 
particularly the electric lines, were cutting 
into revenues of the Central Pacific, but since 
they frequently paralleled the CP, they could 
not be acquired without violating antitrust 
laws. Should the government be successful in 
divesting Central Pacific, the SP could legally 
acquire these. However, by the time a decision 
on the case could be reached, they might be 
lost to competition. It was, at best, a dilemma 
for Kruttschnitt and his associates.1 
The government's suit was of regional but 
also national interest and received much at-
tention in the press. Support for the SP was 
impressive. William Randolph Hearst, whose 
jousting with the Southern Pacific was legend-
ary, vowed to lend his inestimable support and 
to "preserve" SP's "views as convincingly as 
possible." Hearst considered that the public 
did not at all times receive its "proper share of 
advantages" and, in his view, when those ad-
vantages were not appropriately shared, it was 
"the duty of government" to help. However, 
that did not mean, in Hearst's view, the de-
struction of "combination and cooperation 
which makes such advantage possible." 4 
His and other newspapers soon thundered 
opposition to the government's suit. "The 
Sherman Anti-Trust law was intended to im-
prove conditions, not make life more expen-
sive," said the New York American. In Chi-
cago the Examiner quoted Talleyrand as it 
condemned the attorney general for action 
"worse than a crime—it is a blunder." Edi-
torial writers for the San Francisco Chronicle 
considered that McReynolds was "bent on 
doing a great mischief to California and the 
whole Pacific Coast." The "persecution of the 
Southern Pacific Company," they said, was 
"morally ex-post facto" since the government 
was attempting to punish current manage-
ment and owners "for wicked acts committed 
in the last generation by persons who got rich 
and," they added with consummate irony, " i n -
cidentally conferred a public benefit." The 
New York American thought there was "some-
thing awful about a government using its im-
mense weight to destroy its citizens, its institu-
tions, and their values." Other writers focused 
on the financial and legal ramifications of the 
matter. Theodore H . Price, in the Outlook, 
wondered if "the agencies of government shall 
become agencies of economic destruction?" 
An editorialist for Leslie's Weekly pursued the 
same theme. He urged "every security holder 
of the Southern Pacific, and of every other cor-
poration whose interests are being jeopar-
dized by the trust-busting program of the At-
torney General, take up the cudgel in behalf of 
fair treatment for corporations that are obey-
ing the law." Elsewhere, Kenneth C. Kerr, 
editor of Railway and Marine News, wor-
ried that the government's success in this case 
would "establish the most disastrous prece-
dent tending toward the dissolution of various 
other railroads." 5 
The view of California journalists was re-
markably consistent. Among some seventy-
five members of the California Press Associa-
tion, there was universal support for the SP in 
its contest with the federal government.6 
Not surprisingly, men of business were posi-
tively alarmed by implications of the suit. "If 
the lines [SP and CP] are separated each of 
them will be obliged to expend millions of 
dollars to build necessary connecting lines and 
secure terminals," complained William H . 
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Crocker of the Crocker National Bank. This 
would, he concluded, "result in increased rates 
and impaired service." Santa Fe's E. P. Ripley 
expected "a howl . . . from the people" that 
would "surprise the government." However, 
he regarded the loss of the Central Pacific 
"improbable." 7 
The SP filed answers to the attorney gen-
eral's allegations on Apri l 30, 1914. The Cen-
tral Pacific was, said company attorneys, a 
fully integrated entity of the Southern Pacific: 
the lines of the two companies were managed 
commonly, and they had been developed as 
one property. A l l alleged violations of anti-
trust were denied.8 
The trial was held in San Francisco and 
New York during March, 1915; it lasted 
twenty-nine days. The UP did not publicly ad-
mit that it wanted the Central Pacific for itself 
but at this stage urged only that an indepen-
dent CP would offer Southern Pacific some 
much-needed competition. UP's Robert S. 
Lovett reiterated his company's historic fear 
that the SP would divert traffic away from 
Ogden to the Sunset Route. Lovett had to ad-
mit, however, that UP's circumstances in 1915 
were very much different from those in 1901, 
when Harriman had taken SP into his fold. 
Union Pacific now had strong arteries reach-
ing Pacific tidewater at both Portland and Los 
Angeles. Moreover, it had an alternative in-
dependent connection to the Bay Area in the 
form of the Western Pacific from Salt Lake 
City. Lovett also admitted that the Southern 
Pacific was "working the Central Pacific very 
efficiently" and at no disadvantage to his 
road. Lovett likewise conceded that he was 
not certain the Union Pacific would garner 
more business if Central Pacific were indepen-
dent or even if it became UP's own line into 
central California. 9 
William Sproule confirmed that, all factors 
being equal, SP preferred to solicit business 
for the Sunset Route as its longest haul. Im-
portant variables had to be considered, how-
ever. SP did not encourage the waste of ton 
miles and, depending on origin or destination 
points, much traffic moved automatically via 
Ogden. Time-sensitive traffic to or from Cen-
tral Pacific points likewise moved by way of 
the Overland Route. Sproule insisted that no 
change of policy in this regard had occurred 
since SP's separation from Union Pacific. 1 0 
Crusty Julius Kruttschnitt went further. He 
said that relations with the Union Pacific, par-
ticularly from the point of operations, re-
mained as they had been during his entire 
tenure—"harmonious . . . cordial . . . coop-
erative." Kruttschnitt thought transcontinen-
tal service, passenger as well as freight, via 
Ogden was "the best . . . of any . . . in the 
United States." In fact, said SP's chairman, the 
Union Pacific connection at Ogden was likely 
treated with greater care than those made at 
El Paso, where tariff divisions were more fa-
vorable to the SP.1 1 
Much that the court heard in 1915 was a 
rehash of testimony offered earlier in the gov-
ernment's successful attempt to separate the 
Southern Pacific from the Union Pacific. Sev-
eral witnesses hostile to the SP recalled that it 
had been willing to sell the Central Pacific to 
the Union Pacific early in 1913 and wondered 
why the SP took such a dramatically different 
position now. It was a good point, and Krutt-
schnitt welcomed a chance to address it. He 
and other senior officers of both firms knew 
the answer, if the public did not. The attorney 
general in 1913, George W. Wickersham, had 
simply "used compulsion," testified Krutt-
schnitt. Only the energetic activities of the 
press and the California Public Utilities Com-
mission had then convinced the government 
and, incidentally, the Union Pacific to back 
off. Kruttschnitt could not forswear an oppor-
tunity to add an editorial postscript. The cur-
rent fiasco was nothing less than an attempt to 
"rob the Southern Pacific of its rightful prop-
erty," he contended.1 2 
Newspapers continued to watch the affair 
with great interest; all seemed to take an edi-
torial position. The "continuous and spec-
tacular 'kicking' of the poor old political 
corpse of the Southern Pacific Company is 
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grotesque"—a fact, said the San Francisco 
Chronicle, as strange as it was barbarous, 
since " i n a political sense the Southern Pacific 
Company has long been dead as a door nai l . " 
The same newspaper asserted that "never was 
anything more unjust or injurious attempted 
by the most despotic government on earth 
than the unmerging of the Union and South-
ern Pacific, and the attempted unmerging of 
the Southern and Central." The support of 
the California press must have bemused and 
pleased SP's management, since it had until re-
cently been the state's chief whipping boy." 
There was good news for the SP on March 
10, 1917, when the district court denied the 
government's petition. J. P. Blair, SP's general 
counsel, said the decision was a good one not 
just for his company but for all of the larger 
railroads, which, had the government's case 
been upheld, presumably would have been 
subject to their own dismemberment proceed-
ings. For the SP the victory was all the more 
gratifying because in its fight it had been 
"backed by the sympathy and support of the 
communities it served." 1 4 
The euphoria at SP and among its support-
ers was short-lived, for the government im-
mediately appealed the case to the Supreme 
Court. Before that body could study the case, 
however, the country's railroads became sub-
ject to USRA regulations during World War 
I—regulations that among other things de-
manded discontinuance of competition among 
routes and, instead, demanded coordination 
and combination. The irony was incredible. 
The SP and the Union Pacific had been coordi-
nated and combined before 1913—only to be 
separated by zealous proponents of "trust 
busting." In any event, arguments before the 
Supreme Court on this case were deferred un-
til the end of federal control. 1 5 
The Transportation Act of 1920, of course, 
resulted in the release of the railroads to their 
owners but it also strengthened the hand of 
the Interstate Commerce Commission in sev-
eral ways. For instance, mergers or consolida-
tion of railroads now became subject to ICC 
approval. Additionally, Congress ordered the 
regulatory agency to study and in fact to pro-
mote the consolidation of the nation's rail-
roads into a limited number of systems. To this 
end, the ICC hired Professor William Z . Rip-
ley, who eventually suggested nineteen large 
railroads. A l l of this, as it developed, proved 
timely for the Southern Pacific. 1 6 
Officers of the company, however, were con-
cerned when Ripley wondered if SP's lines in 
Oregon might not be better held by the Union 
Pacific. Kruttschnitt told Ripley that the "loss 
of its Oregon lines would be a staggering 
blow" and UP's Robert S. Lovett advised the 
respected professor that "even if they were for 
sale . . . the Union Pacific could use the money 
elsewhere very much more to the advantage of 
the public and its own stockholders." Ripley 
dropped that idea but then floated another. 
Kruttschnitt was thoroughly alarmed, but 
Lovett was greatly pleased when Ripley pro-
posed to place the main line of the Central Pa-
cific with the Union Pacific. 1 7 
Lovett reflected on the idea and then dis-
patched a most remarkable letter to Krutt-
schnitt. Frankly, he said, "the Union Pacific 
would much prefer to be let alone" and, for 
that matter, he assumed the entire industry 
would prefer to seek its own ends. However, 
Lovett was pleased that the government 
seemed to be taking a softer line toward merg-
ers. The very best of these, in his judgment, 
would be a combination of the Union Pacific 
and the Southern Pacific that would also take 
in "the Chicago & North Western and por-
tions of the Wabash and perhaps some other 
minor lines." He felt strongly that this was 
"the most natural relationship of any and 
would accord with the natural lines of traffic"; 
it would be "the wise ?.nd logical combina-
tion." Such a merger would have another im-
portant benefit, as it would simultaneously 
"settle the Central Pacific question." Lovett 
acknowledged that rejoining the SP and Union 
Pacific "would be contrary to the decision of 
the Supreme Court in our merger case [1912], 
but" he observed, "so are all the other com-
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binations as proposed" by Ripley as a conse-
quence of the Transportation Act. Kruttschnitt 
was reserved in response. He had "not given 
much consideration to possible combinations 
between the Southern Pacific System and 
other railway systems." However, Kruttschnitt 
used the opportunity to remind his former 
boss that the SP would "fight to the bitter end 
against any plan of consolidation that involves 
the separation of the Central Pacific lines from 
the other Southern Pacific l ines." 1 8 
Meanwhile, the government's case against 
the Southern Pacific, deferred since 1917, was 
taken before the Supreme Court early in 1921. 
The issue was the same as it had been at the 
federal district court level: should the Central 
Pacific be stripped from its historic owner, the 
Southern Pacific? The stake for the SP was 
also the same: could it long survive with the 
heart of its operations removed? 
On May 29, 1922, the highest court in the 
land handed down a decision that presented 
the Southern Pacific with the greatest crisis in 
its history. The court ruled that SP's acquisi-
tion of the Central Pacific's stock in 1899 con-
stituted an unlawful combination in restraint 
of trade and ordered the severance of control 
by stock ownership or by lease. Among other 
losses that were obvious, the decision, if car-
ried into effect, would have the impact of iso-
lating some 1,300 miles of SP trackage in 
Oregon from the rest of the system. Krutt-
schnitt and the others at SP were dumb-
founded by the ruling and, for the moment, 
nearly immobilized. Two days later William 
Sproule canceled "capital expenditures on the 
CP unless essential to the proper upkeep of 
property." 1 9 
Fortunately, composure replaced hysteria, 
and before a week had passed SP's executive 
committee ordered the official family to go on 
the offensive, to gain both time and friends. 
"Raise as much 'cain' as possible in Califor-
nia," read a directive from the company's ex-
ecutive offices in New York. It was not hard to 
energize the California press, which was al-
ready alert to the issues. In a statement dated 
June 10, William Sproule reminded journal-
ists that the Central Pacific had been leased by 
the SP in 1885, five years before the passage of 
the Sherman Act—the law by which the SP 
had been prosecuted. Indeed, the two com-
panies had been under common management 
for nearly five decades and had grown and 
matured as a single system under two corpo-
rate names. Many in SP's service area, but es-
pecially in California, doubted that they stood 
to gain anything by the court's action. Cham-
bers of commerce and other groups quickly 
took up SP's cause—to preserve its great 
trunk-line system—a cause, incidentally, they 
perceived as their own. Soon there were three 
hundred such groups made up of shippers lo-
cated principally in California, Arizona, Ore-
gon, and Nevada. 2 0 
A new variable, one that had immediate as 
well as long-term implications, now presented 
itself in public. On the surface, at least, SP's 
sole opponent in the Central Pacific matter 
since 1914 had been the federal government. 
SP's management knew, of course, that the 
Union Pacific, its assertions to the contrary 
notwithstanding, coveted the Central Pacific 
not only for its main route from Ogden to the 
Bay Area but also for its impressive gathering 
and distribution system in central California. 
To date, however, the UP had remained as a 
shadow, maintaining a gentlemanly aloofness. 
Its pretense disappeared early in June, 1922, 
following the Supreme Court's decision, when 
Union Pacific representatives began to call on 
chambers of commerce from Portland to San 
Diego in what SP officials viewed as an un-
seemly effort to dissuade them from support 
of "the home road." After all, fumed William 
Sproule, the Central Pacific was not yet "actu-
ally on the market for sale." 2 1 
The Union Pacific quickly warmed to its 
task. President C. R. Gray pledged that the UP 
was solely interested in an "independent" 
Central Pacific "performing its duties" as "the 
westerly half of the Federal railway system 
from the Missouri River to the Pacific Ocean." 
Gray strained credulity when he said the 
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Union Pacific "was not seeking to acquire the 
Central Pacific," but his veracity returned 
when he admitted that his company was wil l -
ing to purchase the Central Pacific from the 
SP "if fair and reasonable terms can be agreed 
on." Should the UP be favored with the Cen-
tral Pacific, Gray promised to complete the 
long-delayed Natron Cut-off. " A n indepen-
dent Central Pacific cannot operate in Ore-
gon" without it, he said. 2 2 
Those were only the opening volleys. As 
one SP officer later recalled, the Union Pacific 
launched a most vigorous and bitter war of 
publicity against the SP and certain of its 
officers. The campaign was led by Fred G . 
Athearn, UP's western counsel, and formerly 
an attorney for the SP. Athearn's position and 
that of his employer appeared benign: " A 
Plain Statement of the Facts" was the title of a 
pamphlet written by him and distributed by 
the UP. Athearn hired newspapermen, attor-
neys, and others; Stuart Daggett, respected 
professor of railway economics at the Univer-
sity of California, also lent his support. To-
gether these forces advertised Union Pacific's 
contentions: 
(1) The Union Pacific would free the West 
Coast from the clutches of a corporation 
that had never built up the territory. 
(2) Central Pacific, as the western arm of the 
Union Pacific, would bring stern competi-
tion to central and northern California 
and much of Oregon. 
(3) The Southern Pacific was a rapacious vil-
lain whose coffers overflowed only be-
cause of the government's munificent grant 
of land. 
(4) The SP was attempting to evade the wishes 
of the Supreme Court in its Central Pacific 
decision. 2 ' 
The Union Pacific's campaign, well funded 
and initially better managed than SP's, tended, 
however, to be heavy-handed and ultimately 
counterproductive. Athearn's style was abu-
sive, and he did not wear well. By mid-August, 
Sproule could legitimately tell Kruttschnitt 
that the "Union Pacific organizations" were 
"falling into discredit" and were "known as 
empty shells." Elsewhere, the Wall Street Jour-
nal frowned on UP's handling of the situation. 
Even Samuel Rea, stately head of the Penn-
sylvania Railroad, considered comments made 
by UP's Gray "ill-advised and inappropriate." 2 4 
By mid-summer of 1922 Kruttschnitt was 
willing to establish SP's own press bureau in 
Washington. However, he placed several cave-
ats on its operation. As a matter of review, he 
told Paul Shoup that the Union Pacific's cam-
paign had been conducted without regard for 
"any consideration of friendship or fair deal-
ing and in utter disregard of the truth." In an 
oblique reference to the way he wanted the 
SP's promotion conducted, Kruttschnitt said, 
"I am willing to admit at the outset both our 
unwillingness and our inability to equal or ex-
cel them in their campaign of vilification and 
misrepresentation." At the same time, he did 
not want the SP to "follow up on every mis-
representation made by the Union Pacific and 
to rush into print about it. It would be undig-
nified," argued the plainspoken Kruttschnitt. 2 5 
SP's campaign to garner public support and 
to gain time gathered speed: The Bulletin was 
mobilized to carry the company's case to em-
ployees, who were told of their losses should 
the Central Pacific fall to the Union Pacific. 
Rail patrons attended meetings at various lo-
cations and pledged to fight against dismem-
berment. And Barron's chided the govern-
ment for failing to note what the American 
public already knew—"the trust-buster as a 
popular hero is dead!" Instead "of being an un-
natural and vicious combination in restraint of 
trade the lease of the Central Pacific by the 
Southern Pacific in 1885 merely consolidated 
in the legal sense properties which had from 
the very beginning been constructed and 
operated as an integral whole," observed 
Barron's.16 
Railroaders thus became politicians, in a 
sense, campaigning before large audiences 
and for high stakes. They understood this 
only in part, and as an unfortunate result took 
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quite personally and were deeply hurt by the 
verbal arrows hurled by the other side. Krutt-
schnitt, for instance, thought C. R. Gray's "at-
tack" on the SP immediately after the Su-
preme Court had rendered its decision both 
"unwarranted and uncalled-for." Feelings ran 
high. Personal friendships and business asso-
ciations, rooted deeply in the Harriman era, 
snapped under the pressure. Even the internal 
reputation of Harriman was somewhat dimin-
ished during the late years of the unmerger 
process, as SP veterans, particularly Krut-
tschnitt, understated his contributions. Feel-
ings of betrayal, distrust, and hostility per-
meated SP's official family and, rightly or 
wrongly, were institutionalized—to be passed 
from one generation of managers to the next. 
On October 9, 1922, the Supreme Court 
refused SP's petition to rehear the case. This, 
on its face, meant that the matter would be 
mandated back to the district court, which 
would "give effect to the decision." The Union 
Pacific immediately took upon itself to spread 
this good news. Advertisements were placed 
in newspapers along Central Pacific's main 
line; they included "an announcement" of the 
court's decision, promises of what the Union 
Pacific now would do to maximize develop-
ment of the region, and praised the fact that 
"Competition—The Public's Right" had been 
restored. Yet it was not a fait accompli. The SP 
had one more card to play. 2 7 
The Sherman Antitrust Act, signed into law 
by President Benjamin Harrison in 1890, mir-
rored a strong contemporary value of the 
time—unrestricted competition as the life of 
trade. During the ensuing thirty years a grad-
ual reassessment of that value took place, at 
least as it applied to the railroad industry, and 
the Transportation Act of 1920 reflected the 
change. Indeed, during the brief period of 
USRA control, competition had been forbid-
den; and this was perceived as consistent with 
the public's interest. During that same period 
of federal control the SP properly considered 
itself in an ironic position—prosecuted by the 
attorney general who insisted on competition 
and told by the director general that there 
could be none. In fact, the unmerger case rep-
resented a test of strong values, old and new, 
the Sherman Act and the Transportation Act. 
The SP had lost in the courts under the for-
mer; it now staked its life as a first-class rail-
road before the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission on the latter. 
The idea of seeking refuge under the new 
legislation had originated as early as June 1 
when SP's executive committee, in review of 
the Supreme Court's May 29 ruling, noted 
that the case had turned on law current with 
the institution of the proceedings in 1914 and 
did not take account of the new powers vested 
in the ICC as a result of the Transportation 
Act. Ripley had allocated Central Pacific's 
main line to the Union Pacific in his suggested 
plan of combination, but the ICC's own pro-
posal of 1921 called for retention of the entire 
Central Pacific as a part of the Southern Pa-
cific. The SP waited until the Supreme Court 
ruled against rehearing and then, on October 
17, 1922, before any action could be taken by 
the lower court pursuant to the mandate, 
made application before the regulatory body 
to acquire control of the Central Pacific by 
stock ownership and lease under authority of 
the Interstate Commerce Act as amended by 
the Transportation Act. This strategy did not 
seek a review by the commission of the court's 
decision but sought instead a new status, 
" lawful" control of the Central Pacific. The 
Union Pacific quickly filed a petition in op-
position. The stage was set for a new round of 
jousting; the stakes were the same as always. 2 8 
The hearing began on November 21 in 
Washington, D . C . Nearly every western state 
acted as intervenor; this was not an unimpor-
tant intramural contest but one of substantial 
import for the entire region. 
The Union Pacific trotted out its traditional 
complaint that Southern Pacific was diverting 
or in the future would divert traffic via El Paso 
and away from the Overland Route. The argu-
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ment was, for that era, conceptually sound. 
Soliciting for the long haul was fine as long as 
labor and capital were relatively inexpensive. 
Nevertheless, in practical terms, the issue of 
sending transcontinental freight via the Sun-
set Route to Gulf Coast connections, or even 
via SP's own ship line between New Orleans 
and New York, was essentially moot—made 
so by the opening of the Panama Canal in 
1914. By 1922, only 4 percent of traffic on the 
Sunset-Gulf Route (i.e., moving via El Paso on 
SP's Texas & Louisiana Lines) could be classi-
fied as transcontinental. Moreover, in 1921 
the SP moved nearly three times the tonnage 
via Ogden as it did via El Paso. 
O G D E N GATEWAY 
To Union Pacific: 1,332,000 
From Union Pacific: 580,000 
EL PASO GATEWAY 
To SP ( T & L Lines): 348,000 tons 
From SP ( T & L Lines): 412,000. 2 9 
The Union Pacific in 1922, let there be no 
mistake, was a formidable opponent. It was 
a well-maintained, well-managed, and well-
financed property that owned blocks of stock 
in the Illinois Central, New York Central, Bal-
timore & Ohio, Chicago & North Western, 
and Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul and held 
bonds, notes, or equipment trust certificates 
of no fewer than thirty-one carriers. Its man-
agement understandably wished to protect 
the company's admirable position and wor-
ried that, if the Supreme Court's decision was 
negated and the ICC ruled that the SP could 
retain the Central Pacific, the SP would, or at 
least could—with impunity—divert traffic 
away from Ogden. "If they succeed, what is to 
become of this important line of railroad," 
wondered Union Pacific's R. S. Lovett. 3 0 
Much of the ICC's energy focused, not sur-
prisingly, on the venerable Julius Kruttschnitt, 
SP's chairman and a man who had the advan-
tage of having served the SP as well as the 
SP's losses due to unmerger proceedings cannot be calculated. Not the least was the loss from its manage-
ment team's being distracted for over a decade. Kruttschnitt had his team in Los Angeles during 1922; left 
to right: F. S. McGinnis, J. T. Saunders, J. H . Dyer, T. M . Schumacher, W. Sproule, J. Kruttschnitt, A . D. 
McDonald, Paul Shoup, G. W. Boschke, D. W. Pontius, T. H . Williams, and F. Karr. 
combined systems during the Harriman era. 
Kruttschnitt himself had become very active 
in SP's campaign for support and was not 
without emotion. It was "a vital question" to 
him, he told future vice-president Charles G . 
Dawes, "as all of my life has been spent build-
ing up Southern Pacific properties." He hoped 
that Dawes and others whom he could in-
fluence would at least refrain from "helping 
those who seek, and have long sought, to de-
stroy the Southern Pacific's body and to dis-
member and feast upon it before even its 
corpse is cold." Dawes assured Kruttschnitt 
that he would support SP's position since they 
were "unquestionably based upon justice, 
public convenience and common sense." 
Kruttschnitt received similar letters of support 
from a variety of persons, including officials of 
friendly connecting railroads like the Virginia 
& Truckee and determined competitors such 
as the Santa Fe." 
Kruttschnitt, though, could be heavy-
handed. In his zeal to protect and advance SP's 
cause before the ICC, he provoked a nasty 
and unproductive campaign designed to prove, 
in essence, that his plant was more tightly and 
effectively managed than that of the Union Pa-
cific. What resulted was the distribution of 
materials that showed each to be a fine com-
pany but with such dramatic differences in 
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operating conditions as to make comparative 
analyses meaningless.32 
Paul Shoup, by now an SP vice-president 
and assistant to the president, was responsible 
for monitoring the day-to-day proceedings 
in Washington. After a month of testimony 
Shoup perceived that momentum was moving 
in favor of the Southern Pacific. He thereupon 
sought a private meeting with C. B. Seger, a 
member of Union Pacific's executive com-
mittee and a former company official whom 
Shoup knew from the period of combined sys-
tems. The two, with the blessings of their re-
spective companies, subsequently drew up a 
proposal that was mutually agreeable. On 
January 3, 1923, copies were distributed to 
the Interstate Commerce Commission, which 
forwarded them to all intervenors. After study 
and discussion, the regulatory body and most 
of the participants were willing to abide by 
tenets of the proposal. On February 6 the ICC 
then handed down a decision authorizing con-
trol and lease of the Central Pacific by the SP.3 3 
The ICC, however, imposed numerous con-
ditions, most of which already had been agreed 
to by the SP and Union Pacific, among them: 
(1) The two carriers would, "as part of one 
continuous line, maintain through train 
service between San Francisco and Chi-
cago equal in quality afforded by either 
party between Los Angeles or Portland 
and Chicago. 
(2) The two carriers would afford parity of 
schedules and service for perishable traffic 
via Ogden, as opposed to their respective 
services from southern California. 
(3) The two would cooperate in the matter of 
freight train scheduling and would not 
discriminate in favor of the Denver & Rio 
Grande Western or Western Pacific at Og-
den or Salt Lake. 
(4) The two would cooperate in the matter of 
joint rate making to protect movement via 
Ogden. 3 4 
Most importantly, the SP was obliged to so-
licit preferentially for the Union Pacific via 
Ogden on traffic originating or terminating 
north of Caliente and Santa Margarita in 
California, south of Kirk on the Cascade line 
in Oregon, and north of the Oklahoma-Texas 
boundaries to the Ohio River and on to Buf-
falo. This, incidentally, was not appreciably 
different from the internal agreement insti-
tuted during the Harriman era to determine 
whether traffic would move via Ogden or El 
Paso. 3 5 
The ICC did not impose conditions regard-
ing the Western Pacific but, to obviate any, 
the SP signed an agreement with that com-
pany which, among other things, guaranteed 
rates, routes, and gateways; provided for in-
terchange or common operation of Pacific 
Fruit Express and Western Pacific refrigerator 
cars; and, reflecting previous arrangements 
that had lapsed following federal control, ar-
ranged to utilize the properties of each as a 
183-mile double-track operation in Nevada. 3 6 
In the course of his testimony Julius Krutt-
schnitt had promised to complete the Natron 
Cut-off and construct new passenger stations 
at Sacramento and Reno if SP's petition to 
control the Central Pacific was approved. 
These were not included among the ICC 
conditions but became moral obligations for 
the SP. 3 7 
There was general approval in the financial 
world and in the California press. The ICC's 
decision, said the Wall Street Journal, "pre-
vents disruption of the Southern Pacific and at 
the same time assures the Union Pacific of 
every service and facility . . . which it could 
expect if it owned the Central Pacific." The 
San Francisco Chronicle was pleased that 
California had gotten what it fought for and 
pointed out broader implications. The deci-
sion had national importance: The Transpor-
tation Act repealed the "Sherman Act as far as 
it relates to railroads," said the Chronicle.™ 
Yet there remained one very large hurdle. 
The district court, of course, had by this time 
received the mandate from the Supreme Court 
ordering it to enter a final decree against the 
Southern Pacific that would have the effect of 
severing the CP from it. Parties of the case 
quickly appeared before the court to argue 
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that control of the Central Pacific by the SP 
had been made lawful by the ICC's order. On 
June 18, 192.3, the district court affirmed that 
position. Politicians from throughout SP's ser-
vice area immediately urged Attorney General 
Harry M . Daugherty to, as Nevada governor 
J. G . Scrugham said, "refrain from further liti-
gating the issue." Daugherty accepted that 
wisdom and on May 5, 1924, the Southern 
Pacific and the Union Pacific signed a contract 
that bound them to the tenets of the ICC 
order.' 9 
Not to be forgotten in all of this were the 
ICC's efforts under the Transportation Act of 
1920 to suggest the structuring of the nation's 
railways into giant systems. Its early energies 
were expended simultaneously with the un-
merger case before the Supreme Court and 
then the ICC commissioners themselves. For 
his part, William Ripley was intrigued with 
the possibilities offered by a combination of 
the SP and the Chicago, Rock Island & Pa-
cific, which, as he correctly observed, might 
create a system "stronger than the Atchison 
[AT&SF] in terminals" such as San Francisco 
and Chicago and would at the same time offer 
the SP Mississippi River gateways other than 
New Orleans at Memphis and Saint Louis. 
The ICC's own recommendation in 1921 was 
also to combine the SP and Rock Island. Union 
Pacific's R. S. Lovett took early and energetic 
exception to that proposition: "The proposal 
to merge the Rock Island while leaving the 
Southern Pacific in control of the Central Pa-
cific would obviously be disastrous to the 
Union Pacific." Lovett, early in 1922, was like-
wise concerned that merging of the SP and 
Rock Island would "mean legal sanction and 
requirement for forcing traffic between Chi-
cago and San Francisco and even Portland 
down via El Paso." 4 0 
The whole matter was perplexing for SP's 
executive officers who, on the one hand, cov-
eted all that the Rock Island offered but, on 
the other hand, dared not enflame the un-
merger issue. They chose the safe course. 
They did not advocate the inclusion of the 
Rock Island in the SP system but instead 
urged the ICC to make "the Rock Island 
the nucleus of a third Southwestern System" 
which, added the SP ironically, could be much 
strengthened by the addition of the St. Louis 
Southwestern Railway (Cotton Belt). 4 1 
Following resolution of the unmerger case 
in which it gained impressive protective con-
ditions, Union Pacific softened its position to-
ward the SP remarkably. Indeed, it no longer 
objected to combining the Rock Island with 
the SP, although it felt keenly that in such 
event the Rock Island's Omaha—Colorado 
Springs/Denver line should be severed from 
the much-enlarged SP. It mattered not at all. 
The idealistic movement to arrange and com-
bine the nation's railways into larger and 
equally blessed systems died aborning. 4 2 
The gigantic cloud occasioned by the un-
merger efforts finally passed. The Southern 
Pacific had survived and it was intact. The en-
tire episode had been filled with ironies. Not 
the least of these were the strange bedfellows 
who assisted the SP in one way or another dur-
ing the hour of its greatest need—California 
politicians and shippers, the California Public 
Utilities Commission, the Western Pacific 
Railroad, the Hearst newspapers, and, 
through the changes brought about by the 
Transportation Act of 1920, the same federal 
government that had harassed it. Other iron-
ies, ones that would not become apparent until 
the passage of nearly sixty years, were simi-
larly rooted in the events and decisions of 
"unmerger." None at the SP in 1924, however, 
were concerned by such implications now that 
this overriding concern had been safely set 
aside. 
C H A P T E R 7 
The Roaring Twenties 
"The United States is bounded on the east, 
west and south by the S.P. and on the north 
by Canada."—Arizona schoolboy, quoted by 
the Saturday Evening Post 
S O U T H E R N Pacific's victory in the unmerger 
campaign was likely savored more by Julius 
Kruttschnitt than by any other person. His 
service had begun in 1878; by 1924 he was 
not only the tireless chairman of SP's executive 
committee but also the respected elder states-
man of the industry. 
Quiet and dignified, Kruttschnitt was with-
out bombast. Patience and courtesy character-
ized his relationship with others; his "orders" 
to subordinates were couched as requests. He 
valued hard work and loyal attention to the 
company's interests, but he also understood 
the need for detachment. Kruttschnitt's hob-
bies included chemistry, astronomy, gardening, 
and golf. He was an omnivorous reader whose 
interests ranged from science to fiction.1 
Making decisions was not a problem for 
Kruttschnitt. Written requests for expendi-
tures presented to him on the road were evalu-
ated and decided without comment; those he 
approved were stuffed into the right pocket of 
his greatcoat; those rejected, into the left 
pocket. In his massive office at 165 Broadway 
in New York City, Kruttschnitt pondered 
weightier matters in a more unhurried fash-
ion, considering the details before making a 
conclusion. 2 
Kruttschnitt considered the most important 
duty of a company's chief executive to be the 
selection of his "official staff," as he called it. 
That required, he believed, "a fair knowledge 
of the functions of each department." Krutt-
schnitt also believed it important to, as much 
as possible, promote from within, and during 
his tenure the company fielded a remarkable 
array of "home grown" talent.3 
Kruttschnitt looked for particular traits in 
candidates for managerial positions. He in-
sisted that they have a fundamental under-
standing of science, the ability "to think logi-
cally and quantitatively" and "to write and 
speak clearly and correctly," an adequate 
understanding of economic theories, and "an 
unlimited capacity to learn." Other require-
ments, equally important, included "the habit 
of looking forward" and a "pronounced firm-
ness combined with a high sense of fairness 
and charity"—essential qualities, said Krutt-
schnitt, "needed to control men." 4 
Kruttschnitt's definition of a railroad was 
disarmingly simple: " A railroad is a huge 
manufacturing plant designed to convert the 
energy locked up in fuel into work for trans-
porting persons and property on specially de-
signed roadways." Yet the business of manag-
ing railroads was not simple; it had become 
complex in the twentieth century because of 
rising wages and inadequate increases in rates 
that put a tight squeeze on the percentage of 
net that "could be turned in to the treasury." 
The problem of lower net returns required, 
said Kruttschnitt, "the closest kind of man-
agement and the services of very much more 
highly trained executives to meet all the money 
requirements." Small wonder that he coun-
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seled the sparing of no expense " i n establish-
ing an Accounting Department to keep track 
of earnings and expenses, to record the his-
tory of operations, to act as general inspectors 
to expose poor results . . . and to . . . work up 
cost data." 5 
Kruttschnitt declared often the importance 
of besting the competition and seeing to the 
needs of shippers. "I believe that in meeting 
competition . . . nothing but cold business 
conditions should govern, and we should seek 
by all legitimate means to retain traffic that we 
have enjoyed, and if we have not enjoyed 
enough we should endeavor strenuously to get 
more," he told William Sproule in 1922. 
Kruttschnitt entreated SP's sales force to en-
courage a shipper "to come to us and to tie 
him to us with bands of steel." He was not 
content simply to attract new shippers; once 
they were "captured," it was necessary, he ad-
monished, to keep them satisfied. Kruttschnitt 
mixed with customers at every opportunity 
and encouraged them to bare their com-
plaints. Only in that way, he understood, 
could problems be alleviated.6 
Kruttschnitt similarly understood the need 
for positive public relations. His attitude to-
ward disclosure of information about acci-
dents is illustrative. Under the chairman's di-
rection, SP provided the press with detailed 
information "developed by thoroughgoing in-
vestigation." This policy of directness and 
honesty resulted in a curtailment of what 
Kruttschnitt called "sensational stories." 7 
SP's chairman wrote much and appeared 
frequently in public as an exponent of the in-
dustry's interests. He was not simply an apolo-
gist. "If the railway is guilty of acts of omis-
sion or commission which are inconsistent 
with its public duty" the government "should 
adequately restrain and punish it ." On the 
other hand, "when the railway is doing its 
best to perform its duty it is obviously con-
trary to the interests of the public for it to be 
subjected to unnecessary restraints and penal-
ties." Kruttschnitt firmly supported the Trans-
portation Act of 1920, which he saw as a 
means to strengthen the credit of the carriers 
and thereby restore attractiveness of railroad 
securities sufficiently to induce investors to 
buy them. He was dismayed by those who at-
tacked the new legislation or urged its repeal. 
He was even more distressed by the ICC; in 
his view, it nullified the clear purposes of the 
act through maladministration. The 6 percent 
return on investment (later reduced to 5.75 
percent) permitted under the law, in fact, had 
been negated by the regulatory commission's 
unwillingness to grant adequate rate increases, 
growled Kruttschnitt. The ICC, among its 
other failings, he thought, simply refused to 
acknowledge that federal laws regarding the 
Panama Canal restricted railroads' ability to 
compete for transcontinental business and 
that several of the states had succeeded in es-
tablishing "make work" legislation while forc-
ing a reduction in intrastate rates. Moreover, 
concluded Kruttschnitt, the ICC was blind 
to new modal competition in the form of 
"freight and passenger motors." 8 
Kruttschnitt viewed SP's victory in the un-
merger case as vindication of his support for 
the Transportation Act of 1920 and vowed to 
do all he could to make certain that the agree-
ments made with the Union Pacific as a conse-
quence would be carried out in good faith. 
Sales forces were told immediately and em-
phatically "to cooperate with the Union Pa-
cific R.R. to secure by active solicitation the 
routing of the maximum of freight traffic via 
the lines of the UPRR and the CPR through 
the Missouri River and Ogden, Utah, as part 
of one connected, continuous line." Krutt-
schnitt felt the election of C. B. Seger, a for-
mer associate, as chairman of Union Pacific's 
executive committee to be especially fortu-
itous—"a pleasure that is enhanced by the 
conviction that much of the bad feelings en-
gendered in the Central Pacific controversy 
will now disappear." If cordiality did not re-
turn, at least the two companies maintained 
proper and formal relationships. In 1927 ex-
ecutive officers and board members from the 
two companies even casually discussed the re-
Q2 S O U T H E R N P A C I F I C , 1 9 O I - 1 9 8 5 
establishment of "the old association of Union 
Pacific and Southern Pacific in common own-
ership." Paul Warburg, a member of UP's 
board, suggested inclusion of both the Chi-
cago &C North Western and the Chicago, 
Rock Island & Pacific. Warburg skillfully ar-
gued that the four railroads and their subsidi-
aries, could be operated independently pend-
ing consolidation under a holding company. 
The idea died, however.9 
With the unmerger problems behind him, 
Kruttschnitt authorized a plethora of capital 
expenditures. Among those long delayed by 
unmerger was the plan, dating from 1906, to 
double-track the Overland Route from Oak-
land to Ogden. Most of the congested sections 
had been completed by the end of 1914, when 
plans were canceled because of the govern-
ment's suit. However, following the favorable 
decision in the Central Pacific case, 112 miles 
of second track were built and, with the new 
Western Pacific arrangement for paired track, 
the SP by the end of the 1920s had nearly 600 
miles of double track on its 782-mile route 
from Oakland to Ogden. These splendid im-
provements facilitated a new speed record 
over the Sierra—when the government's mine 
rescue car was rushed to a disaster—and a 
new monthly record for traffic in September, 
1927, when 54,107 cars were handled over 
the mountains. 1 0 
Consideration was also given in 1926 to the 
possibility of extending the paired-track agree-
ment with the Western Pacific all the way to 
Sacramento. One of SP's directors, Walter 
Douglas, pointed out that Western Pacific's 
eastbound grades through the Feather River 
Canyon were much less than those of the Cen-
tral Pacific over the Sierra, although, as he 
noted, the WP line was appreciably longer. 
Douglas considered that the Western Pacific 
could be used as the eastbound main and 
the Central Pacific could provide the other. 
WP's Arthur Curtiss James had not previ-
ously considered the idea but said his road 
would "cooperate in every possible way with 
the Southern Pacific." SP's A . D. McDonald 
took exception to the notion: " N o w that we 
have a double track over the Mountain, I take 
it that we have sufficient track capacity for 
many years to come." McDonald's argument 
prevailed." 
Another major uncompleted project dating 
from the Harriman era and long delayed by 
the unmerger matter was the Natron Cut-off 
in Oregon. When the government's suit had 
been instituted in 1914, the SP had acquired 
or placed in operation 160 miles of discon-
nected railroad from Natron, southeast of Eu-
gene, to Oakridge, Oregon, and from Weed, 
California, above Dunsmuir, to Kirk, Oregon. 
The Natron project captivated the interests of 
Oregonians, who were sensitive because it 
was incomplete. Consequently, on June 15, 
1922, SP's executive committee authorized 
Kruttschnitt "to make a definite promise to 
the people of Oregon that the Southern Pacific 
Company would complete the line of railroad 
between Weed and Oakridge, forming a part 
of the so-called Natron Cut-off plan, as soon 
as its right to hold the Central Pacific shall 
have been definitely and finally established." 
As quickly as the unmerger decision was 
known, the SP filed with the ICC for permis-
sion to close the 118-mile gap. Approval was 
given on August 15, 1923. 1 2 
Renewed construction on the cut-off began 
at Kirk on September 1, 1923. A month later 
Klamath Falls, whose citizens long had agi-
tated for completion of the line, staged a 
celebration styled "Passing of the Covered 
Wagon." As a part of the event, local leaders 
and visiting dignitaries were taken by special 
trains to Kirk where, as William Sproule had 
promised, they were given a "show to beat the 
movies—a drama with live people in action." 
Some six months later SP announced that 
32.5 miles of the new line had been built ." 
The situation then became cloudy. The Pub-
lic Service Commission of Oregon filed suit 
and also petitioned the ICC to, among other 
things, force joint and common use of SP's 
Natron Cut-off by other aspirants. William 
Sproule suggested that, in the event Oregon's 
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petition was granted, SP stop all work on the 
project. Kruttschnitt disagreed. He thought 
joint use would be objectionable, unnecessary, 
and unfair, but, he reminded Sproule, "our 
promise to construct the Natron Cut-off was 
unconditional." Both were appalled, though, 
when the hearing examiner went well beyond 
the scope of Oregon's petition; he suggested 
that SP's lines in Oregon be stripped from 
their owner and transferred to the Union 
Pacific. 1 4 
Another variable, introduced by the H i l l 
Lines, made the situation even more awkward. 
As early as 1912 the Great Northern (GN) 
and the Northern Pacific had advertised a 
projected line of their Oregon Trunk Railway 
southwestward from Bend to Butte Falls and a 
connection there with Hill's isolated Pacific & 
Eastern stub. Rumors of this extension, which 
many including SP officers saw as the H i l l 
Lines' plan to invade California, circulated 
from time to time. They were resurrected in 
earnest during the late summer of 1924 when 
senior officers of both the Great Northern and 
the Northern Pacific were reported to be "on 
a scouting trip in Southern Pacific's domain in 
Southern Oregon." This time the rumors were 
based on fact. The Oregon Trunk soon ap-
plied for a certificate of public convenience 
and necessity to extend its line southward 
from Bend to Klamath Falls. NP's Charles 
Donnelly told William Sproule that the appli-
cation had been made simply to "protect our 
position." Donnelly, whose railroad had be-
come SP's favored connection at Portland and 
likely stood to lose more than it gained by 
the Trunk's extension, hoped, however, that 
compromise might yet "avoid a conflict of 
interests." 1 5 
Sproule did not favor accommodation. "It 
would give the H i l l system a new entrance 
into our field of activity" and, he fumed, " i t is 
one stride toward California." Sproule's fears 
appeared confirmed a few days later when the 
press reported that H i l l interests had pur-
chased right-of-way from Klamath Falls to the 
Pacific Coast. This was denied by Great North-
ern's Louis W. H i l l , who insisted, however, 
that there was "an immense amount of timber 
to be reached" by Oregon Trunk's extension 
to Klamath Falls. SP's executive officers looked 
for options. They wished to protect the com-
pany's heavy investments in the Natron Cut-
off from "direct competition," to "retain mar-
kets tributary to the new line," but at the 
same time wished to "avoid having the North-
ern Lines find it convenient or necessary to ex-
tend southward . . . into California" and a 
possible "connection there with the Western 
Pacific and Santa Fe." Accommodation was 
required, but what form should it take? Meet-
ings were scheduled among executive officers 
of the various companies. Northern Pacific's 
Donnelly sat in on these but had already with-
drawn his company's support for the 
Bend—Klamath Falls extension by Oregon 
Trunk; the Trunk, he reminded, was owned by 
the Spokane, Portland & Seattle, itself owned 
in halves by the N P and G N . The application 
before the ICC continued in the name of Ore-
gon Trunk although only the Great Northern, 
of the owning parties, remained interested 
in it. Ralph Budd of the G N insisted that 
his road reach "Klamath Falls with its own 
trains" but offered the SP trackage rights over 
the Oregon Trunk extension to Bend. Sproule 
could "see no practical advantage in that." In 
the end, Sproule and Budd "agreed to dis-
agree." The hearing officers' recommendation, 
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Great Northern's request, the Oregon utility 
commission's complaint, and various related 
issues passed to the ICC for judgment."' 
One of the related issues was SP's appli-
cation to acquire the Oregon, California & 
Eastern Railway, a short line reaching into 
rich timber-bearing regions east of Klamath 
Falls and to extend those operations by way of 
branches. Acquisition of the line was certain, 
thought SP's managers, to bring welcome 
revenues and at the same time serve as a block 
to the aspirations of the H i l l interests.17 
The ICC's decision was announced on May 
3, 1926. The earlier recommendation of the 
hearing officer to strip SP of its Oregon lines 
was thrown out, the petition of the Oregon 
commission was denied, the SP was given the 
right to acquire the Oregon, California & 
Eastern, and the Oregon Trunk was autho-
rized to tap Klamath Falls. But the regulatory 
body added significant conditions. The SP 
was obligated to grant the Oregon Trunk 
trackage rights over the Natron Cut-off or 
over the Oregon, California & Eastern by way 
of entry to Klamath Falls. The two companies 
subsequently entered into negotiations but 
were unable to formulate mutually agreeable 
contracts. Part of this reflected Northern Pa-
cific's disenchantment with the H i l l Lines' 
plan, and in time the ICC allowed the Great 
Northern to formally replace the Oregon 
Trunk in the negotiations and as applicant. 1 8 
While this was going on, work progressed, 
if slowly, on the Natron project as well as an-
other smaller one. The original line in Cali-
fornia, from Weed to Grass Lake, purchased 
from the Weed Lumber Company, had been 
constructed to logging-road standards, with 
heavy grades and tight curves, and was inade-
quate to handle traffic efficiently in the volume 
certain to result when the Cascade line was 
placed in operation. New construction, la-
beled the Black Butte Cut-off, 23.7 miles, was 
added to the Natron project. The costs for the 
Natron and Black Butte undertakings were 
enormous, 15 percent beyond estimates and 
authorization. The executive committee of the 
board took an exceedingly dim view of the 
matter. Sproule told chief engineer George W. 
Boschke early in 1926 "that no dollar may be 
spent except where it will be of telling value 
beyond debate." Boschke was hard pressed. 
He told Sproule that the country between 
Oakridge and the summit of the Cascades was 
so difficult as to "make closer estimates im-
possible." Slides, he noted, were a constant 
problem. 1 9 
Finally, it was over. The Cascade Line was 
officially completed on August 7, 1926, al-
though, to allow for proper settling of the 
roadbed, through passenger service would not 
be instituted until the following spring. The 
cost was a staggering $39.4 million, but Cas-
cade's advantages over the older Siskiyou Line 
were great—shorter by 25 miles between San 
Francisco and Portland and easier by far in 
grades and curvature. Eugene staged an ap-
propriate "Trail to R a i l " celebration to com-
memorate the event.20 
For the SP there was no time to celebrate. 
Problems with the Oregon Trunk remained, 
and presently to these was added a threat 
from the Oregon Public Utility Commission 
to reopen the Central Pacific case for the pur-
pose of demanding construction by the SP of 
what it called a "cross-state line" (east-west 
line across the center of Oregon). 
Arduous negotiations among executives of 
the SP and Great Northern failed to resolve 
the matter of the H i l l Lines' entry into Kla-
math Falls. Political conditions did not favor 
the SP. Furthermore, Ralph Budd proved a 
stern negotiator for the opposition. The situa-
tion dragged on. Public relations campaigns 
and even ICC intervention failed to resolve 
the issue. Ultimately, public opinion and po-
litical pressure forced a decision that favored 
the Great Northern against the SP. As a conse-
quence, the Great Northern built a new line 
from Bend to Chemult and reached Klamath 
Falls by "equal joint use" of 72 miles of SP's 
new Cascade Line. The Great Northern gained 
another important concession when SP sold 
one-half interest in its recently acquired Ore-
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gon, California 8c Eastern Railway. Formal 
contracts were signed on November 18, 1927; 
the first G N train rolled into Klamath Falls on 
May 6, 1928. 2 1 
Oregonians were similarly interested in a 
related construction project undertaken by 
the SR In 1911 the company had quietly sent a 
reconnaissance party to study the country be-
tween Fernley, Nevada, and Klamath Falls be-
cause the SP was interested in the potential 
movement of forest products traffic from the 
Susanville, California, area and also in sealing 
off that region from possible incursions by the 
Western Pacific and the Great Northern. The 
Western Pacific, after all, was nearby at Ked-
die, and the Great Northern, through the 
Oregon Trunk, was then building southward 
to Bend. SP's management fully believed the 
Oregon Trunk would continue into the Susan-
ville area because the Weyerhaeuser Company, 
with which the H i l l Lines had strong ties, had 
purchased holdings there.2 2 
The SP had already reached into the Susan-
ville region during 1912 when it completed a 
line from the southeast but thereafter had de-
ferred additional construction because of the 
government's unmerger suits. However, the 
company retained a commercial and strategic 
interest in the country above Susanville to 
Klamath Falls and in its survey between these 
two points. Agitation for rail service among 
those living in Klamath Falls and to the south-
east grew during the early 1920s when these 
citizens became increasingly discontent with 
SP's promises and demanded action. There 
were other considerations. Since 1913, when 
the SP and the Union Pacific had been sepa-
rated, the UP had energetically solicited Ore-
gon traffic via its lines to Portland against SP's 
right-angle route via Roseville. A Klamath 
Falls—Susanville—Fernley line would, SP of-
ficers understood, simultaneously serve to at-
tract transcontinental traffic, save ton miles, 
and frustrate potential competition. In 1922 
Julius Kruttschnitt pledged the SP to build 
such a route. 2 ' 
Kruttschnitt had second thoughts a year 
later when construction costs on the Cascade 
Line proved "much higher than had been 
imagined." However, by the summer of 1925, 
SP's executive officers felt compelled to go for-
ward, albeit nervously, with the proposal as a 
part of the Natron, the Oregon, California 6c 
Eastern, the Oregon Trunk, and other pro-
ceedings before the ICC at that time. The regu-
latory agency quickly gave its blessing.2 4 
The Modoc Line, as the Klamath Falls— 
Fernley line was called, involved a curious com-
bination of old and new. On October 8, 1926, 
the SP acquired control of the narrow-gauge 
Nevada-California-Oregon Railway (NCO), 
which owned a rickety road from Reno to 
Wendel, California, on SP's Fernley-Susanville 
line, and on to Lakeview, Oregon, via Alturas. 
The SP, of course, faced the requirement of 
standard gauging the railway as well as pro-
viding new construction from Klamath Falls 
to Alturas. Internal indecision coupled with 
regulatory confusion in the Oregon T r u n k -
Great Northern matters delayed plans and 
9 6 S O U T H E R N P A C I F I C , 1 9 O I - 1 9 8 5 
even threatened their completion. SP's man-
agement carefully studied potential traffic vol-
umes and patterns. Frankly, there would be 
little local traffic on the Modoc, especially 
from Fernley to Alturas; the new line would 
be dependent on overhead traffic heavily ori-
ented to the timber industry. Much of the in-
ternal speculation centered on a double-edged 
question: What would happen to competitive 
traffic if the Modoc Line were not built and if 
the Oregon Trunk—Great Northern finally 
reached southward to Klamath Falls—or be-
yond? Sproule had cold feet. "I am frank to 
say that where so much money is involved I 
am less and less disposed to be pressed into 
conclusions in apprehension of what a com-
petitor might do," he confided to A . D . M c -
Donald. Ultimately the fate of the Modoc Line 
rested with the Union Pacific and the divisions 
it would permit on traffic moving to it via the 
new route. "Whatever we hold as against the 
Great Northern or gain through development 
of business that otherwise would not be cre-
ated inures substantially as much to your 
benefit as ours and possibly more," William 
Sproule told Union Pacific's C. R. Gray. 2 5 
The Union Pacific saw it likewise and 
agreed to the same rate divisions the two 
roads shared on Oregon traffic moving via the 
historic if long-mile route through Roseville. 
Paul Shoup recommended going ahead with 
the project although its immediate and even 
ultimate benefits were unclear. "I dislike very 
much to recommend the expenditure of this 
large sum of money under existing conditions 
for a line that is almost altogether dependent" 
on a single industry for its traffic base. Never-
theless, on May 18, 1928, SP's executive com-
mittee authorized the company's chief engi-
neer to make final surveys. Work commenced 
on the new construction between Klamath 
Falls and Alturas in January, 1929, and in the 
following summer the gauge of the N C O was 
changed from narrow to standard. The M o -
doc Line was "turned over for operation" on 
September 15 following appropriate cere-
monies. There was limited rejoicing among 
executive officers; acquisition and rehabilita-
tion of the Nevada-California-Oregon plus 
new construction necessary to form the M o -
doc had cost nearly $16 million, well above 
estimates.26 
The saga of railroad expansion in southern 
Oregon and Northern California was ex-
tended in 1929 when SP's chief rivals in that 
territory, the Western Pacific and the Great 
Northern, applied to the ICC for permission 
to expand their respective lines to form a joint 
operation, an "inside gateway" between the 
Pacific Northwest and the Bay Area via Bie-
ber, California. The Southern Pacific under-
standably saw this as "unnecessary duplica-
tion" of rail operations, but the G N and WP 
countered by promising to run Great North-
ern's famous Empire Builder as well as through 
passenger trains from Vancouver and Seattle 
into San Francisco if the request was granted. 
The Santa Fe was not disinterested in this; it 
agreed to establish joint rates and divisions on 
through freight traffic via Stockton, Califor-
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nia. In the end, the ICC favored the concept of 
a new competitive route, its positive impact 
on a "new territory," and opportunities for 
additional passenger travel. The joint request 
was granted to SP's competitors. Paul Shoup 
was philosophical. "We have to face the fact 
that the public everywhere wants expenditures 
of money that does not directly involve it in 
taxation, and for this and other reasons wants 
more railroads, which at least give the impres-
sion of additional life to the communities 
served." As it developed, the Great Northern-
Western Pacific's Inside Gateway never saw 
regular passenger service, and its long-mile 
route proved to be little more than an irritant. 2 7 
SP's management in the late 1920s also had 
to consider the H i l l Lines in a larger context. 
During 1927 stockholders of the Northern 
Pacific and the Great Northern approved a 
plan of merger for those two companies, which 
was then sent to the ICC for decision. Sproule 
did not see much threat to the SP if the merger 
was concluded but asked Shoup for his views. 
"Unquestionably the new company with a 
stronger unified policy and one financial and 
operating program will be stronger than the 
two apart," said Shoup, who saw "no evi-
dence upon which" the SP "could properly 
oppose the consolidation." Furthermore, " i f it 
be one of improving service and developing 
their own territory by bringing more people 
to the West, the Southern Pacific as a north 
and south line on the Pacific Coast will be 
benefited rather than injured." It mattered 
little. The ICC granted the request of the H i l l 
Lines but with an overriding caveat—that 
they be divorced from control of the lucrative 
Chicago, Burlington & Quincy, a condition 
they could not accept.28 
During the same period SP quietly analyzed 
its own strategic options north of the Colum-
bia River. In July, 1925, a management team 
was assigned to study the feasibility of con-
structing a line "from Portland via Longview 
to a connection with the Milwaukee Road" 
and with additional trackage rights over the 
rails of that company "establishing our own 
line between Portland and Puget Sound 
points." In that way, as Shoup told A . D. M c -
Donald, the SP "would serve the entire coast 
territory from Guadalajara to the Canadian 
boundary as one company." A new SP route 
above Portland would certainly yield impres-
sive long hauls for the system but would place 
the company in severe competition with the 
Union Pacific, Great Northern, and Northern 
Pacific. Other problems became apparent 
after thorough evaluation. The costs for con-
struction of a new line would be great, the 
Milwaukee's terminal facilities—which SP 
would likely use—were inadequate, the M i l -
waukee Road itself was frankly not financially 
robust, and overall prospective freight earn-
ings did not look good. Accordingly, studies 
were terminated by Shoup during the summer 
of 192.9.2 9 
A l l of SP's experiences in Oregon and its 
strategic planning in the Pacific Northwest 
were of special interest to the Union Pacific. Re-
lations between the former bedmates warmed 
slightly. Shoup told McDonald that senior UP 
officers had promised that they "would do 
nothing to invade our territory," and Shoup, 
in turn, told the management team studying 
SP's possible expansion above Portland "to 
confer with the Union Pacific . . . to deter-
mine how their interests might be protected." 
After all, said Shoup, the UP had "been 
friendly in [SP's] southern Oregon operations." 
The thaw continued. A few years later, for in-
stance, the Union Pacific fashioned a new al-
liance with the Chicago, Burlington & 
Quincy for transcontinental traffic moving via 
Sidney, Nebraska, that favored the UP and SP 
against the Denver &c Rio Grande Western 
and the Western Pacific. 3 0 
Elsewhere, the capacity of SP's route over 
the Tehachapis was brought into question dur-
ing the second decade of the twentieth cen-
tury. The Santa Fe complained hotly in 1912 
that it was "suffering a good many delays" to 
its trains "because of a lack of facilities." E. P. 
Ripley, president of the Atchison, Topeka &c 
Santa Fe, suggested in the next season that 
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there was "getting to be a little too much traf-
fic for a single-track line" and urged the SP to 
double-track a portion of the Tehachapi route, 
say, between Caliente and Bakersfield and be-
tween Tehachapi and Mojave. The Southern 
Pacific had already begun to acquire right-of-
way for the second track, but William Hood 
remained unconvinced that it was required. 
The subject surfaced again during World War 
I, but when traffic dropped off thereafter, 
discussions ceased. The Santa Fe, however, 
pressed the matter once more in 1921 when it 
complained of congestion resulting in undue 
labor costs and delay to lading. The "very 
rapid development in the San Joaquin Valley 
within the next two years," said W. B. Storey 
of the Santa Fe, would necessitate "additional 
facilities." Freight tonnage handled over the 
Tehachapis was then essentially equal between 
the two roads, although SP's passenger vol-
ume (measured in gross ton miles) was one-
third greater than Santa Fe's.31 
In 1919 the SP began a bit-by-bit project of 
double-tracking the line eastward toward the 
mountains from Bakersfield. Business did in-
crease for both companies, although dispro-
portionately in favor of the SP except during 
the brief perishables season, and so did the 
congestion. In 1927 during the peak season— 
September and October— an average of sixty-
five trains used the line daily, seventy-four on 
October 13 alone. Helper engines were woe-
fully delayed, and many crews had to be re-
lieved because they had been on duty for six-
teen hours. The Santa Fe again urged the SP 
"to provide double track over that entire h i l l , " 
but the SP, to Santa Fe's great disgust, moved 
slowly. By the end of the decade several pass-
ing tracks were lengthened, but only 24.5 
miles were double tracked. Santa Fe then, on 
its own, sought to find a location better than 
one closely paralleling the existing line and 
even explored for a new route totally divorced 
from SP's.3 2 
During the same years and stretching into 
the next decade the SP pondered again the 
benefits of electrifying certain of its strategic 
lines. In 1927 Paul Shoup considered as a 
prime candidate the Sunset Route from Los 
Angeles to El Paso, but the master study of 
that year contemplated only Bakersfield to 
Los Angeles (over the Tehachapis) and Los 
Angeles to Yuma. Based on statistics from 
1926, SP's assessment favored electrification, 
especially if savings in transportation of fuel 
oil for steam locomotives, overtime, and rail 
wear were considered. By late 1929, though, 
there was no need for the increase in track ca-
pacity that electric operations would facili-
tate, and potential net return on investment 
was minuscule. That did not end the discus-
sion, however. Paul Shoup suggested that gas 
from SP landholdings could be traded to util-
ity companies for electricity, and Hale Holden 
wanted the possibility of electrifying the Si-
erra and Tehachapi reexamined. Shoup added 
for consideration the Peninsula line from San 
Francisco to San Jose, at least for the com-
muter business. The Sierra study was the most 
optimistic—promising an increase in track 
capacity, gross ton miles per train, and speed 
as well as a reduction in rail wear and general 
operating expenses. A decade earlier John M . 
Scott had urged Sproule to authorize a new 
alignment between Blue Canyon and Truckee, 
a seven-mile tunnel, and electrification be-
tween Roseville and Sparks. The most recent 
study built on Scott's logic, but unfortunately 
the timing was poor. Traffic fell off badly in 
1930 and deteriorated thereafter. The General 
Electric Company attempted to rekindle inter-
est during 1934, but, as Paul Shoup told its 
representatives, there was "no early prospect 
of our tackling such a job." 3 3 
Expansion of the Southern Pacific in the 
Southwest during these years took two 
forms—construction and acquisition. Of par-
ticular importance was purchase of the El 
Paso &c Southwestern System (EP&SW) in 
1924. 
The El Paso & Southwestern owed its in-
ception to the presence of an abundant and 
rich supply of copper ore in the area of Bis-
bee, Arizona Territory, and the decision of the 
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Santa Fe to locate its New Mexico & A r i -
zona/Sonora line some distance away. Phelps, 
Dodge 8c Company had purchased many min-
ing claims around Bisbee, developed impres-
sive mines, and had constructed a smelter. To 
provide itself with adequate transportation, 
Phelps Dodge then saw to the incorporation 
of the Arizona 8c South Eastern Rail Road, 
which constructed a 36-mile line from Bisbee 
northwestward to a connection with Santa 
Fe's New Mexico 8c Arizona at Fairbank. A 
conflict with the Santa Fe over freight rates 
later caused Phelps Dodge to extend its A r i -
zona 8c South Eastern another 19 miles from 
Fairbank to SP's Sunset Route at Benson in 
1894.'4 
The country was increasingly turning to 
electricity as the twentieth century dawned, 
and demand for copper supplies expanded ac-
cordingly. To meet these requirements, Phelps 
Dodge replaced the smelters at Bisbee with 
larger ones at the newly formed town of 
Douglas, on the flats southeast of Bisbee along 
the Mexican boundary. Collaterally, the El 
Paso 8c Southwestern Railroad was formed 
on June 25, 1901, to take over the properties 
of the Arizona 8c South Eastern and to con-
tinue the railroad construction projects and 
operations of Phelps Dodge. The immediate 
need was to drive a new road from Bisbee to 
Douglas, but that was only part of a more dra-
matic project. There had been concern among 
Phelps Dodge officers that their Arizona op-
erations were captive of the SP after it leased 
the New Mexico 8c Arizona/Sonora lines from 
the Santa Fe in 1898. To obviate this monopoly 
the E P & S W continued construction north-
eastward from Douglas to a new junction with 
the Santa Fe at Deming. That was not all. The 
El Paso 8c Southwestern continued on to addi-
tional outlets at El Paso, reaching that impor-
tant location late in 1902. 3 5 
E. H . Harriman, who by this time had ac-
ceded to control of the Southern Pacific, 
watched these events without amusement. 
Then, when the El Paso 8c Southwestern 
threatened to seek an independent outlet to 
the Pacific coast, either on its own or through 
a cooperative venture, Harriman retaliated 
with various forms of harassment, including 
litigation. Harriman viewed the transporta-
tion enterprise of Phelps Dodge as wasteful 
duplication, but Phelps Dodge perceived Har-
riman's covetousness as the bullying tactics of 
a monopolist. Several years later Paul Shoup 
admitted that SP's "policy at the time had 
been a bad one . . . which resulted in competi-
tive bui lding." 3 6 
With its finances assured by parental sup-
port and lucrative traffic, the El Paso 8c 
Southwestern confidently expanded by way of 
branches and acquisitions. It built short spurs 
during 1902 and 1903; more importantly, it 
took over the various properties of Charles R. 
Eddy on July 1, 1905. 3 7 
The "Eddy empire" included several lines 
that, when taken together, reached from El 
Paso, Texas, northeastward to Tucumcari, 
New Mexico, with branches from Alamo-
gordo to Cloudcroft and Russia; Carrizozo to 
Capitan; and Tucumcari to Dawson. These 
could be enumerated as follows: 
Dates of 
Company Miles Operation 
El Paso & North East-
ern Railroad 
(El Paso to Texas-N. 
Mex. boundary) 19.2 Jan. 1, 1899 
El Paso & North East-
ern Railway 
(Texas-N. Mex. 
boundary to 
Capitan) 144.8 Oct. 31, 1899 
Alamogordo & Sacra-
mento Northern 
Railway 
(Alamogordo to 
Toboggan) 19.3 Nov. 30, 1898 
(Toboggan to Cox 
Canyon) 7-3 Jan. 31, 1900 
(Cox Canyon to 
Russia) 4-5 July 31, 1905 
El Paso & Rock Island 
Railway 
IOO S O U T H E R N P A C I F I C , 1901 —1985 
(Carrizozo to Santa 
Rosa) 12.7-5 F e D - J> 1902 
Dawson Railway 
(Tumcumcari to 
Dawson) 132.0 Jan. 31, 1903 
Most importantly, Eddy had enticed the Chi-
cago, Rock Island & Pacific Railroad to ex-
tend its line from Liberal, Kansas, to a junc-
tion with his El Paso & Rock Island at the 
Pecos River, and when the two met there on 
February 1, 1902, a new transcontinental op-
tion—styled the Golden State Route—was 
forged. 3 8 
The El Paso & Southwestern rounded out 
its operations with additional branches, a 
short incursion into Mexico with the Naco-
zari Railroad from Douglas to serve an affili-
ated mining and smelting operation, acquisi-
tion of the Mexico & Colorado Railroad to 
form its Courtland Branch, and on July 1, 
1907, lease of Rock Island's track between 
Santa Rosa and Tucumcari. It also built from 
Fairbank to Tucson, in 1911 —12, and ac-
quired the Arizona & New Mexico Railway 
from Lordsburg and Hachita, New Mexico, 
to Clifton, Arizona, in 1922. 3 9 
The former Eddy lines gave Phelps Dodge 
an outstanding eastern outlet as well as long-
haul potential. Coal from the Dawson region 
was hauled to Tucumcari for use in fueling 
locomotives of the Rock Island and to the 
Phelps Dodge copper smelters for coking. Yet 
there were problems on the eastern portion of 
the El Paso & Southwestern. Water was scarce 
and what was available was bad for steaming. 
Indeed, during the Eddy years new locomo-
tives failed to make a single round trip with-
out severe damage to flues and boilers because 
available water had "more than 100 grains of 
encrusting solids per gallon" and "could not 
be made suitable by treatment." In 1905 it 
was "common for trains to be laid out in 
numbers along the entire route and extra en-
gines" died "for lack of steam before they 
reached the crippled trains." The company fi-
nally solved the problem by building long pipe 
lines to bring spring water from distant moun-
tains. Only in that way could the railroad be 
operated during the era of the steam loco-
motive. 4 0 
Julius Kruttschnitt, following the death of 
Harriman in 1909, felt the need to seek "sat-
isfactory traffic arrangements" and main-
tain "harmonious and cordial" relations with 
the El Paso & Southwestern. This was all 
the more the case as SP's unmerger plague 
deepened. Small wonder that Kruttschnitt 
was concerned when Phelps Dodge took a fi-
nancial interest in the Rock Island and when 
that road in turn looked covetously toward 
California. 4 1 
Matters remained relatively stable until the 
spring of 1923. By then the unmerger crisis 
had passed, traffic congestion on the Sunset 
Route's single track demanded resolution, and 
the El Paso & Southwestern's vaunted profit-
ability was in doubt because of the glut of pri-
mary metals following World War I. There 
was another important local matter: the strong 
and growing desire of Phoenix to be located 
on a "main line." 
The desire of Phoenix for a main-line rail-
road was played to by James S. Douglas, son 
of Dr. James Douglas, the well-known metal-
lurgist and principal in both Phelps Dodge 
and its railroad. The younger Douglas, 
against the wishes of his father, Kruttschnitt 
believed, had fostered the development of the 
high-sounding Tucson, Phoenix 8c Tidewater 
Railroad and gained impressive franchises in 
Phoenix. Epes Randolph looked into the mat-
ter in 1914 and learned that the El Paso & 
Southwestern had "studied very carefully for 
several years past the question of building a 
line to Phoenix" but had always "decided that 
the building of such a line was not desirable." 
The E P & S W denied then and later that it was 
behind the younger Douglas's project.4 2 
When it surfaced again in the early 1920s, 
SP officers worried that the Tucson, Phoenix 
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& Tidewater might be the "missing l ink" in a 
powerful new competitive line connecting El 
Paso and Los Angeles by way of the E P & S W 
from El Paso to Tucson and the Santa Fe from 
Phoenix westward. Harriman and E. P. Ripley 
had reached an agreement in 1904 to the 
effect that, as Ripley said, "the Southern Pa-
cific should not construct anything north of 
an east and west line drawn through Phoenix 
and that the Santa Fe would preserve a like at-
titude as to anything south of this line." The 
Santa Fe presently assured William Sproule 
that it stood by the Harriman-Ripley agree-
ment and had no involvement in the Douglas 
venture. Sproule was not convinced. He con-
sidered that an allied El Paso & Southwestern 
and Santa Fe—after constructing a Tucson-
Phoenix line—would demand favorable con-
nections and divisions with SP's Texas & 
Louisiana Lines that would "complicate our 
relations with both the Southwest and South-
east." Adding to Sproule's alarm was a story 
in the Los Angeles Times that correctly re-
ported that the E P & S W had purchased termi-
nal properties in that city. 4 3 
Sproule also had reason to be concerned by 
the public attitude in and about Phoenix 
where, said the Arizona Gazette, "the South-
ern Pacific has done and is doing all in its 
power to keep this valley from having a main 
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line railroad." That organ likely represented 
local thinking. Its "platform for Phoenix" was 
unashamedly attuned to boosterism: 
(1) Fight for Main Line railways 
(2) Abate the unsightly weeds 
(3) Iron and shackle the speed devil 
(4) Sixty thousand population in 1928. 
Items one and four were clearly linked. SP's 
management could ignore these feelings and 
local favoritism for the Douglas road only at 
peril to the company's best interests. " A real 
problem confronts us," admitted Sproule. It 
was time to go on the offensive.44 
Sproule considered that there was only one 
way to defuse the situation—to appease the 
local constituency and prevent unacceptable 
competitive challenges—and that was to put 
Phoenix on a main line, SP's. To that end he 
suggested new construction to complete the 
Phoenix-Hassayampa line to Yuma, a direct 
Tucson-Phoenix link, and upgrading trackage 
in and around Phoenix to higher standards. 
Then came the big surprise for the public. An 
SP press release on June 11, 1924, announced 
"that negotiations between the Southern Pa-
cific Company and the El Paso & Southwest-
ern Railroad looking toward the" merger of 
the E P & S W into SP had "been practically 
completed." Petitions for construction of the 
new SP lines and acquisition of the Southwest-
ern properties would go forward together.45 
"Public information" meetings were staged 
throughout the affected area. Kruttschnitt, 
experienced campaigner that he was, insisted 
that benefits of the merger be fully explained 
and defended. The public relations depart-
ments of both companies went into high gear. 
Opposition, and there was little of it except at 
El Paso where civic leaders worried over the 
possible loss of jobs among El Paso & South-
western employees, was effectively obliterated. 
Traffic World enthusiastically applauded the 
SP for an effective program of taking "its plans 
to all concerned" and of laying its "ground-
work so carefully" that only two protestants 
appeared before the ICC. The SP also skill-
fully allayed fears among E P & S W personnel 
by praising them and the company's modern 
equipment, its substantial structures, and its 
high standards of efficiency in maintenance 
and operation. 4 6 
The effort paid off. On September 24, 1924, 
the ICC granted the SP permission to acquire 
"control of the carriers comprising the El Paso 
& Southwestern System by lease and stock 
ownership" and at the same time authorized 
SP's construction plans. The New York Herald-
Tribune thought the ICC's prompt approval 
represented a "new railroad era" and approv-
ingly remarked on the passage of the old, 
which had been typified by "railroad baiters" 
who considered railroad combinations an 
anathema. In the present case the chambers of 
commerce in every town along the E P & S W 
had supported the consolidation. This was ex-
plained, said the Herald-Tribune, by their 
faith in the SP: "The Southern Pacific has be-
come a great and prosperous system through 
cultivating the esteem of the people in its ter-
ritory and continually raising transportation 
standards." The SP took control of the El Paso 
& Southwestern on November 1, 1924, after 
agreeing to pay $28 million in capital stock 
and $29.4 million in twenty-year trust bonds 
to the shareholders of the Southwestern (stock-
holders of the Phelps Dodge Corporation). 4 7 
Construction in Arizona moved briskly as 
crews labored concurrently between Welton 
(37 miles east of Yuma) and Hassayampa and 
between Picacho (47 miles west of Tucson) 
and a point on the Chandler Branch southeast 
of Phoenix. When completed, the Phoenix line 
would, with the acquisition of the EP&SW, 
give the SP a much-needed second primary 
route from near Yuma to El Paso and, at the 
same time, grant the capital city of Arizona its 
historic desire to be located on a main-line 
railroad. Phoenix already boasted an impres-
sive new station used jointly by the Arizona 
Eastern (SP) and the Santa Fe; it offered the 
proper setting when Phoenix staged "one of 
the largest and most enthusiastic celebrations 
ever held in Arizona" to cheer the formal 
Roaring Twenties 
opening of the new line. Two special trains, 
one bearing delegations from California and 
another carrying visitors from Texas, arrived 
simultaneously at the Phoenix station on Oc-
tober 5, 1926. General manager J. H . Dyer an-
nounced that regular passenger operations 
would be initiated by the Californian on N o -
vember 14. 4 8 
SP's recent activity in Arizona made the 
Santa Fe rather uneasy. In 1927 Paul Shoup 
and W. K. Etter from A T & S F reaffirmed the 
earlier Harriman-Ripley agreement, and a 
year later Shoup pledged "that the Southern 
Pacific would not invade the Grand Canyon 
either by rail or directly or indirectly through 
the agency of motor vehicles." For its part, the 
Santa Fe agreed not to "invade the Apache 
Trai l " (SP's rail-highway tourist attraction be-
tween Phoenix and Globe). Looking to the fu-
ture, both companies agreed that the term 
"motor vehicles" as used in this understand-
ing covered "airplane service." 4 9 
If the Santa Fe was concerned with SP's in-
tentions in Arizona, the SP was worried about 
those of the Santa Fe and the Western Pacific 
in California. With that in mind, Paul Shoup 
late in 1925 ordered the company's local offi-
cers to "determine what protective measures" 
might be taken within the next five years to 
"prevent encroachment" on SP's territories. 
Concern centered on Sacramento, Stockton, 
Modesto, Fresno, San Jose, and San Francisco. 
Most of these cities were already well served, 
and additional investment, whether to fore-
stall incursions by competition or not, would 
be redundant. A less expensive way to deal 
with the issue was to wait until applications 
were made before the ICC and then fight 
them. This was the case when WP hoped to 
build trackage parallel to the SP in the San 
Joaquin Valley. In this instance, however, the 
Santa Fe joined with the SP to defeat the West-
ern Pacific. 5 0 
The SP and the Santa Fe found themselves 
uneasy partners on other matters, too. Coop-
eration required soul-searching on both sides 
to find equity or, as Henry de Forest said, to 
keep Santa Fe from increasing "its takings and 
reduce ours." On the other hand, SP man-
agement felt itself forced to work with the 
AT&SF, especially when both could keep 
down costs. There was precedent for this. 
Under agreement dated October 1, 1900, the 
SP and the Santa Fe pledged to own the Sunset 
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Two trains, one bearing delegations from Califor-
nia and another carrying visitors from Texas, ar-
rived simultaneously at the Phoenix station on Oc-
tober 5, 1926. 
Railway in equal shares and to operate inde-
pendently on alternating five-year periods the 
properties reaching from Bakersfield into the 
oil fields. The two had also agreed to jointly 
acquire and prosper the Northwestern Pacific 
(NWP) and on June 27, 1928, they jointly ac-
quired the Petaluma & Santa Rosa Railroad 
through the NWP. Although the SP and the 
Santa Fe often combined against the Western 
Pacific, the three joined in 1927 to acquire the 
54-mile Central California Traction Com-
pany, a third-rail operation between Sacra-
mento and Stockton with a branch to Lodi. 
Cooperation between the SP and A T & S F took 
an ironic turn on January 17, 1929, when the 
SP agreed to acquire Santa Fe's portion of the 
Northwestern Pacific. Finally, in that same 
year the SP and its Pacific Electric joined with 
the Santa Fe and the Union Pacific in forming 
the Harbor Belt Line Railroad to serve the 
needs of the Port of Los Angeles. 5 1 
The SP also acted on its own to solidify 
positions or to keep smaller roads from falling 
into the hands of competitors. This was the 
case in 1 9 2 5 - 2 6 when it purchased the capi-
tal stock of the Holton Inter-Urban Railway, a 
10-mile pike with which it connected at El 
Centre In another but very different part of 
California, the SP leased the scenic Lake Ta-
hoe Railway & Transportation Company on 
The SP gained full control of the picturesque N W P 
in 1929. 
S O M E D R E A M S C O M E T R U E 
The cartoonist for the San Francisco Chronicle 
(Sept. 7, 1928) urged support for SP's drive to ac-
quire full control of the N W P . 
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Arrival of first through train from Nogales over the new line of the SPdeMex, Guadalajara, Apri l 17, 192.7. 
October 16, 192.5, and had its gauge changed 
from narrow to standard during the next 
year. 5 2 
During the 1920s the SP made dramatic ex-
penditures for the construction of new yards 
at Eugene and Los Angeles and additions to 
those at Fresno, Roseville, and Santa Clara. 
PFE facilities at Fresno and Roseville were 
similarly upgraded, and passenger facilities 
also received attention. New stations were 
built at Glendale, Ogden (with the Union Pa-
cific), Phoenix, Sacramento, Reno, Yuma, and 
Stockton. 
One project that, for good or for i l l , was 
not carried to fruition involved constructing 
new facilities, upgrading trackage, and modi-
fying the general office building at 65 Market 
Street to become additionally SP's passenger 
terminal in San Francisco. Harriman had 
toyed with the notion of a new office building 
and terminal, and the issue had again received 
serious attention in 1911. Paul Shoup brought 
up the matter again in 1927, but for whatever 
reason nothing was done. 5 ' 
Not to be forgotten during the so-called 
Roaring Twenties were affairs of the Southern 
Pacific of Mexico. As the decade opened, the 
SPdeMex continued to reflect the domestic 
difficulties of that country; only skimpy main-
tenance was authorized by the parent to keep 
portions of the line open. Work to restore and 
rehabilitate lines damaged during the revolu-
tion began in 1923 after various agreements 
were made with the Mexican government to 
pay claims presented to the railroad. Con-
struction was advanced on the main line but 
went very slowly because of heavy volcanic 
formations requiring extensive tunneling. Fi-
nally, on Apri l 19, 1927, the 1,095-mile line 
from Nogales to Guadalajara was opened to 
through service, with connections to Mexico 
City. A l l was not well, however. Raids by Ya-
qui Indians and bandits combined with acts of 
nature to disrupt service. Furthermore, affairs 
in Mexico generally deteriorated, and in 1929 
revolutionary disturbances "which continued 
for several months resulted in heavy damage 
to the property" as well as lost revenue.54 
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" M y blessings on the Prosperity Special: 
May her speed be steadily maintained and 
may God grant a safe arrival."—President 
Warren G . Harding 
T H E history of the Southern Pacific was not 
solely that of dealing in the rarefied atmo-
sphere of strategy and intrigue, building im-
pressive new lines and acquiring others, joust-
ing with the government, or outwitting or 
being outwitted by the competition. Much of 
it involved the more prosaic but crucial busi-
ness of running the railroad on a day-to-day 
basis. 
Its communications system was of early and 
continuing interest to the Southern Pacific. 
Environmental difficulties—from desert heat 
to mountain blizzards, from isolation to con-
gestion—had to be met and overcome by 
those who strung the lines and those who 
maintained them. Because of the impressive 
volume of perishables indigenous to its opera-
tions, adequate and reliable communication 
was more important to the SP than to other 
carriers. The company's telegraph system not 
only provided an efficient means of dispatch-
ing trains but, since it was shared by Western 
Union, facilitated a marketing system by 
which growers could ship produce when ready 
and sell it en route according to diversion 
procedures.1 
Telephone dispatching began on the SP be-
tween Bakersfield and Fresno and Los Angeles 
and Indio before World War I and gradually 
replaced Morse systemwide. In a similar vein, 
the SP pioneered the use of "simultaneous te-
legraphy and telephony" between Sparks and 
Imlay, Nevada on September 4, 1912. Printer 
circuits were added on line and before the end 
of the 1920s linked New York and Chicago 
passenger offices with those in San Francisco, 
Los Angeles, Houston, and El Paso. In 1923 
the SP's Pacific System (west of El Paso and 
Ogden) boasted 7,328 miles of pole line and 
68,991 miles of wire, and it handled an amaz-
ing 21 ,297,000 telegrams at 688 telegraph 
offices.2 
In 1894 the SP general offices had but 
fourteen telephones, which required the ser-
vice of only one operator. The operator was 
assisted by two messenger boys employed 
to notify those officers who had no "phone" 
that they had a call on the line. Twenty-five 
years later much had changed; the general 
offices then employed thirteen operators, 
who handled 10,000 calls daily through a 
$150,000 telephone installation. More im-
provements followed. On August 5, 1928, the 
"automatic telephone," or "dial system," was 
placed in operation there. The new exchange, 
as the Bulletin reported, was "the largest 
semi-mechanical private branch on the West 
Coast." 3 
At the same time the growing use of ma-
chines, for reasons of efficiency and economy, 
greatly altered office work. They also saved la-
bor. In 1927 the SP owned an inventory of 
5,462 office machines having an aggregate 
value of $1 million. These included typewrit-
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ers, which made up the greatest number, but 
also machines for adding, calculating, dic-
tating, recording, and duplicating. Most of 
these were used commonly among the several 
departments, although some required special-
ized equipment. For instance, the freight ac-
counts office employed "key-punching, tabu-
lating and card-sorting machines" to perform 
its monumental duties. Railway Age compli-
mented SP on its use of such office tools, espe-
cially the addressograph, in preparation of 
time rolls, ICC statements, and paychecks.4 
Southern Pacific's advertising department, 
already mature, reached full flower during the 
1920s. In 1921 alone, it saw to the distribu-
tion of 6.2 million "folders, maps, pamphlets, 
and other pieces of literature advertising the 
scenic, industrial and agricultural resources of 
the states" served by SP. As part of a 1923 
campaign to overcome inroads into passenger 
volume by "auto-stages, private automobiles, 
and steamer lines," the SP stressed the dedica-
tion of its employees to "courtesy and effi-
ciency." This theme was repeated nationwide 
late in the decade. Special events received par-
ticular attention. On the eve of the sixtieth an-
niversary of the Golden Spike ceremony at 
Promontory, the SP, in a striking advertise-
ment, pledged that "the 'Last Spike' Wi l l 
Never Be Driven" because it was "Still Build-
ing With the West." Executive-level support 
for vigorous advertising was manifest in the 
department's budget—over $1 million in each 
of the last three years of the decade.5 
Much, but hardly all, of SP's advertising 
energies were directed to its fine passenger 
service. "Four Great Routes to California 
Offered Only By The Southern Pacific" and 
" G o One Way—Return Another and See the 
Whole Pacific Coast" were themes that 
stressed SP's Overland, Sunset, Golden State, 
and, after completion of the Natron Cut-off, 
Cascade routes. Adjunct promotions stressed 
scenic opportunities afforded by national 
parks—Sequoia, Yosemite, Lassen Volcanic— 
and California's famous missions. "California 
for the Tourist" was an extremely popular and 
comprehensive folder distributed without cost 
for over a decade. SP also advertised the 
Golden State's excellent hotels, among them 
the fashionable Del Monte on Monterey 
Peninsula.6 
The Southern Pacific did not approach 
archrival Santa Fe in expenditures to directly 
or indirectly support art and artists. However, 
it did grant free transportation to several in 
the hope that their work showing scenes along 
SP lines would be shown prominently or pub-
lished in popular magazines such as Ladies' 
Home Journal, Saturday Evening Post, Coun-
try Gentleman, and World's Work. SP also 
commissioned Maynard Dixon to do "a set of 
four lunettes on Arizona themes" for the Tuc-
son station; Dixon additionally turned out 
several travel posters and folders for the SP.7 
Advertising and promotional efforts on be-
half of agriculture continued apace through-
out the 1920s. In 1928, for instance, the SP 
joined with the Agricultural Extension Service 
of the state university to sponsor a fifteen-
car agricultural train that visited twenty-four 
California locations. The cars were equipped 
for stock display and demonstration pur-
poses. Professors discussed the advantages of 
diversified farming and of expanding current 
markets and developing new ones; SP repre-
sentatives spoke to the close relationship be-
tween marketing and transportation.8 
The marketing of California's burgeoning 
harvest of fruits and vegetables was of early in-
terest to both the SP and its wholly owned Pa-
cific Electric. In this regard, Pacific Electric, 
during 1915, purchased the Los Angeles Pub-
lic Market and in the following year acquired 
the Los Angeles Union Terminal Company. 
Four years later these properties passed di-
rectly to the SP. By 1928 the Los Angeles 
Union Terminal owned nineteen acres of land, 
seven multistory warehouses and public mar-
ket buildings, and adjoining shipping sheds." 
Sometimes the business of promotion could 
take a strange twist. Although it did not set out 
to do so, the SP in 1922 attracted nationwide 
attention through an order from the Baldwin 
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Locomotive Works for fifty 2-10-2 locomo-
tives. The story is surrounded by both curi-
osity and irony. The decision to purchase 
these locomotives was made, said Kruttschnitt 
in his usual straightforward style, "to avoid 
expected increases in steel entering into con-
struction of locomotives." Intramural strug-
gles followed, however. Company accountants 
urged accepting the locomotives later in a 
block to save interest payments, while me-
chanical staffers urged receipt in small lots as 
quickly as they could be shipped. The traffic 
department counseled delivery to the nearest 
point on the SP to save transportation costs 
and to receive the first twenty in a "solid train 
for advertising purposes"; the operating de-
partment fussed that moving a solid train of 
locomotives was "inadvisable and unsafe." 
William Sproule worried that " if anything 
happened to the solid engine train we would 
be exposed to criticism not only for the ac-
cident but for having promoted it ." Sproule 
sided with the mechanical and operating 
staffs.10 
Nevertheless, Sproule soon experienced 
pressure from the outside. Samuel M . Vau-
clain, president of Baldwin, and Samuel Rea, 
president of the Pennsylvania Rai lroad— 
which served the Baldwin works at Eddy-
stone, Pennsylvania—both "attached the 
greatest importance to the benefits of the pub-
licity that would be given to the movement of 
these twenty locomotives in a solid train." 
Sproule then backed off, agreeing that the first 
twenty machines could move en bloc over the 
Pennsylvania to East Saint Louis and thence 
to the SP's Texas & Louisiana Lines at Corsi-
cana via the St. Louis Southwestern, but he 
continued to demand that the train be broken 
up upon reaching Corsicana. Meanwhile, the 
Pennsylvania Railroad arranged to distribute 
along its lines "over 10,000 copies" of an im-
pressive broadside calling attention to the 
schedule of what Pennsy and Baldwin styled 
"the Prosperity Special." As the train headed 
west from Eddystone on May 26, 1922, Bald-
win's Grafton Greenough considered that the 
SP was foolishly "overlooking a wonderful op-
portunity . . . to reap the benefit awakened by 
the unique features of this shipment." " 
Attention generated by the Prosperity Spe-
cial as it moved toward the Pacific astonished 
SP's management. Indeed, it was adequate to 
convince Sproule to leave it intact as far as El 
Paso and to permit stopovers en route. In ad-
dition, he grudgingly authorized minimal ad-
vertising, including reprints of the broadsides 
supplied by Pennsylvania/Baldwin—modi-
fied, however, to omit the offensive term "Santa 
Fe type" in favor of 2-10-2. 1 2 
Excitement within the entire SP organiza-
tion mounted as the novel train moved toward 
California. Fox Film's "News Weekly" in-
cluded the story, as did most of the nation's 
newspapers. Sproule capitulated. The train 
passed to the Pacific Lines as a unit and was 
greeted at all locations by large crowds. It was 
the heaviest train handled to date over the Los 
Angeles Division, where three Mikados and 
three Consolidations were joined by one M a l -
let locomotive to lift the Prosperity Special 
over Beaumont H i l l . When the new locomo-
tives arrived in Los Angeles, they were put 
on display for two days at Exposition Park, 
where the SP invited the public to inspect 
them. Thousands took advantage of the offer. 
Sproule was amazed to receive numerous con-
gratulatory telegrams, including one from 
President Warren G . Harding. Several indus-
trial leaders and fellow railroaders similarly 
praised the Southern Pacific for, as Samuel 
Vauclain put it, "earnestly and enthusiasti-
cally backing and supporting the President of 
the United States in his efforts to restore 
permanent prosperity to all our people." If 
Sproule was embarrassed by this misinterpre-
tation of SP's timing and intent in purchasing 
the locomotives or his own obstinate efforts to 
subvert the public relations potential of the 
Prosperity Special, he shrewdly camouflaged 
it. The remaining thirty locomotives trickled 
in over the next two months, dispatched west-
ward over several roads that SP's traffic depart-
ment wished to favor; the last four 2-10-2S 
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SP's management was astonished at the public response to the "Prosperity Special," shown here in Ontario, 
California, June 30, 1922. 
left Baldwin's erecting plant on July 25, 1922. 
SP paid $78,215.29 per copy, f.o.b., or 
$3,660,765 for the lot . " 
The Prosperity Special was only one of in-
numerable trains safely expedited along SP 
lines by way of its expanding network of block 
signals. In 1914 the ICC reported that the SP 
had more miles of such protection than any 
other domestic carrier. SP's inventory of them 
was almost 7,000 three years later, represent-
ing an investment of $4.5 million. The pro-
gram of installation was slowed, unfortu-
nately, by the unmerger difficulties and other 
problems but was renewed in 1928. Over 95 
percent of the Pacific Lines' main routes were 
thus protected when the decade ended. 1 4 
As the company matured, so did its work 
force. Its retirees—alternately referred to as 
pensioners, veterans, or the " O l d G u a r d " — 
began to hold reunions in 1910 and con-
tinued them annually on the anniversary date 
of the Golden Spike ceremony. These were 
gala affairs staged at the famous Palace Hotel 
in San Francisco; over a thousand attended 
the 1923 event. SP's executive officers partici-
pated in them and otherwise exhibited a sin-
cere interest in the welfare of former em-
ployees. For example, a club room was 
provided for the veterans in the general office 
building. Other space there was made avail-
able to the board of pensions, which itself 
dated from 1903 and handled a variety of 
benefits for those who had at least twenty-five 
years of continuous service and had reached 
the mandatory retirement age of seventy or 
had become disabled. Disbursements reached 
one-half million dollars annually by 1922. 1 5 
The Southern Pacific similarly found ways 
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to express its interest in the welfare of current 
employees. These included the establishment 
of clubs and clubhouses at outlying points, be-
gun in the Harriman era, as well as support 
for the SP Traffic Club in the general offices, 
and the SP Picnic Association in Los Angeles. 
Sacramento's SP Band and Glee Club was 
prominent in the life of that important com-
munity, often appearing before charities and 
public bodies, and the Portland Division Em-
ployee Band frequently serenaded employees 
of the Brooklyn Shops during their noon 
break. The company also sponsored employee 
athletic teams for those interested in bowling, 
baseball, and football, and supported intra-
mural track meets, golf tournaments, and 
even a women's General Office Indoor Base-
ball League.1 6 
Harriman and his immediate successors 
considered the further education of company 
employees to be paramount. External oppor-
tunities took the form of courses from the In-
ternational Correspondence Schools and the 
Extension Division of the University of Cali-
fornia. Internal options included schools to 
train future station agents and courses to 
teach apprentices in eleven mechanical trades. 
SP's "Student Course in Railroading," intro-
duced in 1914, was an impressive three-and-
one-half-year laboratory experience designed 
to introduce prospective managers to "al l of 
the principal departments of the railroad." 
Still another program, one that mixed edu-
cation and financial opportunity, was intro-
duced in 1922 when the SP approved an em-
ployee stock subscription arrangement that 
provided for monthly installment payments 
by those who chose to take advantage of it . 1 7 
As competitive pressures increased, Julius 
Kruttschnitt insisted that rank-and-file em-
ployees be instructed in the need for good ser-
vice, good housekeeping, and fuel savings. 
Good service, he thought, could be promoted 
if members of the "SP family" were drawn 
closer and if each member better understood 
the nature of competitive forces. Good house-
keeping was a natural corollary. Competition 
was encouraged among stations, shops, and 
terminals to claim honors for cleanliness and 
orderliness. Competition was likewise pro-
moted among engine crews and operating di-
visions in regard to the efficient use of fuel. 
Winning divisions were allowed to fly the 
company's "fuel banner," and winning crews 
had their names printed in the Bulletin and 
were awarded paid trips to represent the SP at 
annual meetings of the International Railway 
Fuel Association. 1 8 
Similar campaigns stressed safety. Contests 
sought to promote new slogans and pitted 
operating divisions against one another in 
pursuit of the highest rankings. A department 
of safety was established, and the editor of the 
Bulletin constantly stressed the issue. The re-
wards were gratifying; 1927 proved to be the 
safest year to date " i n the prevention of ac-
cidents to passengers and employees of the 
Southern Pacific." A n alarming new variable 
had entered the scene, however. Engine crews 
especially were confronted by the danger of 
grade-crossing accidents. In 1920, 57 persons 
perished and another 293 were injured in 
accidents involving SP trains and motor 
vehicles.19 
Those employees who were injured in an 
accident could take solace in the knowledge 
that Southern Pacific often placed such unfor-
tunate persons on jobs they could still handle. 
Several became crossing flagmen. Shortly be-
fore America's entry into World War I, the SP 
had 308 employees in what it called the "crip-
pled class"; the average length of employment 
after injury was 8.7 years.2 0 
A l l who were injured or otherwise in need 
of health care could avail themselves of the 
service provided them by the Southern Pacific 
hospitals. Such care had begun in 1868. Dur-
ing the following season a company hospital 
was erected at Sacramento; it was the first in 
the country established for the exclusive care 
of rail employees. In 1898 another facility was 
opened in San Francisco, but it burned in the 
earthquake and fire of 1906 and was replaced 
by a second structure three years later. Former 
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station properties of the El Paso & Southwest-
ern in Tucson were later utilized in the devel-
opment of a tubercular sanitorium which, 
along with a new wing for the San Francisco 
hospital, were financed in large part through 
the beneficence of Edward S. Harkness, a 
member of SP's board of directors.2 1 
SP's Hospital Department performed as a 
nonprofit institution in behalf of the com-
pany's employees and was maintained with 
funds contributed by them in the form of 
dues. Prior to March, 1920, these were 50^ 
monthly, rising to 75^ in r 9 2 2 and $1.00 in 
1927. The SP contributed a small monthly 
supplement, and the department likewise re-
ceived gifts from several sources, including 
Mrs . E. H . Harriman. These monies were ade-
quate to provide payment for doctors, nurses, 
drugs, and all food and other supplies neces-
sary for the operation of the central hospitals 
as well as fifteen emergency facilities at out-
lying points. 2 2 
In spite of its progressive if paternalistic la-
bor policy, the SP, like sister systems across the 
country, was confronted with unrest and peri-
odic strikes. Before the beginning of the twen-
tieth century the SP came to embrace the 
"Brown System" of regulating employees' effi-
ciency. Named for George R. Brown of the 
Fall Brook Railway, the system ostensibly rep-
resented a change from the punitive to the 
corrective system of discipline. However, even 
under the Brown System an employee was 
subject to summary dismissal for "disloyalty, 
dishonesty, intemperance, insubordination, 
wilful neglect, gross carelessness, immorality, 
violation of rules resulting in the destruction 
of company property, making false statements 
concerning matters under investigation," and 
the like. When engine and train crews threat-
ened strikes in 1916, William Sproule ap-
pealed to all other crafts to bring pressure on 
their brethren to forestall a disruption. He 
also issued an implied threat: he hoped the 
men would "seriously consider their posi-
tions, their pensions, their transportation 
privileges and the welfare of their families." 
Striking, in his view, was both disloyal and in-
subordinate—adequate reasons for dismissal. 
Not surprisingly, Sproule and most others in 
railroad management at the time saw the un-
authorized strike by switchmen in 1920 as a 
"war on the American people." 2 3 
A more ominous situation presented itself 
in 1922 when shop workers threatened a na-
tionwide walkout. J. H . Dyer's view was that 
the SP and its employees owed "a duty to the 
public to render uninterrupted transporta-
tion" and suggested that wage increases man-
dated by the Railroad Labor Board and the 
USRA since 1917 had been at least adequate 
and probably generous. At the same time, he 
noted, SP's operating ratio of 62.17 in 1917 
had risen alarmingly to 85.27 in r 9 2 0 and 
stood at 78.88 the next year. SP's situation 
was mirrored collectively; the carriers there-
fore argued for reduction in wages because of 
slack revenues that reflected the postwar re-
cession. Emotions heightened. On July 1, 
1922, the shop unions struck over the deci-
sion of the United States Railroad Labor 
Board to lower wages to 1920 scales. Most of 
SP's shopmen stayed on the job although the 
strike itself lasted several weeks. It had a great 
impact on the competition, but the SP was 
shut down only sixty-seven hours; no pas-
senger trains were annulled and embargoes af-
fected perishable and livestock shipments only 
briefly. Employees who stayed on received 
"recognition payments," but deep scars re-
mained. Paternalism gradually passed—to be 
replaced by a more antagonistic and confron-
tational style of labor-management relations.2 4 
The Southern Pacific Company, virtually 
from the beginning, was more than a railway. 
Its vast landholdings—gained in large mea-
sure as a grant from a people and government 
intent on opening the vast resources of the 
West by way of railroad transportation built at 
the earliest possible date—provided numer-
ous nontransportation opportunities for SP 
managers. To locate significant mineral depos-
its on land owned by the SP and to maximize 
i i 4 S O U T H E R N P A C I F I C , I Q O I - 1 9 8 5 
development of coal and oil resources for the 
company's fleet of locomotives, a geological 
department was established in 1898. Its earli-
est work was done in Mexico and in Texas, 
but during 1902 the department turned its at-
tention to Kern County, California, where, 
strangely, the company was disposing land of 
oil-bearing potential at only grazing land 
prices. In 1909 Harriman ordered that a com-
plete geological survey of all company lands in 
California, Nevada, and Utah be made for 
classification as to oil , mineral, or other valu-
able rock deposits. Additional work con-
ducted by the department included investiga-
tions for water supply and ballast material. In 
1926 these tasks were performed by a team of 
company geologists and mining engineers.25 
Nevertheless, SP's interest in maturing its 
nonrailroad properties, particularly those in 
the western San Joaquin Basin, was inexpli-
cably slow. As early as 1893 C. P. Huntington 
had been told that company oil lands were 
likely worth more than the entire railroad. 
Apparently, he was unmoved because the SP— 
even as it converted its locomotives from coal-
fired to oil—continued to sell these valuable 
lands. Company geologists easily confirmed 
the mineral value of the properties, and finally, 
in 1903, SP established the Kern Trading & 
Oi l Company, a subsidiary. Kern was respon-
sible for developing the oil lands but did not 
take title to them. Ultimately, its assets and re-
sponsibilities passed to another subsidiary, the 
Southern Pacific Land Company, established 
on February 12, 1912. For that matter, all of 
SP's oil properties and its significant holding 
in an outside company, Associated O i l , were 
divorced from the railroad properties late in 
1920 and placed in the hands of still another 
subsidiary, Pacific Oi l Company. 2 6 
These changes did not reflect unproductive 
and foolish bureaucratic shuffling. Rather, 
they represented management's best effort to 
preserve shareholder equity. For nearly the en-
tire decade until 1920 the SP had been under 
legal attack by the federal government, which 
sought to divest SP of nearly 175,000 acres of 
land in California given to it as part of con-
struction grants because, said the govern-
ment, the SP had known they were mineral 
and not agricultural when patents had been 
perfected. The courts ultimately took SP's 
side—only 6,100 acres were ordered back to 
the government—but the cases were as long 
as they were inflammatory. Furthermore, in 
1 9 1 9 - 2 0 there was no certainty that the 
country's railroads would be returned to pri-
vate control, and the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in the U.S. v. Reading Company case 
suggested that similar future litigation might 
result in the forced disassociation of SP's oil 
properties from its transportation holdings. 
SP's board of directors was understandably 
worried about protecting the value of all com-
pany assets; to that end it ultimately deter-
mined to give stockholders an opportunity to 
purchase, at $15 each, on a one-to-one basis, 
shares of Pacific O i l . This, reasoned the board, 
would preserve the value of the properties to 
the stockholder. In the end, Pacific Oi l issued 
3.5 million shares, and all but 85,396 (which 
remained in SP's coffers) were purchased by SP 
shareholders. By 1926 Standard Oi l Company 
(California) purchased a sufficiency of Pacific 
Oil's shares to gain control, and on January 1 
of that year the assets of the two companies 
were combined, with Standard Oi l as the sur-
vivor. Much internal criticism later attached 
to SP's spinoff of these properties, but given 
the political circumstances of the time it was 
likely a wise decision. 2 7 
Company attorneys were busy during the 
same period with other sticky litigation con-
cerning SP's administration of the federal gov-
ernment's grant of land in Oregon. These hold-
ings, which the SP had acceded to through the 
acquisition of predecessor companies, were to 
be distributed only to actual settlers in quan-
tities not greater than quarter-sections (160 
acres) and at a price not to exceed $2.50 per 
acre. In fact, much of the land was nonarable 
and unfit for settlement, a view seemingly em-
braced by the Congress when it passed the 
Timber and Stone Act (1878). With this 
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understanding, and to gain funds it consid-
ered legitimate in satisfaction for completing 
the legally mandated rail link between Rose-
ville, California, and Portland, Oregon, the SP 
decided to sell parcels of its land grant in 
larger blocks, at rates higher than $2.50, and 
not to actual settlers. Even then sales were 
hardly brisk; the SP still held more than two-
thirds of its grant when the government sought 
a decree of forfeiture in 1910. The proceed-
ings were complex. Suffice it to say that, in the 
end, SP lost the unsold portion of its Oregon 
grant and paid $1.72 million, which the fed-
eral government believed to be the difference 
between what the SP should have received 
at $2.50 per acre and what it had actually 
charged. However financially important other 
government grants proved to the SP over time, 
the one in Oregon was a bust. 2 8 
If the "heavy" in the Oregon fracas was the 
SP, it was the government in the matter of the 
Colorado River break claim. This issue dated 
from Theodore Roosevelt's request in 1906 to 
E. H . Harriman to do whatever was necessary 
to stop the vagrant flow of water from the 
Colorado's usual course. Harriman and the SP 
had responded promptly and vigorously, clos-
ing the break, but the government was shame-
fully obdurate in satisfying the claim. Not 
even a personal appeal to President Calvin 
Coolidge moved it to honorable action. The 
SP finally resorted to litigation through the 
Court of Claims, and more than twenty-three 
years after the incident the SP, on Apri l 1, 
1930, received a government check of $1,013 
million in settlement.29 
Several of SP's senior officers had been with 
the company since even before Colorado 
River break. Not surprisingly, then, significant 
changes in SP's executive-level personnel and 
organization took place during the 1920s. 
The remarkable Julius Kruttschnitt, a man 
whose roots tapped both the Huntington and 
Harriman eras, retired on May 31, 1925, after 
forty-seven years of continuous service. Krutt-
schnitt was successful in working with the ex-
ecutive team handed to him by Harriman 
U S 
(Stubbs, Mahl , Hood, et al.) and in building 
his own (Sproule, Shoup, McDonald, et al.). 
Kruttschnitt was not the entrepreneur that 
Huntington had been, nor was he the finan-
cial wizard that Harriman was. Rather, he 
represented the trend to professional manage-
ment that typified the industry in the twen-
tieth century. And he was an outstanding 
example of it. Small wonder that upon Krutt-
schnitt's retirement the editor of the Bulletin 
referred to Kruttschnitt as "our friend," and 
small wonder that all of SP's trains, ferries, 
and ships paused in tribute when he died un-
expectedly only days after his retirement.30 
Upon Kruttschnitt's departure, Henry W. 
de Forest became chairman of the executive 
committee. Born in New York City on Octo-
ber 29, 1855, de Forest earned a bachelor's 
degree at Yale and a law degree at Colum-
bia; he remained a member of the de Forest 
Brothers law firm throughout his tenure at 
SP. De Forest became an SP vice-president in 
1913; serving in that capacity and also as a 
member of the board of directors, he was 
responsible for the company's financial af-
fairs. In addition, de Forest served on the 
boards of Wells Fargo, Western Union, and 
several other companies.3 1 
At the same time, Angus Daniel McDonald 
was appointed vice-chairman and in 1928 
would, as additional duties, assume the presi-
dency of SP's Texas & Louisiana operations. A 
native Californian, McDonald was born in 
Oakland on April 14, 1878; he received his 
higher education at the University of Notre 
Dame and entered SP's service at Houston in 
1901. McDonald had been named to the au-
ditor's position in 1910, to a vice-presidency 
in 1913, and to the board of directors in 
1925. 3 2 
William R. Sproule retained the presidency 
of SP's Pacific Lines. Born in Ireland and mov-
ing to New York as a boy, Sproule had entered 
the employ of the SP in 1882 and worked his 
way up the ranks to become general traffic 
manager in 1898. He then left the SP, serving 
as traffic manager for American Smelting &c 
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William R. Sproule retained the presidency of the 
Pacific Lines following Kruttschnitt's departure. 
Refining and later as president of Wells Fargo 
before returning in 1911 as president of the SP 
and a member of its board. 3 3 
Paul Shoup was another Californian, born 
at San Bernardino, and another who rose 
through the ranks. He became president of Pa-
cific Electric in 1912 and, retaining that title 
and those responsibilities, was also an SP vice-
president from 1918 to 1925. As a young 
telegrapher, Shoup wrote short stories, verses, 
and essays that he sold to various newspapers 
and magazines in the West. Friends later 
gathered them into a privately published book 
called Side Tracks from the Main Line. He 
was named executive vice-president in 1925. 3 4 
Additional shuffling was required later in 
the decade when Sproule retired at the end of 
1928. Shoup replaced him as president of the 
Pacific Lines, and de Forest was elected chair-
man of the board, a new position. SP then 
broke tradition by reaching outside of its or-
SP's board of directors broke tradition by reaching 
outside its organization to tap Hale Holden (left) 
as chairman of the executive committee. Paul 
Shoup is shown with Holden in this idyllic scene. 
ganization to tap Hale Holden as chairman of 
the executive committee. A native of Kansas 
City, Missouri, where he was born in 1869, 
a graduate of Williams College and the law 
school at Harvard, Holden had risen quickly 
through the legal department of the Chicago, 
Burlington &C Quincy Railroad to become 
that company's president in 1914. 3 5 
The trade press, financial analysts, and 
others found ample reason to praise the South-
ern Pacific during the last half of the 1920s. In 
1926 there were ten billion-dollar companies 
in the United States; SP ranked number two. 
Among the elite ten, five were railroads, and 
among these the SP had the largest total assets 
and the greatest value in terms of physical 
properties. One year later it had 58,000 stock-
holders, 96,000 employees, and served a huge 
empire with 13,532 route miles of railway and 
3,825 miles of water service. The balance 
sheet showed total assets of $2,206,621,000. 
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Moreover, the company had paid standard 6 
percent dividends since 1907; Barron's rec-
ommended that investors could "hold this 
stock with confidence." Others chimed in 
similarly. Strassburger &c Company saw the SP 
as "an admirably rounded out transportation 
system" whose strength was " i n large measure 
the result of the reinvestment of surplus earn-
ings in its properties." At "no time in its his-
tory has the outlook been brighter," said 
Strassburg in August, 1929. 3 6 
Yet there were clouds, serious clouds, on 
SP's horizon. The board of directors was espe-
cially displeased with management for being 
overly optimistic regarding the estimated rate 
of return for SP's recent construction projects. 
These rates varied greatly on expenditures for 
short branches or extension of branches, but 
in 1928, for example, major projects such as 
the Cascade and Phoenix lines yielded only 
2.6 percent and 3.8 percent, respectively. For 
that matter, the return on investment for the 
entire system was low, only 3.98 percent in 
1926, a fact that was all the more regrettable 
because in that year the company experienced 
the highest operating revenues yet. " N e w ter-
ritory required some time to develop," said 
Paul Shoup, who noted further that vehicular 
and Panamanian competition were draining 
"earnings from investments made" earlier. 
Shoup, however, was not able to explain away 
another bothering statistic, the operating ra-
tio, which in 1926 was 72.2, bad enough in 
and of itself but more disappointing when 
compared to those for the same season of SP's 
archrivals—Union Pacific's 68.5, Santa Fe's 
65.2. Moreover, SP had made an issue of 
bonds in nearly every year during the 1920s 
and felt the need in 1929 to add both equity 
and debt in the form of a new issue of com-
mon stock, trust certificates, and bonds. The 
timing was awful. A massive wave of sell 
orders hit Wall Street on October 24, 1929; 
the crash was at hand and the Great Depres-
sion was not far behind. 3 7 
C H A P T E R 9 
The Dark Decade 
"We face the first necessity of producing a 
service we can sell successfully in an increas-
ingly competitive market. This means a ser-
vice constantly revised and improved to meet 
more exactly the requirements of shippers 
and travelers, a service our customers will 
find easy and pleasant to use."—President 
A. D. McDonald 
T H E United States slid inexorably into the 
world depression following the stock market 
crash of 1929. Except for the worst periods of 
the Civi l War, the nation had never witnessed 
days as dark as these. In 1930 alone, over 
1,500 banks closed, losing $1 billion in de-
posits. At least one-quarter and possibly as 
much as one-third of the work force found it-
self unemployed. However, the nation did en-
dure, survive, and eventually prosper, an ex-
perience mirrored by the Southern Pacific. Its 
profit-and-loss statement did not show a con-
stant downward trend but rather reflected the 
saw-tooth fortunes of the country itself. SP 
was not forced into bankruptcy, yet the pros-
pect was very real during the bleak depression 
decade. 
Southern Pacific's financial condition was 
admittedly grim throughout the 1930s. These 
unpleasant circumstances, however, were not 
solely the result of the Great Depression. The 
company's leaders had matured in an environ-
ment of constant expansion; they were, in a 
sense, captives of SP's past and ill-equipped by 
psychological orientation or tradition to deal 
adequately with the new circumstance. They 
responded sluggishly and, like many others, 
underestimated the length and depth of the 
depression. They clung forlornly to the hope 
that it was an aberration—that the status quo 
ante was, as President Herbert C. Hoover af-
firmed, "just around the corner." He was 
wrong and so were they. Not only did hard 
times persist, they energized competition, par-
ticularly in the form of over-the-road truck 
companies, intercity bus operators and, to a 
lesser extent, air lines. At the same time, and 
in spite of the depression, the family auto-
mobile continued to gain popularity at the ex-
pense of the railroads. 
The exigencies of the depressed economy 
coupled with changed and changing competi-
tive forces finally resulted in a significant re-
orientation of managerial thinking. Before 
business rebounded in 1940, the SP would be 
forced to reduce train service, abandon cer-
tain lines, discontinue entire operations, and 
embrace a wide variety of innovations. Mean-
while, the company suffered with its constitu-
ents; the agony of one was mirrored by the 
other. It was, as one of SP's directors said, "the 
dark decade." 1 
The decline in the number of through and 
local riders, which had begun before World 
War I, continued dramatically throughout the 
1920s. The average distance traveled did go 
up sharply during that decade, but the per-
centage of contribution to total operating 
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This busy scene at Dunsmuir belied reality. The decline in the number of through and local riders, which 
had begun before World War I, continued in dramatic fashion throughout the 1920s. 
revenues by passengers slid from 25.4 in 1920 
to r6 .o in ^ 2 9 . The depression simply accel-
erated the process. Ridership in 1933 was 
nearly as low as it had been in 1898; receipts 
declined in equal portion. 2 
Freight volume, unlike passenger, had 
grown impressively during the 1920s but, like 
passenger, plummeted during the depression. 
Total revenue tonnage in 1933 approximated 
that of 1906. Volume in all major categories 
dropped, but declines in mines, forests, manu-
factures, and merchandise were precipitous. 
In the case of forest products, traffic in 1933 
was only 36 percent of what it had been in 
1930. 3 
Total revenues in 1930 proved to be the 
lowest in ten years. The balance sheet for that 
year looked healthy, however, by comparison 
with the devastated reports of the three sea-
sons following. SP's return on equity for the 
entire decade of the 1920s had been an unim-
pressive 3.84 percent; even that looked good 
by comparison with the company's perfor-
mance in 1930. During the following year 
dividends were reduced and in 1932 were sus-
pended for the duration. For that matter, the 
company's earnings did not cover fixed charges 
in 1932 or 1933. These problems understand-
ably disturbed shareholders, whose numbers 
fell from 54,858 in 1930 to 41,627 in 1941. 4 
The financial picture was so bleak in 1933 
that the company applied for and received 
loans from the Reconstruction Finance Cor-
poration (RFC) and another federal agency. 
As the situation worsened, the SP also bor-
rowed frequently from banks and even sold 
some of its lands to reduce the debt. In 1934 a 
paltry 0.3 percent of SP's budget was available 
for improvements. Fortunately, after the de-
pression eased somewhat in 1935, the com-
pany was able to pay off several bank obliga-
tions, and in 1936 it satisfied the RFC debt.5 
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SP's management found few pleasant op-
tions during those difficult years. On the one 
hand, it was confronted with inordinately 
high fixed costs accompanied by regulatory 
constraints and innumerable labor agreements 
that hindered flexible responses and, on the 
other hand, by faltering traffic and stiffer 
competition. The operating ratio reflected the 
dilemma; it rose from 75.52 in 1930 to 80.79 
two years later. Cuts were required. These 
took various forms, including, for instance, 
line abandonments. The process of reducing a 
plant had begun in the 1920s when 158 miles 
had been abandoned, but it was not sufficient. 
A . D . McDonald in 1932 ordered a vigorous 
study of potential line reductions, and by the 
end of the decade another 768.6 miles were 
pared from the system." 
Other nostrums were equally painful. Pub-
lication of the Bulletin was terminated during 
the summer of 1931, and employee numbers 
dropped dramatically, from 89,304 in 1929 to 
41,863 in 1933. Those who remained were 
forced to accept reductions in wages or sala-
ries. A l l took 10 percent cuts in 1932, and 
those in the official family who earned in ex-
cess of $10,000 annually experienced a fur-
ther 10 percent reduction later the same year. 
Yet another 10 percent cut followed for the 
salaried group in 1933. Among SP's several 
shops, only those at Bayshore (San Francisco), 
Sacramento, Los Angeles, and El Paso worked 
full five-day shifts by early 1934. 7 
Literally thousands of former SP employees 
suffered from the vicissitudes of the depres-
sion. Other than restoring them to their for-
mer jobs, an impossibility for several years, 
there was little the company could do. How-
ever, it did join with its officers and contract 
forces in 1931 to establish an employees' re-
lief loan fund. Those who chose to do so 
could subscribe 1 percent of their monthly 
earnings, which the SP promised to match. 
These funds were then used in making no-
interest loans to persons laid off and were to 
be repaid by them when "circumstances per-
mitted." Such loans, aggregating $349,000, 
were made to nearly 3,000 persons before the 
company was forced to terminate the program 
in 1932. (About half of the monies were ulti-
mately refunded to the contributors.)8 
SP's traffic reverses were discouraging, and 
not all were the result of the depression; modal 
competition was increasingly a factor in the 
company's fortunes. The use of automobiles 
and the introduction of motor buses cut 
deeply into local business. More important to 
overall revenues were the significant inroads 
made by motor trucks, which sliced deeply 
into less-than-carload (LCL) traffic and then 
into historically important commodity classes, 
including agricultural, petroleum, and mer-
chandise. SP's response, like that of the indus-
try generally, was defensive. The "good roads 
movement" was mere propaganda, the editor 
of the Bulletin had wailed in 1922. "There is 
not a highway in the United States today that 
will stand up under truck traffic," he dolefully 
predicted. The SP fought for regulation and 
taxation of truckers at the state level and lob-
bied successfully for the passage of the federal 
Motor Carrier Act of 1935. Nevertheless, the 
company had to admit to its shareholders in 
1937 that "the severity of competition from 
this form of transportation has not materially 
lessened." Furthermore, other modes of trans-
portation levied significant competitive at-
tacks. Intercoastal and unregulated coastal 
carriers constantly sniped at lucrative bulk 
traffic, as did a growing network of pipelines.9 
SP's management had not been slow to rec-
ognize threats presented by other modes of 
transportation, but it was disappointingly le-
thargic in addressing them. There was irony 
in this since it had traditionally responded 
skillfully to threats from other railroads. Ap-
parently, SP's managers thought the company 
invincible against meaningful attack by any-
thing less than steel rails and iron horses. This 
reflected, sad to say, a creeping if unfortunate 
"this-is-the-way-we've-always-done-it" men-
tality that more and more characterized the 
entire industry and earned for it a reputation 
of "reacting" rather than "acting." 
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SP's operations at Oakland—a complex 
mixture of rail and water, passenger and 
freight, steam and electric—served to illus-
trate changed patterns. As the 1920s had be-
gun, SP's Oakland Mole was unquestionably 
one of the country's busiest terminals, serving 
at least 90 steam and over 600 electric trains 
daily. As late as 1928, SP's Eastbay electric 
trains offered pleasant and efficient service, 
with trains operating on twenty-minute head-
ways during daylight hours (forty- to sixty-
minute headways until midnight) with modest 
2 i £ fares (or $6.50 monthly). Nevertheless, 
traffic peaked in 1920 and then declined. 
Losses mounted to nearly one-half million 
dollars annually even before the depression. 
Not surprisingly, certain line reductions were 
made in 1933. In a related matter, the SP 
during the same year entered into agreements 
with both the A T & S F and Western Pacific 
that allowed them joint use of the Oakland 
Pier to originate and terminate their passen-
ger trains. 1 0 
Employees, who had as great a stake as any 
in the new environment, sometimes took 
matters into their own hands. On the San D i -
ego & Arizona (SD&A) they skillfully formed 
their own solicitation committee and quickly 
produced improved ticket sales and freight 
receipts. The S D & A program of "business-
getting" eventually spread across the SP sys-
tem. Interested employees who perceived the 
company's welfare as their own filled out 
"prospective business cards" that were for-
warded to the sales department for follow-up. 
This elementary style of employee involve-
ment eventually took the form of a contest 
among the various operating divisions plus 
the general office force. Cash prizes were given 
during the early 1930s for those who made 
the best suggestions as to how the SP could in-
crease its revenues. During the last part of the 
depression, meetings were held throughout 
the system during which officers frankly told 
employees of the company's difficult position 
and heartily urged everyone to "ask friends 
and merchants with whom you trade to pa-
tronize the Southern Pacific." Enthusiasm was 
great even if the total impact on revenues was 
not. These campaigns also produced impor-
tant side benefits: the SP "team" tended to pull 
more in harness and morale was improved." 
Adversity clearly strengthened the family 
bond between the company and its employees. 
The SP quickly found radio broadcasting and 
later the new medium of television to be espe-
cially useful tools in fostering pride and loy-
alty while at the same time increasing morale 
and getting positive publicity. SP broadcasts 
began in 1923; they originated from K G O , 
General Electric's station at Oakland, and fea-
tured instrumental and vocal selections and 
readings by talented SP personnel living in the 
Bay Area. G E received "applause cards" from 
California and surrounding states compli-
menting the program and individual perform-
ers. To commemorate the sixtieth anniversary 
of the Golden Spike ceremony on May 10, 
1929, the company presented an hour-long 
"Golden Jubilee Program" featuring the noted 
baritone Reginald Werrenrath; it boasted 
broad regional coverage and was well received. 
Even more impressive was SP's half-hour " A l l 
Aboard" program, which aired weekly in 
1940 and 1941 from NBC's Hollywood stu-
dios. Equally pleasant was the publicity the 
company gained when its supervising chef 
was featured for culinary demonstrations on 
the Mutual—Don Lee television network in 
1939. 1 2 
It was much the same with the Hollywood 
film industry that grew up in the shadow of 
SP's operations in Southern California. The 
railroad discovered early that it could make 
money and simultaneously receive free pub-
licity by working with the cinematographers. 
In 1915 such revenues had been only $8,000, 
but two years later they were over $100,000. 
The SP provided hundreds of special trains for 
the industry and even established a "locations 
bureau" in the Los Angeles city ticket office as 
an aid to the studios in selecting sites for spe-
cial pictures and for filming natural scenes. 
"When you see Mary Pickford enjoying a 
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meal on a train, or Bill Hart waving farewell 
from the observation platform," said SP's 
local passenger agent, "the chances are that it 
is an SP diner or train that is being used." 
Truckee was a favorite location for mountain 
scenes and Palm Springs for desert sets." 
As much as its financial officers might have 
wished it, the company could not rely entirely 
on the incidental publicity that resulted from 
radio and movie exposure. The SP also had to 
spend its own money, scarce as it was during 
the depression. Like virtually all other bud-
gets, that of advertising was slashed and would 
not regain its 1929 level until 1946. Available 
money generally was spent to stimulate travel 
on SP's fleet of passenger trains. Advertising 
focused on the company's low-fare Sunday ex-
cursions such as the Suntan Special between 
San Francisco and Santa Cruz, the Snowball 
Specials to the Sierra, and on "Dollar Day" 
campaigns, which offered patrons "One Hun-
dred Miles of Travel for $ 1 . " 1 4 
Although the SP traditionally bragged about 
its "Four Great Routes West," it enjoyed single 
line—haul advantage only via the relatively 
short Shasta Route and its longer transconti-
nental Sunset Route. On the Overland and 
Golden State routes SP had to rely on the co-
operation of midwestern connections not only 
for goodwill but also for the actual movement 
of trains. Historically, the SP kept its Overland 
passenger options open to facilitate joint car 
routes via Saint Louis, Kansas City, Omaha, 
Denver, and Ogden, although its premier con-
nections were always by way of the Union Pa-
cific and Chicago & North Western. That re-
lationship had been strained during the late 
unmerger proceedings when the C & N W sided 
with the Union Pacific against the Southern 
Pacific. Julius Kruttschnitt understood that 
C & N W ' s "interests were nearly identical" to 
those of the UP, but like other SP officers, he 
felt North Western's decision a betrayal—a 
perception that permanently colored SP's view 
of the company. The incident also provided 
the SP an opportunity to favor the Chicago, 
Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway ( C M & S t P ) — 
which had taken no similarly unpleasant posi-
tion in the unmerger matter—with additional 
Overland business. Yet there were problems. 
William Sproule wished to do nothing that 
might strike the Union Pacific as unfriendly 
since that "would open the way for it to work 
passenger business with the Western Pacific" 
to SP's disadvantage. Additionally, Sproule 
believed the Chicago & North Western to 
be "the strongest of the passenger lines" in the 
Chicago-Omaha corridor, "with the Burl-
ington a close second." The Milwaukee, he 
feared, did not have "the soliciting force" 
and was "lacking in organization to deliver 
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any considerable volume of passenger busi-
ness" to the SP. Ironically, the Union Pacific 
had its own complaint with the C & N W , 
which in 1912 had joined with the Northern 
Pacific in establishing through passenger ser-
vice from Chicago to Puget Sound and Port-
land—"to which the Union Pacific man-
agement took vigorous exception," recalled 
Sproule. Nevertheless, little change in policy 
developed until the depression when the M i l -
waukee felt compelled to, as its president 
H . H . Scandrett said, "accomplish a sub-
stantial reduction in passenger train mileage." 
The Milwaukee withdrew from joint San 
Francisco-Chicago service; the Pacific Lim-
ited made its last trip between Chicago and 
Omaha over the C M S t P & P on May 3, 1931. 
Scandrett took the opportunity, though, to re-
mind Paul Shoup that his company would 
continue to favor the Union Pacific and South-
ern Pacific with all California business, and he 
hoped for a continuation of "cordial rela-
tions" and "close cooperation." 1 5 
More interline passengers moved via Ogden 
than any other of SP's gateways, and of course 
the Union Pacific was by agreement and by 
practice the favored connection. The UP was 
also the favored connection at Portland—fol-
lowed there, in order, by the Northern Pacific, 
Great Northern, and the Spokane, Portland 
& Seattle. Elsewhere, the SP, after it acquired 
the El Paso & Southwestern, built stronger 
alliances with the Rock Island via Tucum-
cari, New Mexico. Indeed, during the winter 
months freight and passenger volume moving 
on the Golden State Route exceeded that via 
Ogden—much to the consternation of the 
Union Pacific and of the Santa Fe, which com-
peted with the Southern Pacific-Rock Island 
for Chicago—Los Angeles business.16 
Although ridership slipped, and the contri-
bution of passenger earnings to operating 
revenue mirrored it, passenger business re-
mained an important element in Southern 
Pacific's thinking. Various physical and opera-
tional improvements were made. As a quality-
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The Golden State Route represented a cooperative effort by SP with the E P & S W and the Rock Island in 
order to compete with the Santa Fe for the important Los Angeles—Chicago business. Three sections of the 
Golden State Limited are ready to leave Los Angeles during the great years of the long-haul passenger 
business. 
control measure, train inspectors had been 
authorized in 1904; to simplify the work 
of agents and auditors, it adopted multiform 
coupon tickets a few years later. On-board 
amenities included expensive nickel-plated 
typewriters for the Overland Limited, radios 
on the lounge cars of several trains, small 
Christmas trees on observation cars at the holi-
day season, and intercar telephones aboard the 
Cascade. Railway Age in 1928 celebrated SP's 
decision to provide convenient free parking 
lots for patrons at thirty-seven California lo-
cations, as well as its experimental "auto-
mobile and passenger carrying service" be-
tween San Francisco and Monterey (autos 
moved in baggage cars aboard the same train 
their owners rode for $24, round trip). The 
SP's passenger personnel also drew plaudits. 
For example, the steward on the Argonaut ar-
ranged to have that train stopped briefly on a 
hot summer day in 1927 to have a bottle of 
goat's milk delivered aboard to a sick baby. 1 7 
Southern Pacific passenger trains served the 
great as well as the unknown. The popular 
French "hero of the Marne," Marshal Joffre, 
was joined in 1922 by other celebrities such as 
former President William Howard Taft, fa-
mous child actor Jackie Coogan, and the win-
ners of the Pacific Coast bathing beauty con-
test as notables aboard the company's trains. 
However, most patrons were not well known, 
and some had no names at all: thirty babies 
were born on SP passenger trains between 
1917 and 1926. The company once had an 
expectant mother rushed to a hospital, and so 
great was her gratitude that she christened the 
newly born child with names giving her the 
initials "S .P." 1 8 
Throughout the period before World War 
II the SP campaigned vigorously for tourist 
travel. Between 1913 and 1922 it distributed 
80 million pieces of promotional literature 
throughout the world, and in the same years it 
attracted 4.5 million tourist passengers to its 
lines. With the end of World War I and with 
renewed attendance at national conventions 
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Local trains and branch operations were especially susceptible to attack by rubber tire competition. The 
Tahoe Branch, however, shown here in 1928, drew heavy tourist traffic. 
held in California, SP handled more passengers 
in 1920 than in any year before the great crush 
brought on by the second war.' 9 
Many travelers rode on one of an incredible 
array of special passenger trains chartered 
by organizations as diverse as the National 
Education Association, Sierra Club, Shriners, 
and Rexall Drug, to mention a few. Local 
groups sponsored Tucson's Santa Claus spe-
cial, Fresno's Hello Neighbor Excursion, and 
Santa Barbara's Cycle Train. Others were more 
exotic: the Creole Special carrying revelers 
by special train to New Orleans, Pullman's 
Land Cruise Liners, and the Boat Trains that 
connected at San Francisco with Matson Navi-
gation's SS Malolo for Hawaii. A less exotic 
train paid for by the American Legion carried 
French Marshal Ferdinand Foch from Port-
land to Oakland. Hardly dignified, but very 
popular, were the multiple sections required 
to handle enthusiastic fans from Berkeley 
to football games at Stanford. Easily as up-
roarious were overnight Snowball Specials 
from Oakland to Truckee and return, and pic-
nic specials to Santa Cruz. Senior employees 
later recalled that "after a day at the various 
resorts the celebrants were well organized by 
the time the trains reached home." 2 0 
Special trains likewise transported the na-
tion's presidents on periodic visits to the West. 
William McKinley was the first of these. His 
train traversed the Coast Line, the picturesque 
branch to Monterey, and the Overland Route 
to Ogden in May, 1901. Woodrow Wilson fol-
lowed in 1919 as a part of his unsuccessful 
campaign to win support for America's mem-
bership in the League of Nations. Warren G . 
Harding was celebrated when his train arrived 
in San Francisco from Portland on July 29, 
1923, but mourned five days later when it car-
ried the president's body eastward. Herbert 
Hoover took his campaign to the West over SP 
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William McKinley was a visitor in SP's service area shortly before his death. 
rails following his nomination in 1928, and 
ten years later his successor in the White 
House, Franklin Roosevelt, toured the Over-
land Route and Coast Line. 2 1 
Not as romantic but much more important 
to the company's income statement was its 
freight service. Throughout the 1920s and 
1930s freight contributed an increased por-
tion of total operating revenues, rising from 
66.9 percent in 1921 to 81.2 percent in 1940. 
Peak movements in all group commodities 
for the same period were reached between 
1925 and 1929; total tonnage in 1929 was 
76,016,073, a record, and one that would 
stand until World War II. Most commodity 
classes remained relatively stable through-
out, although tonnage in manufactured items 
jumped dramatically while L C L tonnage de-
clined in the same fashion. 2 2 
The greatest density in freight traffic re-
mained between Roseville, California, and 
Ogden, Utah, on the Overland Route, where 
typically more business moved eastward than 
toward the West. The Union Pacific was the re-
cipient of roughly 90 percent of the volume in-
terchanged there, the Denver & Rio Grande 
Western gaining the paltry remaining 10 per-
cent. Divisions on Bay Area—Missouri River 
revenues interestingly favored the Union Pa-
cific over the SP 54 percent to 46 percent.23 
The next most important corridor of freight 
density was between Los Angeles and Tuc-
son—one that also featured an imbalance of 
eastbound tonnage. Before the opening of the 
Panama Canal and SP's acquisition of the El 
Paso &C Southwestern, most traffic on the 
Sunset Route moved to or from the Texas &C 
Louisiana Lines. By 1925, however, the Rock 
Island became the favored connection (via 
Tucumcari, New Mexico) for the Sunset 
Route. Indeed, throughout the late 1920s and 
all of the 1930s, more tonnage moved to and 
from the Golden State Route than was inter-
changed with SP's lines east of El Paso. 2 4 
The Southern Pacific was called upon to 
handle a predictably wide variety of carload 
as well as trainload commodities. Oddities in-
cluded Easter lilies, pipe organs, Old Forester 
whisky (dispatched for medicinal purposes to 
Pacific Coast druggists during prohibition), 
Top: The SP reinstated the Noon Daylight on April 14, 1946. Each day it marched by the Mission Bay 
engine facility and Potrero Tower enroute from San Francisco to Los Angeles. Bottom: Cuesta Grade and 
the Horseshoe Curve above San Luis Obispo on the Coast Line have always posed difficult operating condi-
tions. 1957. 
Top: SP's Claude E. Peterson urged early improvement of passenger service on the Shasta Route following 
World War II. Peterson's victory included the resplendent Shasta Daylight, which posed for publicity photo-
graphs in the upper Sacramento River Valley. Bottom: During the early and mid-1950s, the SP frequently 
assigned its handsome Alco power to the famous San Francisco Overland, shown here at Troy, California, in 
the Sierra Nevadas. 
Top: The spectacular beauty of SP's routes to the West not only attracted important passenger trade but 
posed difficult and expensive operating conditions. To meet the challenge, SP traditionally employed burly 
locomotives such as SD-45 8898, which delivered massive motive power muscle. Bottom: Donald J. Russell 
marveled that the commander of a Japanese submarine that harassed the area early in World War II failed to 
shell SP's vital trestles between Surf and Santa Barbara. Here an expedited freight traverses one of those 
bridges on the Coast Line during the late 1970s. 
Top: March 24, 1980, was a red-letter day for residents of Hooker, Oklahoma. The first SSW train over 
Rock Island trackage meant continued service for local patrons and resurrection of the Golden State Route 
as a vital transportation artery. Bottom: Later the same day, the first train—with an impressive consist 
of covered hopper cars designed to reassure area wheat shippers that the Cotton Belt intended to meet 
their needs—crossed over the Cimarron River west of Kismet, Kansas, en route to Armourdale Yard in 
Kansas City. 
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candy, mineral water, and even the Liberty 
Bell. Sugar beets, garbanzo beans, and Christ-
mas trees moved on a seasonal basis. Entire 
trains of silk and eggs moved eastward, and 
those of corn and machinery westward. 2 5 
The transportation of livestock typified SP 
operations from the beginning. Stocker cattle 
and lambs moved seasonally to new pasturage, 
ard mature animals moved regularly to mar-
ket. A triweekly train known as the Nevada 
Stock Extra gathered cattle west of Lovelock, 
Nevada, for Bay Area packers, and twice 
weekly "lamb specials" moved sheep eastward 
out of the San Joaquin Valley. During periods 
of drought the SP instituted special rates to 
handle livestock from parched areas to moun-
tain valleys such as those near Truckee. Wild 
horses were rounded up and sent east on SP 
trains for service in World War II, and in every 
season the company handled pure-blood ani-
mals to livestock shows around the country. 
Frankly, however, there was little or no profit 
in it. As early as the Harriman era, SP's mana-
gers complained of inadequate rates and fre-
quent claims. One officer groused that live-
stock producers seemed to know more about 
filing damage suits than about the care and 
nourishment of their animals. 2 6 
Nothing, however, distinguished SP's freight 
operations more than the impressive move-
ment of perishables to satisfy the needs of 
roughly half the nation. Every month saw 
some type of produce moving eastward from 
Oregon, California, or Arizona. Citrus was 
joined by a bewildering array of fresh fruits 
and vegetables, as new growing areas were 
added or older ones expanded. The Imperial 
Valley contributed melons and lettuce, the Sa-
linas Valley lettuce, celery, and carrots, while 
other areas added richly to the cornucopia. 
The growth of this traffic was prodigious. In 
the Imperial Valley, for example, only 297 
cars of perishables were loaded in 1905, but in 
1928 the total reached 36,870. Some produce 
was consumed nearby and other was trans-
ported to regional canners, but the major-
ity was shipped to eastern markets. The SP 
The transportation of livestock typified SP opera-
tions from the beginning. 
handled a total of 176,000 carloads in 1923 
alone; several hundred special trains were re-
quired annually for this traffic. The busiest 
day at Roseville in 1928 was September 28, 
when no fewer than 6,282 carloads of per-
ishables passed in and out of the yard on 
such trains. 2 7 
To expedite the movement of perishable 
commodities, close coordination was required 
among packers, Pacific Fruit Express, the 
Southern Pacific, and its connections. Cars 
had to be marshaled, precooled, spotted, 
loaded, iced, and switched into trains. The 
race to waiting connections was slowed only 
by the need to ice the cars again at long PFE 
docks located at Roseville and Ogden on the 
Overland Route and at Yuma, Tucson, and 
El Paso on the Sunset. PFE required thou-
sands of tons of ice daily, made available me-
chanically in later years, but earlier cut from 
mountain lakes and ponds, stored, and then 
transported to the various PFE docks. Over-
the-road speeds for perishables trains in-
creased following World War I. The elapsed 
times for such trains in 1918 between Rose-
ville and Chicago was 180 hours, but only 
146 hours in 1932. The same was true for 
the Sunset—Golden State Route. Colton-to-
Chicago perishables traffic in 1918 required 
189 hours, but only 146 hours in 1932. De-
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pendability was good. SP perishables trains to 
Ogden for a two-year test period built an en-
viable 92 percent on-time record. 2 8 
In 1929 the SP convinced the Western Asso-
ciation of Railway Executives to accept a plan 
for the equitable scheduling of eastbound per-
ishables and westbound manifest freight—a 
concept dear to the hearts of company plan-
ners and one steadily promoted throughout 
the 1930s. The new scheduling called for uni-
form seventh-day delivery of perishables from 
the Pacific Coast to Chicago, with sixth-day 
service to Saint Louis; the agreement ad-
ditionally promised the same delivery times 
via all routes on merchandise traffic from the 
Chicago and Saint Louis gateways to the Pa-
cific Coast. 2 9 
Competition among the railroads and be-
tween railroads and other forms of transpor-
tation, coupled with demands from shippers, 
combined to force ever faster schedules. The 
premier timetable for the Portland—San Fran-
cisco run, for instance, was reduced to make 
third-morning deliveries. Elsewhere, on Octo-
ber 22, 1935, the SP introduced its impressive 
"merchandise-only" Overnight trains between 
San Francisco and Los Angeles. These speed-
sters stopped only at a few break bulk points 
and offered coordinated first morning, store-
door delivery by company-owned trucks. Way-
bills were teletyped ahead. Before the service 
was temporarily suspended in World War II, 
the SP operated eighteen of these swift nightly 
trains over several western routes.3 0 
The demand for expedited freight service 
was a serious factor in SP's decision in 1929 to 
install "signal dispatching" or Centralized 
Traffic Control (CTC) on a 40-mile stretch be-
tween Sacramento and Stockton that handled 
12,000 trains annually. The C T C operation 
obviated the need for double track and prom-
ised a 30 percent improvement in freight train 
performance. Although much impressed with 
the efficiencies of C T C , the company's man-
agement reluctantly postponed further in-
stallations until economic recovery facilitated 
such expenditures in 1940 and 1941 on the 
Shasta Route and the Coast Line. 3 1 
A more dramatic program to expedite move-
ments of trains involved the construction of a 
spectacular bridge over Suisun Bay near Mar-
tinez, California. For years, SP's busy high-
speed main line between the Bay Area and 
Sacramento suffered from one severe bottle-
neck—the need to ferry every locomotive and 
car across the Carquinez Straits from Port 
Costa to Benicia. This time-consuming and ex-
pensive operation was handled by the Solano, 
built in 1879, and the Contra Costa, in ser-
vice since 1914. By 1927 it was plain that 
these veterans would require replacement and 
that the increase in traffic over SP's busy artery 
would necessitate the service of yet a third ves-
sel. Even then the problem of fog, the possibil-
ity of collision, and severe delay to all trains 
would not be relieved. Furthermore, the Car-
quinez ferry operation caused SP to divert 
heavy freight traffic over the longer Niles Can-
yon route, with its heavy grades on Altamont 
Pass. Earlier managers were not ignorant of 
the advantages offered by replacing the ferries 
with a bridge; it was simply a matter of gener-
ating adequate funding for such a stupendous 
undertaking. Finally, after exhaustive studies 
in 1927, the board of directors on May 31, 
1928, gave its blessing for a $12 million 
double-track bridge. When opened to regular 
service on October 15, 1930, the 5,603-foot 
Suisun Bridge was heralded as the longest and 
heaviest two-track structure west of the Mis-
sissippi River and greatest in the country in 
terms of load-carrying capacity. Passenger 
train schedules were shortened, that of the 
Cascade Limited by forty-five minutes. The 
quaint ferry steamers, which had served so 
long and so well, became scrap. 3 2 
The devastating impact of the Great De-
pression severely curtailed, but did not halt, 
SP's program of acquisition. In 1930 it pur-
chased the 13-mile Clackamas Eastern Rail-
road in Oregon; unfortunately, though, this 
ill-fated line suffered abandonment before the 
decade passed. A more beneficial acquisition 
involved the South San Francisco Belt Rail-
way, which SP operated under contract before 
its purchase in 1940. Greatly overshadowing 
Dark Decade 
Construction of the spectacular bridge over Suisun 
Bay near Martinez rendered SP's Carquinez 
Straight car ferry redundant. Collection of 
Harry M. Williamson. 
these, however, was SP's decision in 1931 to 
gain control of the strategically located St. 
Louis Southwestern Railway (Cotton Belt), 
which linked Saint Louis with SP's Texas 
& Louisiana Lines at Corsicana, Texas, and 
Shreveport, Louisiana. (See chapter 12.) 3 3 
During these same years SP's managers 
came to grips with another issue. On De-
cember 5, 192.5, Railway Age ran a lengthy 
and sobering study dealing with motor bus 
and truck transportation; a week later it fol-
lowed with another that discussed how some 
railroads were seeking to cope by establish-
ing their own motor systems. The Boston & 
Maine, New Haven, Pennsylvania, and Great 
Northern companies were already active in 
this regard. The Southern Pacific had long rec-
ognized the problem presented by vehicular 
competition but was inexplicably slow to see 
the wisdom of actually substituting buses for 
unprofitable local and branch passenger trains. 
Finally, in Apri l , 1927, it formed the Southern 
Pacific Motor Transport Company to engage 
in the motorized transportation of passengers, 
mail, baggage, and express. The first route 
was in California, between Santa Cruz and 
Boulder Creek, established on Apri l 19, 1927. 
Expansion thereafter was rapid. SP acquired 
several local bus companies, added its own 
routes, and by the end of 1928 featured an in-
terstate system that linked Portland and San 
Francisco, Los Angeles and El Paso, Grants 
Pass and Eureka, Truckee and Reno, and Phoe-
nix and Lordsburg over the Apache Trail . ' 4 
SP's philosophy was, as Paul Shoup told 
Great Northern's Ralph Budd, to maintain 
motor stage routes parallel to its own rail lines 
as "auxiliary thereto in substitution of ser-
vice." It was not the intent of the SP, promised 
Shoup, to invade territories of its railway com-
petitors with buses.15 
Early in 1929 the SP, at the urging of Chaun-
cey McCormick, a director and one well 
known for his association with the Interna-
tional Harvester Company, agreed to merge 
the Southern Pacific Motor Transport Com-
pany and all of its subsidiaries with the Pick-
wick Corporation and the Motor Transit Cor-
poration to form a new company which, after 
a name change, emerged as the Pacific Grey-
hound Corporation. SP owned a one-third 
interest in the new firm. A predictably close 
relationship developed between Pacific Grey-
hound and the Greyhound Corporation, an-
other of McCormick's interests. There was 
nothing untoward in this. The Greyhound 
Corporation was actively expanding to create 
a national system; in the process it joined with 
nearly a dozen rail carriers in joint stock 
ownership of local and regional bus com-
panies. For its part, the SP pledged not to start 
new bus lines in competition with Pacific 
Greyhound—although it retained the bus 
operations of Pacific Electric and other of its 
electric lines—and agreed to guarantee the 
revenues of Pacific Greyhound routes sub-
stituted for rail service.3 6 
The development of SP's trucking opera-
tions was roughly analogous. In this case, 
however, the inception came not from the par-
ent company, but from Pacific Electric, which 
on October 13, 1928, established the Pacific 
Electric Motor Transport Company for the 
purpose of providing store-door pickup-and-
delivery service by truck at twenty-three com-
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The Southern Pacific Motor Transport Company was formed in Apri l , 1927, to substitute buses for un-
profitable local and branch passenger trains. This view was made at Felton, California. 
munities it served. The line haul between sta-
tions was provided by rail. Since this was 
experimental, PE hired local draymen for the 
work; no trucks or other equipment were pur-
chased. However, matters changed quickly. 
One year later service was expanded to several 
SP points, and on February 4, 1930, the com-
pany was rechristened Pacific Motor Trans-
port Company. Its network spread and its 
scope was broadened shortly into line-haul 
truck service with company employees. New 
incorporation followed in 1933 to form the 
Pacific Motor Trucking Company (PMT) . 3 7 
P M T initially functioned solely to provide a 
substitute for rail service where economies 
could be expected. In all cases its operations 
sought to benefit the railroad, although its 
purpose eventually was expanded from simply 
protecting rail revenues to attracting new 
business on its own. Traffic surged from 8,525 
tons in 1929 to 340,293 tons in 1935. Part 
of this reflected the company's participation 
in SP's coordinated Overnight train service, 
which began in 1935, and part of it reflected 
Pacific Motor Trucking's own solicitation. 
Moreover, cooperation between SP and the 
trucking firm was not restricted to L C L ship-
ments; the two companies also worked to pro-
vide carload shippers with a total transporta-
tion package. Such was the case between 1934 
and 1939 when SP and P M T jointly moved 
2,847,660 barrels of bulk cement for South-
ern California's Metropolitan Water District 
Aqueduct. A l l of this proved most satisfac-
tory. The trucking firm's operating ratio was a 
startling 42 percent, a fact that clearly caught 
the eye of A . D . McDonald during the trying 
days of the depression.3 8 
Significant changes in the executive suite 
occurred in 1932. Henry W. de Forest re-
signed as chairman of the board but retained 
his position as a member of that body. Hale 
Holden was elected chairman. Paul Shoup be-
came vice-chairman and A . D. McDonald, 
president. Responsibility for the day-to-day 
operations of steamships and the Atlantic 
Lines passed to H . M . L u l l . 3 9 
Pacific Motor Trucking, successor to Pacific Electric Motor Transport, was a successful attempt to blend rail 
and motor modes. 
Significant changes in SP's management team occurred in 1932. From left: Paul Shoup, Joe Saunders, J. H . 
Dyer, A . D . McDonald, unidentified, H . M . Lul l , W. H . Kirkbride. 
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Other changes followed. The resurrection 
of the Bulletin early in 1935 was more than 
symbolic. It reflected, in part, better economic 
circumstances. The nadir for the company 
had been reached in 1932; modest increases 
in freight tonnage and passenger volume raised 
revenues thereafter. The reemergence of the 
Bulletin also reflected A. D . McDonald's con-
cern for improved internal communications 
and his belief that it could mobilize "team-
work among us a l l . " McDonald did not mini-
mize the company's continuing problems. The 
first requirement, he told employees, was to 
"produce a service we can sell successfully 
in an increasingly competitive market." This 
would require hard work and a dedication on 
the part of all to "some phase of the selling 
job." It also meant that the company, strapped 
though it was, would have to come up with 
monies necessary to fund physical improve-
ments. A l l of this was pleasant and instructive, 
but the most promising and poignant portion 
of McDonald's message was as simple as 
its validity was obvious. Adequate service, 
observed McDonald, was one that evolved 
continuously—in other words, "a service 
constantly revised and improved to meet 
more exactly the requirements of shippers and 
travelers." 4 0 
C H A P T E R I O 
The Dark Decade Ended 
"With this bottle of California champagne I 
christen you the Daylight. Good luck and 
Godspeed."—Olivia de Havilland 
B Y 1935 there was no longer any naive notion 
at 65 Market Street that "prosperity was just 
around the corner." Instead, among SP's mana-
gers there was a grim determination to proceed 
and to hope for the best. Their mood was re-
flected by the entire "SP family," which had 
drawn closer in the face of common chal-
lenges offered by the Great Depression. 
Hard times affected Southern Pacific's 
subsidiaries no less than the parent itself. 
Revenues of the Southern Pacific of Mexico, 
for example, slipped modestly in 1930 but de-
teriorated badly throughout the rest of the dec-
ade because of the world depression, storms, 
floods, the loss of markets in the United States 
for perishables produced in Mexico, increases 
in wages, and strikes. Nevertheless, during the 
decade the SP authorized two significant ex-
penditures. On October 20, 1931, the Inter-
California Southern Railway—owned by the 
SP—placed in service a 43-mile line from Pas-
cualitos, a station on the Inter-California be-
low Mexicali , southeastward toward the Gulf 
of California. SP hoped the new service area 
would produce handsome traffic in cotton, al-
falfa, and other agricultural commodities. 
Five years later the West Coast Hotel Com-
pany, another subsidiary, opened the Hotel 
Plaza de Cortes overlooking the Gulf of Cali-
fornia near Guaymas in Sonora. Shareholders 
were told that the excellent winter climate 
coupled with opportunities for deep-sea fish-
ing and bathing promised significant business 
for the SPdeMex from American tourists. The 
hotel opened in March, 1935. Meanwhile, 
however, SPdeMex abandoned its 38-mile 
branch from Navajoa to the picturesque city 
of Alamos because of inadequate traffic.1 
Matters came to a head in 1939 after sev-
eral SP directors toured the lines in Mexico. 
The SPdeMex was clearly expensive to main-
tain and had never yielded the traffic ex-
pected—only 5,800 cars were interchanged 
with the SP in 1935—yet the parent had made 
several internal loans, which unfortunately re-
mained unpaid. Consequently, the board an-
nounced that beginning in 1940, "no further 
cash advances would be made for the relief 
of" the SPdeMex. The future of the road 
looked bleak. It was the same for the Inter-
California Southern, which had turned in 
"substantial net losses" every year since its in-
ception; the assets of that company would be 
conveyed to the government of Mexico in 
1941. The case of the Inter-California Rail-
way, which also operated in Mexico, was ap-
preciably better since it handled overhead 
business to and from the San Diego & A r i -
zona Eastern as well as perishables from the 
Imperial Valley. 2 
The story of Pacific Fruit Express was much 
happier than that of the SPdeMex. Traffic in 
perishables slipped during the first half of the 
depression, and the fortunes of PFE were re-
duced accordingly. Nevertheless, that com-
pany had modernized its facilities at Roseville 
and Fresno and had established new ones at 
Tucson before the full onslaught of the depres-
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sion hit and, as a result, was able to weather 
the storm in relatively good order. When busi-
ness improved in 1936 and 1937, PFE was 
able to purchase 4,700 new cars without dev-
astating its budget. It was also able to test new 
technology. With the advent of frozen-food 
processing in commercial volume, PFE joined 
with packers in experimenting with "water ice 
refrigeration" by providing 30 percent salt 
to the ice supply. That was satisfactory for 
prefrozen commodities, but the era of the me-
chanical refrigerator car remained in the fu-
ture. Until that time, PFE continued to pur-
chase millions of tons of ice annually to cool 
entire trainloads of perishables.' 
The fortunes of the Northwestern Pacific 
Railroad were not as pleasant. It lost money 
throughout the depression years, $4.2 million 
in 1938 — 39 alone. Passengers still flocked to 
the scenic line during summer months, but 
otherwise profitable numbers were absent. 
Freight traffic was no better; it was only a 
trickle by comparison to that of the 1920s. 
Consequently, service was reduced or even ter-
minated and branches were pared. Such re-
sources proved inadequate. Losses continued 
in 1940 and 1941. 4 
On the lines of the parent itself, the reduc-
tion in the number of total passengers, a pat-
tern that had been continuous since 1919, 
understandably caused soul-searching among 
company officers. Early in 1933 SP sought the 
counsel of Lord &c Thomas, a well-known ad-
vertising agency, which bluntly told the rail-
road that it was going to have to adopt a new 
mentality regarding passenger service if it was 
going to stay in that business. The old ap-
proach—"Here is the train; Here is the fare; 
Here is the schedule; Take it or leave i t"—had 
to go. Frankly, said Lord & Thomas, SP was 
" i n the position of a large manufacturer with 
a product that has become somewhat ob-
solete." Simply spending more for advertising 
would not do since "no amount of advertising 
will sell a thing that won't sell itself." 5 
Lord & Thomas consequently urged a bold 
plan to "fit services" to passenger desires: mod-
A familiar scene at PFE docks, this one at Watson-
ville, California, ^ 3 7 . 
ern equipment, faster trains, competitive fares. 
Experimentation was required. The agency 
suggested the San Francisco—Sacramento cor-
ridor for market testing—using "modern, 
streamlined gasoline Rocket Cars" operated 
on two-hour schedules. The design of the 
train, said Lord &c Thomas, should be left to 
"a real artist who understands the value of 
modernistic lines"; the Rocket train definitely 
should not resemble "busses or standard rail-
way coaches." Finally, following the establish-
ment of Rocket service between San Francisco 
and Sacramento, the SP should, said the ad-
vertising firm, turn its attention to the impor-
tant Coast Line route between San Francisco 
and Los Angeles.6 
"Motor train" service on the Southern Pa-
cific was not new. It dated from the era of joint 
control when, to reduce costs on branches 
and secondary runs, motor cars had replaced 
a few steam trains. In 1914, for instance, such 
trains worked the Davis-Hamilton and C h i c o -
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Red Bluff runs in California. More followed. 
Twenty-one new cars were ordered in 1929 
for use in commute service between San Fran-
cisco and San Jose, on the Northwestern Pa-
cific, on the Texas &C Louisiana Lines, and 
elsewhere. In Arizona, gas-electric trains be-
tween Tucson and Nogales were known as the 
Burro, but between Phoenix and Tucson they 
took the more usual term—Doodlebug. Both 
terms reflected the status accorded the cars by 
local patrons as well as by SP's management. 
Nevertheless, the gas-electric cars afforded 
SP's mechanical department valuable experi-
ence that pointed toward the era of the diesel 
The Great Depression was particularly harsh for 
the N W P , which lost $4.2 million in 1938 — 39 
alone. 
and convinced company accountants that in-
ternal combustion had much to commend it. 7 
Thus, there was at least some receptivity 
at the Southern Pacific when the Lord & 
Thomas report was received. However, execu-
tive officers decided to focus primary atten-
tion on the Coast Line rather than the San 
Francisco—Sacramento corridor. Ten years 
earlier Paul Shoup had suggested that some-
thing special be done to establish the Coast 
Line's Daylight Limited as the company's pre-
mier train. Perhaps, he suggested, equipment 
for that train could be painted distinctively— 
white or cream—to set it apart from the rest 
of the passenger fleet. The operating depart-
ment objected, but Shoup persisted. The train's 
speed was increased, new equipment added to 
it, and in July, 1929, Shoup finally prevailed: 
the train would appear in striking pearl gray 
paint for the 1930 season. The depression 
caught the Daylight in its web, however; its 
schedule soon was lengthened and its distinc-
tive decor discontinued.8 
Nevertheless, following the advice of Lord 
& Thomas in part, SP's mechanical depart-
ment and the Winton Engine Corporation co-
operated in plans for a three-car articulated 
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train that could make the Coast run in eight 
hours at the cost of a mere 50^ per train mile. 
The proposal was vetoed, though, by J. H . 
Dyer, vice-president of operations, who felt 
the train was underpowered and inflexible 
because of its articulated nature. The matter 
was in limbo until December 12, 1935, when 
Hale Holden advised A. D. McDonald that 
archrival Santa Fe was purchasing a diesel-
powered steamlined train that, no doubt, 
would be placed in service against the Golden 
State on the Chicago—Los Angeles route. A 
few days later the Budd Company, which had 
provided stainless steel cars for Burlington's 
famous Zephyr in 1934, submitted plans and 
prints to SP for a fine new streamlined train of 
its own. Dyer was not impressed. Let other 
railroads bear the expense of experimenta-
tion, he urged; the SP should look at the pro-
posal again a year hence, after operating re-
ports would be available from the others.9 
For reasons that are not apparent, Dyer had 
a nearly immediate change of heart. Forty-
eight hours later he recommended the acquisi-
tion of new equipment to protect the San 
Francisco—Los Angeles trade and thus "pro-
gress the Southern Pacific with the trend of 
time." It was, in a sense, a sad commentary. 
Dyer was admitting that the SP was not the 
trend-setter, that it was reacting and not act-
ing. After all, the Burlington's Zephyr had 
made its famous dawn-to-dusk run from Den-
ver to Chicago on May 27, 1934; UP's City of 
Salina and Milwaukee Road's Hiawatha had 
entered service in 1935; and Santa Fe's spec-
tacular Super Chief soon would be a reality.1 0 
Happy to say, however, events now moved 
rapidly. In March, 1936, the executive com-
mittee gave approval for a diesel-powered, 
lightweight train for the Coast Line but 
strangely specified Pullman instead of Budd 
for the car order. Equally surprising was the 
subsequent decision to substitute streamlined 
and cross-counterbalanced GS 4-8-4 steam lo-
comotives for diesel power; general manager 
A . T. Mercier explained that operating offi-
cials wanted "time to study diesels from afar." 
At the same time, the matter of the train's 
paint scheme occasioned hearty internal de-
bate; F. S. McGinnis, who was in charge of 
passenger service, urged "flame orange." In 
the end, a striking combination of red, orange, 
black, and aluminum was employed." 
Champagne bathed the pilots of the new 
locomotives and network radio carried the 
story nationwide as the handsome twelve-
car Daylight trains made their initial nine-
hour-and-4 5-minute runs on Sunday, May 21, 
1937. They were instant and profitable stars; 
by their fourth birthday 1.3 million passengers 
had ridden them. Luxury service on the Coast 
Line was doubled in 1940 with the installation 
of the Noon Daylight, and on July 4 , 1941 , the 
equally handsome San Joaquin Daylight be-
gan service between Oakland and Los Angeles 
through the valley of its namesake. Few per-
ceived it then, but the new service had an 
ominous implication: each trip of the Day-
light required the services of forty-five em-
ployees "from the locomotive to the observa-
tion end. " 1 2 
Even before plans for the Daylight ma-
tured, the SP joined with the Union Pacific 
and the Chicago & North Western to sponsor 
another impressive passenger train venture— 
the elegant diesel-powered City of San Fran-
cisco, which, following its inaugural run on 
June 14, 1936, featured "sailings" from Oak-
land and Chicago every sixth day. Demand for 
the extra-fare accommodations provided by 
the eleven-car beauty was great. Another train 
set, this one of seventeen cars and powered 
by three diesel units, soon was ordered; it 
took to the rails on January 2, 1938. The first 
train was owned solely by the Union Pacific, 
but its replacement was the property of the 
participating carriers, each owning approxi-
mately a third. Service was doubled on July 26, 
1941, when still another set of equipment was 
added. Speed of passage was a hallmark of the 
train's reputation. Fine track conditions on the 
Overland Route had permitted Harriman's 
special in 1906 to traverse the Oakland-to-
Chicago line in only 51 hours and 7 minutes, 
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Christening the new Daylight at Los Angeles on March 21, 1937. Actress Olivia DeHaviland did the 
honors. 
but even better maintenance and diesel power 
now allowed the City a swift 39-hour-and-45-
minute schedule. The train was authorized for 
95 mph at several locations on SP's Salt Lake 
and Western divisions." 
Competitive pressures and a slightly im-
proved economy convinced SP's management 
to institute further passenger service improve-
ments. The program of air conditioning older 
equipment, begun early in the decade, went 
forward; company diners were among the first 
to be modernized in this way. There was irony 
in this since deficits in the dining car depart-
ment provided a constant irritant. "The loss 
on dining cars is too great to be borne; it eats 
too much of net passenger revenue," con-
cluded a gloomy Paul Shoup in 1930. Shoup 
proposed to revamp SP's operations by form-
ing a separate company that would function 
in a way similar to the relationship then exist-
ing between the Santa Fe and Fred Harvey. 
Internal evaluation subsequently found no 
relative economic advantage, however, and 
the idea perished. Dining revenues were in-
creased, nevertheless, by introducing "tray 
service" in coaches and tourist cars and by de-
signing low-priced childrens' menus that at-
tracted families to the diners. 1 4 
Other changes followed. A "feminine 
touch" was added to passenger service when 
graduate nurses were assigned as stewardesses 
to the City of San Francisco, then to the Over-
land Limited, and finally to other of SP's name 
trains. By 1938, thirty-four such persons were 
The SP cooperated with the C & N W and the UP in instituting the City of San Francisco in 1936. This view 
shows ceremonies attending the first eastbound trip from Oakland Mole . The Overland Limited, histori-
cally the premier train on the Overland Route, is in the background. 
A second train set for the City—shown here coming off the impressive Martinez Bridge—was acquired in 
1941. 
Dark Decade Ended 139 
The SP added a feminine touch, stewardesses, to its 
passenger service during the 1930s. 
employed by the company—a fact much ap-
plauded by the traveling public. 1 5 
More modern trains and new marketing 
approaches ensued. A pair of streamlined 
Larks for overnight service joined the Day-
lights on the Coast Line; the all-Pullman 
Forty-Niner and the economy-oriented San 
Francisco Challenger complemented the City 
of San Francisco on the Overland Route; and 
the Californian—carrying modern coaches, 
tourist sleeping cars, and separate cars for 
women and children—joined the Golden 
State Limited in the Chicago—Los Angeles 
trade. Average passenger speeds in 1938 were 
highest in the history of the company. 1 6 
Except for expansion of its popular Over-
night merchandise service, SP's freight opera-
tions continued to mirror the industry's tradi-
tional form. However, train speeds advanced 
slightly, total revenue tons increased after the 
low in 1933, the average distance handled 
rose impressively, and so did average revenue 
tonnage per train. 1 7 
Longer, heavier, faster trains required more 
powerful and sophisticated motive power. 
Some of these locomotives were built in SP's 
huge shop complex at Sacramento; the first 
had entered service in 1872 and sixty-six of 
them had been erected there during World 
War I, when commercial builders were unable 
to handle orders. Sacramento also manufac-
tured boilers, frames, and running gear for lo-
comotives to be assembled in other company 
shops at Ogden, Los Angeles, Houston, and 
Algiers (New Orleans). As one of the largest, 
if not in fact the largest, railroad shop facili-
ties west of Chicago, Sacramento likewise 
built, repaired, and maintained thousands of 
freight cars. 1 8 
By the 1930s oil was the primary fuel for 
SP's locomotive fleet. The potential advantage 
of oil for fueling steam locomotives had been 
recognized by SP's mechanical forces as early 
as 1879, when experiments began, and for the 
next several years these were broadened to in-
clude the company's bay steamers and ferries. 
The first locomotive converted to oil was a di-
minutive 4-4-0 in May, 1895, and was an im-
pressive success; some operating divisions 
soon had only oil-fired locomotives. The new 
fuel offered several advantages to the SP, not 
the least of which was its relative cost and ex-
tent of supply. It also provided higher heat 
value per pound, was less expensive to handle, 
and burned cleaner. Advanced design oil-fired 
locomotives boasted another impressive asset: 
they could make longer runs before being 
changed. In 1925 only three locomotive 
changes were required for San Francisco— 
New Orleans passenger trains; oil-burning 
freight locomotives also ran through between 
El Paso and Del Rio and between Houston 
and Algiers. 1 9 
Most of SP's modern steam locomotive fleet 
came from the country's major commercial lo-
comotive works—Baldwin, American (Alco), 
and later Lima. William Sproule in 1922 ex-
claimed that the 2-10-2S recently received from 
Baldwin represented "the ultimate achieve-
ment in the modern locomotive." Sproule's 
temporary euphoria aside, the 2-10-2S proved 
to be steady but only pedestrian performers. 
Not surprisingly, SP shortly thereafter ap-
proached Alco with a design that was, as 
the company said, "a step in advance of the 
mighty 2-10-2 and 4-8-2 types." The new 
4-10-2, or Southern Pacific type, would fea-
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SP's complex at Sacramento was impressive by any measure. 
ture a third cylinder that would maximize 
tractive effort, although it would also present 
additional maintenance problems. Eventually, 
SP's fleet included 182 2-10-2S, 83 4-8-2S, and 
49 4-10-2S. 2 0 
Although the 4-10-2S bore the label "South-
ern Pacific type," the company's distinctive 
cab-forward articulateds were the steam loco-
motives most readily identifiable with the SP. 
The advantages of placing the cab ahead in-
cluded visibility but, more importantly, keep-
ing the cab clear of smoke and gas when 
operating through tunnels and snowsheds. 
The new design was made possible only by 
fueling with oi l ; the road took delivery of the 
first models, 2-8-8-2S, from Baldwin in 1909. 
Although SP experimented with cab-forward 
2-6-6-2S and 4-6-6-2S, its most successful ver-
sions were class A C 4-8-8-2S, which Baldwin 
completed in 1928 — 30 and 1937—39. Tra-
ditional cab-in-the-rear coal-fired articulated 
2-8-8-4S arrived from Lima in 1939 for ser-
vice between El Paso and Tucumcari, where 
coal could be purchased locally at favorable 
prices and where tunnels were not a problem. 2 1 
If the ACs were SP's most distinctive loco-
motives, its GS 4 - 8 - 4 S were the handsomest. 
The first of the series came from Baldwin 
in 1930 and were split between Atlantic and 
Pacific lines. SP also turned to the 4 - 8 - 4 S 
when it sought power for the Daylights, 
but Lima built these in 1936—37 and 1941. 
The Lima GSs proved to be the world's larg-
est streamlined locomotives and, according 
to SP's mechanical department, were "the 
world's most beautiful locomotives." Few ar-
gued otherwise.2 2 
Line changes, however desirable to reduce 
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The 4-10-2, or Southern Pacific type, featured a third cylinder. The SP owned forty-nine of them. 
grades and curvature, were rare during the 
depression. In one case, however, a Bureau of 
Reclamation project provided a better line at 
no expense to the company. In 1938 the fed-
eral government began construction of the im-
pressive Shasta Dam near Kennet, California, 
adjacent to SP's main line to Oregon; this re-
quired a relocation and, as a consequence, the 
government provided a new line of railroad 
between Redding and Delta, 30.1 miles, in 
exchange for title to the former trackage. 
The new route would be placed in service in 
May, 1942. 2 5 
Southern Pacific's service area was generally 
spared the tragedy of Dust Bowl conditions 
that plagued other regions of the country dur-
ing the 1930s, but it was not spared other 
vicious acts of nature. Floods in Texas and 
Oregon during 1935 caused serious damage 
and delayed traffic. These were minor incon-
veniences, however, compared with condi-
tions in California during the first weeks of 
1938. A continuous storm blanketed most of 
the central and northern portions from Janu-
ary 27 to February 11, with heavy rains in the 
lowlands and deep snow in the mountains. 
Total snowfall at Norden, in the Sierras, 
reached a record 805 inches for the season. 
Farther south, gale winds were followed by se-
vere flooding in the southern portions of the 
state. The Coast, San Joaquin, and Sunset 
routes all were out of service for several days. 2 4 
Snows in the Sierra, of course, are legend-
ary. Huntington and his associates learned 
that hard lesson even as they were pushing the 
Central Pacific eastward during the 1860s. 
Bucking snow in the depths of accumulation 
natural to the area could not in all cases be 
accomplished with wedge plows. Miles and 
miles of expensive snowsheds were required— 
so many that one writer suggested the line 
was, in fact, a "railroad in a barn." Rotary 
snowplows pushed by powerful articulated 
locomotives obviated the need for some, but 
not all, of the sheds. In any case, SP found 
it necessary to maintain a fleet of dangers, 
spreaders, plows, and locomotives plus a large 
crew of hearty mountain railroaders to keep 
the Sierra as well as the Cascade line open for 
business each winter. The 1938 season was 
simply more extraordinary than most. 2 5 
Winter snows in the mountains were ex-
pected and, as much as it was possible to do 
so, the company could and did prepare for 
SP's mechanical department boasted that the GS 4-8-4S were "the world's most beautiful locomotives." Few 
argued otherwise. 
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The first of SP's handsome GS locomotives came from Baldwin and were split among the Pacific and 
Atlantic lines. This one was assigned to the famous Overnighter freight train. 
them. Anticipating economic and financial 
storms was much more difficult. This was the 
case not only with the Great Depression but 
with the unexpected and unfortunate eco-
nomic downturn of 1937 and 1938. Morale 
had gone up predictably in the preceding two 
years, as freight and passenger revenues rose 
slightly. This plus notable competitive pres-
sures served to explain SP's renewed program 
of improvements and equipment acquisitions 
during the mid-1930s. More debt, of course, 
had been acquired as a consequence. Severe 
traffic reverses, higher operating expenses in 
1 9 3 7 - 3 8 , plus a millstone of debt combined 
to present the SP with an ominous situation 
in 1938. Moreover, certain major capital 
projects of the 1920s—the Modoc Line, for 
example—had yet to provide "economics 
equal to annual expense incurred by reason 
of construction." At the same time, share-
holders—who had received nothing on their 
investment since 1931—were increasingly res-
tive. Grim was the only way to describe 1938; 
the SP failed even to cover fixed charges in 
that year. Indeed, it was again forced to insti-
tute a policy of reduced wages and salaries 
and to seek financial assistance from banks 
and the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. 
Not surprisingly, executive officers weighed 
the merits of bankruptcy proceedings. Nor 
was it surprising that the argument took two 
sides. It was important to maintain good faith 
with the banks that had stood by the com-
pany over the years, and it was necessary to 
safeguard the interests of the shareholders. 
On the other hand, bankruptcy had the ob-
vious value of clearing company books of on-
erous liabilities. The course of bankruptcy 
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was not chosen, but subsequent managers 
would continue to debate whether or not 
the company should have gone through the 
wringer. In any event, recovery eventually 
turned to prosperity; the RFC loans were re-
paid in 1941, and the bank notes and serial 
bank loans shortly thereafter.26 
Southern Pacific employees were acutely 
mindful of the struggle their company—and, 
indeed, their nation—was experiencing dur-
ing the 1930s, and like Americans everywhere 
at that time they were susceptible to fear and 
prone to hysteria. This was evident even at re-
mote locations such as Palomas, New Mex-
ico—along the Golden State Route between 
El Paso and Tucumcari—when on a memo-
rable evening in 1938 Orson Welles presented 
his dramatization of H . G . Wells's novel, The 
War of the Worlds. At Palomas the astonishing 
"news" that the earth was being invaded by 
Martians was received by a battery-powered 
radio in the track-side home of section fore-
man Joshua M . Babers, who dutifully relayed 
the information by company pony-phone, a 
party line arrangement, to other foremen 
up and down the line. Babers's son, Charles, 
later a general manager for the company, re-
called that the episode "scared the hell out of 
everybody." 2 7 
Pressed as they were by hard times, SP em-
ployees of all stripes during the 1930s may 
have looked longingly to the past as a golden 
era of expansion and prosperity, but they did 
not mourn the passing of one aspect: train 
hold-ups. These were, sad to say, not simply 
the stuff of Hollywood mythology. In fact, sev-
eral occurred on the SP during the late nine-
teenth century, and the trend continued into 
the next. Trains were held up at Copley, Cali-
fornia, in 1904; at Goodyear, California, 
in 1910; at Dryden, Texas, in 1912; and at 
Jaynes Station near Tucson in 1922. A year 
later, on October 11, 1923, train 13 was 
stopped near Siskiyou, Oregon, by the in-
famous DeAutremont brothers; its Railway 
Post Office car was dynamited and three rail-
way employees plus an RPO clerk were killed 
in cold blood. Other if less spectacular rob-
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The tragic derailment of the City of San Francisco at Harney , N e v a d a , was no accident. 
beries occurred near Richmond and Saugus 
in California during 1929 and 1930, but 
"get rich quick" schemes of this type nearly 
disappeared during the hard times of the 
depression.28 
One element of railroading that unfortu-
nately did not disappear was accidents. De-
spite SP's traditional concern for proper main-
tenance of track and equipment, and despite 
its constant devotion to compliance with rules 
and to safety, the road experienced wrecks 
in the natural course of business that sadly 
snuffed out lives and fortunes. Nearly 200 
persons died in passenger train accidents on 
SP lines during the first forty years of the cen-
tury. Most accidents resulted from mechani-
cal, track, or human failure. For example, on 
September 20, 1938, a brakeman mistakenly 
lined a switch that resulted in the head-on col-
lision of the Argonaut and the Californian at 
Tortuga, California. Eleven were killed and 
139 injured. 2 9 
There was no human error but certainly hu-
man responsibility for the tragic derailment 
of the westbound City of San Francisco at 
Harney, Nevada, on August 12, 1939, after "a 
person or persons unknown . . . maliciously 
tampered with the track." Casualties were 
great: 24 died and 115 were injured. A large 
squad of SP special agents and FBI men 
worked on the case, and SP published reward 
notices for several days in fifty western news-
papers. Nevertheless, the perpetrator or per-
petrators were never located. 3 0 
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Many who were on that unfortunate train 
were bound for the Golden State International 
Exposition, staged on Treasure Island in San 
Francisco Bay during 1939 and again in 1940. 
SP's "Roundhouse" exhibit—which bally-
hooed the company's modern freight and 
passenger service, featured beautiful murals 
representing the scenic regions of its ser-
vice area, and included fitting tributes to its 
work force—was one of the most popular at-
tractions. The SP advertised lower rates for 
travel to the exposition and, with the UP and 
C & N W , even instituted a new luxury train, 
the Treasure Island Specials 
The Golden State Exposition was essen-
tially a statement of optimism and an emanci-
pation from the worst days of the depression. 
The SP saw it that way, and so did its em-
ployees, who flocked from all over the system 
aboard special trains for "Homecoming and 
Southern Pacific Days" at the fair in May of 
1939 and 1940. As the editor of the Bulletin 
said, "They came as railroaders to meet with 
railroaders in a railroad celebration." The fes-
tivities included a parade down Market Street, 
luncheons, tours of the general office building, 
a queen contest, various entertainment events, 
and a grand ball . 3 2 
The end of the decade was also witness to 
another statement of optimism—the opening 
of the elegant Los Angeles Union Passenger 
Terminal. The SP had completed its own sta-
tion in Los Angeles on June 12, 1915, but 
civic leaders there soon clamored for a facility 
that would centralize all of the city's rail pas-
senger services. Paul Shoup met with the 
Santa Fe's William B. Storey early in 1929 and 
offered joint use of SP's station, but Storey be-
lieved it "too small to accommodate all the 
roads for any length of time." Los Angeles 
officials then took the issue to the California 
Railroad Commission, but as the depression 
deepened, and as their financial fortunes 
soured, all of the roads—the SP, Santa Fe, and 
Union Pacific—collectively argued against 
any attempt to force construction of an ex-
pensive new terminal. For SP, and likely for 
the others, too, the matter was simple: there 
was little money in the til l , and what was 
available could more advantageously be spent 
in other ways. Nevertheless, the California 
regulatory body—backed by a decision of the 
U.S. Supreme Court in 1933—obligated the 
railroads to such a venture. The idea, of 
course, was as good as its timing was bad. 
Once the matter was determined, however, 
the carriers worked diligently to conclusion. 
Three days and four nights of celebration 
and pageantry heralded the opening of the 
gorgeous $11 million Mediterranean-style fa-
cility on May 7, 1939. 3 3 
If a spirit of optimism began to permeate 65 
Market Street late in the decade, so too did a 
determination to make hard decisions. Autho-
rizations had already been made for massive 
improvements in track and equipment where 
continuing operations promised adequate re-
turn. In other areas, it was a matter of decid-
ing how much to reduce operations or even to 
vacate them. Such was the case for virtually all 
of SP's electrified lines. The company had 
great financial as well as emotional invest-
ments in them, but returns ranged from poor 
to awful. By the late days of the depression SP 
could take none other than a dry-eyed look at 
all of them. 
Curtailments and abandonments had be-
gun earlier. In 1927 buses replaced streetcars 
at Salem and Eugene; SP's electric operations 
in and about the Portland area were reduced 
at the same time; and in 1931 all electric ser-
vice from Portland into the Willamette Valley 
perished. The Peninsular Railway, with almost 
one hundred miles of lines serving major com-
munities in California's Santa Clara Valley, 
flourished until it fell victim to vehicular com-
petition and was abandoned in 1932 and 
1933. Similarly, SP's interests in the Fresno 
Traction Company, Stockton Electric Rail-
road, San Jose Railroads, and the San Jose & 
Santa Clara County Railroad were disposed 
of on Apri l 1, 1939. Elsewhere, the electric 
commuter operation of the Northwestern Pa-
cific in Marin County, which dated from 1903 
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"Homecoming and Southern Pacific Days" at the Golden State Exposition in 1939 and 1940 included a 
parade down Market Street and a tour of the general office building (shown here). 
but had been unprofitable for years, became 
an intolerable loser following the opening of 
the famous Golden Gate Bridge on May 28, 
1937. Lengthy and emotional hearings finally 
resulted in authority for the line to discon-
tinue all electric service on March 1, 1941. 
On the Pacific Electric the situation was more 
complex, but the financial picture was equally 
bleak. PE had turned to buses as early as 
1928, and that policy was accelerated late in 
the 1930s. 3 4 
The San Francisco—Oakland Bay Bridge 
seemed at first to imply longevity but instead 
quickly extinguished the life of SP's East Bay 
electric commuter business. This magnificent 
structure opened to vehicular traffic on N o -
vember 12, 1936, although not to electric 
train service until January 15, 1939. The SP 
long since had grown weary of the losses in-
curred by the East Bay operations and as early 
as 1925 had attempted to unify its electric 
properties there with those of the Key System, 
a competitor. These efforts failed, but with 
the prospect of the Bay Bridge's diverting traf-
fic from both systems, negotiations began 
anew. Agreement between SP and Key was 
eventually reached—Key would accede to all 
of SP's electric lines and on its own would op-
erate service across the new bridge into San 
Francisco—but labor organizations vetoed 
the plan. The SP faced a dilemma. Its East Bay 
commute system, tied to the company's trans-
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Pacific Electric had turned to buses as early as 
1928, and that policy was accelerated in the 1930s. 
bay ferry operation for delivery of passengers 
to and from San Francisco, faced increased 
losses with the opening of the bridge, yet 
regulatory agencies were not likely to autho-
rize abandonment. Nevertheless, something 
had to be done. SP's executive committee late 
in 1934 finally determined to form a new 
company, the Interurban Electric Railway 
Company, to pass all of SP's East Bay commute 
properties to it, and to demand a pay-as-you-
go basis for its operation. Interurban took 
over on December 1, 1938, and began trans-
bay runs effective January 15, 1939. (Key Sys-
tem and Sacramento Northern trains like-
wise used the bridge as well as the Transbay 
Terminal facility on Mission Street in San 
Francisco.) ' 5 
Logic urged that single carrier, direct, rail 
rapid transit would be both attractive and 
profitable. Yet Interurban's deficits were nearly 
$1 million in 1939, and reduced tolls for 
motor-vehicle traffic passing over the Bay 
Bridge promised more red ink. The problems 
simply could not be solved with either in-
creases or reductions in fares. Consequently, 
applications for abandonment were filed on 
February 26, 1940. Permission came several 
months later; the various lines were aban-
The San Francisco—Oakland Bay Bridge seemingly 
implied longevity for SP's electric commute busi-
ness, but in reality it extinguished both SP's 
commute ferry business and its Eastbay electric 
operation. 
doned gradually as substitute service was in-
augurated by the Key System. The last to go 
was the Berkeley line, on July 26, 1941. (Some 
trackage survived under Key ownership, and 
SP retained short sections for industries.) 3 6 
The fortunes of SP's famous and colorful 
transbay ferry network were made equally 
precarious by completion of the Bay and 
Golden Gate bridges. SP's service dated from 
the late 1860s; passengers arriving from 
the east by train were delivered from Oak-
land Pier to San Francisco by ferry beginning 
in 1869. Inexpensive commute service was 
initiated in the same season, and car ferry 
operations began in 1871. Oakland Pier, or 
Oakland Mole as it was known locally, was 
modified and expanded several times in its 
lifetime, as demands required. Daily ferry ser-
vice for automobiles was inaugurated from 
that point in Apri l , 1923. Seven years later SP 
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Oakland Pier, or Oakland Mole as it was known 
locally, was modified several times as demand re-
quired. This early air view dates from 1921. 
and its affiliates operated no fewer than forty-
three boats on San Francisco Bay; as such 
it represented the world's largest transporta-
tion enterprise of that kind. The auto ferries 
enjoyed their peak year in 1930, handling 
nearly 6.2 million vehicles and 15 million pas-
sengers. A l l told, over 40.2 million passen-
gers availed themselves of SP's combined ferry 
service in that season. The operation repre-
sented, as Southern Pacific boasted, "a float-
ing bridge on San Francisco Bay." ' 7 
Change came quickly. To avoid wasteful du-
plication the SP, Northwestern Pacific, and the 
independent Golden Gate Ferries Company 
combined in 1929 to form the Southern Pa-
cific Golden State Ferries, Ltd. , for the pur-
pose of handling the auto ferry business. 
Then, after lengthy negotiations, the Western 
Pacific and the Santa Fe on Apri l 22, 1933, 
each began to operate their trains into Oak-
land Mole and at the same time discontinued 
their respective transbay ferries, substituting 
SP's service. The great days were over. Auto 
ferry service vanished shortly after the open-
ing of the Bay and Golden Gate bridges; so, 
too, did regular transbay commuter opera-
tions on January 14, 1939, the day before In-
terurban Electric began its ill-fated service 
over the Bay Bridge. Oakland-Alameda opera-
tions ended in 1940, and on February 28, 
Streetcars ran down Market Street in front of SP's 
general office to the busy Ferry Building. 
1941, NWP's San Francisco—Sausalito line 
perished. Thereafter, SP's sole ferry service 
was that provided between San Francisco's 
Ferry Building and the Oakland Mole in 
conjunction with its intercity rail passenger 
network.' 8 
The situation regarding SP's other marine 
interests was roughly analogous. The com-
pany had a historic and psychological tie to 
them, but as conditions changed they be-
came redundant. Separation, nevertheless, was 
painful. 
Southern Pacific's interest in oceanic trans-
portation, as with so many other areas, sprang 
from the farsighted policies of C. P. Hunting-
ton. "The railroad cannot traverse the seas," 
Huntington said shortly before his death in 
r 9 o o , but " i t can own ships which do, and to-
gether, the locomotive and the ship can make 
for all commercial purposes a continuous line 
across the lands and seas. . . ." In this way, he 
said, railroads might compete "with the seas 
and the rivers." Huntington's views, of course, 
were similar to those of another innovative en-
trepreneur, James J. H i l l , who in 1901 also 
pointed out the advantages of railroads' own-
ing their "own steamships for carriage across 
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the ocean." Both men did more than philoso-
phize; the railroads they headed each devel-
oped steamship extensions.'9 
SP's entry into the steamship business actu-
ally resulted from a decision by the Pacific 
M a i l Steamship Company in the early 1870s 
to cease issuing bills of lading on shipments 
moving to and from the Orient and points 
served by rail on the eastern seaboard from 
San Francisco. Pacific M a i l , chartered in 1848, 
had enjoyed great profits on traffic to the Ori -
ent moving via Panama but resented competi-
tion from the newly completed transcontinen-
tal railroad. Both the Central Pacific and the 
Union Pacific urged a policy of contracting for 
specified capacity on San Francisco steamers, 
but Pacific M a i l demurred. The two railroads 
then sought to bring Pacific M a i l to heel by 
forming their own steamship company, the 
Occidental & Oriental, chartered in 1874. 
Accommodations with Pacific M a i l were forth-
coming, but Huntington wished for more than 
that. In 1900 SP took control of Pacific M a i l 
when it acquired slightly over half of its stock. 
(Additional shares were purchased in 1901 and 
1912.) Not surprisingly, the Occidental &c Ori -
ental was gradually assimilated into Pacific 
M a i l . In 1907 the two operated ten vessels, 
ranging in size from 9,000 to 27,000 tons, in 
service to Hawaii, Japan, China, the Philip-
pines, Panama, and Central America. 4 0 
Pacific Mail's essential value was its excel-
lent reputation in the Orient, its respected 
fleet of ships, and its ability to funnel business 
to and from SP's rail lines. For instance, on 
September 17,1914, Pacific Mail's Manchuria 
landed the largest cargo of merchandise that 
had ever reached San Francisco from the Ori -
ent. The raw silk and silk pieces it carried 
were then sped eastward by special train, and 
the remaining merchandise was similarly dis-
patched as quickly as transloading could be 
accomplished.4 1 
There were problems, however. By the sec-
ond decade of the twentieth century the SP 
earned "only about $800,000 per annum 
gross" on business interchanged with Pacific 
M a i l — 8 5 percent of it on freight, the rest from 
passenger traffic. This was alarming enough, 
but the Panama Canal Act prohibited Pacific 
M a i l from using that waterway or engaging in 
coastwise business unless SP divested itself of 
control before the canal opened for business. 
William Sproule warned that under the cir-
cumstance, Pacific M a i l could not "continue 
its operations without serious loss"; but in-
stead of selling out, Sproule urged "that Pa-
cific M a i l as such be succeeded by" a new 
company, "the Southern Pacific Steamship 
Lines, retaining the name Pacific M a i l as a 
sub-title." Sproule considered that "the T i -
tanic disaster" had "warned the public that 
big ships are far from insuring safety." He 
thought "yacht-like ships of about 6,000 tons 
gross" that could "run at 16 to 18 knots" 
would protect the Oriental trade and even 
attract new business. It was not to be. On 
June 11, 1915, Julius Kruttschnitt announced 
that Pacific Mail's ships would be sold and the 
company dissolved because of restrictive con-
ditions imposed by the La Follette Seamen's 
Law, which was to take effect on November 4, 
1915. This legislation required that 75 per-
cent of the crew in each department of the 
company speak the language of the officers— 
a requirement particularly objectionable, said 
Kruttschnitt, since Pacific M a i l employed 
American officers and Asiatic crews for its ves-
sels. Service ended following the departure 
of the Mongolia on November 2, but the 
company was resurrected in the next year 
after W. R. Grace & Company purchased SP's 
holdings. 4 2 
During the same period the Southern Pa-
cific provided "elegantly equipped steamships 
with all the latest appliances for comfort and 
safety" between Portland and San Francisco 
and between San Francisco and San Pedro 
(Los Angeles) by way of its San Francisco & 
Portland Steamship Company. Additional ser-
vice was offered by the steamer Breakwater 
between San Francisco and Coos Bay, Oregon, 
and later between Portland and Coos Bay, be-
fore full rail service was made available to that 
location. 4 ' 
More important and longlasting was SP's 
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P A C I F I C M A I L s c o A . M r o H R l p J a p a n a n d C h i n a , 
STEAMERS L E A V E W H A R F 
Corner First and Brannan Streets, at three o'clock, P. M. , for 
Y O K O H A M A . A . I N " I D H O N & K O U G , 
Connecting at Yokohoma with Steamers for HIOGO, N A G A S A K I , S H A N G H A I , and at Hongkong with steamers for 
all E A S T I N D I A N A N D S O U T H E R N PORTS. 
SAILINGS FROM SAN FRANCISCO: 
C I T Y O F B I O UTS J A N E I R O September 19th. 
C I T Y O F P E K I N G October 26th | C I T Y O F S Y D N E Y November 14th. 
For N E W Y O R K , via P A N A M A , M E X I C O , C E N T R A L A N D S O U T H A M E R I C A , steamers sail on the 3d, 
13th and 23d of every month, at 12 o'clock noon. 
4®* Prompt attention paid to written or telegraphic reservation of State Rooms or Berths, which should be engaged at least one week 
before sailing. Cabin plans on exhibition and passage tickets for sale at the 
C O M P A N Y ' S O F F I C E , F I R S T A N D B R A N N A N S T S . , 
GEO. H . RICE, Traffic Manager. S A N F R A N C I S C O . 
nautical involvement in the Gulf of Mexico 
and along the East Coast. This began on Feb-
ruary 1, 1883, when C. P. Huntington gained 
control of Morgan's Louisiana & Texas Rail-
road & Steamship Company. These properties 
were consolidated with, others on March i , 
1885, to form SP's Atlantic System, embracing 
all of its rail lines east of El Paso. Oceanic 
operations, carried on under the flag name 
"Morgan L ine"— in honor of Charles Mor-
gan, founder—afforded the SP a coordinated 
through rail-water route between the Pacific 
and North Atlantic ports. When SP acquired 
the Morgan Line, its equipment inventory in-
cluded sixteen ocean-going steamships, trans-
fer ferries, river boats, tugs, and auxiliary 
barges. Steamship routes at that time were: 
New Orleans to New York i ,800 miles 
New Orleans to Havana (via 700 miles 
Tampa and Key West) 
Morgan City, La. , to Vera Cruz, 800 miles 
Mexico (via Galveston) 
Morgan City, La. , to Brazos 400 miles 
Santiago (Brownsville) 
Morgan City, La. , to Corpus Christi 300 miles 
TOTAL 4,000 miles 4 4 
In 1902 the SP purchased the Bromwell 
Steamship Company, a competitor operating 
three ships between New Orleans and New 
York, and consolidated its operations with 
those of the Morgan Line. In the same year 
regular freight service was established be-
tween Galveston and New York. Also in 1902 
navigation responsibilities were divorced from 
Morgan's Louisiana & Texas Railroad & 
Steamship Company and thereafter operated 
as a department of the SP—although the 
"Morgan Line" flag designation was wisely re-
tained because of its popularity and business 
value. 4 5 
Morgan Line passage between New York 
and New Orleans was promoted by the SP as 
a wonderful " 1800 mile trip—Five Days on 
the Deep." Weekly sailings were doubled in 
1913 as popularity increased. Shippers and 
travelers alike were told of the many advan-
tages offered by the " 1 0 0 % SP Route." In 
1922 and thereafter passengers were urged 
to take advantage of "One Hundred Golden 
Hours at Sea" while shippers were surprised 
to learn that SP's water-rail route schedules 
were competitive with all-rail options. 4 6 
As a result of conditions imposed by the 
Panama Canal Act, Morgan Line routes and 
service became subject to review by the ICC. In 
1917 that agency confirmed Morgan's existing 
route structure and approved its carriage of 
Mexican oil in tankers. The ICC eventually 
also allowed Morgan to expand service to 
Houston, Baltimore, Boston, New Bedford, 
and Norfolk. SP's maritime operations, on the 
other hand, were understandably curtailed 
by the government when its fleet was " i m -
pressed" during World War I. 4 7 
In 1921 the Morgan fleet was at its apex, 
with twenty-eight ocean-going steamers (five 
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of which were freight-passenger ships) and 
sixty-five auxiliary vessels. By the time it cele-
brated its Golden Jubilee in 1927, however, 
the Morgan Line had begun an inexorable de-
cline. Service to Havana had ended in 1923 
with the sale of the two ships assigned to that 
route, and six years later its tankers were sold 
to Richfield Oi l in exchange for fuel o i l . 4 8 
Morgan's last hurrah, although unrecog-
nized at the time, came with the launching of 
the Dixie on July 27, 1927. A n oil-burning 
passenger and freight steamer of 12,000-ton 
displacement, it was clearly the crown jewel of 
Morgan's fleet; it cost $2.4 million and was 
placed in service on the New York—New Or-
leans run during January, 1928. The magnifi-
cent vessel was grounded in a fierce hurricane 
near Miami in 1935, but passengers and crew 
fortunately escaped serious injury although 
the vessel itself was damaged. While laid up, it 
was reconditioned and modified to add sev-
eral recreational and service facilities. The re-
splendent Dixie resumed service on Decem-
ber 11, 1935, the sole vessel of its type on 
Morgan's roster, departing from New York 
and New Orleans every third Wednesday.49 
Operations of the Morgan Line were under 
constant scrutiny by SP accountants through-
out the depression; it failed to generate net in-
come after 1931, and, as a consequence, older 
vessels were sold or retired rather than re-
placed. Lower volumes of traffic were offered 
the line, but depressed conditions demanded 
reduced rates to retain even that. Operating 
costs rose accordingly. Furthermore, the rela-
tive value of the Morgan Line to the Southern 
Pacific had decreased following the acqui-
sition of the St. Louis Southwestern Railway 
in 1931. Not surprisingly, an internal study in 
1937 urged disposal. H . M Lul l , who was in 
charge of steamship operations, took excep-
tion. He admitted the urgency of the problem 
and counseled President A . D . McDonald to 
curtail operations if necessary but "to con-
tinue the Morgan Line without making any 
heavy investments." In any event, said Lul l , "it 
would be difficult to find a purchaser for an 
operation which itself has not been profitable 
for a long t ime." 5 0 
McDonald took Lull's advice, but the end 
was clearly in sight. Services were reduced 
in 1940, and by the end of that year the fleet 
was down to twelve freighters and the Dixie. 
Events then took a strange turn. Early in the 
next season, at the request of the government, 
the Dixie was transferred to the navy; the 
grande dame of the fleet sailed from New Or-
leans on February 22, 1941, for the last time 
under the Morgan flag. With no similar vessel 
to protect the New York—New Orleans ser-
vice, it was necessary, said the SP, "to discon-
tinue this service." Two freighters assigned to 
that run were then sold to other carriers and 
before midyear the navy directed the SP to 
hand over the remainder of the fleet, ten ves-
sels, "for national defense purposes." With 
that passed the famous Morgan Line. It was 
"with much regret," said SP's press release, 
that the "company had been forced to quit the 
business." It was true that there was nostalgia 
among SP officers for the old line, but in truth 
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The Dixie, outbound from New Orleans. 
the war provided the company a convenient 
and graceful way of terminating business that 
was a distinct financial liability and offered no 
future promise/1 
Another of SP's ventures into water trans-
portation—steamer service on California's 
Sacramento and San Joaquin rivers—gained 
much less notice than its transbay ferries or its 
oceanic subsidiaries. The service dated from 
March 1, 1854, when it was begun by the 
California Steam Navigation Company, a firm 
that was acquired by the California Pacific 
Railroad and that itself passed to the hands 
of the Southern Pacific. Wheat shipments in 
great volume were typical of early billings, but 
later the steamers carried fruit, wine, hard-
ware, and general lading. Tourists especially 
appreciated daylight trips through what pro-
moters labeled "the Netherlands of America." 
To be sure, the wide, flat valley of the Sacra-
mento featured fertile lands behind a system 
of dykes and levees. Although they owned a 
proud record of service, the SP's river steamers 
were doomed by an adequacy of rail lines sup-
plemented by a growing network of roads; 
they ceased operations on January 15, 1930. 5 2 
If SP aggressively sought to curtail or even 
terminate unremunerative elements of its busi-
ness during the late 1930s, it also energeti-
cally sought to make more money from those 
it retained. Such was the case for the long-
distance passenger train. A massive national 
advertising campaign in 1939 urged a public 
long weary of the depression that this was 
"The Year to See America," especially North-
ern California, where SP trains served "The 
Heart of the Snow Region" and, not to be 
slighted, Southern California, "Where the 
Winter is Summer." Additional advertising, 
on billboards strategically located along con-
gested highways, suggested that harried driv-
ers should "take the train next time" for they 
were, after all, a safe, fast, inexpensive, and 
relaxing way to travel. And they were air con-
ditioned. Pleasure travel did increase, in part 
because of gradually improved economic con-
ditions and in part because those who had 
money to travel chose to do so at home in-
stead of abroad, where conditions were in-
creasingly uncertain. SP's management was 
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SP's service on the Sacramento River dated, indirectly, from 1854. 
also convinced that improved schedules, air 
conditioning, new equipment, external adver-
tising, and "new economy-type trains" such 
as the San Francisco Challenger, the Cali-
fornian, and the Beaver (on the Overland, 
Golden State, and Shasta routes, respectively) 
served as attractions." 
Executive officers labored on other matters 
as well. Periodically during the 1930s they 
sought to simplify SP's inordinately complex 
corporate structure. Several subsidiaries, as 
diverse as the Phoenix &c Eastern Railroad 
and the South Pacific Coast Railway, were dis-
incorporated or otherwise merged into the 
parent corporation. The most impressive of 
these efforts culminated in 1934 when the nu-
merous entities making up SP's Texas & Loui-
siana lines were merged into the Texas & New 
Orleans Railroad. (See chapter 11.) 5 4 
Another major decision involved the very 
location of the company's executive offices. 
Correspondent with the retirement of Hale 
Holden as chairman in 1939, after lengthy 
deliberation, and apparently at the strong 
urging of Jesse H . Jones and the Reconstruc-
tion Finance Corporation, the board of direc-
tors announced that executive headquarters 
would be moved to San Francisco from New 
York City. Collaterally, responsibilities of the 
chairman devolved to the president, A . D. 
McDonald, and an all-California executive 
committee was appointed. The move, said the 
company, was designed to put the board in 
closer contact "with local problems." Most 
observers thought it long overdue.5 5 
The decision to move the executive offices 
to San Francisco resulted in an increased ag-
gressiveness on the part of SP's board as well 
as its management team. The economic pic-
ture, of course, had brightened for the com-
pany as the depression ebbed. Furthermore, 
difficult but correct decisions by SP's leaders 
had been made during "the dark decade," es-
pecially during the later years. These diverse 
decisions were centered on such issues as deal-
ing with SP's funded debt, reducing or aban-
doning marginal or unprofitable elements of 
its business, focusing on and making greater 
investments in those elements that promised 
greater return, advancing its strategic posi-
tion, and otherwise planning for the future. In 
the end, SP's senior managers simply gambled 
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on the future. They made impressive capital 
expenditures for new motive power (including 
the road's first diesel locomotives—switchers 
for Oakland, placed in service on Apri l 1, 
1939) and equipment, betterments to track 
structure (SP would have 4,700 track miles of 
rail that was n o pound or heavier by 1942.), 
and installation of C T C . A l l promised lower 
operating expenses and represented tangible 
evidence of that gamble. 5 6 
The SP was not without problems. Never-
theless, its diligent efforts caught the eye of 
several outside analysts who, like a writer for 
the San Francisco News, applauded "the great 
changes" that were "the result of definite plan-
ning and hard work by men who were given 
the responsibility to make them." In its finan-
cial survey of the SP in 1937, the N . S. Hall 
Company pointed out that the SP was "the 
largest transportation system in the country, 
measured either in terms of mileage or total 
assets." Hal l gave SP a high credit rating, al-
though not as high as that given rivals Santa Fe 
and Union Pacific. Fortune in 1937 observed 
that SP was "bigger than General Motors, 
Standard O i l of New Jersey, or U.S. Steel. . . i n 
short, after A T & T and the great Pennsylvania 
Railroad, [it is] the third-biggest industrial 
corporation in the land." SP's railroads, it re-
ported, represented 95 percent of the holding 
company's assets. Others pointed out with 
admiration that Southern Pacific was going 
to emerge from the depression without the aid 
of bankruptcy proceedings. For that matter, 
they noted, SP had never defaulted on a fixed 
obligation. 5 7 
Much of the credit for SP's ultimate success 
in weathering the depression and preparing 
the company for the future belonged to A . D . 
McDonald, "an auditor by training and a 
Scotsman by birth," as one writer put it. 
McDonald was an exacting officer who per-
sonified a simple creed of dependability, per-
severance, courage, and character. Indeed, ar-
gued McDonald, "character is the basis of a 
successful life." To the graduates of Notre 
Dame in 1931, he said: "Without an ideal of 
some kind life has no significance; without a 
life purpose, opportunities can neither be seen 
nor grasped." McDonald was clearly a man 
of exceptional integrity and vision. He ad-
vocated what he called "a new era in rail-
roading" and urged every employee to do his 
utmost to make the Southern Pacific "Your 
Friendly Railroad" in fact as well as philoso-
phy. The very success or failure of the com-
pany, McDonald understood, depended not so 
much upon physical facilities as upon the 
individuals who worked for the company in 
all capacities. Small wonder a family feel-
ing permeated the SP organization during his 
tenure.5 8 
Small wonder, too, that the SP family was 
shocked when Angus Daniel McDonald died 
unexpectedly on November 15,1941. It would 
fall to Armand T. Mercier to lead the Southern 
Pacific through the trying but also exhilarat-
ing years of World War II. 5 9 
Angus Daniel McDonald, who had led the SP 
through the harsh days of the 1930s, died unex-
pectedly on November 15, 1941. 
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The Texas £s? New Orleans Railroad 
"This is the oldest, largest and strongest 
system in Texas."—S. G. Reed, History of 
the Texas Railroads 
SP managers in later years complained that an 
"iron curtain" existed at El Paso. Although 
the assertion may have been exaggerated, there 
clearly were difficulties of communication, lo-
gistics, and authority at this critical junction, 
where traffic was channeled to and from the 
Pacific Lines, Texas &C Louisiana Lines, and 
the Golden State Route. There were several 
possible explanations for the problem. Before 
the era of modern communication, division of 
the sprawling Southern Pacific into two sys-
tems—Pacific and Atlantic—for administra-
tive purposes made sense. On the other hand, 
such division promoted two separate and in-
creasingly disparate corporate cultures. The 
matter was further confused in Texas by an 
onerous constitutional requirement that every 
railroad operating in the state "keep public 
office in the state" and further that no Texas-
chartered railroad could consolidate with a 
"foreign" company (one chartered in another 
state). For that reason alone, SP's interests 
in the Lone Star State for many years could 
not be integrated with its interests elsewhere. 
Moreover, as the relative importance of the 
Texas & Louisiana Lines and its Morgan Line 
extension decreased—because of the erosion 
of traffic correspondent with the opening of 
the Panama Canal and the growing impor-
tance of SP's Golden State Route—the cloud 
of second-class citizenship settled over SP's 
Sunset Route east of El Paso. Only in later 
years would SP management seek to break 
down the "iron curtain" and bring its Texas & 
Louisiana Lines fully into the company as an 
equal partner.1 
Southern Pacific's early interest in Texas and 
Louisiana understandably centered on driving 
the Sunset Route to completion between Los 
Angeles and New Orleans. Construction of 
the line west of El Paso was for its own ac-
count, but between New Orleans and El Paso 
the SP forged a through line only by gathering 
and tying together several separately orga-
nized properties. Initial construction by SP's 
antecedent companies began during the early 
1850s in both Louisiana and Texas. 
The easternmost portion of the Sunset 
Route had its origin in Apri l , 1852, when am-
bitious citizens of Louisiana secured a charter 
for the romantic-sounding New Orleans, 
Opelousas & Great Western Railway. Con-
struction of the 5'6" gauge line began five 
months later, but progress was slow as crews 
toiled in the low and poorly drained forest 
swamps west of Algiers, across the Mississippi 
River from New Orleans. Five years were re-
quired before the line was completed 80 miles 
to Brashear City, now Morgan City, Louisi-
ana. There the terminus remained until after 
the Civil War, when Charles Morgan acquired 
the property and changed its gauge to stan-
dard. For some years Morgan had been oper-
ating a fleet of small steamers between New 
Orleans and Mobile and later from New Or-
leans to Brashear City, Galveston, and Corpus 
Christi. On June 4, 1873, Morgan also initi-
ated steamer service between New Orleans 
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and Havana. Just before he died in 1878, 
Morgan disposed of his rail and water inter-
ests, which then were recast as Morgan's Loui-
siana & Texas Railroad & Steamship Com-
pany ( M L & T ) . 2 
Under the watchful eye of a young engineer 
named Julius Kruttschnitt, M L & T construc-
tion gangs renewed their activity in 1878, 
reaching Lafayette with rail in May, 1881, and 
then turning northward toward Alexandria. 
Sixty miles of construction and twenty-five 
miles of trackage rights over the Texas & Pa-
cific allowed the Morgan's Louisiana & Texas 
to reach that community. Elsewhere, the Loui-
siana Western Railroad, supported by the SP 
through Collis P. Huntington, completed its 
line westward from Lafayette to the Sabine 
River in 1881. 3 
On the Texas side of the Sabine, land and 
timber promoters who sought to open up a 
promising country and at the same time find 
an outlet through Houston for forest prod-
ucts, broadened the scope of their enterprise 
to include creation of the Texas & New Or-
leans Railroad ( T & N O ) — a company that 
would satisfy their initial desires and at the 
same time provide connection for the lines 
(mentioned above) building from the east 
across Louisiana. By January, 1861, Texas & 
New Orleans crews had negotiated the Trinity 
and Neches rivers and their valleys to provide 
a line from Houston to Orange. The history of 
the T & N O during and shortly after the Civi l 
War is unclear, but it was partly dismantled 
and out of service for a time. New owners 
rehabilitated the property, and the line to 
Orange was opened again on October 16, 
1876. The short stretch between that place and 
the Sabine River was closed by the Louisiana 
Western Extension Railroad before March, 
1881, and thus a connecting service between 
New Orleans and Houston was established.4 
An important adjunct to the growth and 
development of Houston and SP's eventual 
association there involved two unrelated firms, 
the Texas Transportation Company and the 
Direct Navigation Company. Incorporated in 
Shortly before he died in 1878, Charles Morgan 
disposed of his water and rail interests, which were 
then recast as Morgan's Louisiana & Texas Rail-
road and Steamship Company. 
1866, the Texas company ten years later built 
a strategic line of railroad from Houston along 
Buffalo Bayou (now called the Houston Ship 
Channel) to Clinton, 7.4 miles. It was sup-
ported by Morgan's Louisiana & Texas Rail-
road & Steamship Company, which already 
was laboring to secure federal aid in develop-
ing the ship channel and in making Houston a 
deep-water port. The Direct Navigation Com-
pany had been established in 1866 for the 
purpose of operating steamboats and barges 
on Buffalo Bayou between Houston and Gal-
veston and also offering lighterage for cotton 
and other commodities to vessels lying in or 
about Galveston Bay. After improvements to 
the channel were made, the relative impor-
tance of the navigation company diminished, 
but that of the Texas Transportation Company 
was increased. Both, of course, in their own 
ways served greatly to make Houston an im-
portant world port. 5 
Buffalo Bayou, foot of M a i n Street in Houston, head of navigation. 
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On February n , 1850, by special act, the 
legislature of Texas chartered the Buffalo 
Bayou, Brazos & Colorado Railway (BBB&-
C), and its construction, begun a year later, 
was the earliest of any by SP's antecedents. 
The purpose of the railway was to link the 
headwaters of Buffalo Bayou, some five miles 
from Houston, with the twin productive val-
leys of the Brazos and Colorado rivers to the 
west. By the fall of i 8 6 0 rails had reached 
Alley ton, 80 miles inland but slightly short of 
the Colorado River. The gap was closed by 
the Columbus Tap Railway, which itself be-
came part of the B B B & C in 1866. Four years 
later the road was sold to promoter Thomas 
W. Peirce and others, who on July 27, 1870, 
changed its name to the Galveston, Harris-
burg & San Antonio Railway ( G H & S A ) . 6 
Peirce's immediate goal was to extend the 
line to San Antonio, which was reached on 
February 5, 1877. A momentous celebration 
followed, as townsmen applauded the coming 
of the steamcar civilization. At the same time, 
C. P. Huntington was contemplating means by 
which to extend SP's influence eastward from 
California and simultaneously frustrate the 
efforts of Thomas Scott, and later Jay Gould, 
to make reality of the goals implied by the cor-
porate title of the Texas & Pacific Railway 
(T&P). The SP quickly built eastward through 
the territories of Arizona and New Mexico. At 
the same time, the value of the G H & S A was 
not lost on Huntington, who successfully in-
duced Peirce to link with the SP at El Paso in-
stead of building northwestward from San 
Antonio to a junction with the Texas & Pa-
cific. 7 Galveston, Harrisburg & San Antonio 
construction gangs faced no serious problems 
until they reached a few miles west of Del Rio, 
where surveyors' stakes led them into the 
narrow valley of the Rio Grande. Indeed, to 
maintain standards of grade, tunnels were re-
quired near the confluence of the Pecos River 
and the Rio Grande. The location proved tem-
porary; a viaduct or "high bridge" over the 
Pecos would be placed in service in March, 
1892. As crews from San Antonio worked 
westward, others approached from El Paso. 
On January 27, 1883, they met 227 miles west 
of San Antonio. The Sunset Route was com-
plete; through trains from New Orleans and 
San Francisco left their respective terminals 
on February 5. Furthermore, the joint South-
ern Pacific-Galveston, Harrisburg & San A n -
tonio enterprise defeated the aspirations of the 
Texas & Pacific; Jay Gould was reduced to 
signing an important territorial agreement 
with Huntington in 1881. Under that com-
pact Huntington agreed to allow the Texas & 
Pacific trackage rights from Sierra Blanca, 
Texas, to El Paso, 90 miles, but the T & P laid 
no rail west of the Rio Grande. 8 
Unfortunately, the record of the early finan-
cial involvement of Huntington and the SP in 
those properties eventually acquired in Texas 
and Louisiana is incomplete. Certainly this is 
the case with the Galveston, Harrisburg & 
San Antonio. Huntington did pledge support 
for Peirce's extension to El Paso through the 
Southern Development Company, and he may 
have exercised authority over the property 
as a consequence. Control passed to the SP 
on March 1, 1885, when the G H & S A was 
leased, and was clearly affirmed on July 1, 
1889, when the railroad became one of SP's 
proprietary lines, operated under its own flag 
but governed by the parent.9 
Huntington worked feverishly for further 
consolidations and acquisitions. Morgan's 
Louisiana & Texas Railroad & Steamship 
Company became a proprietary line on 
March 1, 1885. It was much the same with 
the Texas & New Orleans Railroad, which 
with its rights and ancillary holdings also be-
came one of SP's proprietary properties in 
1885. New construction in and about Hous-
ton then linked several SP properties.1 0 
The Houston & Texas Central Railroad 
( H & T C ) offered the SP an opportunity to 
broaden significantly its service area. A d -
vantageously located on a north-south axis, 
it had evolved from the Galveston & Red 
River Railway, chartered as early as 1848. 
Construction began in January, 1853, from 
The Sunset Route was completed early in 1883, when construction crews met at a remote location 
227 miles west of San Antonio. 
The M L & T became a proprietary line on March 1, 1885. M L & T ' s handsome locomotive #47 and the 
business car Morgan were visitors at the New Orleans Exposition of 1884 — 85. 
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The SP officially reached the important river city of 
New Orleans when the M L & T became a proprie-
tary line in 1885. 
Houston on a 5'6" gauge (altered to standard 
in 1874—77). Following a change in name to 
the Houston & Texas Central, its fortunes 
were inhibited by inadequate financing and 
then by the Civi l War. When that conflict 
ended, the Houston & Texas Central owned a 
main line from Houston northward to M i l l i -
can and a short branch from Hempstead to-
ward Austin. Its rails finally reached Dallas 
during the summer of 1872, and the Red 
River at Denison in March of the next year. 
The branch to Austin had been completed ear-
lier, in December, 1871. The H & T C fleshed 
out its system by acquiring the Waco 6c" North-
western Railroad (Bremond to Waco and 
shortly beyond, 55 miles, in 1873); the 108-
mile Austin & Northwestern (built in part 
to narrow gauge and later converted to stan-
dard from Austin to Llano, with branches) in 
1901; the Fort Worth & New Orleans Rail-
way (from Fort Worth to Waxahachie, 42 
miles) in 1901; and the tiny Central Texas & 
Northwestern Railway (Garrett to Waxa-
hachie, 13 miles), also in 1901. The Houston 
&C Texas Central itself came under SP's control 
in 1895 but, pursuant to Texas law, remained 
in operation by its own offices.11 
From its earliest entry into the railroad af-
fairs of Texas, the SP favored Houston over 
Galveston. It did not ignore Galveston; on the 
contrary, it established service there, by track-
age rights, as the result of the Huntington-
Gould agreement in 1881. Then, on Septem-
ber 28, 1905, the SP—through its Galveston, 
Harrisburg & San Antonio—secured an inde-
pendent entry by acquiring the Galveston, 
Houston & Northern Railway, which owned 
a main line from near Houston to Galveston 
plus a branch from Strang to Sylvan Beach as 
well as trackage on Galveston Island. 1 2 
To further strengthen its grip on Houston 
and to hold much of East Texas for its own 
development, the SP brought the expansive-
sounding Houston East & West Texas Railway 
into its corporate fold during 1900. The com-
pany had been incorporated in 1875; its sub-
sidiary in Louisiana, the Gulf, Shreveport & 
Kansas City Railroad, was chartered in 1883. 
Together they had built 232 miles of track be-
tween Houston and Shreveport during the 
period from 1876 to 1885. Originally con-
structed as a narrow gauge line, the line was 
changed to standard in 1894. 1 3 
An especially curious relationship existed 
between the Southern Pacific and the San A n -
tonio & Aransas Pass Railway. The SAP, as it 
was known, was incorporated in 1884 as a 
consequence of the desire of San Antonio's 
leaders for a connection to the Gulf. Con-
struction in 1885-88 took the line through 
Kenedy and Beeville to Corpus Christi, with a 
branch to Aransas Pass and Rockport. Other 
construction between 1886 and 1888 ex-
tended the SAP from Kenedy to Houston and 
between 1885 and 1887 from San Antonio 
northwesterly to Kerrville. To secure a con-
nection with the Texas-Mexican Railway, a 
branch was built south from Skidmore to 
Alice in 1887—88. Yet another feeder was 
placed in service during 1891 from Yoakum to 
Waco. Late in 1903, San Antonio & Aransas 
Pass's management announced plans to ex-
tend its line from Alice into the Rio Grande 
Valley with a terminus at Brownsville. Con-
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struction crews reached Falfurrias by mid-
1904, but then they were disbanded for lack 
of money. The SAP had been a part of SP's 
domain since 1892, but in December, 1903, 
the Railroad Commission of Texas compelled 
the SP to divest itself of stock control. This 
proved, however, to be a temporary setback, 
as the ICC in 1925 would authorize the lease 
of the San Antonio & Aransas Pass to SP's 
Galveston, Harrisburg & San Antonio. 1 4 
Huntington's insatiable thirst for more rail 
lines remained unslaked. The high-sounding 
New York, Texas & Mexican Railway was the 
pet of Count Joseph Telfener, an Italian noble-
man, who dispatched his fellow countrymen to 
construct a line—from Rosenberg, 37 miles 
west of Houston on the G H & S A , to Browns-
ville and then into Mexico. Incorporated 
in 1880, the New York, Texas & Mexican 
began service from Rosenberg to Victoria two 
years later, but the project failed there. The 
SP purchased substantially all of its stock in 
1885, selling it, in turn, to the G H & S A dur-
ing 1905. 1 5 
The New York, Texas & Mexican Railway 
connected at Victoria with the Gulf, Western 
Texas & Pacific Railway (GWT&P) , which 
between 1871 and 1873 had built a 28-mile 
route from Victoria to Cuero. The G W T & P 
passed to Charles Morgan in 1877, to the SP 
in 1885, and to the Galveston, Harrisburg & 
San Antonio in 1905. During 1888 — 89 the 
Gulf, Western Texas & Pacific also built a 56-
mile connection between Victoria and the San 
Antonio & Aransas Pass at Beeville. 1 6 
Rounding out what became SP's network in 
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The San Antonio & Aransas Pass Railway came into SP's orbit in 1892, left it temporarily, and returned in 
the 1920s. A n SAP train is seen here at San Antonio. 
the Victoria area was an undertaking styled 
the San Antonio & Gulf Shore Railway. Its pro-
moters hoped to link San Antonio with the 
Gulf, Western Texas & Pacific at Cuero. Only 
28 miles were constructed between 1895 a n d 
1898; it fell to the GH&tSA in 1905 and was 
finished to Cuero during the next two years.1 7 
Most of the formerly independent com-
panies in Texas and Louisiana that became 
part of the Southern Pacific had at least one 
branch or secondary main line. Morgan's Loui-
siana & Texas and the Louisiana Western had 
several feeders that tapped much of southern 
Louisiana. Elsewhere, SP's predecessors so 
pervaded the landscape in and about Houston 
that their collective map looked like a plate of 
wet spaghetti; the Houston & Texas Central 
owned a second line between Mexia and Nava-
sota; the Galveston, Harrisburg & San A n -
tonio had an important branch from Spofford 
to Eagle Pass and a connection there for Mex-
ico; and the New York, Texas & Mexican had 
two short appendages. 
Several of these predecessor companies had 
nicknames that suggested something of their 
heritage or at least their local reputation. The 
Houston East & West Texas was known as the 
"Rabbit" because its profile seemed to hop 
from hill to hill and its ride was so unpleasant 
that, as customers said, it was " H e l l Either 
Way You Take It." The Houston & Texas Cen-
tral took the moniker "Hoboes and Tin Cans," 
and because it was built by Italian crews, the 
New York, Texas & Mexican became known 
as the " M a c a r o n i . " 1 8 
Another of SP's Texas lines with a nickname 
was the "Dalsa," between Hearne and Fla-
tonia. The word Dalsa, as might be expected, 
stood for Dallas and San Antonio; the line it-
self represented a shortcut for traffic moving 
on the SP from San Antonio and the west 
to Dallas and Fort Worth. Completion of 
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this route by the Houston & Texas Central 
required acquisition of the tiny Hearne &C 
Brazos Valley Railroad between Hearne and 
Stone City; new construction between Stone 
City and Giddings; trackage rights over the 
San Antonio & Aransas Pass from Giddings 
to Flatonia; and use of the Sunset Route 
to San Antonio. It was opened for regular 
freight service on September 10, 1913, al-
though scheduled passenger service did not 
begin until October 7, 1920. 1 9 
SP's interests in the states of Texas and Loui-
siana were further expanded during the 1920s. 
The 40-mile Franklin & Abbeville Railway, 
serving a Louisiana sugar refinery and planta-
tion, was added in November, 1924. So, too, 
was the Dayton-Goose Creek Railway, a 25-
mile pike serving the petroleum industry from 
Baytown to Dayton in Texas; it became part 
of the SP empire on May 1, 1926. Longer but 
not nearly as consequential as the Dayton-
Goose Creek was the Texas Midland Railroad, 
acquired on Apri l 1, 1928. This 125-mile 
road—made popular by Hetty Green, "The 
Witch of Wall Street," and her flamboyant son 
Colonel Ned Green—linked Ennis (on the 
H & T C ) with Paris, in northeast Texas. Also, 
the San Antonio & Aransas Pass returned to 
the SP fold on Apri l 8, 1925. 2 0 
A continuing desire to expand its oppor-
tunities in the Lone Star State predictably led 
SP's management to pursue acquisition of the 
Texas Mexican Railway, which stretched from 
the Gulf of Mexico at Corpus Christi west-
ward to the Rio Grande and an important 
gateway to Mexico at Laredo. Constructed as 
the Corpus Christi, San Diego & Rio Grande 
Narrow Gauge Railroad, the line had been 
completed bit by bit between 1876 and 1881. 
The corporate designation was changed to 
Texas Mexican in 1881, and the road was 
converted to standard gauge in 1902. It con-
nected with the San Antonio & Aransas Pass 
at Corpus Christi and at Alice. SP's interest in 
the Texas Mexican dated from early 1920 
when W. R. Scott, who was in charge of the 
T & L Lines, urged Julius Kruttschnitt to au-
thorize its purchase. "Possession of the road," 
said Scott, "would put us in an ideal position 
toward future development in Mexico and 
would give us a preferred location in Laredo, 
the main gateway to Mexico." Furthermore, 
Scott warned, "the Gulf Coast Lines [which 
had trackage rights over the Tex-Mex from 
Corpus Christi to Robstown] has been mak-
ing overtures for the control or purchase of 
this l ine ." 2 1 
Negotiations followed a serpentine path. It 
was true that the Gulf Coast Lines proposed 
to lease the Texas Mexican, but for whatever 
reason such an agreement was not consum-
mated. Meanwhile, SP officers studied the 
matter; the executive committee finally autho-
rized lease or purchase of the line in February, 
1925. This upset the Missouri Pacific, which 
had come to control the Gulf Coast Lines as 
well as the International & Great Northern 
with which the Tex-Mex connected at Laredo. 
It also upset the Missouri-Kansas-Texas Rail-
road (the M - K - T , or Katy), which had no 
physical connection and, in fact, whose lines 
were no closer than San Antonio. Conse-
quently, it seemed for a while that the SP, Mis-
souri Pacific (MoPac), and the Katy would 
collectively purchase the Texas Mexican. The 
Katy eventually withdrew, but at the outset of 
the depression the SP and MoPac, through the 
agency of the Central Hanover Bank and Trust 
Company, appeared to develop a compatible 
joint-lease arrangement. Events conspired 
otherwise. The Missouri Pacific went into 
bankruptcy in 1933, the SP itself struggled 
through hard times, and the Texas Mexican 
remained independent.22 
Had the Southern Pacific been successful in 
acquiring the Texas Mexican, it likely would 
have had those properties leased for operation 
by the Texas & New Orleans Railroad. SP's 
managers in Houston long had been faced 
with the difficulty of administering the affairs 
of each subsidiary as an operating concern. 
Fortunately, however, the railroad commis-
sions of Texas and Louisiana and the Inter-
state Commerce Commission gave their re-
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spective blessings to a plan by which all of the 
entities making up SP's Texas & Louisiana 
Lines passed under lease to the T & N O which, 
of all, owned a corporate title that best de-
scribed the geographic nature of SP's proper-
ties in Texas and Louisiana. The new arrange-
ment permitted a desirable concentration of 
authority, activities, and supervision and fa-
cilitated economies in all departments. The 
unification took effect on March 1, 1927." 
Benefits of the new consolidation were im-
mediately evident in the colonization and ag-
ricultural promotion efforts of the Texas & 
New Orleans. Its antecedents had earlier de-
veloped their own programs so that the attrac-
tions of each area in SP's service area had been 
properly advertised; the Galveston, Harris-
burg & San Antonio, for instance, promoted 
southwest Texas while the " o l d " T & N O bally -
hooed east and southeast Texas. The G H & S A 
had early organized an immigration bureau, 
sent agents abroad to recruit settlers, and 
authorized a rate of 1.75 cents per mile for 
all who chose to relocate along its lines. 
Elsewhere, Morgan's Louisiana & Texas had 
helped to rejuvenate Louisiana's flagging sugar 
cane industry shortly after the turn of the cen-
tury by building high-capacity sugar cane cars 
and by lowering rates, which allowed pro-
ducers and processors to concentrate their 
operations and regain financial stability. Now, 
under the T & N O ' s unified leadership, these 
efforts were more tightly focused. A coloniza-
tion agent was located in New Orleans for the 
purpose of promoting the agricultural and in-
dustrial potential of Louisiana; a twelve-car 
farm demonstration train toured Texas in 
cooperation with that state's A & M College; 
160 4 -H members from T & N O country in 
Texas received paid trips to College Station for 
a short course in 1927; and a flood of new, so-
phisticated promotional materials emanated 
from the Houston offices.24 
A l l of this was particularly useful given SP's 
final campaign of expansion in Texas—into 
the "Magic Valley" or, more precisely, the 
Lower Rio Grande Valley. The San Antonio & 
Aransas Pass had set out for the valley in 
1903, but the drive stalled at Falfurrias dur-
ing the following year. When the SAP re-
turned to SP's orbit in 1925, a thorough as-
sessment of SP's options and opportunities in 
South Texas was ordered. W. R. Scott told 
A. D. McDonald that the Missouri Pacific 
would "always be our chief competitor in 
Texas" and, noted Scott, the MoPac was— 
through its Gulf Coast Lines—thoroughly en-
trenched in the Rio Grande Valley. Much to 
the consternation of L. W. Baldwin, president 
of the Missouri Pacific, who considered the 
"territory already adequately served," the In-
terstate Commerce Commission nevertheless 
granted permission to extend the SAP line 
from Falfurrias to McAllen, with a branch 
from Edinburg eastward to Harlingen. Con-
struction began on October 5, 1926, and on 
February 6, 1927, service was initiated to 
McAllen. Baldwin was even more disturbed 
when the T & N O asked the ICC for per-
mission to extend its Edinburg branch to 
Brownsville. He offered the T & N O trackage 
privileges over the MoPac, "without local 
rights," between the two places, but Scott saw 
"nothing of value in this proposition." The 
ICC went along; service to Brownsville began 
on November 10, 1927, with a predictable 
and enthusiastic celebration." 
Under the original order the SAP had per-
mission to build "to the international boun-
dary . . . at a practicable crossing of the Rio 
Grande"; this would have been near McAllen 
but, although the National Railways of Mex-
ico periodically encouraged it to do so, the 
T & N O never elected to create another "bor-
der port" at that location. Instead, the com-
pany sought to develop local business in the 
"Magic Valley." Small wonder. SP's share-
holders were told that it contained "the richest 
and most productive soil of any agricultural 
section in the country." T & N O agricultural 
agents and sales representatives spread this 
good news far and wide, offering fascinating 
programs and instructive pamphlets. In a re-
lated campaign, agricultural agents promoted 
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the institution of a significant canning indus-
try in the Valley. The rewards were immediate. 
Much of T & N O ' s increase in freight volume 
for 1928 came from billings made along the 
new 135-mile lines. It was the same for pas-
senger revenues. Vacationers by the thousands 
detrained each winter at handsome new sta-
tions in McAllen, Edinburg, Harlingen, and 
Brownsville. 2 6 
A heavy volume of perishable traffic origi-
nated on the T & N O or moved overhead. It 
began in 1884 when two enterprising farmers 
shipped a carload of watermelons from Prairie 
View, Texas, to Houston, where they sold 
them from a stand in front of Grand Central 
passenger station. Their profits were good; 
watermelon soon became a principal crop in 
many parts of the T & N O ' s service area and, 
at the same time, an important part of the rail-
road's traffic mix. Louisiana shippers sent 
wild dewberries to market, and in 1937 the 
Rio Grande Valley set a record in the move-
ment of citrus. Bananas moved overhead to 
the West, while a full range of California and 
Arizona produce passed to the East. Pacific 
Fruit Express iced 43,508 cars at El Paso 
in 1928 alone. Indeed, PFE represented an 
imposing enterprise along the T & N O , with 
icing facilities at El Paso, San Antonio, Del 
Rio, Hearne, Edinburg, Skidmore, Houston, 
and Shreveport.27 
The Texas & New Orleans also handled 
the usual traffic in merchandise and bulk 
commodities, and it likewise hosted promo-
tional movements—solid trains of tractors 
and threshing machines, for example—and 
early in 1940 it participated in the unit train 
movement of Plymouth automobiles from De-
troit to a consignee in San Antonio. Local 
loadings included grain, cement, cotton, ag-
gregates, wool, merchandise, and L C L items.2 8 
Nothing more characterized local loadings 
on the T & N O than livestock. Live turkeys 
moved from Victoria, horses and mules from 
the San Antonio area, and goats, sheep, and 
hogs from other localities. Yet, in Texas at 
least, the term livestock was a synonym for 
cattle. At many locations, particularly on the 
old Galveston, Harrisburg & San Antonio 
and on the Llano Branch, cattle billings were 
extremely important. Huge company-owned 
stock pens were located at Alpine, Marfa, 
Ryan, Valentine, Lobo, and Llano; impressive 
water and feed facilities, necessary to comply 
with federal water and rest laws, were located 
at El Paso, Waco, Hearne, and Ennis. In 1916 
a total of 5,792 carloads of cattle were shipped 
from or delivered to stations between San A n -
tonio and El Paso; Marfa and Uvalde had the 
greatest billings. Handling livestock, however, 
was a tedious business. Dispatchers watched 
train sheets carefully to be certain that live-
stock was delivered within thirty-six hours or 
otherwise unloaded for feed, water, and rest. 
Brakemen were responsible for inspecting the 
animals at every stop and for prodding any 
"down" animals. And, of course, each car had 
to be bedded with sand before loading. 2 9 
Another commodity that characterized 
Texas & New Orleans country—one that was 
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A full range of California and Arizona produce 
moved east over the T & N O . Here a cantaloupe 
train takes water at Marathon, Texas. 
far more important to the ultimate devel-
opment of the region and to the railroad's 
fortunes—was oil . Early fields were located 
near Corsicana, Humble, and Dayton, but the 
grand-daddy of them all was ushered in on 
January 10, 1901, at Spindletop dome near 
Beaumont. Petroleum products promised im-
pressive revenues as well as a constant and 
inexpensive source of fuel. Three locomo-
tives from the T & L Lines, one each from the 
G H & S A , H & T C , and T & N O , were soon 
equipped to burn oil . The experiment was a 
dramatic success; by July 31, 1901, 500 tank 
cars and 50 storage tanks were ordered as the 
first step in converting the entire locomotive 
fleet of the Texas & Louisiana Lines from coal 
to oi l . Morgan steamers followed in short 
order. Meanwhile, shipments of crude oil pro-
duced generous revenues, but they proved 
short term. Refiners complained that rail rates 
were too high compared with those of pipe 
lines; the carriers had to admit that they could 
not even meet their operating expenses at pipe 
line rates. Although they generally lost the 
haulage of crude oil , Texas railroads con-
tinued to handle prodigious volumes of re-
fined products—7.8 million tons from the 
Lone Star State in 1940, of which 31 percent 
was billed on the Texas & New Orleans. Pe-
troleum caused Houston to boom. Shortly be-
fore World War II, twenty-five refineries had 
been located in and about that bustling city. 3 0 
Reflecting its growing need for a depend-
able and inexpensive supply of fuel oil for 
its locomotives and steamships, the SP saw to 
the creation of the Rio Bravo Oi l Company 
on March 3, 1903. Specifically, this new sub-
sidiary was empowered "to produce, sell 
and transport oil and other minerals in Texas 
and Louisiana." It quickly acquired lands and 
leases in areas that promised production of 
lignite, coal, and oil . Rio Bravo produced 
more than 31 million barrels of oil from 
various fields by 1944. It also produced a 
precedent-setting case in which the Texas Su-
preme Court ruled that owners of adjacent 
lands could claim mineral rights to the center 
of an easement granted for a railroad right-of-
way. That decision in 1932 cost Rio Bravo 
over $6 million and partly explains SP's need 
to seek the assistance of the Reconstruction 
Finance Corporation during the depression.31 
Many who arrived in the " o i l patches" to 
work for Rio Bravo and other petroleum com-
panies did so aboard Texas & New Orleans 
passenger trains. Without question, the flag-
ship of T & N O ' s passenger operation was the 
Sunset Limited, which began life in November, 
1894 (as the Sunset Express), and served the 
entire route from San Francisco and Los A n -
geles to New Orleans. In 1916 the Sunset 
Limited featured a sterling consist of "Pul l -
man drawing room, compartment and obser-
vation cars and dining car" and made only 
nine station stops on the 1,194—mile n n e be-
tween El Paso and New Orleans. The number-
two train on the route, later named The Ar-
gonaut, handled standard equipment plus 
popular "tourist sleepers."3 2 
The rest of T & N O ' s passenger operations— 
except for the Houston-Dallas line, which in 
1930 boasted four trains daily in each direc-
tion including the Sunbeam, Hustler, Owl, 
and a local—were prosaic. During the same 
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The T & N O handled a normal traffic in merchan-
dise and bulk commodities. This train of mixed 
freight has stopped at Taft, Texas, northwest of 
Corpus Christi. 
season gas-electric motor cars held down 
train assignments on seven runs. M a i l and ex-
press revenues justified the existence of these 
and most others, but income from local pas-
sengers declined, reflecting the national trend 
toward automobiles and buses. Sadly but pre-
dictably, trains from the Rio Grande Valley 
handled an increasing number of corpses dur-
ing the winter months, as more and more el-
derly refugees fled the North to spend snowy 
seasons in a warmer climate. On a happier 
note, passenger business picked up in 1936 
when the Texas Centennial Exposition was 
held in Dallas. The T & N O derived additional 
income from special trains such as that which 
carried President Franklin Roosevelt from 
Houston to San Antonio in 1936. Thousands 
cheered him in Houston at the SP's fine new 
passenger station and along the route. Other 
Texans supported their favorite college foot-
ball teams each fall by riding special trains 
that carried them to gridiron clashes at the 
Cotton Bowl (Dallas), Sugar Bowl (New Or-
leans), Sun Bowl (El Paso), and even to the 
Rose Bowl (Pasadena). The annual contest be-
tween the Texas A & M College and the Uni-
versity of Texas always guaranteed extra 
trains, which required no advertising. That 
happy situation was not the case generally. 
However, the T & N O air conditioned its cars, 
reduced its rates, and advertised these facts. 
Business on regularly scheduled trains turned 
up during the 1930s, if only slightly.3 3 
Competitive forces likewise had impact 
on Texas & New Orleans freight operations. 
Faster and more reliable freight service was 
required. Perishables received the most expe-
ditious handling; forty-eight hours elapsed 
time from Edinburg to Memphis, sixty-three 
hours to East Saint Louis via Shreveport and 
the St. Louis Southwestern Railway (SSW). 
The T & N O and SSW, via Corsicana, also co-
operated in the operation of the Motor Spe-
cial, which, after automobile manufacturing 
companies established plants in California, 
handled parts as an extension of the assembly 
process. Additional improvements followed in 
merchandise service. Sixth-day delivery from 
Los Angeles to New Orleans was improved to 
fifth day in 1937, and three years later the 
T & N O instituted the Corpus Christi Over-
night on the Victoria division to and from 
Houston. 3 4 
Signal protection and automatic train con-
trol added an important level of sophistication 
to T & N O ' s plant. The first automatic block 
signals had been installed between Houston 
and Beaumont during 1904, and by the end of 
1926 the entire Sunset Route was thus pro-
tected. The Houston-Dallas line followed in 
completion a year later. Additional funding 
provided for the installation of an electrical 
control system governing the movement of 
trains over the Dallas Belt Line. More im-
pressively, 171 miles of track between San A n -
tonio and Rosenberg, west of Houston, were 
outfitted with automatic train control by the 
end of 1927. 3 5 
The Texas & New Orleans's motive power 
inventory followed a predictable evolution 
from the American Standard 4-4-os to the 
famous Golden State (later called General 
Service) 4-8-4S. In 1925 there were 665 lo-
comotives assigned to the T & L Lines; they 
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The Sunset Limited, T&NO's flagship train, leaves the Houston station. 
averaged twenty years in age and only 71.27 
tons weight on the drivers. During the 1930s 
passenger trains usually drew 4-6-2s; through 
freights drew workhorse 2-8-2S and 2-10-2S. 
A host of smaller power handled branch, local, 
and switching assignments, while the hand-
ful of GS engines were true to their "gen-
eral service" designations, although they usu-
ally held passenger runs. Compared to the 
motive power stable for SP's Pacific Lines, the 
T & N O ' s fleet was pedestrian but reliable. 3 6 
The impact of the Great Depression was 
particularly devastating to the service area of 
the T & N O and thus to the railroad itself. Re-
duced revenues led to "forced economies." 
Layoffs were carried out in all departments, 
resulting in thousands of personal tragedies 
within the corporate family. H . M . Lul l , SP's 
senior officer in Houston at that time, re-
minded all employees that recovery had fol-
lowed every previous depression, and he en-
couraged his forces to anticipate the future 
"with renewed faith and courage." Mean-
while, he authorized the establishment of an 
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T & N O passenger trains proudly called on this im-
pressive station facility at San Antonio. 
Employee Relief Loan Fund for unfortunate 
employees furloughed as a result of hard times. 
Recovery proved elusive, though. Maintenance 
programs suffered accordingly. By early 1932 
a disappointing 24.3 percent of the T & N O 
locomotive fleet was "waiting repairs, in shop, 
or unserviceable." Five years later the com-
pany junked nearly one hundred engines.37 
In November, 1930, the mayor of Houston 
contacted the Texas & New Orleans, among 
several of the city's largest employers, asking 
that the company "give reasonable assurance" 
to employees that "their jobs are secure" and 
to "employ force as fast as conditions war-
rant." Lull promised the mayor that he and all 
other T & N O officers shared a concern for 
victims of the depression, especially those for-
mer railroad employees now out of work. He 
took the opportunity to point out, however, 
that "the situation in which the railroads find 
themselves at present" was "not due wholly to 
the present business depression." Lul l com-
plained that a variety of laws and governmen-
tal policies had circumscribed the inherent 
efficiencies of railroads. The railroads were 
tightly regulated by state and federal agencies 
that granted inadequate rate increases; they 
were forced to compete with an inland water-
way system, an Intercoastal Canal, a growing 
system of roads and highways, and air car-
riers—all of which received large governmen-
tal subsidies; and they were unfairly taxed. 
This, said Lul l , reduced their profitability, im-
paired their ability to compete, and restricted 
their ability to maintain or expand employ-
ment. Lull may have been impolitic in speak-
ing so boldly, but he correctly perceived that 
the railroads were suffering from more than 
just the current economic trauma. 3 8 
Lull also correctly understood that success-
ful management and operation of railroads 
proceeds from an understanding of "coopera-
tive enterprise." Failure was certain unless 
each department, and indeed each individual, 
could be counted on to "perform work faith-
fully and well ." Lull was especially pleased 
with the good work of the T & N O service 
clubs, which he thought represented "mutual 
helpfulness." There seems little doubt that the 
sense of family, strong on the Pacific Lines, 
was even stronger on the T & N O . This may be 
explained by the harshness of times in Texas 
and Louisiana or by the fact that the T & N O 
itself was restricted to only two states, whereas 
the Pacific Lines were spread over several. In 
any event, the tight-knit nature of the T & N O 
was reflected in the energetic activities of 
"employee service clubs," which held elabo-
rate annual parties in Houston and lobbied 
there and elsewhere to increase both passenger 
and freight business for the railroad. It was 
similarly manifest in various athletic activi-
ties—bowling, golf, basketball tournaments 
and a remarkably fine system track and field 
meet staged annually from 1924 until World 
War II—and in the impressive performances 
of the railroad's band and glee club. Most of 
all, it was reflected by the tenor of the Bulletin 
for the T & L Lines. 3 9 
The editors of the Bulletin over the years 
persistently stressed these themes: safety; the 
quality of cuisine and service in Texas & New 
Orleans dining cars; courtesy; the injustice of 
subsidies given to other forms of transporta-
tion; fuel conservation; camaraderie and loy-
alty; and, most of all, the sense of "one big 
family." Particularly popular were regular col-
umns devoted to news about the T & L Lines, 
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operations of the Morgan Line, activities 
of the service clubs, accomplishments of per-
sonnel, retirement notices, and especially 
"Gossip From Along the Line." After resump-
tion of publication in 1936, following a hiatus 
after 1932, the Bulletin featured in-house 
advertisements boosting T & N O passenger 
service and exhorting employees to seek 
every opportunity to sell it. The Bulletin like-
wise mirrored regrettable regional racial atti-
tudes. Activities of the segregated "colored 
employees service clubs" were reported, as 
were retirements such as that of one George 
A . Branford, whom the editor in 1940 identi-
fied as one of the company's "most popular 
colored employees." 4 0 
The medical welfare of Texas & New Or-
leans personnel was attended to in company-
owned hospitals. The first of these was estab-
lished by the Galveston, Harrisburg & San 
Antonio at Columbus, Texas, in 1880; its suc-
cessor was placed in service at Houston in 
1911. Payroll deductions were made in the 
form of dues as early as 1880, on the G H & S A 
and later on the other subsidiaries. The stan-
dard rate initially was 50^ per month and guar-
anteed the employee medical care as well as 
voting rights in the hospital association.4 1 
Therapy of another type was required in 
an effort to combat the erosion of less-than-
carload business on the T & N O . To this end, 
the Southern Pacific Transport Company was 
established on August 1, 1930; the Southern 
Pacific Transport of Louisiana followed on 
April 16, 1932. Both were organized as truck-
ing arms to coordinate with and supplement 
T & N O rail lines in "the performance of store-
door pick-up and delivery." Initially, contracts 
were drawn with local drayage operators for 
pick-up and delivery while the T & N O pro-
vided the intercity haul in box cars. Later on, 
Southern Pacific Transport's operations were 
expanded to include over-the-road hauls by 
company-owned trucks driven by its own 
employees.42 
Other changes were in the offing. Operating 
circumstances at New Orleans had been diffi-
cult since service began there before the Civil 
Historically, T & N O passenger trains reached New 
Orleans by ferry from Avondale. 
War. A bridge across the Mississippi River 
had not been built because of difficult founda-
tion conditions, low lands in approach to the 
river, required navigational clearances, plus 
costly hazards of construction. Consequently, 
yarding operations for freight were conducted 
across the river at Algiers; cars were ferried 
from there to New Orleans. Passenger trains 
reached New Orleans Union Station (actually 
the Illinois Central station, which hosted 
T & N O and Gulf Coast Line trains as tenants) 
by ferry from Avondale. The SP, through Mor-
gan's Louisiana & Texas, as early as 1892 had 
proposed a high-level bridge, but the depres-
sion of 1893 precluded construction. The 
matter languished until 1916. In that year the 
Public Belt Railroad Commission succeeded 
in gaining passage of a state constitutional 
amendment that gave the City of New Orleans 
exclusive right to construct and operate a 
bridge across the river at that place. The proj-
ect again fell into obscurity until increased rail 
business and the development of vehicular 
transportation made it more popular. Finally, 
on November 5, 1932, bonds of the Public 
Belt Railroad Commission were guaranteed 
by agreement among the SP, the City of New 
Orleans, and the State of Louisiana; these 
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The Hustler calls at Ennis, Texas. 
The first regularly scheduled train to use the $13 
million Huey P. Long bridge was the eastbound 
Sunset Limited on December 17, 1935. 
were sold to the Reconstruction Finance Cor-
poration shortly thereafter.43 
Events then moved quickly. Construction 
began on December 31, 1932., and the 4.35-
mile imposing double-track railroad and four-
lane highway structure was placed in service 
on December 16, 1935—reason enough for 
a day-long celebration. The first regularly 
scheduled train to utilize the $13 million 
Huey P. Long-Mississippi River Bridge was, 
appropriately, the eastbound Sunset Limited 
on the seventeenth. It was headed by T & N O ' s 
G S - i 702, with tires painted white and side-
rods and brass polished to a shine. Soon there-
after the venerable ferry ships and transfer ves-
sels were scrapped, and a new freight yard was 
built at Avondale. 4 4 
The great bridge at New Orleans under-
standably served as a valuable "shot in the 
arm" for the depression-weary railroaders of 
the T & N O . They received another on Septem-
ber 19, 1937, when their company introduced 
"the very latest in travel comfort, luxury and 
convenience"—the new twin streamlined Sun-
beams on two-stop, 4-hour and 45-minute af-
ternoon runs between Houston and Dallas. 
The eight-car trains were powered by P-14 
4-6 -2S , streamlined by the Houston shops es-
pecially for Sunbeam service; all equipment 
was painted in Daylight colors. So popular 
were the trains that T & N O ' s management 
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quickly authorized new streamlined equip-
ment for the morning Hustler. On June 5, 
1938, the road advertised "double daily air-
conditioned service between Houston and 
Dallas." The Hustler performed local work, 
but the Sunbeam now offered a nonstop run 
of 265 miles in 265 minutes. Even the Owl re-
ceived new bedroom sleeping cars in 1940 to 
accompany its standard sleepers, chair cars, 
coaches, and head end equipment.4 5 
Opening of the Huey Long Bridge and 
streamlining of the Sunbeam and Hustler 
were not simply of psychological importance; 
they were also statements of faith. The SP 
made no more important statement during 
the grim days of the 1930s, however, than 
when it wisely and courageously acquired the 
strategically located St. Louis Southwestern 
Railway—a property that complemented the 
SP, as well as the Texas & New Orleans, and 
secured important gateways at Memphis and 
East Saint Louis. 
C H A P T E R 1 2 
The St. Louis Southwestern Railway 
"For the future of these lines [SP's Texas & 
Louisiana Lines] it is absolutely necessary 
that we should own a line extending to the 
main distributing point for the Southwest, 
St. Louis . "—W. R. Scott to A . D . McDonald 
As clouds of the Great Depression settled over 
the land, the St. Louis Southwestern Railway 
(Cotton Belt) operated a modest system of 
lines, somewhat under two thousand miles in 
all. Lying on a northeast-to-southwest axis 
from Saint Louis, it served portions of Mis-
souri, Illinois, Arkansas, Louisiana, and Texas 
and met the Southern Pacific's Texas & New 
Orleans at several locations, including Shreve-
port, Dallas, and Waco. It was a logical fit in 
SP's network. 
The St. Louis Southwestern possessed a 
colorful and complex history. Its earliest prede-
cessor, the Tyler Tap Railroad, was formed 
when disappointed citizens of Tyler, Texas, 
learned that neither the Texas & Pacific Rail-
way nor the International & Great Northern 
Railroad had chosen their community for 
new lines. Incorporated late in 1871, the Tap 
finally began service on October 1, 1877, be-
tween Tyler and the T & P at Big Sandy, 21.5 
miles to the northeast. Built as a narrow-
gauge road, it quickly fell on hard times and 
required reorganization in 1879 as the more 
expansive-sounding Texas & St. Louis Rail-
way. Two years later construction crews had 
taken the road beyond Big Sandy to Texarkana 
as well as southeastward to Waco. In the pro-
cess, the Texas & St. Louis opened an impor-
tant new country and provided important 
connections for its patrons. For a while at 
least, it was also considered an integral part 
of a grandiose Great Lakes—to—the—Gulf 
narrow-gauge system proposal. That caught 
the attention of Jay Gould, who sought to buy 
it or kill it. He canceled traffic agreements that 
the narrow gauge had with his properties at 
Texarkana, but the Texas & St. Louis struck 
back by announcing a major incursion into 
"Gould country." On August 12, 1883, the 
road was opened across Arkansas to Bird's 
Point, Missouri, on the west bank of the Mis-
sissippi, opposite and slightly above the mouth 
of the Ohio River. Traffic alliances then were 
forged with the Illinois Central Railroad and 
the St. Louis, Alton & Terre Haute Railroad; 
transfer boats ferried cars to and from Cairo, 
Illinois. Financial difficulties followed, how-
ever, and on January 23, 1884, the company 
landed in the hands of a receiver.1 
The properties were sold in 1886 to become 
the St. Louis, Arkansas & Texas Railway, but 
the new company was not without the prob-
lems of the old. Its narrow gauge was a dis-
tinct liability, the road lacked feeders, and its 
financial circumstance remained precarious. 
Nevertheless, it plunged ahead. On the north-
ern portion of its lines the gauge was changed 
to standard on October 18, 1886, and on 
January 12, 1887, over the remainder; the 
cost was nearly $3 million but the altera-
tion was required if the road was to survive. 
Construction or acquisition of branches fol-
lowed. These included: Mount Pleasant to 
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• T H E G A T E S A J A R . " 
With pleasure we announce the completion 
TEXAS & SL LOUIS RAILWAY 
C o t t o n B e l t R o u t e • 
r'R< IM 
Caira, III. to Gatesville, Texas, 1 
Forming in connection witIi the 
C A I R O S H O R T L I N E 
AND 
Illinois Central Rai lroad, ! 
A new route t<» nil the principal points in ' 
, ARKANSAS & TEXAS. 
\W solicit y'Mil' )ititrt»iinjti*. wliirh u.- win fitil<-itvi*v, 1»y primtpt 
nml rdlii i i i l wrvirr. tn merit. 
G E O . \V. KISTINK. UFA) \V I . IU.KY. 
(telH'fal Manai.'1-r. <t»-n'l. Freight A I*»s**r. Agent. 
General Oificss. 25 South Fourth Street, St. Louis, Mo. 
Sherman, Texas (1887); Commerce, Texas, to 
Fort Worth ( r888) ; Corsicana, Texas, to Hills-
boro, Texas (1888); Altheimer to Little Rock, 
Arkansas (1888); Lewisville, Arkansas, to 
Shreveport, Louisiana (1888); and, Maiden to 
Delta, Missouri (1889). In 1887 it also ac-
quired, but then lost, a narrow-gauge line 
southward from Tyler to Lufkin. A l l of this 
was necessary and at the same time too much; 
the St. Louis, Arkansas &C Texas declared 
bankruptcy on May 14, 1889. 2 
Its successor took two titles: the St. Louis 
Southwestern Railway, incorporated under the 
laws of Missouri on January 16, 1891, and the 
St. Louis Southwestern Railway of Texas, nec-
essary to satisfy the constitutional require-
ments of that state, on January 12, 1891. Gen-
eral offices were located in Saint Louis and in 
Tyler, Texas. Pine Bluff, Arkansas, centrally lo-
cated, became the principal shop location. A l -
though hardly financially robust, the SSW 
The narrow-gauge Texas & St. Louis ended up in 
the hands of a receiver. 
nevertheless pursued important changes and 
made impressive purchases. The Lufkin line 
was reacquired in 1899 after it had been stan-
dard gauged and then extended through pur-
chase a few miles to Monterey. Two years later 
the Cotton Belt also purchased the Stuttgart 
& Arkansas River Railroad, a 3 5-mile artery 
that connected Gillett with the SSW main line 
at Stuttgart. Even earlier, in 1893, it had taken 
control of the Paragould Southeastern Rail-
way, another formerly narrow-gauge road; be-
tween 1888 and 1907 the Paragould was ex-
tended from near the Arkansas village of its 
namesake eastward to Blythesville. It was fully 
absorbed into the Cotton Belt in 1914. Dur-
ing 1892 the SSW additionally gained access 
to important markets at Memphis when the 
St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern granted 
it traffic concessions via its line from Fair Oaks, 
Arkansas (north of Brinkley). The Cotton Belt 
secured another major market in 1898 when 
it secured trackage rights over the Gulf, Colo-
rado & Santa Fe Railroad from Wylie, Texas, 
into Dallas. Elsewhere, the SSW created the 
Shreveport Bridge & Terminal Company, 
which itself authorized construction of an im-
pressive bridge over the Red River at that loca-
tion. It opened on December 1, 1907. Of par-
ticular importance for the long-range goals of 
the company was the incorporation in 1896 of 
the Gray's Point Terminal Railway. On De-
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cember 1, 1898, that subsidiary completed an 
extension of line northeastward from Delta, 
Missouri, to Gray's Point, where a new trans-
fer incline was built to facilitate ferrying op-
erations across the Mississippi to connections 
at Thebes, Illinois, with the Illinois Central 
and the Chicago & Eastern Illinois Railroad. 
Eventually the older transfer facility at Birds 
Point washed away, although service to Cairo 
remained by way of Thebes.' 
If Jay Gould had tried to thwart the aspira-
tions of what became the Cotton Belt, his sec-
ond son, Edwin, had much to do with its later 
good fortune. The younger Gould became an 
officer of the St. Louis Arkansas &C Texas 
in 1888, and after the company's reorganiza-
tion into the Cotton Belt, became its vice-
president. He was elected president during the 
next year and served in that position until 
April 22, 1912. Under Edwin Gould coopera-
tion was predictable with the so-called Gould 
Lines, headed by his brother George. For ex-
ample, in 1900 the Iron Mountain agreed 
to handle Cotton Belt passenger trains and 
freight traffic directly into Saint Louis, and in 
the same year the Iron Mountain granted the 
SSW permission for full freight and passenger 
service into Memphis from Fair Oaks. Also in 
1900 the Cotton Belt was joined by the Mis-
souri Pacific and the Iron Mountain (along 
with two non-Gould lines, the Illinois Central 
and the Chicago & Eastern Illinois) in form-
ing the Southern Illinois & Missouri Bridge 
Company to build a new rail line and bridge 
over the Mississippi between Thebes, Illinois, 
and Illmo, Missouri. Opened on May 25, 
1905, the Thebes Bridge was owned in fifths 
by the participating carriers, although even-
tually control would pass to the Missouri Pa-
cific (60 percent) and Cotton Belt (40 per-
cent). The bridge immediately extinguished 
the need for the nearby transfer incline and 
ferry. The bridge likewise implied further co-
operation with the Iron Mountain. That road 
was granted trackage rights over the SSW 
from Illmo to Dexter, Missouri, 47 miles, and, 
reciprocating in kind, the Iron Mountain in 
1903 granted the Cotton Belt trackage rights 
for passenger trains and in 1904 for freights 
from Thebes to East Saint Louis, approxi-
mately 120 miles. Bridge and passenger sta-
tion rights were then accorded by the Terminal 
Railroad Association of Saint Louis, in which 
the Cotton Belt acquired a proprietary inter-
est during 19 i o . 4 
Under Edwin Gould's influence the Cotton 
Belt expanded farther. Twelve miles of new 
construction in 1903 took the SSW directly 
into Dallas from Addison, and during the fol-
lowing four years the Lufkin Branch was ex-
tended farther, to White City. In Arkansas 
the SSW absorbed the Central Arkansas &C 
Eastern Railroad in 1911 and then completed 
that company's construction program—short 
stubs from Stuttgart to Hazen and from Stutt-
gart to England. Other acquisitions were not 
as well advised. The 30-mile Eastern Texas 
Railroad between Lufkin and Kennard, ac-
quired in 1906, would be abandoned in 1921, 
and the 106-mile Stephenville, North & South 
Texas Railway, leased by the Cotton Belt in 
1913, would be abandoned between 1934 and 
1941. Also, on January 1, 1918, the short Pine 
Bluff Arkansas River Railway was leased, but it 
too would be abandoned early, in 1934/ 
With its system essentially in place, Cotton 
Belt's management turned to the important 
business of solidifying previous gains. Early in 
1913 the SSW opened a new freight terminal 
in north Saint Louis, and during the following 
summer the company purchased a large tract 
of land in East Saint Louis that eventually 
became its freight yard there. Elsewhere, on 
April 1, 1912, the Cotton Belt joined with 
four other railroads to form the Memphis 
Union Station Company, and on the same day 
the Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railroad 
(CRI&P) granted the Cotton Belt the right to 
use its line for passenger trains only from 
Brinkley to Memphis. During the next season 
these two railroads joined with the Iron Moun-
tain in thirds to fund construction of the Hara-
han Bridge over the Mississippi at Memphis. 
Cotton Belt's investment in that structure was 
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eventually jeopardized when the Iron Moun-
tain became balky over the contract covering 
SSWs use of its line to Memphis from Fair 
Oaks for freight trains. Fortunately, the Rock 
Island was more flexible and, effective Feb-
ruary 28, 1921, the SSW began use of the 
C R I & P between Brinkley and Memphis for 
freight and passenger trains alike. Cotton 
Belt's passenger trains, of course, used Mem-
phis Union Passenger Station; its freights uti-
lized yards of the Illinois Central. 6 
The era of railroad expansion had generally 
passed except in West Texas, Arizona, and 
Oregon, but during 1928 Cotton Belt's man-
agement foolishly yielded to "construction 
fever." It took the form of the Saint Francis 
Basin Project. The company's purpose was to 
gain fuller access to the rich and productive 
agricultural territory of southeast Missouri 
and northeast Arkansas and at the same time 
shorten its route between Saint Louis and 
Memphis. To accomplish this, the SSW pur-
chased six tiny railroads and built 30 miles of 
new line. When operations began on Novem-
ber 10, 1930, the Saint Francis project rep-
resented a through line from Saint Louis— 
by way of McDonald, Arkansas, and then 
trackage rights over the Missouri Pacific—to 
Memphis. It was a gigantic bust. Through ser-
vice ended as early as November 10, 1934, 
and a portion of the line would be abandoned 
in 1940. 7 
From 1900 through 1929, SSWs traffic 
trend in freight was upward; ton miles in-
creased at an annual average rate of 10.8 per-
cent. This was explained by Cotton Belt's ex-
panded system of branches and by the rapid 
development of the Southwest. The propor-
tion of traffic originated on line hovered at the 
50 percent mark, and manufactured goods led 
among all commodities handled; products 
of agriculture, mines (mostly crude oil), for-
ests, and L C L followed in order. Competition 
for local business was brisk, and for over-
head traffic, intense. Missouri Pacific's sub-
sidiaries, the St. Louis, Iron Mountain & 
Southern and the Texas & Pacific, provided 
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immediate and keen rivalries along the en-
tire length and breadth of the Cotton Belt. 
Vigorous competition for interchange traffic 
and long-haul business came also from the 
Missouri-Kansas-Texas Railroad and the St. 
Louis—San Francisco Railway. 8 
Except for the extremities of the l ine— 
Saint Louis and East Saint Louis on the north 
and Dallas-Fort Worth on the south—the 
service territory of the St. Louis Southwestern 
could generally be classified as agricultural. 
From Illmo to Texarkana the terrain is gener-
ally flat to rolling, with river-silt soil in the 
lowlands and sandy clay elsewhere. Much of 
the country had been heavily timbered earlier 
but was gradually cleared and drained for cul-
tivation. Principal crops included corn, rice, 
potatoes, alfalfa, and—around Tyler—fruits, 
vegetables, and even roses. Additionally, as the 
company's popular nickname suggests, cotton 
was grown at several locations along the SSW. 
Even the company monogram, if legend be 
trusted, is the cross-section view of the drive 
cam from an old cotton gin. 9 
To bolster local business the Cotton Belt 
in 1908 established an agricultural and in-
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dustrial department, which, not surprisingly, 
tended to emphasize farming projects. During 
the following year a 300-acre demonstration 
farm was purchased near the Lufkin Branch 
south of Tyler. The company's purpose was to 
prove that crops other than cotton and corn 
could be profitably produced in that region. 
Most of the land was initially devoted to the 
cultivation of peach trees, but experimen-
tal acres were also devoted to pears, apples, 
plums, and figs. The plan to gain greater pro-
duction from the East Texas "poor lands" was 
demonstrably successful. In 1912 a total of 
1,158 carloads of fruits and vegetables were 
billed from SSW stations in the county where 
its Brunswick Farm was located. Experiments 
later centered on tomato production, and, to 
increase sales potential by expanded mar-
keting, the railroad sponsored a program of 
picking and wrapping green tomatoes, which 
ripened enroute. Company horticulturists 
also experimented with improved cotton-
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One of the principal crops grown in the Cotton 
Belt's service area is rice. Bulk carriage in covered 
hopper cars was many years in the future. 
growing techniques as well as food preserva-
tion and preparation; the SSW then spread 
the news of their work by way of special dem-
onstration trains and in the 1920s by a motor 
bus fitted with loudspeakers.1 0 
The railroad also engaged itself in another 
innovative service. In 1916 Edwin Gould, 
who by then was Cotton Belt's chairman, be-
came alarmed by the widespread malarial in-
fection along the company's lines and pledged 
to see what could be done to relieve the prob-
lem. Gould placed certain of his personal se-
curities in a trust fund, specifying that its 
income was to be used for malaria preven-
tion and control programs. Gould was confi-
dent that positive results could be achieved 
from the programs but felt the company itself 
should not be burdened with such expense 
until the value was clearly demonstrated. M a -
laria, without question, was a serious prob-
lem and a special menace to railroad workers 
and others who labored in the outdoors. It 
sapped their strength and because of its oner-
ous reputation handicapped the industrial 
and agricultural development of the entire re-
gion. Remedial measures began in 1917 at 
Tyler, Lufkin, and Texarkana, where "drain-
age and oiling operations" were carried out by 
a "malaria extra gang" under the supervision 
of the company's sanitary engineer. During 
the next two seasons other campaigns to con-
trol mosquitoes, and thus malaria, were under-
taken at Mount Pleasant, Commerce, and 
Pine Bluff. At the same time the SSW placed 
screens on the windows and doors of its ca-
booses and gang cars. Personnel were simul-
taneously educated on the matter through ex-
hibits and instructional presentations aboard 
the Cotton Belt's car Anopheles, which toured 
the company's Arkansas lines and most of 
those in Texas, with the cooperation of the re-
spective state health departments. The car was 
equipped with exhibits and models to teach 
the story of typhoid fever, bubonic plague, and 
smallpox as well as that of malaria. Results 
were impressive. The number of malaria pa-
tients given treatment by Cotton Belt's Railway 
Employees' Hospital at Texarkana for the years 
1 9 1 7 - 2 0 was but one-third of those for the 
years 1913 —16 (before the program began).11 
Like most of the country's railways, the St. 
Louis Southwestern came under control of the 
federal government's U.S. Railroad Admin-
istration on December 28, 1917. The USRA 
soon cut the railroad's allowances for track 
maintenance, purchased inadequately treated 
ties for the company's roadbed, and curtailed 
services. Meanwhile, the U.S. Labor Board in-
creased pay for employees, but the ICC autho-
rized rate increases that were inadequate to 
cover these new costs. Capital improvements 
were few, although the Valley Terminal Yard 
in East Saint Louis was completed during 
the USRA years. The Cotton Belt was, sad to 
say, ill-served by government administration 
brought on as the result of World War I. 1 2 
The quality of freight and passenger service 
on the Cotton Belt, in comparison with that of 
the major trunk roads, was as pedestrian after 
the war as it had been before. During the 
years 1926 through 1928 one daily scheduled 
time freight in each direction (sometimes a 
second northbound train) typified all of the 
principal lines. These were supplemented with 
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Cotton Belt's secondary routes frequently saw passenger service provided by motorcars. 
triweekly local service and extras as needed. 
Between 1923 and 1929 passenger ridership 
fell by 76.8 percent, and 1923 was the last 
year that passenger service generated net earn-
ings. Nevertheless, passenger train miles re-
mained high in comparison with freight. Sleep-
ing cars, diners, and club cars were found 
on four trains—one in each direction be-
tween Saint Louis and Pine Bluff and between 
Memphis and Dallas—and as late as 1928 the 
primary lines boasted two passenger trains in 
each direction. Secondary routes and branches 
were yet served by steam trains, motorcars, or 
mixed trains. Pride of the line was the Lone 
Star Limited, which offered daily service be-
tween Memphis and Dallas—Fort Worth. 1 3 
Although it was hardly an impressive money 
maker, the Cotton Belt was nevertheless at-
tractive to suitors because of its location. This 
was fully perceived by James E. Gorman, presi-
dent of the Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific 
Railroad, who in March, 1925, ordered "the 
purchase of a dominant interest in the stock of 
the Cotton Belt." As a consequence of the 
sale, St. Louis Southwestern for the first time 
in its history became governed by another 
railroad company, although the Rock Island 
determined not to seek a merger or even im-
mediate consolidation of the Cotton Belt into 
its own system, but rather chose to operate it 
as an allied and independent company. Rock 
Island's interest in the Cotton Belt was under-
standable. It wished to control an increased 
portion of traffic to and from Texas and south-
western points. However, the Rock Island it-
self was about to be assaulted by a group 
holding the St. Louis—San Francisco Railway, 
a rival of the Cotton Belt. Because of this new 
development, and because the Interstate Com-
merce Commission issued an unfavorable de-
cision on the CRI&P's request to acquire an 
additional interest, the Rock Island disposed 
of its SSW stock to the Kansas City Southern 
Railway (KCS) later in 1925. 1 4 
Thus began a particularly curious chapter 
in the Cotton Belt's history. On July 24, 1926, 
the Kansas City Southern asked the ICC for 
permission to control the Missouri-Kansas-
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Texas, which in turn made application to 
control the Cotton Belt. The enterprise repre-
sented the genius of Leonor F. Loree, the in-
triguing chairman of the KCS, who hoped to 
forge a large new southwestern rail system. 
The ICC denied these unusual applications 
because of what it considered inadequate fi-
nancial structures, but Loree countered with 
another proposal: that the M - K - T acquire 
both the KCS and the Cotton Belt. Mean-
while, the regulatory agency filed proceedings 
against the KCS, alleging violation of the 
Clayton Antitrust Act by purchasing capital 
stock of the Katy and Cotton Belt. Loree threw 
in the towel; the application was withdrawn 
and the Kansas City Southern disposed of its 
Cotton Belt holdings. 1 5 
Throughout this strange interlude, and even 
earlier, Cotton Belt's management had prose-
cuted noteworthy programs of betterments 
and efficiencies. In 1898 nearly all of the road's 
track had been 56-pound rail; by 1915 most 
was 85 pound. Curves and grades, many con-
structed to narrow-gauge standards, were 
gradually eased. It was much the same with 
motive power and rolling stock. By 1915 the 
road owned 250 locomotives with an average 
tractive effort of 29,188 pounds, and most of 
its converted narrow-gauge equipment had 
been replaced by larger all-steel or steel un-
derframe cars. Additionally, the SSW owned 
eight gasoline-powered motor cars used in 
passenger service. The Cotton Belt had early 
experimented with oil for fueling its loco-
motives, but it was not until significant fields 
were developed near or on line that manage-
ment decided to convert the fleet. This was be-
gun in earnest during 1 922 -23 and com-
pleted shortly thereafter. From 1923 through 
1929 significant capital was also invested in 
heavier rail, ties, ballast, bridge renewal and 
strengthening, and line revision. A l l of this 
was necessary before Cotton Belt could accept 
its newest power—handsome 4-8-4S built 
by Baldwin and placed in service between 
Pine Bluff and Texas points during Septem-
ber, 1930. These programs collectively repre-
sented SSW management's belief that expenses 
could be substantially reduced by building 
more efficiency into the plant. Cotton Belt's 
managers likewise faced up to the need to 
trim unremunerative operations. This was the 
case, for instance, when service to Cairo, Illi-
nois, over the Chicago & Eastern Illinois and 
Illinois Central was ended in 1925. 1 6 
During the years immediately preceding the 
onset of the Great Depression, Cotton Belt's 
president, Daniel Upthegrove, demanded that 
the company recognize and address changing 
competitive circumstances. Upthegrove under-
stood that modal competition from trucks and 
buses was not going to disappear, and with 
that in mind he decided to join the enemy, so 
to speak, by forming Cotton Belt's own motor 
vehicle arm, the Southwestern Transportation 
Company, incorporated on October 1, 1928. 
Two months later the new company began 
operation of motor coaches and motor trucks 
on several routes paralleling the railroad. Even 
earlier, buses had replaced motor trains on the 
Lufkin Branch under a contract with an out-
side company. Indeed, the Cotton Belt was an 
industry leader in the use of motor vehicles, 
a matter that was closely monitored by the 
trade press.17 
In spite of their persistent efforts, Upthegrove 
and his sales department watched in dismay 
as revenues slumped following the Crash of 
1929. There was little that could be done to 
increase volume among Cotton Belt's major 
freight commodities, but there was clear po-
tential in the movement of L C L freight. 
Cotton Belt's management recognized that 
much of this business had been lost to truck-
ers and presently moved to arrest the trend by 
improving package car service and, through 
its Southwestern Transportation Company, in-
stituting coordinated rail-truck service with 
"store-door pick-up and delivery." These in-
novations not withstanding, SSWs L C L busi-
ness continued to slump; one final ingredi-
ent was required in the design of an inte-
grated transportation package necessary to 
meet truck competition—speedy overnight 
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trains to provide, as Upthegrove said, "service 
comparable with trucks." Thus was born Cot-
ton Belt's famous Blue Streak merchandise 
train. 1 8 
This train, said J. R. Turney, Cotton Belt's 
vice-president for traffic, would "jettison con-
ventions and taboos of railroading." It would 
do so by being carded as "first class"; by as-
signing passenger locomotives to it; by dis-
patching only carloads of L C L merchandise 
on it; and, by coordinating its schedules with 
connecting trains plus pick-up and delivery by 
Southwestern Transportation Company. In 
that way, said Turney, merchandise purchased 
in Saint Louis on one day would be "ready for 
sale before the next over store counters . . . 
[at] . . . all points served by the Cotton Belt 
in Missouri, Arkansas, and Louisiana." The 
Blue Streak, he affirmed, was SSWs answer to 
"the demand of modern business," and, he 
predicted, " w i l l prove to be the forerunner of 
a new breed of freight train." Service began 
between East Saint Louis and Pine Bluff on 
October 1, 1931, with much publicity—and 
much gnashing of teeth by Cotton Belt's rail 
competition, particularly the Missouri Pacific 
and the Frisco, both of which considered the 
service "wasteful and unnecessary." Never-
theless, the Blue Streak was an immediate suc-
cess; it captured new business and gave the 
company a vital psychological boost. "Again! 
Cotton Belt Shows the Way!" was the bold as-
sertion made by the company when the Blue 
Streak took to the rails. It was no idle boast.1 9 
Southern Pacific officers in New York, San 
Francisco, and Houston were well aware of 
the impressive strides that the Cotton Belt had 
made to improve itself during the last half of 
the 1920s. They were equally aware of its fa-
vorable location and potential for mischief in 
any merger such as that proposed by the Rock 
Island and later by Loree. As SP's H . M . Lull 
said, "sooner or later the Cotton Belt wil l be 
merged with some other system." Earlier in 
the decade William Ripley had wished to 
place the SSW with the Frisco but later rec-
ommended splitting it between the Frisco and 
the Rock Island. The ICC itself had similar 
changes of heart. That body initially thought 
the SSW should be placed with the Frisco but 
eventually considered that it would be better 
as a part of the Illinois Central. 2 0 
Although it had forged a traffic agreement 
with the Cotton Belt on business moving via 
Corsicana as early as 1913, Southern Pacific's 
interest in the smaller road increased gradu-
ally over the next two decades. When J. M . 
Herbert left the SP to become president of the 
SSW in 1916, a new general traffic agreement 
specified that the Cotton Belt "would solicit 
via Southern Pacific preferentially" but that 
the SP would only "solicit via Cotton Belt 
without discrimination." Meanwhile, the his-
toric importance of the Sunset Route east of E l 
Paso for transcontinental business declined 
because of changed traffic alliances, competi-
tion from water carriers using the Panama Ca-
nal, and conditions of the Canal Act that ham-
pered the Morgan Line. Additionally, more 
business, especially perishables, moved via 
Tucumcari after the SP acquired the El Paso & 
Southwestern. Perishables and other time-
sensitive freight also moved in large volumes 
by way of El Paso and the Texas & Pacific-
Missouri Pacific. In 1928, for instance, the 
Texas & New Orleans received 18,484 car-
loads of perishables from the Pacific Lines, but 
the rival Texas & Pacific was given more, 
22,085. On the other hand, most of the can-
taloupes from the Imperial Valley and A r i -
zona were handled to Tucumcari for inter-
change with the Rock Island. 2 1 
Serious threats to take over the SSW by the 
Rock Island and Loree during the 1920s thus 
caused understandable consternation among 
SP's management personnel. Debate over the 
matter was continuous and heated. In Hous-
ton, W. R. Scott brooded about the future of 
T & L Lines. He pointed out to A . D. McDon-
ald in 1926 that the SP lines under his direc-
tion were, in a sense, captive with "no outlet 
except to the Gulf Coast and the West." It was 
absolutely necessary, he maintained, for the 
SP to "own a line extending to the main dis-
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The first run of Cotton Belt's famous Blue Streak occurred on October 1, 1931. 
tributing point for the Southwest, St. Louis." 
The Cotton Belt, he thought, was uniquely 
situated to benefit the SP. It would provide an 
outlet to the east and northeast for the flood of 
perishables sure to come, the result of new con-
struction in the Rio Grande Valley; it would 
yield a long haul for the SP system; and it 
would facilitate direct connection with the 
eastern trunk roads and obviate the need for 
intermediate carriers such as the Missouri-
Kansas-Texas and the Frisco, among others. 
Scott was thinking of Saint Louis but also of 
Memphis as valued entrepots reached by the 
Cotton Belt. For good measure, he shrewdly 
urged purchase of the important Choctaw, 
Oklahoma & Gulf Railroad, controlled by 
the Rock Island but rumored for sale, between 
Memphis and Tucumcari. Scott waxed enthu-
siastic about prospects at Memphis, where 
extremely important connections could be 
effected with the Louisville & Nashville Rail-
road; Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis 
Railway; and the Southern Railway. Acquisi-
tion of the Choctaw would extend SP's domin-
ion through Oklahoma and Arkansas while 
providing an excellent short-mile thirty-fifth-
parallel route via El Paso and Tucumcari 
to Memphis; acquisition of the Cotton Belt 
would grant the SP access to both Memphis 
and Saint Louis and give new meaning to its 
heavy investment in the Texas & Louisiana 
Lines. In all, it would capture a huge territory 
for the parent. 2 2 
Scott's enthusiasm for expansion as well as 
his growing sense of urgency were not matched 
by senior executive officers in San Francisco 
nor initially by those in charge of sales for the 
entire system. The Cotton Belt, complained 
T. M . Schumacher, "is the weakest line be-
tween North Texas junctions and St. Louis." 
Schumacher was joined in opposition by Paul 
Shoup who, at least on the Pacific Lines, his-
torically had been an ardent expansionist. 
Shoup thought acquisition of the Cotton Belt 
was undesirable, however, because it would 
threaten "friendly relationships" with the 
Rock Island and the Missouri Pacific. Most of 
all, Shoup was "very much concerned with 
anything that might result in diversion of traf-
fic from our lines to the Santa Fe." Never-
theless, Scott was not about to be put off. He 
presided over a part of the SP that was charac-
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terized by high costs of "gathering and dis-
tributing a large volume of local traffic" and 
would lose the offsetting advantage of long 
haul should friendly options to the north and 
east be lost. Scott's fear was not unfounded. 
The Missouri Pacific had recently integrated 
the International & Great Northern and the 
Gulf Coast Lines into its main system, and 
controlled the Texas & Pacific; L. F. Loree was 
still posturing for the amalgamation of the 
M - K - T , KCS, and SSW; and the Frisco and 
Rock Island at the time seemed headed for 
merger. If all else failed, said Scott, the SP 
should acquire or at least neutralize the Trin-
ity & Brazos Valley Railway (owned jointly by 
the Rock Island and the Fort Worth & Denver 
City Railway) from near Dallas to Houston. 
Nevertheless, his focus was clearly on offen-
sive expansion. "I think it is highly important 
that the Southern Pacific have system lines to 
through Mississippi River points, say at Mem-
phis and St. Louis, or should have some line 
closely allied or in control tapping the St. 
Louis gateway and later a strong connection 
with Kansas C i t y . " 2 ' 
The internal debate continued. Scott won a 
convert in the sales department when F. H . 
Plaisted submitted detailed memoranda de-
monstrating that "when measured by South-
ern Pacific revenue," business interchanged 
with the Cotton Belt was "substantially more 
than with any other southwestern line." In-
deed, he said, "disposition of the Cotton Belt 
is the crux of our problem." The SSW offered 
the SP, Plaisted argued, the "strongest south-
west connection we have on transcontinen-
tal traffic" and, at the same time, afforded 
the T & N O "an opportunity to participate in 
transcontinental business [El Paso to Cor-
sicana]" as well as a much-needed outlet to 
the northeast for traffic originating in Texas 
and Louisiana. Others in the sales department 
disagreed. Freight and passenger traffic man-
agers in San Francisco complained that it 
would be imprudent to acquire the SSW ("it 
is in our interest to have as many connections 
as possible friendly and working with us") 
and impossible to "compete successfully as 
a St. Louis line through Corsicana" because 
routes of the principal competitors were bet-
ter located and shorter. " O u r best interests 
lie in continuing enthusiastic support for all 
southwestern lines," concluded J. T. Saunders 
and F. S. McGinnis. Paul Shoup was wil l -
ing to make only a marginal concession: If the 
SSW were purchased at all, the "acquisition 
should be based wholly upon the needs of the 
T & N O for additional Mississippi River gate-
way connections." 2 4 
The entire scenario was bewildering. The 
Cotton Belt had gone to the merger altar first 
with the Rock Island and then with L. F. 
Loree, but neither marriage had materialized. 
It had also presented itself to the Santa Fe but 
was rebuffed. Several observers, including SP's 
F. H . Plaisted, looked favorably on a combina-
tion of the Cotton Belt and the Chicago & 
Eastern Illinois as natural and unoffensive. 
Others thought the Chicago & Alton a logical 
mate for Cotton Belt. In any event, Daniel Up-
thegrove was in San Francisco during March, 
1931, to inquire as to SP's intentions. He 
found SP officers cordial but coy. 2 5 
Upthegrove must have understood, though, 
that senior officials of the larger company 
were nervously studying maps of the entire 
trans-Mississippi West. Hale Holden worried 
privately that the assertive Van Sweringen 
brothers from Cleveland might, in fact, finally 
merge former Gould lines—the Missouri Pa-
cific, Denver & Rio Grande Western, and 
Western Pacific—into a powerful transconti-
nental operation threatening the Overland 
Route. A strengthened Missouri Pacific would 
also, as Holden and other of SP's senior execu-
tives slowly came to understand, threaten SP's 
investments in Texas and Louisiana.2*1 
The time for action had arrived, but it took 
a strange turn. To protect itself, and to expand 
its options, the SP purchased 44,300 shares of 
the St. Louis—San Francisco—as an invest-
ment in a "friendly connection," according to 
Holden—and, on October 25, 1929, it also 
began the purchase of St. Louis Southwestern's 
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stock, both common and preferred. By July 
15, 1930, the SP held 35 percent of the total 
outstanding stock of the SSW but Kuhn, Loeb 
& Company held another 22 percent for the 
SP pending approval by the Interstate Com-
merce Commission of its wish to control the 
Cotton Belt. Papers were filed with that agency 
on July 25, 1930. 2 7 
The results of these steps were mixed. The 
Frisco entered bankruptcy in 1933 and SP's 
stock in it, purchased for $5,036,770, was 
sold eventually at almost a total loss; the in-
vestment in a "friendly connection" proved 
hardly fortuitous. Meanwhile, in spite of a se-
rious challenge by the Missouri Pacific, the 
ICC on January 12, 1932, gave its blessing to 
"acquisition by the Southern Pacific Com-
pany of control of the St. Louis Southwestern 
Railway Company by purchase of capital 
stock." Before that announcement was made, 
however, minority shareholders in the SSW, 
led by one Walter E. Meyer, succeeded in per-
suading the SP to acquire holdings on the 
basis of one share of SP stock for three shares 
of Cotton Belt common and three shares of 
SP for five shares of St. Louis Southwestern 
preferred. Holdings by the SP were thus in-
creased to 86 percent but, strangely, Meyer 
and his associates did not subscribe; they re-
mained minority but vocal shareholders.28 
As all of this transpired, the country slid 
into the Great Depression. In Cotton Belt 
country, 134 Arkansas banks failed in 1930 
alone, and the value of the state's cotton crop 
dropped by 68 percent in only one season. 
This was instantly reflected by the fortunes of 
the SSW. Net income for the company had 
fallen annually since 1926, but deficits began 
in 1930 and would continue through 1940. 
During those eleven years the company lost a 
staggering $11.5 million. A crisis was at hand 
when bank loans and bonds matured in 1932. 
On January 26 the Cotton Belt asked the ICC 
to authorize a loan from the Reconstruc-
tion Finance Corporation, and the regulatory 
agency approved the application for $18 mil-
lion, but only on condition that the SP guar-
antee it. After some grumpy discussions SP's 
executive committee agreed. However, three 
years later, when the Cotton Belt asked for an 
additional loan contingent on SP's guarantee, 
the larger road balked. The SSW thereupon 
defaulted in the payment of interest on the 
RFC loan and on December 12, 1935, filed 
for reorganization under section 77 of the 
Bankruptcy Act. A month later Berryman 
Henwood was appointed trustee.29 
Fortunately, the news was not all grim. A 
report by Shields & Company in 1935 re-
marked favorably on the company, pointing 
to the quality of its management and Cotton 
Belt's place in SP's sun. Moreover, Cotton 
Belt's management had labored diligently to 
get the property in good order before the 
onset of the depression, and that policy paid 
off. So, too, did efforts to develop a strong 
sales team, which enterprisingly solicited traf-
fic from forty-six offices located as variously 
as Blytheville, Arkansas, and Mexico City. 
Additionally, new arrangements called for the 
SP to solicit preferentially for the Cotton Belt 
except as governed by the Central Pacific Con-
ditions and other agreements entered into be-
fore it secured control of the SSW. The rewards 
eventually were pleasing. Together, the SP and 
SSW lured substantial and valuable overhead 
traffic, especially automobiles, trucks, and 
parts moving to the Southwest and to Cali-
fornia. Perishables received from the SP at 
Shreveport and Corsicana for handling east-
bound during the six-year period from 1936 
to 1941 totaled 115,091 carloads. For that 
matter, the total percentage of freight business 
that the SP interchanged steadily favored the 
Cotton Belt. 3 0 
Eastbound transcontinental 
to SSW 
Westbound transcontinental 
from SSW 
To SSW from T & N O 
To T & N O from SSW 
1933 1941 
19.3% 26% 
7.8 13 
14.8 19 
24.2% 33% 
Its Finest Hour 
"Temporarily our entire facilities will have to 
be used to handle military business."—A. T. 
Mercier, 1942 
A lively debate characterized the meeting of 
Southern Pacific's board of directors on Oc-
tober 15, 1942. At issue was the question of 
whether the company should energetically 
discharge its bonded indebtedness or renew 
the payment of dividends on its stock. During 
the "dark decade" just past, SP's board had 
struggled with the company's debt structure, 
courageously authorized significant expendi-
tures for plant and equipment, and had kept 
the property out of the bankruptcy courts. 
Like the nation itself, the SP had survived the 
Great Depression and, like the nation, was 
then confronted with the realities of World 
War II. It was the staggering volume of traf-
fic incident to that conflict that resulted in 
bittersweet profits adequate to occasion the 
board's debate over debt and dividends and 
allowed the company, in the end, to both ease 
indebtedness and issue dividends.1 
Events of 1940—Lend-Lease, the first 
peacetime draft, calling up of reservists, and 
simultaneous orders for war material—re-
sulted in a huge surge of business. Fortunately, 
the SP was in relatively good physical condi-
tion because of the improvements to property 
made during the last half of the depression. 
Moreover, the SP was not without experience 
in defense matters. National Guard troops 
had been transported regularly to annual 
training exercises, and in the summer of 1940 
the company participated in a gigantic move-
ment of National Guard and U.S. Army troops 
aboard forty trains to maneuvers at Fort Lewis, 
Washington, and elsewhere. Before the year 
was out the SP found itself delivering building 
materials for several new military posts and 
even transporting huge "railroad rifles" on 
the Coast Line to the upper Santa Barbara 
Channel for target practice.2 
Government traffic increased in 1941. Dur-
ing the several months preceding this coun-
try's entrance into the war, the SP handled 
thirty to fifty special passenger trains per week 
for the Civilian Conservation Corps, army, 
and navy. Its "number one job," said the com-
pany in Apri l , 1941, was "the speedy and effi-
cient movement of freight and passenger traf-
fic involved in Uncle Sam's gigantic defense 
program of construction and training." A 
steady flow of freight passed daily over what 
the company called the " 'Burma Road' of 
National Defense" to a bewildering array of 
military installations as diverse as Mather 
Field near Sacramento and sprawling Fort 
Bliss near El Paso. Major shipbuilding centers 
at Richmond, San Francisco, Oakland, W i l -
mington, and Vallejo in California, Houston 
and Orange in Texas, and Portland, Oregon, 
provided additional tonnage of monumental 
dimensions.3 
Even before December 7, 1941, the SP was 
experiencing both labor and equipment short-
ages. Many from SP's family had been drafted 
and others had volunteered, especially for the 
army's new Military Railroad Units. At the 
same time, Joseph H . Dyer, SP's vice-president 
for operations, urged employees and shippers 
St. Louis Southwestern Railway 
As the 1930s ended the Cotton Belt's for-
tunes seemed improved, but the long-term 
picture remained murky. Nevertheless, like 
the Pacific Lines and the Texas & New Or-
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leans, the St. Louis Southwestern was about 
to face the greatest challenge of its history: 
World War II was at hand. 
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alike to do whatever was required to relieve 
the national car shortage; and the mechanical 
department reported the temporary lease of 
motive power from several other railroads, in-
cluding the Texas & Pacific, the Rock Island, 
the Burlington, and the Great Northern. Pri-
vately, SP officers worried that the property 
was already taxed to the limit. It was not. 4 
The day that President Franklin Roosevelt 
said would live in infamy brought immediate 
and dramatic change to the very fiber of the 
country. The victories of Japanese forces in the 
Pacific were made more ominous by the igno-
rance of where they might strike next. Ru-
mors on the West Coast were rampant. One 
SP officer, Donald J. Russell, was awakened 
two nights after the Pearl Harbor attack by a 
caller who urgently reported that the Japanese 
were at that moment bombing Taylor Yard in 
Los Angeles; on the next day another caller 
excitedly announced to him that Japanese 
infantry had landed near the Golden Gate. 
The army received similar bizarre reports in 
greater number and detail; in partial response, 
it hastily equipped flatcars with anti-aircraft 
weapons that for several days dutifully pa-
trolled the coastline aboard special SP trains. 
Somewhat later a Japanese submarine did ha-
rass the Santa Barbara area but fortunately 
failed to shell SP's high viaducts nearby.5 
Response around the country to the Japa-
nese bombardment of Pearl Harbor resulted in 
a seemingly contradictory blend of stern de-
termination and hysteria that was reflected on 
the SP. The naval threat on both coasts, as well 
as the Gulf of Mexico, meant the immediate 
diversion of coastwise and Panama Canal traf-
fic to the nation's rails and thus a growing glut 
of freight business, which the carriers pledged 
themselves to handle without government in-
tervention of the type experienced in World 
War I. It was much the same in terms of pas-
senger carriage. Six days following Pearl Har-
bor Day, A . T. Mercier told the passenger de-
partment to stop "soliciting extra trains for 
the movement of special parties to any point." 
The meaning was clear: "Temporarily our en-
tire facilities will have to be used to handle 
military business." Part of that business, sad 
to say, was to move Americans of Japanese an-
cestry by the thousands to internment camps 
in the interior. 6 
SP's response to new conditions took vary-
ing forms. President Mercier urged close, 
calm teamwork among all hands and further 
urged each person to "be alert and refrain 
from gossip." Hoods were applied to loco-
motive headlights, train markers, and track-
side signals, and blinds were drawn at night 
or windows blacked on all passenger, mail, 
and express cars. It was much the same at the 
general office building in San Francisco. A 
twenty-four-hour air raid and fire watch was 
established on the building's roof, and all win-
dows were darkened. On the Cotton Belt em-
ployees were ordered to refrain from com-
menting publicly on "plans of the armed 
forces for movement of personnel, material or 
equipment" and were reminded that, to guard 
against espionage, visitors were barred from 
the train shed at Saint Louis Union Station. At 
Klamath Falls and elsewhere "railroad de-
fense" organizations were established. Com-
pany shops turned their talents to unusual 
tasks: Sacramento fashioned steel plates and 
shafts for shipyards and hot metal cars for the 
steel industry, while at West Oakland, navy 
mechanics studied diesel maintenance pro-
cedures aboard units from the City of San 
Francisco as well as SP's new fleet of switchers. 
For its part, the Northwestern Pacific aided in 
the construction of ocean-going dry docks to 
assist vessels damaged in battle. Even SP's re-
maining ferry operations were affected. The 
U.S. Coast Guard requested that SP deploy the 
vessels variously in the Bay Area instead of 
concentrating them at Oakland Pier, where 
they were susceptible to air attack and fire.7 
Across the entire system scrap drives took 
on a patriotic fervor. Such feelings ironically 
surrounded the abandonment and disman-
tling of 120.8 miles of Central Pacific's historic 
main line above Utah's Great Salt Lake be-
tween Lucin and Corrine. Much emotion at-
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Hoods were applied to locomotive headlights and 
trackside signals. 
tached to the line. It included not only the 
stretch where ten miles of track had been laid 
in one day (on Apri l 28, 1869) to win a wager 
with the Union Pacific but also historic Pro-
montory, where the Central Pacific and the UP 
joined on May 10, 1869, to set off national ju-
bilation. The Lucin Cut-off had rendered the 
old line redundant in 1904, but the SP had 
been unsuccessful in abandonment efforts un-
til the navy requisitioned all track metal and 
serviceable ties. Appropriate "unspiking" cer-
emonies were held at Promontory on Septem-
ber 8, 1942. Two diminutive locomotives 
owned by the dismantler, Hyman-Michaels 
Company, faced each other; a crowd between 
them watched as the first spike was removed 
by representatives of the SP and UP. 8 
The spirit of patriotism reached a fever 
pitch in 1942. Railroaders by the thousands 
joined the armed forces. By the end of the 
year, 6,192 from the Pacific Lines alone had 
"joined up." Those who stayed behind found 
other ways to serve. The SP Club at Los A n -
geles provided transportation for servicemen 
to USO clubs in Hollywood and elsewhere; 
several persons in the general office building 
performed as air raid wardens, and others vol-
unteered as members of the building rescue 
squad; women from the San Francisco office 
force served as hostesses for army and marine 
dances; and virtually all purchased war bonds 
and stamps.9 
The rush of business placed a great demand 
on SP's rolling stock. Cars were patched, 
painted, and in some cases modernized. More 
were acquired—87 passenger cars and 8,798 
freight cars from the end of 1938 through 
1942. Shortages persisted, nevertheless. On 
the T & N O cabooses were in such short sup-
ply that boxcars were fashioned into side-
door, or what crews called "Bul l Moose," 
cabooses.10 
The need for motive power presented spe-
cial problems. Every locomotive SP owned, 
regardless of age, was reconditioned and re-
stored to service. Additional power was leased 
from other roads, and on Tehachapi Pass help-
ers belonging to the SP and Santa Fe were 
pooled. Rehabilitation programs and cooper-
ative ventures were laudible, but inadequate. 
Still more power was necessary. Immediate 
needs could be eased somewhat by the pur-
chase of diesel-electric switch engines to re-
lieve steam road power then assigned to yards. 
Diesels had other advantages. Mechanical offi-
cers admitted that one diesel switcher was the 
equivalent of one and one-half steam switch-
ers. This same understanding, strange to say, 
did not extend to the relative value of General 
Motors' FT freighters, which neighbor Santa 
Fe embraced with such gusto. In the end, SP 
purchased 120 diesel switchers during the war 
years but for road service stayed with steam: 
130 new GS 4-8-4S and A C 4-8-8 -2S, plus 
used locomotives including ten 2-8-4S from 
the Boston & Maine. Because of the large in-
crease in GS and A C locomotives, and because 
the Sacramento shops could not be economi-
cally expanded, a new erecting shop with 
twelve pits was placed in service at Sparks, 
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Nevada, during 1944. Interestingly, the SP uti-
lized structural steel and overhead cranes from 
the T & N O ' s abandoned complex in El Paso 
for the Sparks facility." 
Neither was the physical plant ignored. SP 
crews accomplished herculean tasks as they 
installed additional C T C equipment and up-
graded track under the press of time-sensitive 
traffic in great volume. Military authorities 
were concerned that Beaumont H i l l east of 
Colton, California, on the Sunset Route would 
become a bottleneck; for SP management the 
question was whether to add a second main 
track or install C T C . Ultimately, it was in-
cluded on the list of lines for which C T C was 
authorized. By the end of the war such ca-
pability was extended by 375.2 miles sys-
temwide, including: Redding—Black Butte 
in Northern California; Colton to Indio in 
Southern California; a stretch east of Sparks, 
Nevada, and another west of Ogden on the 
Overland Route; and parts of the San Joaquin 
and Coast lines. The volume of track work 
was even more impressive. In 1929 SP had 
only 1,532 track miles boasting rail of n o 
pounds-per-yard or heavier, and that figure 
was not appreciably increased until shortly 
before the outbreak of war. However, during 
the years 1940—45 an amazing total of 2,619 
track miles were fitted with the heavier rail. 
And that did not tell the whole story; older 
rail thus released was cascaded to secondary 
mains, branches, sidings, and elsewhere to 
generally upgrade the entire track plant. 1 2 
Bridges received similar attention. Several 
were strengthened and new ones installed at 
various locations. None, however, were as 
spectacular as the 1,390-foot continuous can-
tilever, single-track steel bridge over the Pecos 
River gorge on the Sunset Route in West 
Texas. The bridge it replaced, a spindly 1892 
structure, was, as board member Harvey S. 
M u d d said, "a weak link in a most strategic 
route." Consulting engineers in 1941 recom-
mended a new structure, but the extent of war 
traffic was not yet apparent and SP's own engi-
neers thought replacement unnecessary. By 
October, 1942, however, 408 freight and 209 
passenger trains passed over the bridge per 
month. "I think the minds of all of us would 
rest easier if we had two strings in our bow," 
said M u d d . Consequently, on January 12, 
1943, SP directors authorized construction of 
the new structure in addition to a requisite 
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A new erecting shop was placed in service at Sparks, Nevada, in 1944 because the Sacramento facility was 
overtaxed. 
line change of nearly two miles. The million-
dollar project was placed in service on De-
cember 21, 1944, but the old bridge remained 
intact as Mudd's "second string" and would 
not be dismantled until 1949. Meanwhile, 
as had been the case during World War I and 
earlier border disturbances, army personnel 
guarded the bridge area against "saboteurs or 
others who might recognize its importance to 
the transportation phase of the nation's war 
effort." 1 3 
The fortunes of SP's subsidiaries were mixed 
during these years. The Northwestern Pacific 
continued to pile up net deficits, but because 
of generally better business conditions the 
SPdeMex had net earnings in 1942 and 1943. 
Results for Pacific Electric during 1941 were 
disappointing, and its management continued 
a policy of contracting rail operations and 
purchasing additional buses as a substitute 
for specified rail passenger operations. Sixty-
nine rail cars were modernized in that season, 
however, and the decision proved wise, as PE 
in 1942 was deluged with war business plus a 
flood of domestic traffic, reflecting the ration-
ing of both tires and gasoline. Because of the 
resulting increase in revenues, and because of 
a refinancing plan that reduced bond interest, 
Pacific Electric earned net income from 1942 
through 1945. 1 4 
On SP's Pacific Lines, the Texas & New Or-
leans and the Cotton Belt, there was con-
tinuous consternation as each struggled to 
handle the flood of business. Some traditions 
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were retained, others dropped. Special mer-
chandise service such as that provided by the 
Overnighters was canceled for the duration in 
order to conserve power and crews. Freight 
traffic was diverted to the most direct connec-
tions instead of maintaining the longest pos-
sible haul for the SP, and late in 1942 trans-
continental freight schedules were lengthened 
by twenty-four hours. Nevertheless, when re-
quested by the military to do so, SP went "the 
l imit" to provide essential service. On one oc-
casion the SP transferred a load of fighter 
plane landing wheels from a boxcar to an ex-
press car and then rushed it westward on the 
Argonaut to a desperate California assembly 
plant. Elsewhere, crews such as that of Extra 
978 west from Valentine to El Paso late in 
1942 took expedited trains over the railroad 
at speeds well in excess of those authorized. 
Operating officials, who were "encouraged to 
get trains over the road," discreetly looked the 
other way. Municipal officials similarly looked 
the other way when, on demand, the SP moved 
naval munitions along Alameda Street—right 
through downtown Los Angeles—to ord-
nance installations at Seal Beach and else-
where in the area. On the busy Overland 
Route "barge trains" carrying steel hulls for 
landing craft were a periodic phenomenon, 
and, because of potential submarine attack on 
coastal shipping, there was a constant stream 
of symbol oil trains moving crude and refined 
petroleum products from the T & N O to the 
Cotton Belt and other connections. Indeed, 
during the thirty-six months following Sep-
tember 15, 1941, the T & N O billed 533,540 
carloads of petroleum products from its sta-
tions. Similarly, entire trainloads of munitions 
moved to and from several locations such as 
the Sierra Army Ordnance Depot at Herlong, 
California (on the Modoc), the Naval A m -
munition Depot at Hawthorne, Nevada (on 
the Mina Branch), and the Benicia Arsenal, 
across the straits from Martinez, California. 1 5 
Problems in moving the growing throng of 
passengers were, if anything, even more com-
plex. Revenue passenger miles rose by 109.5 
A constant stream of symbol oil trains moved from 
the T & N O to the Cotton Belt and other carriers. 
This elderly switcher assembles such a train at 
Beaumont. 
percent in 194 2 . Early that year the SP dropped 
thirty-five passenger trains, including the pro-
fitable Noon Daylight and the Sunset Limited 
(between San Francisco and Los Angeles), 
in order to gain equipment. Later that year 
numerous long-distance passenger schedules 
were lengthened and the sale of liquor on 
most trains was discontinued, as was the sale 
of beer by news agents. It was not a matter 
of morality but of expediency; most of SP's 
lounge, club, and tavern cars had already dis-
appeared, to become coaches and diners. 1 6 
The war even had impact on SP's commuter 
operations. Significant problems arose on 
the historic San Francisco—San Jose route as 
more and more patrons flocked to it because 
of gasoline rationing and shortages of rubber 
tires. The situation was worsened when the 
usual sturdy 4 -6 -2S were removed for freight 
and troop train service, to be replaced by 
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lighter and older power. Equipment shortages 
also resulted periodically when commuter 
coaches were pressed into temporary military 
duty. In Texas the expanding shipbuilding in-
dustry demanded reliable and inexpensive 
commuter operations, which the T & N O was 
called upon to establish. For a brief period 
such service extended from Houston's Grand 
Central Station to that city's Brown Ship Yard, 
but at Beaumont it lasted throughout the con-
flict. A n A - i 4-4-2 performed yeoman duty 
hauling several cars on twice daily trips to the 
Livingston Yard near Orange. 1 7 
As the military's Pacific campaigns gained 
momentum, space available for civilian travel 
became even more restricted. Holidays 
brought special problems. The SP, along with 
all of the nation's carriers, pledged that such 
space would go "to Uncle Sam's boys first" 
and frankly discouraged travel by others dur-
ing those periods. Pullman space could easily 
be proctored but that was not the case for 
"first come, first served" coach accommoda-
tions. Consequently, on June 16, 1943, the SP 
instituted a "train assignment plan" under 
which boarding passes were issued on a pri-
ority basis; troops "traveling on orders" were 
at the head of the list, and "civilian traffic to 
the capacity of our trains" was last. Through-
out the war SP's Reservation and Information 
Bureau was swamped; in 1943 the San Fran-
cisco office received an average of 16,000 calls 
daily and that at Los Angeles another 15 ,000." 
Before the dawn of 1944, 65 percent of 
SP's passenger revenues derived from military 
business. The numbers were awesome. During 
the first seven weeks of the war SP operated 
573 military trains; during the thirty-four 
months following December 1, 1941, it han-
dled 20,511 of these in addition to dozens 
of cars of military personnel that moved on 
regular trains. In 1943 alone it transported 
approximately five million personnel aboard 
136,234 "military cars." This, of course, said 
nothing of the thousands more who traveled 
"on orders" aboard SP's regular trains. 1 9 
Representatives of SP's passenger traffic de-
Throughout the war, SP's Reservation and Infor-
mation Bureau was swamped. 
ARMED FORCES A N D W A R 
INDUSTRIES MUST H A V E 
FIRST CALL 
To Our Passengers and Shippers: 
With \merica at war, the armed 
forces and war industries must have first 
call upon transportation. 
This means not only that troop trains 
must he given right of way hut also that 
the freight trains carrying materials and 
supplies must he handled with the same 
dispatch as the forces themselves, so 
guns, tanks, ammunit ion , ships and 
planes may he available when and where 
needed. 
Knowing that this has caused and will 
continue to cause delay at times to our 
civilian passengers and shippers, let me 
express our regret for the inconvenience 
you may experience. We shall he doing 
our hest to serve you in the c ircum-
stances. We thank you for the under-
standing cooperation you have shown 
in the past and feel sure this helpful 
spirit will continue throughout the 
present crisis. 
A. T . M E R C I E R 
President 
Southern Pacific Company 
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In 1943 alone, the SP transported five million per-
sonnel in "military cars." 
partment were assigned to important on-line 
installations, and others rode m a i n (military) 
trains and dealt with any number of problems. 
These often took the form of emergency re-
quests for food and refreshments, which pas-
senger representatives passed to the harried 
commissary department or to local bakers, 
soft drink bottlers, and dairies. As an ex-
ample, a midnight request by a military train 
commander was satisfied less than three hours 
later at Tucson when a bakery truck met the 
train with one hundred loaves of fresh, hot 
bread. And, in the dead of a cold winter night 
during 1942, SP personnel even delivered stove 
pipe, elbows, and bailing wire to an ailing 
kitchen car on a m a i n train at Dunsmuir. 2 0 
The greatest attention of all was given to 
hospital trains, many of which originated at 
the Presidio of San Francisco. After the estab-
lishment of Hospital Train Units by the Army 
Medical Corps in July, 1944, the SP moved 
486 of them plus 408 single cars, or a total of 
164,267 patients. Equipment included stan-
dard Pullmans in addition to the army's own 
ambulance and kitchen cars. "Convoy per-
sonnel" was composed of military doctors, 
nurses, and medical technicians. Some, but 
not all, of these "mercy trains" were destined 
for the thirty-two military hospitals located in 
SP's service area.2 1 
Among a host of unsung heroes during the 
war years was SP's hard-pressed dining car 
and commissary staff. Although itself subject 
to shortages and rationing restrictions, the SP 
by the fall of 1943 had become, as the Wall 
Street Journal observed, the "biggest food 
buyer in the West." Indeed, during the last 
quarter of 1942, the Pacific Lines alone served 
more meals than any other carrier—including 
the Pennsylvania Railroad, the traditional 
leader. It was an incredible accomplishment. 
New diners could not be obtained because of 
War Production Board restrictions and, for a 
while, even the longest of SP's trains had to 
make do with a single dining car. Personnel 
turnover was great because of the draft, but 
the department grew, nevertheless, to a 2,400-
man force in 1943. Civilians were restricted 
to two meals daily on almost all trains and 
in every instance were urged to have eaten a 
meal before boarding. By the end of 1942, 
menu entrees were restricted to three, and 
box lunches were sold on every long-distance 
train. 2 2 
A l l of this reduced, but hardly eliminated, 
pressure on the dining cars and their over-
worked crews. Niceties were curtailed. Table 
flowers disappeared, waiters wore plainer uni-
forms, the cars—now making two trips where-
as before the war they made one—went with-
out new paint, and fresh fish, poultry, pasta, 
and eggs often replaced red meat on the menu. 
Indeed, menus themselves were often in short 
supply, as was linen. Dirty windows frequently 
greeted patrons when they finally found a seat; 
tight turn-around times simply prohibited 
doing anything more than watering, icing, 
and cleaning car interiors. 2' 
The dining car situation mirrored the glut 
of military and domestic travel needs. These 
could not always be anticipated. In one case, 
on very short notice, the SP was obligated to 
move a large contingent of troops—requiring 
thirteen diners and a crew of 150 cooks, wait-
ers, stewards. Incidents such as this placed an 
inordinate stress on the entire operation. As 
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Any day saw hundreds of military personnel arriving at or departing from the Oakland Mole. 
one company officer recalled, "on one Fri-
day we had 19 tons of meat in the [West Oak-
land] commissary refrigerators, but because of 
heavy military and domestic requirements the 
inventory was down to only ten pounds of 
ham hocks Monday morning." The skill and 
dedication of the dining car and commissary 
personnel was reflected in an amazing set of 
records: 1,029 luncheons served one noon on 
the Daylight in 1943, and a staggering total of 
14,080,000 "military meals" prepared during 
the years of war. 1 4 
Others likewise toiled with special dili-
gence and practically without recognition. 
M a i l handlers, express messengers, and Rail-
way Post Office clerks shuddered, but did not 
falter, under a load that grew with each day of 
the war. The Christmas season required spe-
cial energy; that of 1944 was memorable. 
With the Pacific campaign in full swing, the 
SP found itself moving solid trains of mail 
on the Overland Route from late September 
to early November. In all, 2,931 carloads of 
overseas mail were moved into the Oakland 
and San Francisco terminals during that brief 
period. 2 5 
Accidents are an inevitable, if highly un-
pleasant, part of the railroad business. The 
sheer volume of trains and the nature of their 
lading during World War II increased the po-
tential for disaster. Nevertheless, SP's safety 
record during those hectic years was notewor-
thy. A hair-raising derailment of seventeen cars 
of munitions early in 1944 near Wabuska, 
Nevada, fortunately resulted in no injuries, 
and all cars were rerailed without explosion 
or fire. A few months later, however, several 
SP employees were injured and damage to 
property was extensive when a mighty explo-
sion tore through the navy's Port Chicago fa-
cility northeast of Oakland. Windows in nine 
coaches of the San Francisco Challenger were 
knocked out by the blast just as the train was 
moving off the Martinez-Benicia bridge (over 
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Nothing on the SP had greater priority than the 
Hospital Trains. 
five miles away), but only one patron was in-
jured. Not so fortunate were passengers on 
the Pacific Limited when the second section 
collided with the rear of the first near Bagley, 
Utah, on New Year's Eve, 1944. Fifty persons 
died and 168 were injured, many of them mili-
tary personnel. 2 6 
Because of its essentially fine safety record, 
because it did perform with obvious dedica-
tion in trying times, and because the public 
tended to understand the exigencies of war-
time, SP's reputation generally was improved 
between 1940 and the end of 1945. The Lord 
& Thomas Agency surveyed freight shippers 
in May, 1942, and found the SP well regarded 
among nearly all. "We have had cars held up 
but feel that SP is doing as well as can be ex-
pected under present conditions," said a rep-
resentative of the Rath Packing Company. 
"Even if our shipments are a few days late," 
echoed the traffic manager of Fairbanks Morse 
Company, " i t is only part of our contribution 
for defense." 2 7 
Throughout those years of war the SP held 
Soldiers prepared to roll at San Luis Obispo. 
massive "War Service Day" rallies each June at 
principal locations around the entire system. 
In all cases, said President A . T. Mercier, the 
95,000 men and women of the Southern Pa-
cific at home saluted those from the family 
serving with "Uncle Sam's fighting forces." 
These events obviously served to demonstrate 
the solid bond between those at home and 
those abroad, but they also were useful ve-
hicles for promoting donations of blood, for 
increasing participation in payroll savings 
plans, and for memorializing those who had 
fallen in battle. The war bond and blood 
donor programs were the obvious means by 
which all could contribute to the war effort, 
but there were others. Cotton Belt employees 
took pride in their Victory Gardens, and sev-
eral from the T & N O offices in Houston vol-
unteered their time for Traveler's A i d , USO, 
and Red Cross projects. And in Arizona mem-
bers of a bridge and building gang even ap-
prehended two German POWs who had es-
caped from a nearby camp. 2 8 
The number of SP employees in the armed 
forces grew to 15,196 in June, 1944, and to 
19,000 by V - E Day, 1945. They served as 
officers and enlisted personnel in all branches 
and in both theaters of war. Several from the 
T & N O were assigned to the 719th and 734th 
Railway Operating Battalions, while others 
from the Pacific Lines joined the 705th Head-
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tion to this problem, the SP in September, 
1942, established a Labor Employment De-
partment with offices in San Francisco, Los 
Angeles, and far-off Chicago. Recruiting was 
intense. Meanwhile, most shops worked ten-
hour shifts, and the accounting offices went 
on two-shift days. In the operating area, the 
employee shortage was accentuated by so-
called full-crew laws, which unreasonably de-
manded several brakemen on freights, and by 
maximum-car laws that required extra trains. 
California and Arizona requirements were es-
pecially difficult.' 0 
The problem grew. Older personnel post-
poned their pensions and retirees returned 
to work. In 1942 and 1943 nonunion per-
sonnel from the San Francisco headquarters 
spent weekends as track laborers. So, too, did 
local businessmen, professors, bankers, stu-
dents, and others who answered SP's patriotic 
appeal to "help win the war." More perma-
nent help came from the reservations of the 
Navajo, Hopi , Pima, and Apache Indians; 
they were concentrated on section gangs across 
Arizona." 
Women represented a vast labor pool, one 
that had not been tapped much in the past 
because of social traditions. Those customs 
passed quickly during World War II. By March, 
1943, over 1,300 women were employed by 
the Pacific Lines in its accounting depart-
ment. Dozens more signed on as clerks, teleg-
raphers, and traffic representatives. Others 
donned overalls to become blacksmith help-
The draft and competition for labor resulted in a 
constant shortfall. Recruiting was intense. 
quarters Company and 754th Railway Shops 
Battalion. 2 9 
Of all the problems faced by the Southern 
Pacific during World War II, none was greater 
than meeting its employment needs. During 
1 9 4 0 - 4 1 more than 18,000 employees were 
added to forces on the Pacific Lines and more 
than 2,100 on the T & N O . War traffic grew 
and so did SP's need for personnel, but the 
draft and competition for labor resulted in 
a constant shortfall. To give concerted atten-
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ers, engine wipers, yard clerks, fire lighters, 
painters, coach cleaners, rodmen, and even 
section laborers. On the railroad, as else-
where, they were often referred to as "Rosie 
the Riveter" but at Watsonville, women track 
workers were called "George Burdusis' A n -
gels" (after the local section foreman of that 
name), and at Mojave the female roundhouse 
crew was affectionately labeled "Piston Pack-
ing Mammas." Eventually more than 4,000 
women were assigned to nonclerical positions 
formerly held exclusively by men.' 2 
Labor shortages persisted, nevertheless. As 
early as the summer of 1941 the SP had asked 
the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Ser-
vice for permission to import 5,000 Mexican 
laborers under the Alien Contract Labor Act. 
The request was vigorously opposed by labor 
organizations in this country, and the applica-
tion was denied. At the insistence of the Rail-
road Retirement Board and organized labor, 
the SP then agreed to solicit track laborers 
from east of the Mississippi River and pay for 
transporting them to job locations. The plan 
failed miserably. Of the 2,896 men thus re-
cruited, only 1,501 actually went on the pay-
roll, and most of these worked only a few 
days. They had simply used the SP for free 
transportation and sustenance and then "de-
serted" for even better paying jobs among the 
ballooning war industries on the West Coast." 
A second attempt to contract Mexican labor 
was successful, however. The first trainload 
of 509 workers was delivered to the SP at 
Nogales, Arizona, on May 16, 1943; the last 
was received at El Paso on August 13, 1945. 
None of these Mexican nationals were as-
signed to the T & N O but were sent instead to 
the Pacific Lines, the San Diego & Arizona 
Eastern (SD&AE), NWP, and PFE. A few of 
the 36,711 who eventually arrived served in 
the mechanical and stores departments, but 
most were assigned to track gangs. Indeed, by 
D-day in 1944 a full 78 percent of track jobs 
on the Pacific Lines were held by Mexican 
nationals under contract. They proved to be 
excellent workers and did much to serve the 
war effort. Total wages for them amounted to 
$ 4 8 > ° 9 7 , 7 I 4 - ' 4 
The need for a constant and reliable labor 
force was one of several themes promoted 
through SP's impressive World War II adver-
tising campaigns. These were designed to ex-
plain the company's wartime difficulties and 
responsibilities, to supply necessary current 
information, and to create a feeling of under-
standing and goodwill. It worked. "Our ad-
vertising," said the passenger department's 
F. S. McGinnis in 1942, "has been based on 
the principle that an informed and under-
standing public will be considerate in view of 
the current crisis." 1 5 
The SP chose the specific messages to im-
part through local and national newspapers 
and magazines, window displays, posters, bill-
boards, and radio. As its labor requirements 
increased, the SP moved from classified to 
more sophisticated display and institutional 
advertising and finally to radio spots. It was 
the same with other messages that manage-
ment considered worthy—the need to pur-
chase war bonds, the need to give military re-
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Women were tapped in great numbers, even for the 
most difficult tasks. 
quirements priority over civilian, the need for 
safety in all cases, and an appreciation for all 
hard-working railroaders, who were contrib-
uting mightily in the war effort. Other adver-
tisements announced that SP would happily 
supply on request free copies of Priority Spe-
cial, the story of a hospital train on the Los 
Angeles Division written by Harry Bedwell, a 
company telegrapher whose work frequently 
graced the pages of the Saturday Evening Post 
and other national magazines. Finally, SP ad-
vertised its own radio program. 3 6 
Begun in November, 1943, " M a i n Line" 
was a weekly thirty-minute evening program 
aired throughout the service area of the Pa-
cific Lines by stations of the Mutual—Don Lee 
Broadcasting network. Because the program 
was spliced between "The Lone Ranger" and 
"Bulldog Drummond," its success was as-
sured. The SP hoped to accomplish two objec-
tives with the broadcast: to tell the story of 
the railroad and what its employees were 
doing to win the war, and to attract men and 
women to its service. The show's popularity 
Eventually more than four thousand women were 
assigned to nonclerical positions formerly held by 
men, as shown by this "Sunbonnet Gang," Elko, 
Nevada, in 1943. Harry Williamson Collection. 
gained regularly in the Hooper ratings be-
cause, as the trade press said, "it dramatized 
real life incidents to show that a railroad is 
not just trains and tracks—it is also the 
people whose daily work keep things moving 
along this vital artery." In a sense, " M a i n 
Line" was a fitting exclamation mark for SP's 
entire wartime advertising program—likely 
the best public relations project in the com-
pany's history. 3 7 
As Douglas MacArthur prosecuted his fa-
mous island-hopping campaign in the Pacific, 
Dwight Eisenhower pushed into the German 
homeland along a broad front. Throughout 
the war Europe had been the primary theater, 
and when the conflict there ended on May 8, 
1945, the SP warned "This War Isn't Over 
Yet!" in bold newspaper ads that appeared on 
V-E Day. Indeed, with the Third Reich van-
quished, the West Coast would become, as the 
SP said, "the great marshalling yard" for the 
"big push" against Japan. The railroad, al-
ready straining under its load, was certain to 
be assigned an even greater tide of troops and 
material now released in Europe. That would 
mean more restrictions and hardships for non-
military patrons—freight and passenger alike. 
In sum, said the SP, "first things come first until 
this war is over—and it isn't over yet." 3 8 
The redeployment necessary to prosecute 
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SP's advertising was based on the principle that an informed public would be understanding. 
the "big push" did, indeed, focus on the Pa-
cific coast as springboard for the remaining 
theater of war. President Harry Truman told 
the country that U.S. forces in Europe would 
be transferred to the Pacific over a ten-month 
period, promised that "various transportation 
restrictions" would not only "be retained but 
increased," and urged citizens to avoid need-
less travel. The swell of traffic to the West was 
both immediate and dramatic; the movement 
of troops subsequent to V-E Day represented 
the heaviest passenger load of the entire war 
for the SP. Transportation shortages were se-
vere. On July 6 the Office of Defense Trans-
portation issued an order requiring the dis-
continuance of all sleeping-car runs between 
cities less than 450 miles apart. A . T. Mercier 
announced that the SP would carry out the 
order "to the letter" and added that it would, 
for the time being, accept no reservations for 
train space made more than five days in ad-
vance. The public grumbled, but the govern-
ment's decision freed 892 sleepers around the 
country for military use, which meant that 68 
percent of all sleeping cars could be assigned 
for troop movement. Additional capacity had 
been promised somewhat earlier when the 
War Production Board authorized construc-
tion of 1,200 troop sleepers (1,200 others had 
been built in 1943) to be leased to and paid 
for by the railroads on a mileage basis, and to 
be operated by the Pullman Company exclu-
sively for the services. These troop sleepers ac-
commodated thirty persons each; standard 
sleepers were ordered by the military on the 
basis of three persons per section; three were 
also assigned to two double seats in coaches.39 
Then, suddenly, it was over. Atomic bombs 
dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki brought 
Japan to its knees. Surrender occurred on A u -
gust 15, 1945; America understandably in-
dulged itself in long-awaited victory cele-
bration. 
For the country's railroads, especially those 
in the West, however, there was hardly a mo-
ment to celebrate. The military placed an im-
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Then, suddenly, it was over: V-J Day in San Fran-
cisco along Market Street in front of SP's general 
office building. 
mediate embargo on material destined for 
ports of embarkation; freight cars backed up 
across the country, clogging yards. It was 
much the same with troops headed for the Pa-
cific. Where should they go? The military ser-
vices eventually unscrambled the mess, but 
not before the carriers received undue criti-
cism for a situation not of their making. 
As the West Coast's premier railroad, the SP 
had been instrumental in staging for the Pa-
cific offensives; now it would play a similar 
role in reverse. The heavy eastbound growth 
of traffic resulting from V-J Day began in Sep-
tember, grew in October, and exploded in N o -
vember, to exceed SP's peak wartime load. 
"Get the boys home for Christmas" was the 
rallying cry. Thousands were so delivered. On 
December 1 alone there were forty-nine spe-
cial military trains spread across the system. 
For the 1945 Christmas season, only 18 per-
cent of space on eastbound Overland trains 
was available for civilian use. Nevertheless, 
the demobilization process proved lengthy. 
The last of the troop sleepers was not taken 
out of service until early 1947. 4 0 
As the wartime frenzy passed, SP's officers 
could reflect on the company's record for 
those years. Foremost in their minds was that 
over 20,000 from the SP family had been in 
the military at war's end and, sadly, 268 died 
in the service of their country. The effort at 
home produced its own war stories. The SP 
claimed, probably correctly, that it had served 
more military installations (290) than any 
other railroad. In any event, the traffic handled 
for them and for all others was, simply stated, 
prodigious. On the Sierra, an average of sev-
enty-three trains and helper engines passed 
Colfax, California, daily over a three-month 
test period in 1943, but on September 1, 1945 
—before the real crush of eastbound traffic 
began—"the mountain" witnessed sixty-two 
train and fifty-three helper movements. Far-
ther south, on Beaumont H i l l , east of Colton, 
California, on the Sunset Route, it was much 
the same. Traffic there was so fierce during the 
war that local freights, stuck in sidings for su-
perior trains, lost their crews—and even relief 
crews—to the "16-hour law." Helpers congre-
gated at the top of the hill but frequently could 
not return because of the velocity of traffic. 
This, of course, compounded problems be-
cause upbound trains could not proceed with-
out assistance. Consequently, dispatchers pe-
riodically ordered several helpers, coupled, 
down the hill as fast-moving second sections 
of passenger trains. Ton miles told the story: 
an increase from 545.5 million in 1940 to 1.6 
billion in 1944 over the Sierra, and 582.1 mil-
lion in 1940 to 1.1 billion in 1944 over Beau-
mont. The traffic situation on the Cotton Belt 
can be stated rather more cryptically. This was 
the order given to northward trains during the 
evening of May 23, 1943, at Fordyce, Arkan-
sas, and may be considered representative: 
N o . 17 Engine 807 meet Extra 544 North and 
Fourth and Fifth 24 Engines 574 and 575 and En-
gine 809 at Faith and meet Sixth and Seventh 24 
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Wartime traffic on the Cotton Belt was as dramatic as on the lines of its parent. Here, the first #119 leaves 
Texarkana in 1943. 
Engines 810 and 802 at Cabool and has right over 
Eighth and Ninth 24 and N o . 26 Pine Bluff to 
Rison. 4 ' 
Traffic records fell, especially in 1944 and 
1945, as these statements show: 
1944— The highest number of revenue pas-
sengers since 1919 (only World War I 
years were ever higher) 
—The highest average number of per-
sons per intercity train (326.7) 
—The greatest revenue ever from pas-
senger service (not including mail, ex-
press, etc.) 
—The highest total revenue from freight 
—The highest average number of reve-
nue freight tons per train 
1945 — The highest average distance traveled 
per person (330.2 miles—more than 
four times the World War I high) 
—The greatest passenger contribution to 
total operating revenues since 1921 
—The greatest average distance hauled 
per freight ton (423.9 miles) 
These records were established with 227 fewer 
locomotives, 929 fewer passenger cars, and 
22,208 fewer units of freight equipment than 
the SP had owned in the late 1920s. This, 
of course, reflected the constrictions of the 
1930s, greater unit capacity for newer cars, 
and better equipment utilization. Fortunately, 
during the war years, the SP was actually able 
to establish a net gain of 197 locomotives, 378 
passenger cars, and 1,547 freight cars. Newer 
motive power advanced the average tractive 
effort per locomotive by approximately 25 
percent. Furthermore, system shops had kept 
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the number of "bad order" locomotives and 
cars at very low levels—4.5 percent and 2.4 
percent, respectively, in 1943. 4 2 
The SP received several commendations for 
its war efforts and issued its own messages of 
congratulations. The Twelfth Naval District, 
the Los Angeles Port of Embarkation (Army), 
and the Bureau of Naval Personnel were among 
several government agencies expressing thanks 
and best wishes to the SP and its employees, 
and Standard Oi l of California's Summer Bul-
letin for 1945 celebrated "the War Job of a 
Great Railroad." For his part, SP president 
A. T. Mercier congratulated the entire com-
pany family for "a truly splendid job in helping 
win the war." Mercier had other if similarly 
upbeat news for SP's owners. The company's 
debt, he told them, had been substantially re-
duced during the war years (from $721 mil-
lion at the end of 1940 to $534 million at the 
end of 1945) and, as they already knew, the SP 
had renewed divided payments—$1.00 per 
share in 1942, rising to $2.25 in I 9 4 5 . 4 ' 
The Southern Pacific, like the country itself, 
had been on a roller-coaster ride for a decade 
and a half. It had experienced the darkest 
days of its existence during the Great Depres-
sion and its finest hour during World War II. 
Its leaders could but wonder what the future 
held. 
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Into a Bright Future 
"The success or failure of Southern Pacific 
will depend almost entirely on our ability 
to meet competition."—S. K. Burke to J. T. 
Saunders 
N o management ever lacks problems; the 
challenges vary in time and circumstance. For 
A . D. McDonald they had involved keeping 
the company out of bankruptcy courts during 
the depression of the 1930s. For Armand 
Theodore Mercier they centered first on com-
plexities resulting from World War II and then 
on positioning the Southern Pacific for suc-
cessful conversion to a profitable peacetime 
economy. 
Born in New Orleans, Mercier graduated 
from Tulane University with a degree in civil 
engineering before joining the SP as a transit-
man and roadmaster's clerk in 1904. He rose 
quickly through the engineering and operat-
ing departments, served briefly in the execu-
tive departments of the San Diego &C Arizona 
Eastern and Pacific Electric and, on his six-
tieth birthday, December n , 1941, assumed 
the presidency of the Southern Pacific. Dur-
ing the war years Mercier spent much of his 
time "out on the line," determining where and 
how to make the property more efficient and 
leaving the executive suite in charge of Vice-
President Donald J. Russell. He was friendly 
and jovial, an expert in human relations, and 
one who inspired hard work and devotion on 
the part of subordinates as well as the rank 
and file of employees. His devotion to SP's slo-
gan—"The Friendly Railroad"—was legend-
ary. Mercier's message to the SP family at the 
end of World War II was typical of the man: 
"Let us go forward harmoniously as a unit 
with high morale within the organizatior 
to establish the company outstandingly a 
a progressive and friendly public servic 
institution." 1 
Mercier did not order a broadly based and 
systematic approach to postwar planning 
until mid-1944. Individuals within various 
departments, however, took it upon them-
selves to speculate in this regard and to offer 
suggestions. Those of S. K. Burke, assistant 
vice-president—freight traffic, were especially 
noteworthy. Appropriately styled "In Time 
of War Prepare for Peace!" Burke's dry-eyed 
views were submitted to his superiors only a 
month after the Pearl Harbor invasion. Burke 
underscored the erosion of traffic to competi-
tive modes during the decade preceding but 
argued that it had been nothing more than a 
"prelude" to that sure to follow in peacetime 
since air, water, and vehicular competitors all 
stood to gain from the technological advances 
that result from war. Burke's assessment was 
not pessimistic; he simply counseled expedi-
ent countermeasures. First of all, he urged 
the company to jettison any financial or 
emotional attachment to unprofitable affili-
ate companies or even traditional operations. 
"The success or failure of Southern Pacific will 
depend," said Burke, "almost entirely on our 
ability to meet competition." That, he argued, 
meant not only "a very high standard of per-
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Leadership of the SP during the trying days of 
World War II and the optimistic times following 
fell to Armand Theodore Mercier (center). 
formance" and "an intensive planned cam-
paign of selling our product in the competitive 
market," but also reduction of "the volume 
of transportation produced," the "rejection 
of traffic that cannot be handled profitably," 
and reductions " i n the cost of providing said 
transportation." 2 
Others were neither as direct as Burke nor 
as macrocosmic. Rather, they anticipated the 
future in circumscribed ways. The advertising 
department, for instance, as early as March, 
1943, speculated on its postwar responsibili-
ties, and the passenger department actively 
solicited ideas as to what its future posture 
should be. 
President Mercier took a cautious ap-
proach. In planning for postwar service he 
would be guided by the past: "We intend to 
extend the new service that public approval 
and patronage made profitable during the 
years immediately before the war," he told 
stockholders early in 1945. That notion was 
clear in his mind, but other issues seemed 
more vexing. Mercier worried, for example, 
about maintaining equity between those who 
had labored hard and long to keep the trains 
rolling during the war and those who were re-
turning to claim jobs that they perceived were 
rightfully theirs as a reward for saving the 
country from fascism. It would require a deli-
cate juggling act, he understood.5 
At the same time, Mercier and his staff were 
mindful of changes occurring in SP's service 
area, particularly in California and Texas. 
Both states had experienced regular if not spec-
tacular growth during the first four decades 
of the century, but the growth in Califor-
nia during the 1940s was phenomenal. The 
great explosion in Texas, particularly in the 
Gulf Coast region, would not be far behind. 
Already, firms such as Anderson, Clayton 
& Company, the Houston-based diversified 
foods concern, were urging "returning war 
veterans" and "released war workers" to find 
their fortunes in the Lone Star State. It au-
gured well for the future of the Texas & New 
Orleans as well as its parent. Hundreds of new 
industries had developed along spurs of both 
during the war, and more were sure to follow. 4 
These considerations colored the recom-
mendations of L. B. McDonald, vice-president 
of operations, who in 1947 told Mercier that 
important traffic, much of it susceptible to 
competitive attack, was being delayed, partic-
ularly during peak movements, because of " i n -
sufficient locomotives." The SP, he recalled, 
had placed every available locomotive in ser-
vice as a consequence of heavy war traffic; 
many of these had been worn out even before 
and were certainly so now. Relief in the form 
of new power was essential. Furthermore, M c -
Donald urged construction of longer sidings, 
second tracks, expansion of C T C , and im-
provements to terminal facilities. He was es-
pecially concerned with expanding capacity 
on the Sunset Route and between Los Angeles 
and Bakersfield on the San Joaquin line. Most 
of all, however, he worried about SP's ability 
to protect its potential in the Los Angeles 
Basin. The population of Los Angeles County 
alone had grown yearly by an average of 
90,000 since World War I. This growth was 
reflected in freight business. The number of 
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Hundreds of industries had located along the SP 
during the war, and more were sure to follow. Yet 
the SP left nothing to chance; its recruitment was 
aggressive. 
cars loaded or unloaded in the city of Los A n -
geles by all carriers in 1945 was more than 
three times greater than the depression low of 
1933, and SP researchers forecast a continued 
growth of business even after war's end. 5 
The SP had enjoyed a generally favorable 
public image during the war and, in the main, 
possessed a favorable image of itself. Mer-
rier cherished these as important assets and 
worked hard to enhance them after the con-
flict. He was adept in the field of public re-
lations and encouraged policies that would 
yield a "good press." In Houston, for example, 
the T & N O worked regularly with several uni-
versities to give their students a firsthand view 
of railroading, with public schoolteachers in 
business education, with agricultural spe-
cialists from Texas A & M College, as well 
as with countless elementary schoolteachers 
who took their pupils on tours and trips spon-
sored by the railroad. These activities, Mer-
cier understood, demonstrated the company's 
public spirit, offered the company important 
opportunities to "show itself off," and in-
creased morale. SP's president saw the com-
pany's new sixty-minute color motion picture 
"This Is M y Railroad" in the same vein. Em-
phasizing the role of employees at all levels in 
the company and filmed at various locations 
from New Orleans to Portland, it drew rave 
reviews from thousands of SP personnel, fami-
lies, and friends who attended the premier 
showing in Houston on October 1, 1947, and 
thereafter at special showings around the sys-
tem. The film was designed to instill pride in 
the company but, more than that, to instill 
pride in all who worked for the SP and in the 
specific jobs for which they were responsible. 
It was a smashing success.6 
Mercier further understood that increased 
morale was the corollary of capital spend-
ing. During the six years from 1946 through 
1951, an average of 439 track miles per year 
was outfitted with new and heavier rail; nearly 
90 miles of additional C T C were installed; 
sidings on all main lines were extended to fa-
cilitate longer freight trains; a large grade-
separation project (depressed trainway) proj-
ect at El Paso was initiated; a bridge-
strengthening program was executed on the 
Sunset Route east of El Paso; work was begun 
on a hump yard at Roseville, California; and 
many significant line changes were completed 
in Oregon and Texas. Following L. B. McDon-
ald's urging, special attention was also given 
to the Los Angeles area, where nearly six 
miles of track was built in 1946 for a new auto-
mobile assembly plant near Van Nuys at Ray-
mer. Equally important, another 8.6 miles of 
construction and a 6.6-mile trackage rights 
agreement with the Union Pacific in 1951 
served to expedite the flow of freight traffic to 
and from the harbor and industrial areas at 
San Pedro and Long Beach.7 
More pedestrian, but nevertheless essential, 
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were a variety of improvements made to SP's 
communications system. These included radio 
telephones on Bay Area switchers and, when 
perfected, caboose-to-engine radios for road 
trains. Additional teletypes linking offices 
across the system were also acquired. The 
need for adequate communication was obvi-
ous; in 1951 SP's telegraph department han-
dled 80,000 written telegrams and over 30,000 
telephone calls daily. 8 
Some of the most impressive changes dur-
ing the brief interim between World War II 
and the Korean conflict involved SP's motive 
power fleet. Steam still ruled; a modern "stand-
ing test laboratory" for the scientific testing of 
such locomotives was installed at Sacramento 
after the war, and company shops continued 
to perform heavy repair on steam power. Yet 
the era was nearly ended; no new steam power 
would be ordered. Indeed, in 1946 SP ac-
quired its first diesel freighters, four-unit 
(6,000-hp) F3S from General Motors' Electro-
Motive Division to be assigned on the Sunset 
Route between Los Angeles and Lordsburg, 
New Mexico. Diesels for passenger service 
were ordered, too, with more following each 
year. By the end of 1951 SP owned 993 diesel 
freight, passenger, road-switcher, and switch-
ing units. Service and repair facilities for the 
new power were established at Los Angeles, 
Roseville, Houston, San Antonio, and Ogden 
in 1949, and at Eugene, Klamath Falls, Duns-
muir, and Lafayette in 1950. 9 
Some of these new locomotives were pur-
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chased as power for SP's fleet of postwar 
streamlined trains. The program for upgrad-
ing SP's passenger fleet had begun during the 
depression but, except for the delivery of vari-
ous new passenger cars, had been shelved 
during World War II. Shortly before that con-
flict began, however, the SP had placed in 
service a handsome overnight streamlined 
train between San Francisco and Los Angeles. 
Styled the Lark, these eighteen-car trains 
represented the finest in overnight rail travel. 
Experience gained with the streamlined Lark, 
its Daylight counterparts, and the City of San 
Francisco proved to be valuable as study for 
postwar passenger improvements began on a 
formal basis early in 1943. 1 0 
The planning program was broadly gauged. 
Each member of the passenger and advertising 
departments was asked for recommendations. 
Suggestions were noteworthy for their vigor 
and vision; they unmistakably anticipated 
competition from aviation and automobiles. 
For example, H . K. Reynolds believed that the 
patron of the future should find on "the trains 
the same comforts and conveniences he has 
at home." Moreover, said Reynolds, all cars 
should be equipped with public address sys-
tems, car windows should have tinted glass, 
motion pictures should be shown in diners 
and lounges, stewardesses should be assigned 
to each major train, and train-board "cigar 
stores" where passengers could purchase "cig-
arettes, magazines, and candy bars" should 
replace "the news butcher." One of Reynolds's 
colleagues further proposed acquisition of "a 
fleet of small streamliners that could be oper-
ated for less than $1.00 per mile, to be run on 
fast schedules between San Francisco and Sac-
ramento, Monterey, and other points." He 
also suggested "a l l room" Pullmans for the 
long-distance trains. Additionally, there was 
general agreement among members from both 
departments that each of SP's "Four Great 
Routes" should have a "leading daily train" 
identifying that route and that each should 
also be served by a "popular economy train ." 1 ' 
As it developed, the Shasta Route received 
first consideration because, said the passenger 
department's Claude E. Peterson, it was one of 
"the natural areas" where SP could "retain 
traffic previously enjoyed" as well as generate 
new business "by means of attractive and 
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The Lark, shown here coming up the Peninsula toward San Francisco, provided luxurious overnight service 
between Los Angeles and the Bay area. 
expeditious service." Specifically, Peterson 
suggested two fourteen-hour trains—a new 
Shasta Daylight and a reequipped overnight 
Cascade, the latter to run through to Seattle in 
cooperation with the Northern Pacific. Vice-
President D . J . Russell had reservations. On 
the one hand, he was convinced that "from 
a passenger revenue standpoint," SP's great-
est opportunity was " i n providing luxurious 
coach type trains with the most comfortable 
accommodations, low fares, reasonable din-
ing car prices, and with lounge and bar facili-
ties available." On the other, Russell believed 
that "after a reasonable time, the greater part 
of the sleeping car traffic will be lost to air 
lines. . . . From a long range viewpoint, some 
day we will be scrapping Pullman cars." Addi-
tional internal discussions followed, but the 
SP announced expansive plans for both trains 
early in 1946. Meanwhile, Cascade's schedule 
was tightened and its older equipment was re-
placed on a piecemeal basis. Peterson's hope to 
extend the Cascade to Seattle over the North-
ern Pacific, however, was never realized, al-
though the SP and N P did agree to a modest 
through-car arrangement. After protracted 
delays, the Shasta Daylight began service 
on July 10, 1949, and, finally, on August 13, 
1950, a fully streamlined Cascade made its 
initial trip. Both trains were diesel powered. 1 2 
For several years preceding the war the 
Rock Island had pressed the SP for improve-
ments that would make passenger service on 
the Golden State Route more competitive 
with that provided in the Chicago—Los A n -
geles corridor by the Santa Fe. Rock Island 
representatives observed that freight shippers 
often made invidious comparisons between 
the joint SP-CRI&P operation and Santa Fe's 
single-line route based on passenger train 
schedules. This, they added pointedly, hurt 
both companies. The SP, with several routes 
to maintain and protect, hedged and, in any 
event, the war made the issue moot for the du-
ration. The SP dragged its feet even after V-J 
Day; it anticipated a continuing volume of 
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The Shasta Daylight entered service on July 10, 
1949. Its dining car offerings could be summarized 
in a word: excellent. 
eastbound military traffic on the Golden State 
Route for several months, and this, said Peter-
son, would not allow SP to "promptly set up 
postwar plans." Nevertheless, Peterson and 
others from the SP met with their counter-
parts from the Rock Island earlier in 1946 to 
make long-range plans. 1 3 
That meeting promised much for the Golden 
State Route. The two companies agreed to 
sponsor four trains in each direction with 
a new flagship—the thrice-weekly Golden 
Rocket on a 39-hour and 45-minute schedule. 
Additionally, the Golden State was to become 
"Pullman only" while the Californian and 
a through local were to handle most of the 
headend business. Complications, however, 
developed quickly. After the war ended, ship-
pers and others in the Imperial Valley, long 
sensitive to SP's exclusive dominion there, 
pressured for "better passenger service." Con-
sequently the SP, with the reluctant concur-
rence of the Rock Island, established a new 
Chicago—Los Angeles train—the Imperial— 
which detoured through Baja California west 
of Yuma and then turned back into the Impe-
rial Valley to serve Calexico, El Centro, and 
Brawley with a "through t ra in . " 1 4 
Establishing a new train with old equip-
ment was one thing, but fashioning a new 
train with new equipment—on an expedited 
schedule—was quite another. The Rock Is-
land dutifully ordered cars for the fancy 
Golden Rocket, and the SP told patrons and 
shareholders alike that the new train was "on 
the way." Nevertheless, the SP had cold feet; 
it stalled until the early fall of 1947, when, 
much to the Rock Island's consternation, the 
Golden Rocket project was scrapped. Rock Is-
land's president, John D. Farrington, com-
plained bitterly, but the best he could get from 
Mercier was a promise to speed up the sched-
ule of the Golden State Limited to forty-
five hours and divert equipment to it that 
would have been assigned to the now stillborn 
Rocket. Even this caused confusion. The Rock 
Island already had ordered its portion of ob-
servation lounges for the Golden Rocket, but 
the SP argued that such "cars were not popu-
lar, did not have enough room, and receipts 
were about 50% under those of full lounges 
placed next to the diner." The SP simply 
would not order its complement but sub-
stituted instead "two rounded 10-6 sleepers" 
to maintain symmetry for all train sets. In any 
event, "an improved Golden State" employing 
a strange mixture of rebuilt and new equip-
ment was inaugurated on January 4, 1948. 
The SP promised that its full share of the 
train's new cars would be on hand before the 
end of the next year. The entire episode was 
ironic. SP management frequently found rea-
sons to complain about real or imagined 
problems with connecting carriers on through 
routes—the CRI&P, UP, C & N W — b u t in this 
case the Rock Island was the aggrieved party. 1 5 
Plans for the premier train on the Sunset 
Route were similarly complex. As early as 
1938 SP's advertising department had sug-
gested "the inauguration of coast-to-coast 
streamlined service via New Orleans" as the 
best way to "focus national attention on the 
company's long haul Sunset Route." The 
"Union Pacific and the Santa Fe," complained 
F. Q . Tredway, "have whole fleets of stream-
lined trains." What the SP needed, he con-
tinued, was "a progressive, sensational move." 
That could be accomplished, he enthused, by 
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The Golden Rocket failed to birth, but a refur-
bished and speedier Golden State took to the rails 
on January 4, 1948. This one is at El Paso, in 1952. 
establishment of "the first truly transcontinen-
tal run"—the Robert E. Lee, on a fifty-nine-
hour schedule. This one train, said Tredway, 
"would steal the show" from the competition 
and be "front page news" everywhere. A . D. 
McDonald was intrigued with the idea and 
noted that cooperation could be expected 
from both the Louisville & Nashville and the 
Southern Railway as connecting carriers on 
the Washington-Los Angeles run, but he ad-
vised that the project "would have to be ta-
bled until some future time." Mercier took 
the same position in 1943 and again in 1947, 
and the project died. 1 6 
Neither McDonald nor Mercier argued 
with Tredway's contention that "no halfway 
measure will ever revive passenger travel on 
the Sunset Route." Yet there were problems. 
When the Robert E. Lee failed to win ap-
proval, Claude Peterson suggested a thirty-
nine-hour all-Pullman streamliner between 
Los Angeles and New Orleans, but the route 
was characterized by significant "intermediate 
business" on both ends—Los Angeles, Phoe-
nix, Tucson on the west and San Antonio, 
Houston, New Orleans on the east—with a 
long stretch between Tucson and San Antonio 
that yielded little passenger business of any 
kind. Furthermore, noted one of Peterson's as-
sociates, there was "the always-present negro 
problem in Texas and Louisiana," which re-
quired "separate but equal" or duplicate facil-
ities. These problems militated against Peter-
son's dream. 1 7 
Nevertheless, something had to be done. 
The motive power and equipment assigned to 
the Sunset Limited had been severely taxed 
by wartime travel and was clearly shabby 
compared with the Daylight, the Lark, and 
the new trains planned for the Golden State 
and Shasta routes. A l l that could be done in 
the short term, though, was to speed Sun-
set's schedule to just under forty-eight hours 
in 1946, and to reestablish a through New 
York—Los Angeles sleeper for it a year later. 
Finally, in 1948 SP's board authorized expen-
ditures for five new train sets and power to 
pull them. The fifteen-car trains that resulted 
were gorgeous in every detail. Designers from 
the Budd Company, which built the cars, cre-
ated interior decor representative of the re-
gions traversed by the train. Especially im-
pressive were the Audubon Dining Room, the 
Pride of Texas Coffee Shop, and the French 
Quarter Lounge—painted in a shade of pink 
called Sunset that even inspired a woman's 
fashion trend. The new trains took to the rails 
on forty-three-hour schedules effective August 
20, 1950. " N o w , " enthused a beaming Claude 
Peterson, "we have streamliners to sell on all 
four routes." 1 8 
The earliest of these, the famous City of San 
Francisco increased its "sailing dates" to three 
times weekly late in 1946 and was made daily 
on September 1, 1947. New equipment or-
dered for it in 1948 would be delivered over 
the next two years. Changes also affected 
other trains on the Overland Route. Through 
sleepers to New York and Washington via Chi-
cago and both the New York Central and 
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The newly equipped Sunset Limited was properly christened at New Orleans before its departure on Au-
gust 20, 1950. 
Pennsylvania railroads were assigned to the 
historic Overland Limited in 1946. The Gold 
Coast and a mail train protected the remain-
ing business in 1950. 1 9 
Elsewhere, on Apri l 14, 1946, the SP rein-
stated the Noon Daylight to aid its hard-
pressed sisters, the original Daylight (now 
renamed Morning Daylight) and the San Joa-
quin Daylight between the Bay Area and Los 
Angeles. Also in 1946 the SP initiated expe-
dited service between Sacramento and Los 
Angeles by way of the Sacramento Daylight 
and a connection with the San Joaquin Day-
light. This pattern of service was modified in 
the fall of 1949 when the Noon Daylight was 
replaced by the Starlight, a streamlined eve-
ning coach train running about an hour ahead 
of the all-Pullman Lark over the Coast Line. 
Most mail and express moved via the San Joa-
quin line on the Owl and the West Coast.10 
One innovative idea that was "on the draw-
ing boards" for nearly thirty years involved the 
broadly based operation of interline passenger 
trains from one coast to the other. The eastern 
roads—the Baltimore & Ohio, the New York 
Central (NYC), and the Pennsylvania (PRR)— 
and their western counterparts—the Santa Fe, 
the Southern Pacific, and the Union Pacific— 
had no difficulty embracing the concept but 
bickered endlessly over details. Simply stated, 
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" N o w we have streamliners to sell on all four 
routes," SP's Claude Peterson exulted. The Sunset 
nears Morgan City, Louisiana, in 1953. 
each protected itself as well as its presumed ad-
vantages against cooperative welfare. Shortly 
after the war the idea was resurrected by M . W. 
Clement, president of the Pennsylvania, who 
suggested that his road join with the New York 
Central in dispatching six trains per week 
(three each) from New York City to Chicago 
(or Englewood) for: Los Angeles via A T & S F 
(3) or CRI&P-SP (3); San Francisco via 
C & N W - U P - S P (6); Seattle via C B & Q - G N (3) 
or Milwaukee Road (3). In this way, both of the 
eastern roads would have one train per week to 
Los Angeles, San Francisco, and Seattle and, 
conversely, each of the western roads would 
have trains to New York City. 2 1 
Virtually all of the potential participants 
found fault with Clement's proposal. The 
Great Northern and Milwaukee doubted there 
was adequate through business between New 
York and Puget Sound; the Baltimore & Ohio 
had not been included and objected on that 
count; the Santa Fe felt it should monopolize 
the Los Angeles trade; the SP took exception 
to Santa Fe's position; and the Pennsy and 
N Y C quarreled as a matter of policy. Privately, 
the SP simply wanted to stall; it was straining 
yet with the load of government business re-
sulting from the unexpectedly swift conclu-
sion of World War II, and it wished to go to the 
bargaining table with a strengthened hand re-
sulting from an upgraded service on the 
Golden State Route (the Golden Rocket or a 
much-improved Golden State Limited). How-
ever, the SP could not accomplish the latter 
goal, it reasoned, until military traffic sub-
sided. Clement persisted with a mix of charm 
and vigor. His company completed arrange-
ments with the Missouri Pacific and Texas & 
Pacific for through sleepers to the Southwest 
and hinted at plans for entire trains. Not sur-
prisingly, the management of the T & P then 
approached Mercier with a proposal for "the 
first transcontinental route with coast-to-
coast passenger trains" via SP-T&P-MoPac-
PRR. Mercier would have none of it. The dis-
appointed Clement pestered in support of his 
general plan through 1946 and 1947 but in 
the end accomplished only the assignment of 
New York-Oakland and Washington-
Oakland sleepers on the Overland Route and 
New York—Los Angeles sleepers on the 
Golden State Route. 2 2 
Sleeping car service was central to long-
haul passenger business, but the entire nature 
of that trade was clouded by a government 
antitrust suit against the Pullman Company. 
The matter was solved only when participat-
ing railroads, including the SP, purchased 
Pullman Incorporated's subsidiary, the Pull-
man Company, which actually operated the 
cars. The plan was approved on May 6, 1947, 
and took effect the following July 1; SP's inter-
est totaled 8.5 percent.2' 
A l l of this represented substantial change 
for the SP in the postwar environment. The 
flood of military traffic eventually passed, and 
as gasoline and tire rationing ended, the pub-
lic rediscovered its fascination with the auto-
mobile. Bus and air competition also in-
creased, as did that from competing railroads 
that raised speeds, added classier equipment, 
and promoted themselves broadly in the lu-
crative long-haul business. 
The SP responded with its own classy equip-
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The beauty of SP's Santa Barbara station is properly matched by that of the Daylight. 
ment, new trains, and advertising. It also 
brought back popular trains such as the Sun-
tan Special, which took eager excursionists 
from San Francisco to Santa Cruz each Sun-
day of the summer. As equipment became 
available again, SP representatives similarly 
solicited a variety of excursions as expansive 
as the fifty-day Hadacol Caravan promoting 
that popular over-the-counter elixir, annual 
specials from the Bay Area to Sacramento for 
the California state fair, and a flamboyant 
tour from San Francisco to New York for the 
annual convention of the American Legion. 
Football specials took fans from California's 
St. Mary's College to see their favorite team 
play Fordham in New York's Polo Grounds, to 
annual gridiron collisions between the Univer-
sity of Texas and archrival Texas A & M , and in 
1950 six fifteen-car trains were used for the 
Cotton Bowl contest between Rice and South-
ern Methodist. More dignified were special 
trains for the 1945 United Nations conference 
in San Francisco, and more publicized were 
President Harry Truman's campaign specials 
in 1948. The most unusual was likely the 
Lordsburg Mercy Train, which in January, 
1949, rescued nearly four hundred motorists 
who had been stranded by a blizzard near that 
New Mexico community. Finally, numerous 
excursions on the San Diego & Arizona East-
ern, the Northwestern Pacific, and over lines 
of the parent company were handled on behalf 
of camera fans and railroad buffs. 2 4 
After SP's board of directors authorized 
new streamliners and physical improvements 
necessary to advance their schedules, it fell 
to the passenger department to promote the 
company's modernized service. It did so with 
relish. The advertising budget exceeded $1 
million in 1946 and hovered at that level for 
the half-dozen years following the war. "Next 
Time Try the Train" was the theme stressed on 
billboards that were placed to attract the at-
tention of motorists likely to be fatigued and 
otherwise concerned with safety. The SP also 
took on the airlines with an award-winning ad 
that admitted air's primary advantage, speed, 
but argued that "trains have a lot of advan-
tages, too, including economy and plenty of 
room to move around." The SP additionally 
promoted "installment plan" travel through 
credit and missed no opportunity to cooper-
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The Daylight's schedule afforded a splendid ride through gorgeous Southern California. 
ate with radio personalities such as Jana Lee, 
who conducted her "Women's Magazine of 
the A i r " in 1947 from the West Oakland com-
missary. Neither did it miss opportunities 
to ballyhoo travel on SP trains by celebrities 
such as entertainers Jack Benny, Tony Martin, 
George Burns, Donald O'Connor, and Ronald 
Reagan, who arrived together from Holly-
wood at SP's San Francisco station shortly 
before Christmas, 1948. Internally, Claude 
Peterson reminded SP personnel that "We've 
got plenty to sell" and added, "Let's all be 
salesmen." Beyond that, Peterson urged every 
employee to embrace a simple philosophy that 
acknowledged the passenger as "our friend" 
and asked all hands to do whatever was neces-
sary to keep the fine new equipment clean and 
neat. Team effort paid off. The SP in 1950 
won the prestigious annual Railway Passenger 
Service Award of the Federation for Railway 
Progress.25 
The number of revenue passengers handled 
by the SP in 1950 was only half the number of 
1945 but was nearly the same as that of 1929; 
revenues from passengers followed a similar 
trend. The passenger picture, then, was mixed. 
For A . T. Mercier it posed a dilemma. He had 
committed millions of dollars to SP's postwar 
passenger program but the return on this 
investment appeared uncertain. He hedged. 
"Any money we may have in the immediate fu-
ture must be spent for something other than 
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After the war the SP could again ballyhoo its 
popular Suntan Special. 
additional passenger equipment," Mercier 
told D . J . Russell in June, 1948. A few days 
later he expanded on this theme in a letter to 
Rock Island's J. D . Farrington: "I do not feel 
we should obligate ourselves [for new pas-
senger equipment] until we have a somewhat 
better estimate . . . as to the revenues that fol-
low these large expenditures." Mercier mir-
rored his contemporaries on other railroads 
when he complained about government sub-
sidies for vehicular and air modes and urged 
the formulation of "fair competitive condi-
tions." Meanwhile, circumstances demanded 
contraction of at least certain segments of the 
system's passenger offerings. Several trains on 
the Texas & New Orleans were discontinued, 
as was service in Arizona between Tucson and 
Nogales and on the San Diego & Arizona 
Eastern. Even the venerable tourist sleeping 
cars disappeared; the last one on the Golden 
State Route was removed in December, 1950, 
and the final car, on the San Francisco—Los 
Angeles run, was removed on February 14, 
1951. Discontinuances in the six years follow-
ing V-J Day, Mercier noted, saved 4.7 million 
train miles. 2 6 
The decline in passenger volume following 
the end of the war was only one of several 
changes affecting employee numbers, working 
arrangements, and morale. By the end of 1947 
most of the women who had entered the em-
ploy of the SP because of the war as well as 
men who had come back from or who had 
postponed retirements were no longer on the 
payroll; total numbers dropped to 83,346 and 
overtime was rare. These reductions and more 
promised by technological advances such as 
diesel-electric locomotives for road assign-
ments caused nervousness among employees 
covered by labor agreements. Furthermore, 
they argued that their diligent service and 
hard work during the war ought to be recog-
nized through better wages, shorter work 
weeks, and longer vacations. Enginemen con-
sidered further that each diesel road unit 
should have both an engineer and a fireman. 
Several work-rule concessions and wage in-
creases followed. Overall, SP's rates of pay in-
creased by 119 percent during the 1940s, and 
by 1951 forty-nine cents of every operating 
dollar expended by the company was for 
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wages. Nevertheless, the high morale and 
good feelings between management and la-
bor—increased during the common struggle 
of the depression and war—were shaken by 
confrontation and even strikes following V-J 
Day. 2 7 
Just as there were changes in the work place 
so, too, were there changes in SP's corporate 
structure. The Southern Pacific Company had 
been incorporated by an act of the Kentucky 
legislature in 1884, and subsequently had paid 
taxes there as a franchise company. The State 
of Kentucky, however, changed its interpreta-
tion in 1944 to insist that the SP pay an ad va-
lorem tax on nonoperating intangibles (stocks 
and bonds owned by the company). Litigation 
followed, and in the end SP settled with Ken-
tucky but was reincorporated in Delaware 
on September 30, 1947. In other corporate 
matters, the Dawson Railway & Coal Com-
pany was dissolved on October 18, 1948, and 
the Union Belt Railway of Oakland was ac-
quired on November 15, 1948. 2 8 
The investment assets of the "new" com-
pany were noteworthy. In 1950 they included 
the 12,441-mile Southern Pacific Transporta-
tion System plus 2,546 additional miles of af-
filiated railroads (the Northwestern Pacific, 
the San Diego & Arizona Eastern, SPdeMex, 
etc.). They also included: 
Pacific Motor Trucking (100 percent owner-
ship), 
Land companies (4,135,797 acres plus 
4,236 town lots), 
Rio Bravo Oi l (100 percent ownership), 
Los Angeles Union Terminal (100 percent 
ownership), 
Southern Pacific Building Company (100 
percent ownership), 
West Coast Hotel Company (100 percent 
ownership), 
Pacific Fruit Express (50 percent owner-
ship), 
Railroad terminals (12.5 percent to 50 per-
cent ownership), 
Miscellaneous physical properties (100 
percent ownership), and U.S. Treasury 
obligations and securities of other com-
panies. 
In addition, the SP owned 88.34 percent of 
the 1,569-mile St. Louis Southwestern Rail-
29 
way. 
On July 24, 1947, the St. Louis Southwest-
ern emerged from nearly twelve years of bank-
ruptcy. That historic event was all the more 
notable since the road had been able to do it 
without reorganization through a voluntary 
readjustment of its financial structure. In fact, 
on the day Berryman Henwood was dis-
charged as trustee, the company paid $18.5 
million to satisfy all of its creditors and at the 
same time retired three groups of mortgage 
bonds. Moreover, the Cotton Belt was in good 
physical condition. During its years of travail, 
it had laid heavier rail on 665 miles of track, 
installed 191 miles of C T C , and purchased 
heavy steam locomotives, twenty-three diesel 
switchers, and five multiple-unit road diesels 
plus air-conditioned coaches and hundreds of 
freight cars. Business had boomed for the 
road during the war—it was four times 
greater in 1943 than 19 29, the previous peak— 
but war traffic records alone did not explain 
the company's fine accomplishment. Manage-
ment earned much of the credit. The SSW, for 
instance, turned in a highly enviable operating 
ratio of 46.4 in 1943 and averaged 51.8 for 
the war years.3 0 
Ironically, the SP near the end of the war un-
dertook a searching study of its options re-
garding the SSW. Cotton Belt's inability to 
stand alone because of light on-line loadings, 
its recent financial instability, and its "long 
mileage" Los Angeles—Saint Louis route were 
noted as liabilities. However, its value as an 
integral part of an "a l l system route" between 
the Pacific Ocean and the Mississippi River, as 
an essential outlet to and from the Texas & 
New Orleans, and its well-maintained and 
tightly operated property were listed as assets. 
There were other considerations. Should the 
larger road sell its interest in the SSW, the pro-
ceeds could be used to redeem SP's 5 percent 
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bonds. Early in 1947, however, A . T. Mercier 
concurred with the findings of the research 
team: "The Southern Pacific should retain an 
interest in the line and continue to coordinate, 
wherever possible, service and facilities of the 
T & N O and Cotton Belt, and that the Pacific 
Lines and the SSW should continue to work 
for the development of traffic to be inter-
changed between the two for their mutual ad-
vantage." It was a fortuitous decision. The 
SSW renewed dividend payments in 1948, 
$5.00 a share on preferred, and in 1950 autho-
rized that amount for preferred and common 
stock alike. Moreover, it thereafter paid and 
even prepaid various obligations due on the SP.3 1 
Interestingly, SP's investment in the Cotton 
Belt was threatened somewhat by the strategic 
goals of the Santa Fe, which long had cast 
a covetous eye toward Saint Louis. As early 
as 1887 the Santa Fe had purchased the St. 
Louis, Kansas City & Colorado Railroad 
with the hope of extending it to a connection 
with Santa Fe's main line at Kansas City. Con-
struction was made to Union, about sixty 
miles west of Saint Louis, but the Santa Fe lost 
control and the line passed eventually to the 
Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railroad for 
completion. That did not end the Santa Fe's 
interest, however. Its system map for 1930 
showed a projected line to Saint Louis in con-
junction with the Chicago, Burlington & 
Quincy Railroad; Hale Holden recalled that 
"these negotiations were now more than fif-
teen years o l d . " The depression and World 
War II again postponed Santa Fe's plans, but 
before V-J Day it renewed them. This predic-
tably energized most of the railroads entering 
Saint Louis from the west in a campaign of 
opposition. Specifically, the Santa Fe and the 
Burlington wished to acquire a 156-mile line 
between Kansas City and Mexico, Missouri, 
from the Gulf, Mobile & Ohio Railroad; the 
Burlington would then grant the Santa Fe 
rights from Mexico to Saint Louis. Ultimately, 
however, in the summer of 1948, the Interstate 
Commerce Commission denied the applica-
tion, much to the relief of the Cotton Belt and 
its fellow protestants.'2 
Just as it had scrutinized the Cotton Belt, 
SP's management studied prospects offered by 
the Southern Pacific of Mexico. That com-
pany had consistently turned in net losses, al-
though the parent and the Texas & New Or-
leans each derived substantial revenues from 
traffic moving to or from the SPdeMex. Yet it 
was insufficient. As D. J. Russell said, the road 
had "no future, no possibilities." Thus, late in 
1950 SP's management determined to dispose 
of the "West Coast Route," as it was known. A 
year later, on December 21, 1951, the SP sold 
the Mexican government 1,227 miles of rail-
road, rolling stock, materials, supplies, and 
concessions for $12 million. SP's historic in-
vestment in the SPdeMex was $51.7 million; 
against this it had received net revenues from 
overhead (interchange) in the amount of $41 
million, another $12 million from its sale, and 
a tax benefit of $11.9 million for a total of 
$64.9 million. This represented a very disap-
pointing profit of only $13.2 million over 
forty-six years of operation. The SPdeMex 
would be dissolved on August 23, 1955, and 
its remaining assets distributed to the South-
ern Pacific Company. 3 3 
The course of the West Coast Hotel Com-
pany was similar. To stimulate tourist travel 
the SPdeMex had organized this enterprise to 
foster the Plaza del Cortes Hotel at Miramar 
Beach near Guaymas in 1935. Its facilities 
were handsome but profits were spare. Its 
stock was transferred to the Tijuana & Tecate 
Railway in 1940; on September 1, 1945, t n e 
property was leased to Mexico Hotels, Ltd. , 
and sold to that firm nine years later. 3 4 
Meanwhile, SP's managers increasingly 
turned their attention to matters of freight 
transportation. Much of the accumulated 
need for postwar goods had been satisfied by 
the end of 1948. Wholesalers reduced their in-
ventories in 1949 as a result, but a sudden up-
surge in civilian and government buying fol-
lowed the outbreak of the Korean conflict 
SP's managers increasingly turned their attention to matters of freight transportation. A long drag comes off 
the former E P & S W line into El Paso in the late 1940s. 
The postwar building splurge resulted in a heavy forest products business from SP's lines in Oregon. Here 
one of SP's famous Cab-Forward locomotives wrestles tonnage over the Cascade Line near M t . Shasta. 
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in 1950. A "freight car shortage" followed, 
in spite of SP's constant campaign to expand 
its fleet; the company owned approximately 
10,000 more freight cars in 1950 than it had 
at the end of World War II. Revenues from car-
goes hauled in those cars hit a peacetime high 
in 1947. Indeed, the importance of freight to 
SP's corporate health increased impressively 
after the war. Total receipts from freight, reve-
nue tons per train, average cars per train, aver-
age distance hauled, and percentage of contri-
bution to operating revenue all rose. Except 
for L C L business, which in 1950 was only half 
of what it had been at war's end, tonnage in all 
commodity classes remained stable.3 5 
On his retirement at the end of 1951, Ar -
mand (Ted) Mercier could look back on the 
accomplishments of the SP during the postwar 
years with justifiable pride. The property 
was in good shape, new streamliners were in 
service, the road's equipment inventory was 
laudable, and several unproductive activities 
had been trimmed. Furthermore, the SP had 
been able to reduce some of its funded debt 
while paying regular dividends—$4.00 an-
nually from 1946 through 1948, $5.00 each 
year thereafter. And the future looked good. 
Operating revenues for the company in 1951 
were the highest in its history, and 550 new in-
dustries had been located on SP lines in that 
year. Finally, Mercier had the pleasure of turn-
ing over the helm to a trusted subordinate, 
Donald J. Russell. 3 6 
C H A P T E R 1 5 
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"Iron wi l l , coupled with engineering savvy, 
has kept Southern Pacific operational from 
below sea level to 8000 feet above, against 
the worst that the Colorado River and the 
Great Salt Lake and the Richter Scale can 
hurl at its fixed plant."—David P. Morgan 
C L O U D S on the Southern Pacific's horizon in 
1952 were scarce. Its service area was growing 
in population and in relative national promi-
nence; commodities historically important to 
SP's traffic mix continued to promise pro-
digious tonnage; and the property was well 
maintained. The company, it seemed, could 
not fail to prosper. Yet to reach its full poten-
tial, the SP required the strong hand of a truly 
outstanding chief executive. Donald Joseph 
Russell was precisely that man. His leadership 
would prove to be the strongest since the re-
spected Julius Kruttschnitt. 
Born in Denver, Colorado, on January 3, 
1900, Russell grew up in Oregon and Califor-
nia. He served in the Imperial Royal Flying 
Corps (Canada) during World War I, attended 
Stanford University, and entered the employ of 
the SP as timekeeper for a maintenance gang 
in 1920. Russell held numerous positions in 
the engineering and operating departments 
before his appointment as assistant to the 
president in 1941; there was little doubt that 
he was headed for the corner suite in the execu-
tive department. 
Russell's views on managing the property 
were clear and uncomplex. A n axiom ad-
vanced many years before by James J. H i l l — 
and one that Russell may not have been 
aware of—was nevertheless embraced by him: 
" A railroad's success is in direct proportion 
to the closeness with which its affairs are 
looked after." Russell's view was similar, but 
he stated it more colorfully: "Railroading is 
like athletics—you eat and sleep it 24 hours a 
Clouds were scarce on SP's horizon when Donald J. 
Russell took the helm. 
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day or go to work elsewhere." He held that 
standard for himself and expected it of others. 
"The company—he lived and breathed it ," re-
called an associate. Others remembered that 
his was an imperial presidency, that he rarely 
delegated authority, and that he appeared to 
be an awesome figure. They also recalled, 
however, that his "bark was worse than his 
bite," that he was firm but fair, and that he 
was an aggressive, capable, and inventive 
manager. Richard D. Spence, who served as 
vice-president—operations before leaving to 
head Conrail, especially admired Russell's 
"hands-on feel" for the railroad. Indeed, no-
body doubted either his knowledge of the 
property or his ability to spend the company's 
money to the greatest advantage.' 
An SP trainmaster once told the editor of 
Trains Magazine how upset the general office 
became over a snow blockade in the moun-
tains. The rationality of this reaction was lost 
on the journalist, who protested that a heavy 
snowfall represented "an Act of G o d . " Re-
plied the trainmaster, " M r . Russell doesn't be-
lieve in Acts of G o d . " This may explain, in 
part, the chagrin at 65 Market Street when 
the westbound City of San Francisco was ma-
rooned at Yuba Gap just days after Russell 
became president. A fierce storm, which one 
mountain officer called "a wild nightmare," 
began on January 10, 1952, and lasted until 
the sixteenth. Before it was over, 84 inches of 
new snow whipped by raging winds created 
mammoth drifts and fearsome slides. The 
City hit one of these slides on the thirteenth 
and could not be extricated before snow inun-
dated it. For three days the elements defeated 
all of SP's valiant efforts to free the 196 pas-
sengers and 30 crewmen. Sadly, the engineer 
on a relief plow train was killed in another 
slide, but fortunately no serious health prob-
lems arose among the passengers, and on the 
sixteenth a rescue train finally delivered them 
to Oakland. Another three days were required 
to free the City itself. President Russell praised 
the unceasing efforts of company personnel, 
but nobody doubted he was sorely displeased 
An act of God; Russell frowned on such. 
that the honor and reputation of the SP had 
been besmirched.2 
Mother Nature struck the SP again six 
months later when "an earthquake of notable 
severity" hit south-central California on July 
21, 1952. The municipality of Tehachapi was 
nearly demolished, and SP's important San 
Joaquin line was closed by collapsed tunnels 
and numerous slides. Over a thousand men 
and approximately 175 heavy machines toiled 
twenty-five days, and more than $2 million 
was expended before the line could be re-
opened. Russell himself spent considerable 
time on the scene and served to "expedite 
matters." Nobody was more appreciative than 
Fred Gurley, whose Santa Fe Railway shared 
the important artery. Russell was clearly proud 
of the way the company had responded to this 
emergency, but he also expected that kind 
of response to be routine: "The things that 
people look on as great catastrophes," he said, 
"are commonplace with us. We get out and fix 
them.'" 
It was that kind of mentality—"no problem 
is too big to overcome"—that Russell wished 
to see in his subordinates. Yet he was not na-
ive. The first requisite of a successful manager, 
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he told students at Stanford University's Grad-
uate School of Business in the summer of 19 5 6, 
was "the ability to grasp specific situations 
quickly and relate them to broad, long-range 
considerations." Russell perceived that these 
skills, inadequately developed in otherwise 
talented officers, might be made to flourish by 
sending them to college for what he called 
"broadening." The SP paid full salaries as well 
as all expenses for those managers selected. 
During one phase of the program in 1958, 
seventy-nine persons were enrolled in ad-
vanced management, engineering, and liberal 
arts courses at colleges and universities across 
the country. "We are happy of course, to be 
able to give more education to some of our 
people," Russell noted, "but the primary pur-
pose also represents a hardheaded business 
effort." 4 
Russell also expected the SP's subsidiaries 
to perform at the same high levels as the 
parent, and he sent their executives back to 
school as well. Indeed, the first candidate for 
the program was Harold J. McKenzie, Texas 
& New Orleans's chief engineer, who was sent 
to the Advanced Management Program at 
Harvard in 1950. McKenzie then went to the 
Cotton Belt as executive vice-president, be-
coming its president on July 1, 1951. He re-
placed F. W. Green, who had replaced Daniel 
Upthegrove in 1947. Russell had grown impa-
tient with the elderly Green, however, because 
he seemed unable or unwilling to vigorously 
prosecute programs using SSW earnings other-
wise subject to excess-profits tax. McKenzie 
had no such difficulties. A graduate of Texas 
A & M college, he had begun his career with 
the engineering department at Houston in 
1926, served as project engineer for the Pecos 
River Bridge undertaking during World War II, 
and became T & N O ' s chief engineer in 1945. 
McKenzie was an excellent choice for the 
Cotton Belt presidency. He had a fine sense of 
humor as well as a flair for working with 
people and getting them to "pull in harness." 
One subordinate explained his success in turn-
ing the Cotton Belt into a most admirable 
property: "McKenzie knew that he did not 
know everything. He was not ashamed to learn 
from anybody, anywhere. He consulted all per-
sons involved, asked for their advice, pondered 
it, and then made his own decision." 5 
McKenzie's line of command and marching 
orders were clearly stated; he was to answer 
only to the chairman of the Cotton Belt board 
of directors (A. T. Mercier, and after Janu-
ary 1, 1952, D . J . Russell), and he was to do 
his utmost to streamline the Cotton Belt and 
maximize its profits. That process included, 
among other things, combining, as quickly as 
possible, the St. Louis Southwestern Railway 
and the redundant St. Louis Southwestern 
Railway of Texas. On December 18, 1953, the 
ICC authorized the SSW to lease and operate 
all railroad properties of the Texas company, 
which itself ceased to exist as an operating 
property on March 1 , 1954. Such might other-
wise have violated the sensibilities of the 
proud Texans, but McKenzie smoothed the 
issue by moving SSW's corporate headquar-
ters from Saint Louis to Tyler. A new $1.5 
million general office building opened there 
in 1955. 6 
Since the Cotton Belt had only a small 
bonded indebtedness and a handsome surplus 
for dividends, McKenzie was in the enviable 
position of paying cash for improvements such 
as C T C , new rail, and a fleet of rolling stock. 
The C T C program, begun in 1943, was com-
pleted in 1956, when the entire main line 
from Illmo, Missouri, to Corsicana, Texas, 
was so equipped. Yard improvements at Valley 
Junction in East Saint Louis, Jonesboro, and 
Tyler; welded rail for major portions of the 
main line; hot journal detectors; and mobile 
inspection units at East Saint Louis and Pine 
Bluff all represented impressive plant im-
provements. New cars in traditional f o r m — 
box, flat, and gondola—were joined by spe-
cial equipment—bulkhead flats, insulated 
boxcars, flats for trailers, and eventually tri-
level flats for automobiles.7 
McKenzie also vigorously prosecuted Cot-
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H . J. McKenzie happily authorized innovative ad-
vertising to maximize profits. 
ton Belt's program of dieselization. Road 
switchers from Alco and road and switching 
units from G M ' s Electro Motive Division 
(EMD) were present in sufficient numbers by 
the end of 1953 to write finis to the era of 
steam. Ironically, the final run was made by an 
elderly 2-8-0, number 502, which without 
fanfare delivered a work train from Corsicana 
to Tyler on October 28, 1953. A few of 
CONNECTION ro s f>r 
Cotton Belt's smaller locomotives and about 
half of its handsome fleet of 4-8-4S were sold 
to parent SP where they rolled out their final 
miles. In gestures of goodwill, the Cotton Belt 
distributed bells from dismantled locomotives 
to area churches and happily donated 4-8-4 
number 819, built by the Pine Bluff Shops in 
1943, to the city of Pine Bluff for display.8 
With an excellent physical plant and 
new power and equipment for his railroad, 
McKenzie turned to the matter of industrial 
development. Attractive sites were purchased 
at North Little Rock, Texarkana, Waco, Tyler, 
and Bossier City (across the Red River from 
Shreveport); special attention was given Fort 
Worth and Dallas, where several valuable 
tracts were acquired. "We definitely need 
more industries to strengthen our company 
and we are going to do what is necessary 
to locate them on our line," McKenzie told 
the Cotton Belt's far-flung sales organization 
in 1955. 9 
McKenzie had reason to be concerned about 
on-line business. More than 60 percent of 
Cotton Belt's traffic was overhead, and there 
was a clear and steady erosion of certain tradi-
tional local traffic—tomatoes, roses, live-
stock, and even cotton. The road was pleased, 
however, to record significant movements of 
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The end of steam on the Cotton Belt came in 1953. 
soybeans and a growing volume of rice, espe-
cially to and from Stuttgart, Arkansas. 
Even the Cotton Belt's involvement with 
trailer-on-flat car (TOFC) reflected efforts to 
retain or recapture business local to the rail-
road. Begun on September 1, 1954, SSWs 
piggyback operations served ramps at thir-
teen on-line locations. Service was extended 
through interline agreements with twenty-one 
other carriers in 1956, and during the follow-
ing season the Cotton Belt and SP joined with 
others to forge transcontinental T O F C ser-
vice. The SSW handled approximately 64,000 
tons of piggyback traffic in 1956. 1 0 
By the mid-1950s shippers acknowledged 
the Cotton Belt's growing reputation for de-
pendable service, speed, and concentration on 
the needs of freight traffic. The rewards were 
sweet: increased market share in its own ter-
ritory and, in close cooperation with parent 
SP, in the highly competitive transcontinental 
business, too. By 1967 Cotton Belt speedsters 
aggregated nearly as many miles of " 5 0 mph 
or over" running as did much larger roads 
such as the Chicago, Burlington & Quincy 
and the Union Pacific. Its premier trains in-
cluded the eastbound Colton Block, west-
bound Motor Special, and, of course, the 
most venerable of them all, the westbound 
Blue Streak Merchandise." 
The BSM celebrated its twenty-fifth birth-
day in October, 1956. South Texas and Cali-
fornia L C L cars had long since been added to 
the train and, indeed, it had evolved to serve 
both transcontinental and regional patrons. 
During the 1960s the BSM frequently held 
the title as the world's fastest freight train; this 
was ballyhooed far and wide through Cotton 
Belt's eye-catching advertisements and through 
its aggressive sales department. Small wonder 
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the BSM became one of the country's best-
known freight trains. 1 2 
If the Cotton Belt was willing to go head 
to head with all comers in competition for 
freight traffic, it took quite another approach 
to its marginal passenger operations. Con-
ductors and engineers still took pride in 
bringing the company's few passenger trains 
" i n on time," and in 1957 the SSW assisted 
Warner Brothers Studio and motion picture 
personalities Andy Griffith and Patricia Neal 
in filming " A Face in the C r o w d " aboard a 
Cotton Belt train and at the depot in Piggot, 
Arkansas. Nevertheless, the end of the pas-
senger train era on the Cotton Belt rapidly ap-
proached. Service to Memphis ended in 1952, 
and by early 1956 Cotton Belt's sole operation 
was one daily train between Saint Louis and 
Texarkana with an SSW bus connection to 
Tyler. Even that was tenuous. The Cotton Belt 
vacated the huge Saint Louis Union Depot on 
January 1, 1958; buses shuttled the few pas-
sengers between East Saint Louis and Saint 
Louis. Pullman service ended on February 8, 
1959, with the remaining mixed trains having 
been discontinued, on the first day of the year. 
The end came with little remark and no cere-
mony when trains 7 and 8 completed their re-
spective runs between East Saint Louis and 
Pine Bluff on November 29, 1959." 
During the years that Cotton Belt was ter-
minating passenger operations, one of its im-
portant subsidiaries, the Southwestern Trans-
portation Company, expanded its trucking 
services. Begun in October, 1928, with a 
route structure of under one hundred miles, 
Southwestern Transportation thirty years later 
owned 550 pieces of equipment, employed 
nearly 600 persons, had operating authority 
in all six states served by the Cotton Belt, and 
sported new terminals at Memphis, Dallas, 
Texarkana, and Tyler. It also teamed with its 
parent in providing T O F C service. Indeed, it 
had toyed with the piggyback concept as early 
as 1930 but did not mature its interest until 
the mid-1950s, when coordinated St. Louis 
Southwestern—Southwestern Transportation 
SWT joined with its parent, the Cotton Belt, to 
provide T O F C service as early as 1930. 
T O F C service was established to on-line 
points in addition to Houston and San A n -
tonio on the SP. Although the trucking line al-
ways stood in the shadow of its larger railroad 
parent, its employees took pride in the com-
pany motto—"perfect delivery"—and in the 
several National Safety Council awards that 
the company earned. 1 4 
McKenzie and his subordinates implicitly 
understood that work habits, levels of produc-
tivity, morale, and attitudes regarding safety 
are inextricably linked. Consequently, they 
were understandably elated when SSW earned 
three gold and two lesser Harriman safety 
awards during the 1950s and 1960s. They 
were likewise pleased with news from the au-
ditor's office. In the fifteen years following 
1953, the SSW doubled the tonnage it carried 
and more than doubled its net income. Fur-
thermore, it did so with only half the number 
of employees in 1968 as the company had 
required in 1954. SSW's operating ratio re-
flected this: it averaged only 63.74 f ° r t n e 
fifteen-year period. There was additional 
pleasant news. Cotton Belt provided a 6.63 
percent rate of return on investment for 1954, 
but the rate stood at an impressive 12.11 per-
cent in 1967. Some SP vice-presidents and de-
partment heads thought McKenzie "got away 
with murder" in his annual requests for SSW 
capital and maintenance projects, but D . J. 
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Russell found little to cheer about in the performance of Pacific Electric. 
Russell, in approving them, understood that 
money spent on the Cotton Belt would return 
a handsome profit. Indeed, Yale University's 
Kent T. Healy argued that the St. Louis South-
western was the most efficiently run railroad 
in the country. 1 5 
Russell found little to cheer about in the 
performance of another subsidiary, however. 
Pacific Electric had enjoyed a renaissance of 
business during World War II when every 
piece of its equipment had been pressed into 
service. In fact, a new rail branch—from Ter-
minal Island to the Los Angeles—San Pedro 
line—alone required 116 cars daily to carry 
shipyard workers to and from their jobs dur-
ing those hectic years. In 1945, as another ex-
ample, PE carried more than 109 million pas-
sengers. Yet after V-J Day patronage plunged 
to prewar levels. Faced with declining de-
mand, worn plant and equipment, and a par-
ent that was openly skeptical of rewards from 
further heavy investment, Pacific Electric's 
president, O. A . Smith, was confronted with 
only difficult alternatives.16 
The company's problems were deeply rooted 
in the changing landscape of Los Angeles 
and in the changing patterns of American 
transport. Pacific Electric's management had 
early recognized the threat that motor vehicles 
posed to company fortunes, but rather than 
submitting to corporate handwringing, it had 
purchased buses as early as 1917 to serve as a 
low-cost feeder system to the main rail routes. 
Twenty years later studies by PE and by the 
California Railroad Commission even urged 
substitution of buses for certain rail lines; sev-
eral of these recommendations were imple-
mented between 1938 and 1943. Subse-
quently an SP study pointed out that impaired 
clearances on several routes and high mainte-
nance costs of the "electrical overhead sys-
tem" argued in favor of a ten-year program 
for dieselization of freight service and an ac-
celerated time table for elimination of all elec-
tric service in favor of motor coaches. The 
process began in 1950; buses replaced rail 
cars on several lines, "one-man" passenger 
cars were employed for most of the remaining 
electric service, and diesels replaced electrics 
on specified freight routes. Pacific Electric put 
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Pacific Electric conveyed all of its passenger transit 
operations to Metropolitan Coach Lines as of Oc-
tober 1,1953. 
on a happy face for its golden jubilee in 1952, 
but prospects were bleak. 1 7 
Dramatic changes followed. On October 1, 
1953, after intensive negotiations, Pacific 
Electric conveyed all of its passenger transit 
operations to the newly formed Metropolitan 
Coach Lines for $7.2 million. Metropolitan 
intended to convert all remaining PE rail pas-
senger operations to bus and in 1954-55 did 
so on the Los Angeles—Hollywood—Beverly 
Hills and Los Angeles—Glendale—Burbank 
lines, but failed to win regulatory agency ap-
proval for the remaining four routes. Profits 
eluded the Metropolitan Lines, however, and 
on April 1, 1958, the tax-supported Los A n -
geles Metropolitan Transport Authority took 
over. The axe fell quickly. The "Big Red Cars" 
made their last trips to San Pedro and to Bell-
flower in 1958, to Watts in 1959, and the final 
operation—to Long Beach—ended on April 9, 
1961. In the process Pacific Electric became 
"freight only" and diesel powered. As late as 
1953, fully 50 percent of its revenue had come 
from passenger operations, although PE at 
that time generated freight revenues from 900 
industries at 117 stations; in 1956 it handled 
170,900 carloads and employed over 2,000 
persons. Nevertheless, Pacific Electric's life 
as an independent entity soon ended; on A u -
<®s£> 
T 
gust 12, 1965, the Pacific Electric was merged 
into the Southern Pacific.' 8 
Many mourned the passage of the "World's 
Greatest Electric Railway System," and some 
charged SP with "years of . . . neglect" in its 
administration of Pacific Electric's affairs. 
Others believed that PE's decision to convert 
electric rail passenger operations to motor 
coach could be explained solely by sinister 
collusions between parent SP and bus-builder 
General Motors—although Pacific Electric 
purchased G M vehicles only after World War 
II and then only because it offered a better 
product coupled with attractive financing ar-
rangements. In fact, rail passenger car miles 
had peaked in the mid - i920s ; PE's passenger 
bus miles surpassed rail in 1940, and in 1950 
its buses carried more passengers than did the 
electric cars. This said nothing of total pas-
senger traffic that moved increasingly by pri-
vate automobile—a fact that was central to 
PE's grim financial picture. After 1923 Pacific 
Electric had posted annual deficits until 
World War II. Interline freight divisions favor-
ing PE resulted, however, in generally offset-
ting advantages for SP's system at large; this 
consideration was overriding until PE faced 
the need to renew plant and equipment fol-
lowing the war. Meanwhile, the ability of Pa-
cific Electric's rail operation to compete was 
impaired by the construction of highways on 
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either side of its private rights-of-way and by a 
plethora of right-angle grade crossings as the 
public roadway system exploded. Accidents 
followed as a matter of course; there was a 
public outcry; the company was forced to 
lengthen schedules, which put its rail service 
at a disadvantage. Indeed, the California 
Highway Department had the last word when 
its planners rejected Pacific Electric's sugges-
tion that rights-of-way for high-speed, grade-
separated electric passenger service be in-
cluded in the Los Angeles freeway network. 1 9 
President Russell found more pleasurable 
notice in events more than two thousand 
miles to the east. Indeed, the mood was mea-
surably upbeat in 1954 when New Orleans 
celebrated the official opening of its long-
awaited and impressive new Union Passenger 
Terminal to serve seven railroads and their 
forty-eight daily trains. The new station 
produced a monumental relocation project, 
replaced five older stations, eliminated 144 
grade crossings, and cost a staggering $57 
million. The station building alone cost over 
$16 million. SP's Russell and the other rail-
road presidents who were there for the dedi-
cation on May 1 may have had a bittersweet 
reaction, however, knowing that the railroads 
would pay for this new facility while tax-
payers would foot the bill for the New Or-
leans airport and terminal only a few miles 
away. SP's share of the cost amounted to 
16.5 percent of the total. 2 0 
The opening of the New Orleans Union 
Passenger Terminal generally reflected SP's 
positive feelings regarding passenger service in 
1954. Film and television celebrities such as 
Jack Benny, Don McNei l l , Kim Novak, and 
Forrest Tucker continued to ride SP's finest 
trains; additional new equipment—including 
dome lounges—was on order or had been de-
livered; the Chicago Cubs baseball team still 
arrived in Mesa, Arizona, each year aboard 
the Golden State Limited for spring training; 
and Claude E. Peterson, in charge of SP's pas-
senger business, was featured in both Business 
Week and Modern Railroads for his im-
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The passenger railroads paid for the new station 
opened in New Orleans on May 1, 1954. 
Rita Hayworth arrived in San Francisco aboard an 
SP train for the filming of "Pal Joey" in 1957. 
pressive efforts in promotion of the company's 
trains. There was other visible evidence of SP's 
enthusiasm for passenger business: modern 
city ticket offices were opened in Los Angeles 
and San Francisco; the company had stream-
lined its ticketing system; and SP embraced a 
"family fare plan" to promote vacation travel. 
Its fleet of premier long-distance trains— 
the Shasta Daylight, City of San Francisco, 
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In 1954, a lot of new passenger equipment—including dome lounges—was on order or had been delivered. 
Golden State Limited, and Sunset Limited— 
maintained the popularity of SP's "Four Great 
Routes West" by catering to patrons who were 
interested in comfort, convenience, and ser-
vice. Lucius Beebe, the writer, bon vivant, and 
rail enthusiast extraordinaire, lavished praise 
on several SP trains, especially the Golden 
State and Sunset. Furthermore, the dining car 
service, however costly, maintained its reputa-
tion for high quality. In 1954 SP also began to 
operate "hamburger gr i l l " or cafeteria cars on 
certain trains in an attempt to reduce expenses 
and gain revenues from those who considered 
dining car meals too expensive. And, for those 
who wanted their own automobiles when 
they arrived at their destination, the SP experi-
mented briefly with what it called "Private 
Auto Piggyback" between Portland and Oak-
land and Los Angeles.2 1 
Passenger specials in varying forms re-
mained popular throughout the 1950s and 
into the next decade. On the Texas & New 
Orleans they included Cub Scout Specials to 
Houston, annual Christmas Orphans Specials 
from San Antonio to outlying points, as well 
as the annual Fun Tours to New Orleans 
Mardi Gras festivities. On the SP itself they 
included forty-five trainloads of Boy Scouts in 
1953 to an annual jamboree in California, 
several special trains for the i 9 6 0 Winter 
Olympics at Squaw Valley, California, popular 
Reno Fun Trains, as well as campaign trains 
for Harry S Truman, Dwight D. Eisenhower, 
Adlai E. Stevenson, John F. Kennedy, and 
Richard M . Nixon. Less spectacular but of 
great importance locally were specials on the 
T & N O that carried workers to their jobs near 
Lake Charles, Louisiana, when floods blocked 
highways in 1958 and in Oregon during 1956 
when the SP transported school children from 
Scholfield Road to Reedsport after mud slides 
closed roads. The most remarkable special of 
all, however, was that which carried Soviet 
Premier Nikita S. Krushchev and his entou-
rage plus accompanying newsmen (over four 
hundred persons) aboard an eighteen-car 
train along the Coast Route from Los Angeles 
to San Francisco on September 20, 1959. 
Krushchev obviously enjoyed the experience. 
"This is a fine train and a nice route," he told 
Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, and praised 
the dining car service, commenting especially 
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Russell insisted on Hamburger Gri l l cars after he 
watched passengers leave the train during a mail 
stop at Eugene to purchase sandwiches at a nearby 
cafe. 
on SP's famous salad and the tasty cornbread. 
The Soviet contingent fooled the commissary 
department, though, by ordering gin instead 
of vodka. 2 2 
Sparkling equipment, innovative marketing, 
and newsworthy special trains notwithstand-
ing, all was not well with SP's passenger 
operations. Except for the Korean war years 
of 1951 — 52, the SP suffered annual declines 
in the number of passengers handled from 
1946 to i 9 6 0 . The average distance each pas-
senger traveled fell as did the ratio of ticket 
revenues to total operations revenues. SP 
sought fiscal relief by discontinuing little-used 
trains, but the issue proved volatile. For in-
stance, when the company sought to remove a 
pair of trains between Grants Pass, Oregon, 
and Dunsmuir, California, the overall ques-
tion of SP's interest in passenger service was 
raised by protestants. Russell was characteris-
tically direct: "We feel that the logical mea-
sure of the need for a passenger train is 
whether it is sufficiently patronized to pay at 
least its out-of-pocket cost of operation." To 
be sure, as more and more former patrons 
chose alternate means of transport, passenger 
trains became a greater financial burden for 
the SP and increasingly an emotional issue for 
the public. 2 3 
SP's passenger philosophy during the last 
half of the 1950s was to protect the reputation 
of its premier trains, to cover out-of-pocket 
costs on the secondary trains, and to eliminate 
all others. There were times, though, when 
Russell felt his subordinates were not pressing 
the issue with adequate vigor. Early in 1955 
he told Claude Peterson to make "a realistic 
short and long range forecast of the passenger 
service" that SP might expect to maintain. In 
this regard, Russell reminded Peterson it was 
not likely "that the mail wil l continue on 
our trains indefinitely." He was especially 
concerned that money not be wasted on 
new diesel locomotives if SP intended to 
significantly reduce its passenger train miles. 
Peterson counseled against "drastic action," 
proposing instead a systematic reduction 
through 1957. Russell's response was blunt: 
"I am disappointed in your long range think-
ing on this subject, and had hoped you would 
take a more realistic and aggressive approach 
thereto." A further indication of Russell's feel-
ing came a few months later when the pas-
senger department was downgraded and 
merged with public relations.2 4 
Russell's pessimism regarding the future of 
railroad passenger business was based on his 
perceptions of the relative advantages enjoyed 
by the train's principal competitors—the au-
tomobile and the airliner. "There will never be 
a thing as valuable as rubber tires going where 
the people are," Russell said in noting the 
flexibility of the automobile for the short 
haul. It did not end there. Congress had estab-
lished the first federal highway program in 
1916 and forty years later passed the Federal-
Aid Highway Act, which inaugurated the in-
terstate highway network that gave the auto-
mobile an advantage for long-distance travel 
as well. Similarly, commercial aviation, which 
profited greatly from technological advances 
as a result of World War II, grew astonishingly 
during the late 1940s and throughout the fol-
lowing decade. Russell's views, molded in part 
by his experiences in the Imperial Royal Fly-
ing Corps during World War I, were in ad-
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vance of conventional wisdom—a fact that 
frequently put him at odds with his fellow 
railroad leaders and with the public at large. 
As early as 1942 he had warned that pas-
senger revenues provided only a small portion 
of SP's income but consumed a disproportion-
ate percentage of management's time and the 
company's resources. In 1956 Russell ob-
served that losses in passenger patronage came 
despite the millions of dollars expended after 
the war to provide the finest trains in the 
country. In 1955 alone, he continued, the SP 
had lost $4 million in the dining car service 
because, as Russell noted, the company "tried 
to give the best we could for what people 
could afford to pay." Yet the slippage in pas-
senger numbers continued. "It's just a change 
in the American way of life," said the SP presi-
dent. "You can't make people do what they 
don't want to." The "jet plane will spell the 
end of the transcontinental [passenger] train"; 
the "Pullman car will be extinct within 20 
years," Russell predicted in 1957. 2 5 
Even the irrepressible Claude Peterson had 
to admit that "the long-term outlook for pas-
senger travel" was not good, although like 
Russell he expected continued need for short-
distance trains in urban areas. Both men 
agreed that the SP would provide "trains 
which the public needs . . . and will support 
by actual use" and both pledged in 1956 to 
operate those same trains as "the finest in the 
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Khrushchev's entourage confounded SP's commissary personnel by ordering gin instead of vodka. 
Lightly patronized trains such as the Gila Tomahawk, running in Arizona between Bowie and Globe, did 
not pay out-of-pocket costs. 
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SP's 1948 study spelled doom for the unconventional Cab-Forwards used to hurry perishables over the 
Sierra Nevada from Roseville. 
country." Results were mixed. During the 
1958 vacation season business was up signifi-
cantly on the Sunset Limited and the Golden 
State but down disappointingly on the Shasta 
Daylight and Coast Daylight. Russell insisted 
that unremunerative trains and service be cur-
tailed. At the same time SP initiated a pro-
gram of selling airline tickets at locations 
along the SP where the air carriers had no 
offices. "This , " said the SP, "is in line with our 
policy of giving customers a complete travel 
service" and keeping "them coming back to 
SP ticket offices." Russell's determination to 
cut costs and the company's campaign to sell 
international airline tickets appeared to some, 
however, as duplicitous efforts to get out of 
the passenger train business. In California, 
Arizona, and Oregon, state regulatory bodies 
frequently denied SP's discontinuance applica-
tions and insisted that the company continue 
to operate money-losing and lightly patron-
ized trains. Ironically, public sentiment hard-
ened against train discontinuances even as 
travelers abandoned the rails. The SP pro-
claimed "We Want to Run Passenger Trains" 
but warned it was "only sensible to discon-
tinue those trains which so few people use 
that the trains obviously are no longer 
needed." The public, however, was not per-
suaded. It perceived that the SP embraced 
a policy of wholesale abandonment of the 
trains. SP's general advertising, some ob-
served, now featured the advantages of its 
freight service as well as its passenger offer-
ings—a distinct break with the past. The 
issue was volatile and acrimonious debate 
would persist through the decade following. 2 6 
Meanwhile, after a slow start, SP moved to 
effect the complete dieselization of its opera-
tion. SP's lethargy in this matter is explained 
by the presence of strong-minded steam-
oriented men in the mechanical department 
and by the fleet of modern GS and A C loco-
motives that it had purchased during the 
1930s and 1940s. The die was cast, however, 
in 1948 when the company completed an ex-
haustive motor power survey that projected 
a gross savings of $66.7 million following 
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dieselization accomplished in an orderly fash-
ion over a ten-year period. The plan would be 
executed, in part, on the basis of internal re-
search dealing with steam locomotive mainte-
nance procedures. For instance, SP found that 
although higher standards of maintenance 
were applied to passenger locomotives, the 
cost of maintaining freight locomotives was 
more than 60 percent greater per ton mile; and 
that, in terms of locomotive ton miles, those 
engines running on level terrain and those pull-
ing light loads cost less to repair than those 
working mountain grades or pulling heavy 
loads. In other words, the intensity of use and 
not locomotive miles or locomotive ton miles 
was the criterion used to determine mainte-
nance procedures and costs. The same crite-
rion would be employed to determine retire-
ment patterns for SP's steam locomotive 
fleet.27 
SP's steam locomotive retirement program 
thus considered the age and size of the ma-
chines, but these factors were not controlling. 
The company had found that the age of a lo-
comotive did not contribute to high repair 
costs if it was properly maintained; and it also 
determined that heavy locomotives, because 
of more intense use during their overall life pe-
riods, could not be expected to last as long as 
smaller types less intensively utilized. Conse-
240 S O U T H E R N P A C I F I C , I Q O I - 1 9 8 5 
The old and the new; the new would win out. 
quently, elderly and lighter locomotives could 
be expected to remain on the roster after 
heavier and in some cases newer engines were 
gone. Maximum annual savings per loco-
motive, predicted SP planners, could be real-
ized by dieselizing freight districts having 
heavy grades; conversely, minimum savings 
could be expected from replacing steam on 
the San Francisco—San Jose commute line. 
Planners similarly recommended the gradual 
replacement of steam for switching, local 
freight, and secondary passenger assignments. 
Finally, they also urged the full dieselization of 
the San Diego & Arizona Eastern by 1956, 
and the Northwestern Pacific and T & N O 
in 1957. 2 8 
Actually, the need for new power on the 
T & N O was relatively greater than on the Pa-
cific Lines. In 1948, when the first diesel road 
units arrived, the average age of T & N O ' s 450 
locomotives was 43.1 years. By the end of 
1952 the road had 212 diesels; three years 
later only 34 steamers remained, including 
nine 0-6-os and seven 2-10-2S (T&NO's GS 
engines already had gone to the Pacific Lines). 
The last steam locomotive in road service on 
the T & N O took a train from Avondale to La-
fayette on December 23, 1956, and a few 
weeks into the new year the last of T & N O 
steam locomotives was retired. 2 9 
Dieselization on the Pacific Lines followed a 
similar pattern. Over 90 percent of through 
freights on the Sunset Route between Los A n -
geles and El Paso were diesel powered by early 
1952, and at the end of the next year SP's Pa-
cific Lines owned more diesel units than 
steam locomotives. Following the 1948 plan, 
SP retained steam for much of its passenger 
service—handling 64.2 percent of passenger 
miles as late as 1952. Savings in passenger ser-
vice were not as dramatic as in freight, and, 
moreover, President Russell frowned on spend-
ing money for passenger units if SP was going 
to trim its offerings in that area. Steam, never-
theless, was on its last legs. The era of external 
combustion ended on the north end of the 
The Russell Years 
A frequent scene along SP lines during the mid-1950s. Here an Alco switcher lugs a " tra in" of locomotives 
from scrapper. 
Portland Division on October 5, 1955, when 
4-10-2 number 5021 handled a freight train 
from Brooklyn Yard to Eugene. The ACs were 
still found wrestling tonnage on the Modoc 
while GS and 4-8-2 locomotives handled the 
commuter fleet, but orders for new diesels in 
1955 and 1956 plus an unexpected downturn 
in the economy promised to end it all. A C 
number 4211 was the last cab-forward to 
handle revenue freight, from Oakland to 
Roseville, on November 30, 1956; GS num-
ber 4430 drew the last steam-powered com-
mute on January 22, 1957. The operating 
department early in 1957 anticipated that 
sixteen heavy and forty-three light steam lo-
comotives "which had remaining mileage" 
would be required to see the SP through "the 
peak season" of 1958, although the SP actu-
ally declared itself "fully dieselized" at the end 
of 1957. It did agree, however, to operate a se-
ries of railfan excursions in 1958, the last 
being an emotional weekend trip to Reno on 
October 18 — 19 using GS 4460. Then it was 
over. The SP and its subsidiaries fittingly do-
nated sixty locomotives for display in honor 
of an era now passed. Yet not even the most 
hardened industrial engineer would argue that 
there was any substitute for the sight, sound, 
and wonder of those awesome steel giants 
under steam.5 0 
The capital requirements necessary for 
dieselization were stupendous, but Russell 
correctly observed that "the investment was 
worth every cent." The diesel proved to be 
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Before the era of steam in commute service ended in 1957, magnificent GS locomotives replaced older and 
lighter power. 
more efficient than steam. More importantly, 
steam required massive service facilities and a 
huge attending labor force that the diesel did 
not. Steam power, in fact, served to point up 
one of the industry's trying liabilities—it was 
at once capital intensive and labor intensive. 
Russell saw no immediate way to avoid the 
constant need for massive infusions of capital, 
but he did set out to "get rid of bodies." Diesel-
ization certainly reduced the number of em-
ployees necessary for the company to do its 
work; Russell was pleased by this and looked 
elsewhere for opportunities to reduce the 
work force. He was, for instance, enraged 
when an internal study showed that an aver-
age of thirty-three persons handled or, in 
Russell's word "touched," a company requisi-
tion. A streamlined system, instituted shortly 
thereafter, reduced the number who 
"touched" the requisition to five—with a cor-
respondingly smaller number of persons on 
the payroll. " A large number of employees," 
said Russell, was "fine in a time when wages 
were low" and when there was little modal 
competition. It was not "fine," however, in an 
era of escalating wages and intense modal 
competition." 
Russell constantly looked for better ways to 
do business. He complained bitterly that "the 
railroad industry was far behind others" in 
the area of research, and under his direction 
SP's own Bureau of Transportation Research 
and the Department of Research and Mechani-
cal Standards were nurtured. Additionally, he 
engaged Stanford Research Institute in 1953 
to search for a cure to the constant problem of 
freight claims. "I wanted PhDs who knew 
nothing about railroads to study the prob-
lem," Russell explained. Two years later the 
institute and SP's own Sacramento shops 
unveiled the prototype of what soon would 
be called the "Hydra-Cushion" freight car, 
which featured hydraulic dampening devices 
to reduce coupling and train slack impact. 
The results were marvelous. During a six-
month test in which the car hauled only auto-
mobile windshields, no claim was filed by 
shippers. Early in 1958 SP sold the Hydra-
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Cushion rights and patents to private manu-
facturers; consequently, the entire national car 
fleet benefited from the new technology. SP 
also looked to SRI for advice on the appli-
cation of magnetic drum data storage devices 
for various accounting and car-reporting 
functions.' 2 
Russell was equally interested in capitaliz-
ing on the dramatic growth that had occurred 
in SP's service area during the fifteen-year 
period following 1940. SP's industrial de-
partment focused on California, where the 
increase in economic expansion was most dra-
matic, but did not ignore the rest of the com-
pany's sprawling route structure that served 
what SP called the "Golden Empire." The 
fruits of these efforts were sweet. Russell 
gleefully reported that "new industries, each 
requiring a spur track, are being located along 
the Southern Pacific's rail lines—at the rate of 
I-V2 a day in 1955." Four years later the SP 
led all rail carriers in the number of new in-
dustries located along its lines." 
This phenomenal growth plus the burgeon-
ing development of previously established in-
dustries placed great stress on SP's freight car 
fleet. The company responded dramatically— 
spending $267 million to acquire 46,604 cars 
in the ten years following World War II. This, 
in addition to the company's stringent policy 
of maintenance (the percentage of unservicea-
ble cars in 1955 was a mere 1.9), increased 
SP's carrying capacity by nearly one-half.'4 
Traditional as well as specialized cars were 
employed to handle SP's growing volume of 
revenue freight during the 1950s; the total for 
1956 even exceeded that of 1943, the peak 
year of World War II traffic. The portion of 
operating revenue attributed to freight rose 
similarly, to 91.4 in 1959. Exotic shipments 
such as fractionating towers, massive gener-
ators, and even miniature submarines gained 
headlines, but SP's bread-and-butter freight 
revenues continued to come from manufac-
turers and products of mines, forests, and 
agriculture: automobile parts; set-up autos; 
copper concentrates and anodes; iron ore; pe-
troleum and chemical products; logs, lumber, 
and paper; and, food products ranging from 
bananas and raisins to lemons and oranges.'5 
Traffic in bulk commodities generally in-
creased or remained stable during this period, 
but time-sensitive merchandise traffic and 
L C L business were increasingly subject to 
truck competition. SP's response was to some-
what tardily, but then with gusto, embrace 
T O F C service—a technology that was not 
new but one that came into its own gradually 
after the war. On May 4, 1953, the Texas & 
New Orleans initiated T O F C service between 
Houston and on-line cities in Louisiana for 
L C L shipments, and two months later the SP 
initiated the concept on the West Coast for 
hauling trailers of the subsidiary Pacific Motor 
Trucking between San Francisco and Los 
Angeles aboard the Overnighter merchan-
dise trains. This service was expanded during 
1954 and 1955 to principal locations on the 
The portion of operating revenue attributed to freight rose to 91.4 percent in ^ 5 9 . Trains like this one at 
Crescent Lake, Oregon, told the story. 
During the late 1950s, the SP embraced the T O F C concept with gusto. In this view a piggyback train is 
leaving San Francisco. 
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SP and further through connections with the 
Union Pacific at Ogden, the Northern Pacific 
and the Great Northern at Portland, and the 
Cotton Belt at Corsicana. The SP hauled its 
100,000th trailer in 1956. SP's efforts in this 
regard were remarkable. Indeed, one writer 
called the SP "the Piggyback Champion of 
U.S. railroading.'" 6 
SP's T O F C efforts retained, regained, or ex-
panded traffic in high-rated commodities and, 
as operations were broadened, also attracted 
business from freight forwarders and even 
common carrier truckers. Postal business was 
retained and not lost to trucks by diversion to 
T O F C from passenger head-end cars; auto-
mobile shipments increased astonishingly as 
SP instituted T O F C options for that highly 
competitive business. Initially, SP modified 
existing flatcars with special tie-down devices 
but later purchased specially built 79-foot and 
then 8 5-foot cars for the operation. At first 
SP's trucking subsidiaries provided all trailers, 
and by i 9 6 0 SP claimed to have the nation's 
largest fleet of piggyback equipment. That ap-
proach changed, however, as first the Cotton 
Belt and then the SP purchased shares in 
Trailer Train Company, a piggyback car leas-
ing agency that owned and leased equipment 
to its owners. Was there profit in any of this? 
Internal studies showed mixed results. In 
1959 T O F C business moving between the Bay 
Area and Los Angeles showed a net loss, pri-
marily because of inadequate or inefficient use 
of equipment and facilities and because of a 
high percentage of northbound empties. One 
year later T O F C service in that corridor 
showed an overall profit; automobile traffic 
was especially lucrative, but "rail-billed" 
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T O F C business resulted in "a substantial 
loss." Technological advances, it seemed, had 
proved greater than those of marketing and 
pricing. 3 7 
Some T O F C business moved at "passenger 
train speed" on dedicated trains such as the 
Pacific Coast Expediter between Portland and 
Oakland or the Coast Merchandiser between 
San Francisco and Los Angeles, but other 
piggyback shipments were assigned to expe-
dited trains such as Cotton Belt's famous Blue 
Streak Merchandise. That train, in fact, was 
rapidly becoming the premier train of SSWs 
parent, too. The Blue Streak typically handled 
high-rated merchandise forwarder business 
and auto parts to Southern California. This 
and similar lading was subject to competitive 
forces that conspired to demand speedier 
schedules for time-sensitive business through-
out the 1950s. To emphasize its determination 
to meet these forces, SP instituted several ad-
ditional name trains as diverse as the West 
Coaster on the Overland Route and the Ari-
zona Zipper on the Sunset Route between Los 
Angeles and Tucson via Phoenix. By early 
1956 SP's Pacific Lines boasted thirty-nine 
symbol or name freight trains. 3 8 
Increased train speeds required substantial 
expenditures for track and signaling improve-
ments. In this regard, the SP continued its pro-
gram of installing new and heavier rail, ex-
panded its radio-telephone system, and added 
capacity by the installation of more C T C . 
Throughout the 1950s Russell pushed C T C 
programs on SP's major routes: "It does the 
business for less money than double track-
ing," he said. Capacity on the Sunset Route, 
for example, was increased in 1955 between 
Colton and Yuma with a combination of 
C T C , lengthened sidings, and construction of 
second main for 9 miles on the west approach 
to Beaumont H i l l . By the end of the 1950s 
C T C extended from Los Angeles as far east as 
Sierra Blanca, Texas, on the T & N O . Special 
attention was given the entire Sunset Route at 
mid-decade because traffic via the El Paso 
Several line changes in West Texas reduced mileage 
and increased maximum track speed. 
gateway to and from the T & N O had nearly 
doubled since 1940. Studies were made for a 
modern yard west of El Paso, and that city's 
Alfalfa Yard was expanded. Additional line 
changes in West Texas, including one that 
eliminated the famous "horseshoe curve" at 
Torcer, 79 miles east of El Paso, and another 
resulting from the damming of the Devil's 
River west of Del Rio, reduced mileage and in-
creased maximum track speed.3 9 
Of the many betterment projects approved 
during the Russell years, none was more dra-
matic in scope and undertaking than the Salt 
Lake fill. The impressive cross-lake trestle, in 
use since 1904, incurred increased mainte-
nance problems with age, and if SP chose to 
renew it, the work would have to be done 
"under traffic." SP engineers and outside 
consultants considered various alternatives, 
among them: renewing the old trestle; build-
ing a concrete trestle; a solid fill; and a com-
bination of these. Eventually they concluded 
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The new track at the Mofeta-Feodora cut-off in One improvement eliminated the famous "horse-
West Texas has been tied into the main line before shoe curve" at Torcer, seventy-nine miles east of 
the old track is taken up. El Paso. 
that a fill would be the best choice. Work be-
gan on 1955 and was conducted by SP forces 
in addition to those from the Morrison-
Knudsen Construction Company. 4 0 
The fill required a prodigious effort. To pro-
vide maximum stability, a 25-foot trench was 
dug in the lake bottom, 30 feet beneath the 
surface. This trench varied in width from 
175 feet to 600 feet; when filled with rock and 
gravel, it provided a stronger foundation for 
the fill than if materials had been poured di-
rectly onto the lake bottom. Above the sur-
face, the top of the fill would be 3 8 feet wide. 
Originally, it was designated to an elevation of 
4,217 feet above sea level, the same as the 
1904 trestle, but after engineers' tests deter-
mined that the fill would not be stable at the 
elevation, the level was reduced to 4,212 
feet—still 12 feet above the level of the lake 
at that time. The fill's length was 12.68 miles; 
its maximum height was 97 feet. Material 
handled totaled an enormous 60,832,000 cu-
bic yards. Ironically, fire consumed 645 feet of 
the elderly trestle on May 4, 1956; for the first 
time in its history the trestle was out of service 
(for six days), and traffic normally moving 
over it was rerouted or annulled. For Russell 
the fire emphatically proved the wisdom of 
constructing the fill. Work on the project went 
well, and on July 27, 1959, the first revenue 
train passed over it. Russell was delighted. 
The enterprise had been completed almost a 
full year ahead of schedule.41 
Completion of the fill allowed the SP to in-
crease train speeds on the Overland Route 
and thereby improve the efficiency of the 
Ogden Gateway. This pleased the Union Pa-
cific, SP's historic partner at Ogden, but it also 
pleased the much smaller Denver & Rio 
Grande Western with which it also connected 
at that point. Even before the SP completed 
work on the fill, the Rio Grande had pledged 
itself as a competitor of Union Pacific for SP's 
favor. Yet for the smaller road it was a grim 
battle. During the early twentieth century the 
road had been part of George Gould's empire, 
the intermediate carrier for his Missouri Pa-
cific and his new Western Pacific. In the pro-
cess Gould had looted Rio Grande's treasury, 
and when his empire crumbled, the road 
passed into receivership during 1918. Some 
years earlier the Harriman-controlled SP and 
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UP had added to the woes of the smaller road 
when they determined to close the Ogden 
Gateway to the Rio Grande and, after the SP 
and UP were separated, the latter determined 
to keep the gateway closed, a position af-
firmed by an ICC decision of 1915. Rio 
Grande's circumstances were further eroded 
in 1923 by the so-called Central Pacific Con-
ditions, which pledged the Southern Pacific to 
preferentially solicit traffic to and from pre-
scribed areas in the West via Ogden for the 
benefit of the Union Pacific. 4 2 
On the surface all this made little difference 
anyway, as the Rio Grande's route from Den-
ver to Ogden was long and indirect compared 
with Union Pacific's. However, completion of 
its Dotsero Cut-off in 1934—shortening the 
route by 175 miles—placed the Rio Grande in 
a position to at least claim competitive ability. 
Another important variable was introduced at 
about the same time when SP gained control 
of the St. Louis Southwestern. The SP, of 
course, was obligated under the Central Pa-
cific Conditions but the Cotton Belt was not. 
Consequently SSW's sales force could and did 
solicit traffic to the advantage of the SP and to 
the Rio Grande via Ogden. Conversely, the 
Rio Grande was not bound by any restrictions 
and campaigned vigorously for interchange 
business with the Southern Pacific. These mar-
keting changes posed a delicate problem for 
the SP. On the one hand, it wished to keep its 
options open and maximize opportunities; on 
the other, it needed to maintain proper if not 
necessarily cordial relations with the UP. For 
its part, the D & R G W in 1949 filed papers 
with the ICC to force the UP to establish joint 
rates to and from the Northwest—a case that 
it eventually won. The aggressive Rio Grande 
also sought, in 1957, and gained, in 1966, 
modifications of the Central Pacific condi-
tions that gave it an improved competitive 
environment. As a result of these events, SP 
became D & R G W ' s principal source of inter-
change business, a fact that was not lost on 
Rio Grande's president, Wilson J. McCarthy, 
who constantly reminded his successor, Gus B. 
Aydelott, to "remember the SP." 4 3 
Meanwhile, the Southern Pacific Company 
sought to simplify its complex corporate struc-
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The first revenue train passed over the Salt Lake fill 
on July 27, 1959. Note the earlier fill and trestle 
at left. 
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ture through a series of internal mergers. Five 
corporate names—the Southern Pacific Rail-
road, Arizona Eastern, Dawson Railway, El 
Paso & Rock Island, and the El Paso &c South-
western—disappeared in 1955. The venerable 
Central Pacific followed four years later. In 
1961 the ICC approved the merger of three 
more subsidiaries into the parent company. 
These were the El Paso & Southwestern of 
Texas, El Paso Southern, as well as the much 
larger Texas & New Orleans Railroad. Russell 
noted that these mergers would not result 
in any substantial change in the total as-
sets and liabilities of the SP but would yield 
further centralized control and simplify finan-
cial, accounting, legal, and administrative 
procedures.4 4 
Another matter of internal importance con-
cerned SP's ownership of stock, amounting to 
34 percent, in Pacific Greyhound. This owner-
ship gave the SP four members on the bus 
company's eleven-member board, an agree-
ment in effect since 1929. Shortly after the 
war, however, the federal government brought 
suit under the Sherman Antitrust Act to force 
SP's divestiture of its Pacific Greyhound stock. 
The issue dragged on until SP sold its com-
mon stock in 1954 and its preferred two years 
later. SSWs trucking company, Southwestern 
Transportation Company, would similarly sell 
its holdings in what had become the Grey-
hound Corporation during 1969. The venture 
had proven profitable over the long run; in ad-
dition to receiving dividends over the years, 
SP made a three-to-one profit on its invest-
ment in Pacific Greyhound. Southwestern 
Transportation's net, if anything, was larger.4 5 
These profits and those from routine busi-
ness, plus reductions in SP's funded debt and 
equipment obligations, allowed Russell to pre-
sent the company's growing number of share-
holders with an increasingly rosy picture. SP 
paid annual dividends of $3.00 per share from 
1952 through 1958 and split two-for-one in 
1952 and three-for-one in 1959. Funded debt 
and equipment obligations had stood at just 
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under $800 million in 1940 but, even after 
massive acquisitions of freight cars, stream-
lined passenger equipment, and diesels, stood 
at only slightly over $600 million by the mid-
1950s. Interest charges declined similarly. 4 6 
Russell was concerned, nevertheless, with 
the need to raise the company's stature in 
the financial community. This resulted in a 
redirection of SP's advertising strategies— 
"to impress on the money-lenders, investment 
counselors, trust administrators and the like 
that Southern Pacific is a railroad with a great 
future." Whether it was because of this cam-
paign or because of SP's noteworthy perfor-
mance during the 1950s, the SP did gain con-
siderable popular attention. In 1954 the SP 
ranked third among all domestic railroads in 
terms of operating revenues and in the same 
year it ranked ninth among all companies (ex-
cluding banks and insurance firms) as mea-
sured by total assets. Moreover, SP's manage-
ment received plaudits from Forbes and the 
American Institute of Management, and the 
company received "buy notices" from stock 
brokers who, as one noted, admired the SP 
because the "price risk is small and longer 
term prospects are substantial." There was 
one discordant note. SP's return on investment 
was only 3.5 percent in the ten-year period 
following World War II.4 7 
Russell's mark on the Southern Pacific dur-
ing the 1950s was distinct and emphatic. N o -
body doubted that his vigorous leadership 
would have the same positive impact on the 
company during the decade upcoming. In-
deed, his tenure would be distinguished by the 
admiring label "The Russell Years." 
C H A P T E R I 6 
The New Standard Railroad of the World? 
"The machines that have been invented for 
saving the labor of men's hands have come 
to stay, and every intelligent business man 
recognizes i t . " — C . P. Huntington, 1900 
T H E tumultuous 1960s proved to be a period 
of extraordinary stress for the United States. 
The country was confronted by a variety of 
controversial social and political issues; four 
men of widely differing persuasions occupied 
the White House; and, the war in Viet Nam 
threatened to dissolve the national spirit. 
Those who managed or worked for the South-
ern Pacific were not removed from these 
movements and events, but the company itself 
forged ahead under the steady guidance of 
Donald Joseph Russell. Yet, just as there was 
constancy at 65 Market Street so, too, was 
there change. Russell recognized that dramatic 
alterations had occurred, were occurring, 
or certainly were necessary in the fabric of 
the nation's transportation plant—especially 
within the railroad industry. With this in 
mind, Russell determined to position the SP in 
a fashion that would maximize its potential 
for profitability and assure its future. 
Russell's efforts went forward against the 
backdrop of strained relationships between 
the company and those who worked for it. 
The SP had long been known as a company 
where one familial generation followed an-
other in employment and where there was a 
"true sense of family"; insiders felt it, and out-
siders recognized it. This sense of closeness 
had been reinforced during the hard times of 
the depression and in the urgency of war years 
that followed. Much of the "glue" that had 
held the family together, however, sub-
sequently eroded. Ordinary employees no 
longer had an opportunity to directly solicit 
business for the company since the haulage of 
L C L freight had nearly disappeared and, in-
deed, the small rail shipper himself faced 
extinction. A similar situation obtained as 
passenger trains disappeared. Furthermore, 
management authority itself was increasingly 
centralized in San Francisco. A l l of this served 
to create greater distances between labor and 
management. 
Such was reflected in many of the com-
pany's traditions and customs. SP glee clubs, 
athletic groups, and service organizations con-
tinued to function, but without the previ-
ous vigor and level of participation. Annual 
Christmas parties for office personnel in San 
Francisco, Houston, and elsewhere ended. Of 
more tangible importance were changes in 
health care. On January 31, 1968, the Hospi-
tal Association of the Southern Pacific Lines 
in Texas and Louisiana was dissolved and its 
Houston hospital closed. At about the same 
time the Cotton Belt deeded its facility at Tex-
arkana to employees, but the hospital would 
finally close in 1972. Even earlier, in 1963, SP's 
Pacific Lines hospital department had been re-
organized. Although a few company physi-
cians remained, employees no longer had di-
rect contact with company-sponsored health 
providers. Henceforth these benefits were pro-
vided through company-paid contracts with 
various health insurance companies.1 
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Tangible changes occurred in many of SP's tradi-
tions and customs, including in the important area 
of health care. SP's hospitals were closed during the 
1960s. 
Labor-management relations were espe-
cially subject to friction over the industry's 
and SP's diligent efforts to reduce the work 
force. Management complained bitterly of 
"make work" policies that it labeled "feather-
bedding." Some rules were, to be sure, ridicu-
lously wasteful of company resources. Yet the 
term featherbedding was perceived by labor 
as an indictment of all contract workers. The 
result was an acrimonious and, certainly in 
terms of morale, counterproductive conflict. 
In the end, arbitration awards and compro-
mise agreements allowed the carriers to re-
duce numbers in specified crafts. The number 
of firemen, whose necessity on diesel loco-
motives was certainly questionable, was re-
duced beginning in 1964, and "third brake-
man rules" (on freight trains) mandated by 
law in New Mexico, Arizona, and California 
were gradually rescinded. However, " ful l crew 
laws" in Oregon and Arkansas would not be 
repealed until 1972. 2 
As important as it was to trim the number 
of employees, Russell understood that it was 
even more urgent to provide educational op-
portunities for the remaining work force— 
opportunities that would benefit individual 
employees and the company, too. During 
1963 the SP initiated a program of reimburs-
ing employees who worked toward degrees 
offered by accredited colleges and universities, 
and shortly thereafter instituted a series of 
free home study courses available through its 
Training Bureau. There was a special program 
for locomotive engineers; in 1968 the SP an-
nounced that it had ordered the industry's first 
"locomotive simulator." This sophisticated 
$1 million computer-aided teaching device 
would be used, the company noted, to provide 
standardized training for enginemen.' 
At the same time Russell decided to beef up 
SP's officer recruitment and improvement pro-
grams. "We need to take advantage of all the 
thinking we can get," Russell said: the com-
pany needed "an adequate pool of people ca-
pable of taking on high level responsibility." 
To this end, SP sent more and more of its 
managers to advanced programs at univer-
sities such as Harvard, MIT, and Stanford and 
simultaneously recruited young talent from 
campuses across the country. The newcomers 
were then sent through SP's intensive two-year 
management training program. 4 
In a related manner, the Southern Pacific on 
June 22, 1962, became the first railroad in the 
country to voluntarily pledge its support for 
President John F. Kennedy's "Plan for Prog-
ress"—a joint effort between the nation's 
major corporations and the President's Com-
mittee on Equal Employment Opportunity to 
advance the principle of equal consideration 
and treatment for all applicants and all em-
ployees. The plan predated the Civi l Rights 
acts. As Russell told SP's officers and super-
visors, "equal employment opportunity with-
out regard to race, creed, color or national 
origin is a vital part of our American heri-
tage." Whether Russell knew it or not, he was 
affirming a principle advanced sixty-two years 
earlier by Collis P. Huntington. "If we deny to 
the individual, no matter what his creed, his 
color, or his nationality, the right to justice 
which every man possesses," Huntington had 
said in 1900, "there will be no enduring pros-
perity and decline will surely follow. If, on the 
contrary, we establish and maintain as a prin-
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SP's innovative locomotive simulator would be used to provide standardized training for enginemen. 
ciple of our national life the right of every man 
and of all property to be treated fairly and 
equally before the law, there is hardly a limit 
to the splendid success that the people of our 
republic can gain and hold. . . . " Huntington 
would have been proud of SP's advanced posi-
tion on the matter.5 
During this same time the Southern Pacific 
found other avenues to demonstrate its corpo-
rate responsibility. The SP delivered carloads 
of water without charge to a New Mexico vil-
lage after its water system was disabled; do-
nated an impressive collection of fossils and 
rocks to the University of Texas; sponsored an 
award-winning float that appeared in Pasa-
dena's 1969 Tournament of Roses Parade; 
handled a two-car " M a i n Street U.S .A." ex-
hibition belonging to the Henry Ford M u -
seum and Greenfield Village to several on-line 
locations; provided vigorous support for the 
Junior Achievement program; and, with spe-
cial trains dispatched for the purpose, picked 
up motorists marooned by a devastating bliz-
zard at Vaughn, New Mexico. SP's mountain 
forces likewise rescued a hapless skier who 
had become lost near Norden, in the Sierra 
Nevada. 6 
Much of this was newsworthy, and the 
media provided free advertising as a conse-
quence. It fell to SP's advertising department, 
however, to place the company's overall self-
image before the public. Russell was espe-
cially eager to improve the stature of the SP 
in the financial community; image ads thus 
stressed the company's constant efforts to re-
invest in plant. On another front, outdoor 
billboards extolled SP's ability to handle fast 
freight, big loads, and provide excellent plant 
locations. These handsome specimens won 
first prize in the Outdoor Advertising Asso-
ciation's 1964 competition. 7 
On the other hand, one advertising cam-
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paign proved to be immediately controversial. 
Early in 1954 the SP had placed a huge two-
directional lighted display sign atop its gen-
eral office building in San Francisco. The mes-
sage that it blinked each evening toward the 
Bay and toward downtown was the uncompli-
cated company slogan—"SP, Your Friendly 
Railroad." The public's response was anything 
but friendly. Letters to the editors of the city's 
newspapers charged the SP with callous dis-
regard for the integrity of San Francisco's sky-
line. Photographer Ansel Adams was one of 
many prominent persons who complained of 
SP's "arrogance." Russell assured the famous 
environmentalist that "railroad people are not 
a breed apart" and that "we of the Southern 
Pacific are just as proud of San Francisco . . . 
and its beauties as you and other citizens." In 
spite of protests, the sign remained until 1961, 
when it was quietly dismantled. Russell later 
admitted " i t [the sign] was a lousy thing." 8 
Nothing loomed so large on the Southern 
Pacific during the 1960s as Donald J. Russell 
himself. "With the railroadman's traditional 
gold watch chain slung across his vest" he 
"looks every inch the old-time railroad boss," 
wrote one observer in 1965. Russell was, in-
deed, a railroader's railroader—"the most 
dedicated railroadman I ever knew," said 
Cotton Belt's Harold J. McKenzie. Russell 
possessed a commanding presence: no subor-
dinate even thought of calling him " D o n " ; it 
was always " M r . Russell." 9 
Russell's success as a manager sprang from 
his very persona. The San Francisco Examiner 
called him "an unpretentious realist"; an as-
sociate referred to him as an "uncomplicated 
purist." Subordinates clearly respected his 
character, integrity, honesty, and his unfailing 
ability to make decisions. Nobody had to 
guess where Russell stood on issues. As his 
wife once said, he "is seldom wrong and never 
in doubt." Sternly self-disciplined, fearsome, 
and blunt nearly to rudeness, Russell was 
nevertheless an aggressive, capable, and in-
ventive manager whose mind was restlessly in-
dependent. His style was at once traditional 
and unorthodox. He was, fortunately for the 
SP, the right man at the right time. 1 0 
Russell was not without humor, but often it 
was sardonic. One example serves to illustrate 
this trait. On an inspection trip over the well-
manicured Cotton Belt, Russell turned to 
Harold McKenzie and said, " M a c , if the 
property looks this bad after two weeks no-
tice, I wonder how bad it is usually?" 1 1 
Russell showed no humor on one issue. He 
was emphatic in his belief that one of top 
management's major responsibilities was that 
of locating and cultivating talent for executive 
leadership. His views regarding desirable 
characteristics were typically straightforward. 
He looked for the person who could "gear his 
imaginative process to cold facts," who could 
"grasp specific situations quickly and relate 
them to broad, long-range considerations," 
who was an "innovatist," not what he called a 
"repeater." Additionally, he placed high value 
on a person's ability to make decisions and on 
his "courage to think out recommendations 
and then stand up for them." Equally impor-
tant were emotional stamina, ambition, "a 
real love for the activity in which the com-
pany is engaged," and an "interest in affairs 
outside the company." Finally, the future ex-
ecutive must be "interested in people." He had 
to be "consistently fair," to "be able to see the 
other person's point of view," to "understand 
the emotional reasons behind it ," and to "find 
a common ground for understanding." After 
all, said Russell, "his most important task will 
be to build a team which will do the job for 
him, and he will be able to do this only by 
motivating and inspiring the people around 
h i m . " 1 2 
Awards and recognition for President 
Russell came as a matter of course. In 1957 he 
received the National Defense Transportation 
Association's annual award and in the same 
season was honored by Forbes Magazine as 
one of the fifty "foremost business leaders of 
America." More followed. Russell's counte-
nance graced the cover of Time on August 11, 
1961, and Forbes for November 1, 1965 . " 
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Russell's efforts and accomplishments were 
properly recognized, as were those of the com-
pany he headed. In an industry that many 
saw as disintegrating and demoralized and 
others saw as dying, SP's star seemed to shine 
brightly. Russell had provided the company 
with personal and determined leadership, had 
demanded innovation and imagination from 
subordinates, and had, as one writer phrased 
it, forced the SP to "discard its conservatism." 
The same observer praised Russell and the SP 
for realizing "sooner than most that the rails 
were caught up in a fight for survival." Others 
noted—without taking anything away from 
Russell or the SP—that the company bene-
fited from changes in demography that fa-
vored it. They pointed with admiration to SP's 
crescent-shaped route structure—stretching 
from Portland, in the Northwest, through 
California and Texas to Saint Louis, in the 
Midwest—and serving, in SP's idiom, the 
"Golden Empire." Many focused on the rail-
road itself. Time called it "aggressively mod-
ern," and Forbes said it was "one of the best-
run railroads in the U.S." Dean Witter & 
Company, the investment firm, argued that 
the SP was " i n the forefront of railroad renais-
sance" because, in part, it boasted a manage-
ment that had "demonstrated that it could 
keep the company competitively competent." 
Statistics told the tale. In 1963 SP led all rail-
roads in ton-miles handled, and in 1967 it 
ranked third among all transportation com-
panies (behind Penn Central and United Air 
Lines) in terms of operating revenues and sec-
ond in terms of assets, net income, and in-
vested capital. A l l of this moved David P. 
Morgan to speculate in Trains Magazine that 
the Southern Pacific might have become the 
new standard railroad of the world. Toward 
the end of the 1960s several analysts pointed 
to SP's broad income base that resulted from its 
diversification—and recommended its "com-
mon stock as one of the soundest values for 
good income and growth available today," as 
one brokerage firm put i t . 1 4 
The general enthusiasm that surrounded 
the company was certainly based in part on 
SP's continuing dedication to research and de-
velopment coupled with its willingness to ex-
periment. SP's close association with the Stan-
ford Research Institute continued throughout 
the 1960s, although it delegated a variety 
of other research projects to the company 
laboratory at Sacramento and to various 
teams from the engineering and mechanical 
departments.15 
SP's interest in experimentation assumed 
concrete form in 1961, when it took delivery 
of new 4,000-hp diesel-hydraulic locomotives 
manufactured in West Germany by Kraus-
Maffei A G . SP's interest in the diesel-hydraulic 
reflected not only a search for alternatives to 
diesel-electric power but also a disenchant-
ment with domestic manufacturers, which, 
thought the company's management, were too 
complacent and backward in developing 
larger and more powerful locomotives. With a 
significant portion of its diesel fleet needing 
replacement, SP wished to have a look at what 
the Kraus-Maffeis could do under harsh 
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The Kraus-Maffeis are shown here with a dynamometer car at Monolith, California. 
operating conditions before deciding whether 
to rebuild older units in its own shops, return 
them to the builders for upgrading, trade 
them on new power, or simply scrap and pur-
chase new power. Ultimately, SP acquired 
twenty-four diesel-hydraulic units, including 
three manufactured by American Locomotive 
Company, and was impressed with their higher 
horsepower per unit, improved rail adhesion, 
and reliable propulsion through hydraulic 
transmissions, cardan shafting, and geared 
axle drives. However, problems with the high-
speed engines were serious. Additionally, the 
German-made locomotives experienced air in-
take difficulties in mountain operations where 
long tunnels and heavy ascending grades were 
encountered. Consequently, beginning in 
1967, as they came due for major repairs, the 
Kraus-Maffeis were retired; mechanical per-
sonnel continued to evaluate the Alcos, but 
eventually they, too, were scrapped. Mean-
while, domestic builders brought out the 
types of diesel-electric power that SP officers 
had been seeking. At mid-decade the company 
received, for instance, 2,500-hp GP-35S and 
3,600-hp SD-45S from General Motors as 
well as 3,000-hp Century 630s from Alco and 
2,800-hp U28CS from General Electric. 1 6 
Southern Pacific's freight car acquisitions 
during these years represented a blend of the 
new as well as the old and reflected traffic 
forecasts based on the period i 9 6 0 through 
1964, when tonnage grew at a 6.5 percent an-
nual rate. Special equipment orders included 
"damage free" and "compartmentized" boxes, 
stainless steel hoppers, trilevel flats, wood 
chip cars, and cabooses. Other orders brought 
a flood of conventional boxcars. At the same 
time, company shops modified older cars to 
increase capacity and in all cases kept the fleet 
in functional order. In 1969 a mere 2 percent 
of the company's inventory of rolling stock 
was "bad ordered." 1 7 
Other physical improvements were not as 
eye-catching as powerful locomotives and 
huge new freight cars but were just as impor-
New Standard Railroad? 2-57 
tant in advancing the company's efficient 
rail operations. C T C was expanded to cover 
nearly 2,500 miles by the end of 1962, and 
many of the earlier installations were up-
graded to make them even more effective. 
Along its main routes the SP also installed 
wayside scanners to detect overheated jour-
nals on moving trains and thereby enhance 
safe passage. At the same time, the company's 
communications department—-already one of 
the largest privately owned systems—prose-
cuted the expansion of a "storm-proof" mi-
crowave network. This was begun in 1956, 
with a modest 18-mile link between Dunsmuir 
and Black Butte in mountainous northern 
California. By the end of 1963 SP had 316 
miles of microwave in service, and by 1969 the 
system had grown dramatically to 3,450 miles 
with more promised. 1 8 
An important corollary was SP's deepening 
interest in computers—an interest that came 
to full flower with the implementation of its 
Total Operations Processing System (TOPS), 
perhaps the most advanced and comprehen-
sive management information and control sys-
tem in the industry when "cut over" in 1968. 
Indeed, the system was so impressive that it 
would earn Modern Railroads' prestigious 
"Railroad M a n of the Year" award in 1972, 
for James W. Germany, who headed the opera-
tion at the time. 1 9 
Interest in computers at SP developed early, 
and management learned much from the use 
of IBM's 650 and then IBM's 7070 and 1401 
data processing systems during the late 1950s 
and early 1960s. Impressive progress was 
made, especially in accounting procedures, 
but problems resulted, too. Germany noted 
that inadequate attention had been paid "to 
the quality of input data"; an associate also 
pointed to "human resistance to change" that 
manifested itself in some quarters. This was 
understandable, as computers clearly implied 
change in historic procedures and implied a 
reduction of jobs. Furthermore, the matter co-
incided with a fierce jurisdictional dispute be-
tween members of the Order of Railroad Tele-
graphers and the Brotherhood of Railroad 
and Airline Clerks over the handling of "inter-
city messages of record." These and other 
problems notwithstanding, a feasibility study 
team composed of SP and I B M personnel was 
established in i 9 6 0 and labored into 1963. At 
that point senior management made decisions 
to "move on the jurisdictional dispute" and 
to simultaneously "develop and implement 
TOPS." Russell boldly authorized the design 
of a complete system—but one that would 
only gradually be implemented, forgoing im-
mediate returns in favor of a greater yield 
later. Eventually, TOPS orientation sessions 
were held systemwide, clerks were retrained, 
programmers and systems analysts were hired, 
and on May 7, 1968, TOPS began to function 
when Portland's Brooklyn Yard was "cut over." 
By the end of 1969, TOPS was operational 
across the SP, Cotton Belt, and other rail 
subsidiaries.2 0 
TOPS was designed to be a " l iv ing" com-
puter system, one that could be adapted to 
new circumstances and expanded in its func-
tional capacity. Among operating personnel, 
Richard D. Spence was especially enthusiastic 
about its potential. Spence saw TOPS as a 
management tool of many dimensions. For in-
stance, it could be used to improve car and 
locomotive utilization; as a system for collect-
ing, processing, and delivering cost and in-
ventory information to various levels of man-
agement; as a master file of SP's equipment 
inventory; as a means by which to better ac-
count for per diem and car miles; as a device 
to provide passing records and revenue data 
for the sales department; as a funnel for way-
bill accounting; and as a way to speed up or 
otherwise improve accounting of all types. 
TOPS, of course, was not a decision-making 
system, but rather offered management a reli-
able means for monitoring and control. The 
heart of supervision, Germany noted, is com-
munication; TOPS, utilizing SP's own micro-
wave system, could and did provide the neces-
sary vehicle. Collaterally, TOPS served the 
twin purposes of centralization and standard-
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TOPS proved to be a model for the industry. 
ization and at the same time put "cracks in de-
partmental empires." Small wonder that sev-
eral companies studied or replicated SP's 
$22 million model called TOPS. 2 1 
Russell did not shrink from such large price 
tags. "Capital expenditures are the prere-
quisite of profits," Russell was fond of saying. 
Yet that hardly meant he was a spendthrift. 
For those who advanced proposals for impor-
tant improvements or capital expenditures, 
Russell posed his classic question: "What will 
your project do to improve earnings per 
share?" Well conceived and economically jus-
tifiable plans were approved. These were as di-
verse as a "cat whisker" clearance car to mea-
sure tunnel bores, strengthening approaches 
to the huge Dumbarton Bridge south of San 
Francisco, planting tamarisk trees to provide 
windbreaks along the busy main route in the 
desert east of Los Angeles, and "daylighting" 
or enlarging tunnels, renewing the remaining 
timber-lined tunnels with grout and steel sets, 
and replacing elderly timber snowsheds with 
new ones made of prestressed concrete. In 
other cases massive expenditures were autho-
rized to create more "push button" or elec-
tronic hump yards. Earlier efforts had focused 
on Antelope at Roseville and Taylor at Los 
Angeles; later plans included Englewood at 
Houston (1956), Cotton Belt's facility at Pine 
Bluff (1959), and Eugene (1967). Collectively 
these new yards cost over $16 million to 
implement.2 2 
Even more capital was required to complete 
the impressive 78.3-mile Palmdale Cut-off, 
which provided a time-saving shortcut be-
tween the Sunset—Golden State Route at Col-
ton and the San Joaquin line at Palmdale. SP's 
interest in such a route was not new. In 1928, 
for example, William Sproule had raised the 
question "as to what might be saved in cost of 
handling freight between the San Joaquin Val-
ley and points east of Colton by using the 
Santa Fe from Mojave to Kramer, building a 
new SP line from Kramer to Oro Grande, and 
using the Santa Fe again from Oro Grande to 
Colton." SP's locating engineers could not find 
a feasible route between Kramer and Oro 
Grande, however, and suggested instead a new 
57-mile line from Lancaster along the foot-
hills of the San Gabriel Mountains to Cajon 
Pass, with trackage rights over the Santa Fe 
from Cajon's summit to San Bernardino, 27 
miles. Internal studies showed that this proj-
ect, if implemented, would result in an appre-
ciable savings in operational expenses and in 
per diem charges, and would advance time-
sensitive traffic by nearly half a day. Neverthe-
less, the proposed cut-off was shelved at that 
time because SP's extensive betterment activi-
ties elsewhere created a cash shortage and the 
depression and war followed soon thereafter.23 
Russell revived the issue during the mid-
1950s when he secured a "handshake agree-
ment" from Santa Fe's Fred S. Gurley "to use 
the A T & S F from San Bernardino up Cajon 
Pass." Gurley retired in 1957, however, and 
his successor, Ernest S. Marsh, "reneged" on 
the deal. For Russell, who saw matters in 
terms of distinct ethics and morals, Marsh's 
conduct was shameful; Russell also felt that 
Marsh's strategy was shortsighted. Had the 
agreement been forged, the SP would have 
paid for another main track to Cajon Sum-
mit—with appropriate and sophisticated sig-
naling and crossover—to be used commonly 
by the SP and the Santa Fe. In any event, 
Marsh's decision "left the SP with nothing to 
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do but build its own line"—one that Russell 
determined would be better engineered and 
more efficient than that of rival Santa Fe. 
Work began early in 1966; on July 11, 1967, 
the Palmdale Cut-off was placed in service. It 
was the longest domestic railroad construc-
tion project in many years and cost $22 mil-
lion. The price was justified, Russell thought, 
for the new route gave the SP a means by 
which to save both time and ton miles while 
avoiding the congestion of Los Angeles. Fur-
thermore, noted a smiling Russell, "we built a 
line of such quality that our freight trains pass 
their [Santa Fe's] passenger trains." 2 4 
Russell's credentials as a railroader were, of 
course, unquestioned. Yet he was too nimble 
of mind to be wedded only to the concept of 
transportation provided by flanged wheels on 
steel rails. He was an early and energetic ad-
vocate of diversification in transportation ser-
vice under one management. In his view "such 
a company would offer movement by rail, by 
air, by highways, by water, or by pipeline, in 
any combination best trailored to individual 
need." This led Russell to contemplate ac-
quisition of the Railway Express Agency, 
which, he thought, if merged with SP's Pacific 
Motor Trucking, "would provide a very at-
tractive operation" since Railway Express 
"had rights to go to so many places." The rail-
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road or another subsidiary could provide 
T O F C equipment for the far-flung operation 
that Russell envisioned. It came to naught, 
however, after Russell concluded that the In-
terstate Commerce Commission would not 
approve the idea. 2 5 
This did not end Russell's interest in a fully 
integrated transportation network under one 
management. He chafed under laws and gov-
ernment regulations that stood in the way of 
his eminently logical aspirations but deter-
mined to do what he could under the circum-
stances. There was one opportunity imme-
diately at hand. The SP, like other rail carriers, 
had watched in dismay as unregulated truck-
ers captured a large portion of the petroleum 
products business that heretofore had gone by 
rail. "Why not lose the business to ourselves?" 
Russell asked rhetorically. Thus was born the 
Southern Pacific Pipe Lines, Incorporated 
(SPPL). 2 6 
SP's interest in pipelines was at once historic 
and contemporary. In 1906 the company had 
constructed its own 3 2-mile line in California 
for the purpose of transporting locomotive 
fuel oil and, through its partial ownership of 
Associated O i l , SP had an indirect interest in 
the pipeline operations of that firm. Events 
bearing directly on the formation of SPPL, 
though, dated from 1951, when SP's traffic de-
partment warned President A . T. Mercier that 
the Texas Company contemplated construc-
tion of a pipeline from " E l Paso to Arizona," 
threatening loss of rail traffic. The SP and 
other western railroads thereupon agreed to 
reduce their rates and the ICC concurred, but 
in September, 1953, a federal court over-
turned the regulatory agency's order. Texaco's 
plans failed to materialize, but, with rail rates 
locked at an arbitrarily high level by the 
court's ruling, additional traffic was lost to 
trucks. Moreover, SP's sales personnel knew 
that several oil companies were studying the 
possibility of constructing a "joint venture" 
pipeline between Los Angeles and Phoenix. 
Late in 1954 Russell asked William G . Peoples, 
head of SP's traffic department, for his views 
on the possibility of pipelines built by and for 
the SP. Peoples expressed interest, and an 
interdepartmental committee soon recom-
mended the project. Russell's approval was 
enthusiastic.27 
The Southern Pacific Pipe Lines was born 
on February 18, 1955, and matured rapidly. 
Construction, generally following SP's Sun-
set—Golden State Route between the Los A n -
geles Basin and El Paso, began early in 1955; 
a year later operations began. Funding came 
through a $5 million advance from the rail-
road and from borrowing $29 million. Busi-
ness response was both immediate and profit-
able, and expansion followed. Lateral lines 
were built in the Imperial Valley during the 
late 1950s, as were one primary and several 
laterals to link the Richmond-Concord re-
fining area with Reno and Fallon, Nevada. 
Routes serving Portland-Albany-Eugene, 
Norwalk—San Diego (jointly with the Santa 
Fe), and Bakersfield-Fresno were completed 
by the mid-1960s. Eventually additional later-
als were added, several in the Bay area, and 
the capacity of the original route between El 
Paso and Tucson was expanded. As a product 
line common carrier, SPPL service was avail-
able to a variety of customers, including 
producers and distributors as well as several 
military installations. The subsidiary's statis-
tical profile was impressive. Although clearly 
capital intensive, SPPL proved hardly labor in-
tensive; total employment in 1969 stood at 
only 310. In 1963 SPPL operated 1,760 miles 
of line, handled 53 million barrels of product, 
and generated $6.6 million in net profit; by 
1969 it operated 2,438 miles of line, trans-
ported 134 million barrels of product, and 
turned a profit of $10.7 million. Moreover, 
after 1969 SPPL was debt free.2 8 
Another and very different pipeline oppor-
tunity presented itself during the mid-1960s 
when Southern California Edison Company 
announced its intention to build a large coal-
fired generating plant at Davis Dam near Bull-
head City, Arizona. The utility considered the 
procurement of coal from Arizona, Utah, and 
New Mexico with delivery by rail or coal 
slurry pipeline. The Santa Fe understandably 
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urged rail delivery over an existing line from 
New Mexico or from Black Mesa, Arizona, 
by way of new construction; Shell Pipeline 
Company proposed a slurry operation from 
Emery County, Utah, or from Black Mesa. 
Southern California Edison eventually se-
lected fuel from Peabody Coal Company's 
preserve at Black Mesa, northeast of Flagstaff 
above the Grand Canyon. By that time the 
Southern Pacific Pipe Line also involved itself 
in formal negotiations with the utility and 
with Peabody. To further promote its oppor-
tunities, SPPL formed the Black Mesa Pipeline 
Company, a wholly owned subsidiary, on 
Apri l 29, 1966. 2 9 
Fortune eventually smiled on the new sub-
sidiary, although Black Mesa initially faced a 
serious obstacle—the Atchison, Topeka & 
Santa Fe Railway. Black Mesa's projected 
slurry line would cross arteries of the Santa Fe 
at four locations, but SP's historic adversary 
stoutly refused to grant easements. Compli-
cated maneuverings followed. In the end 
Peabody agreed to pay the Santa Fe a pre-
mium on each ton of coal crossing the rail-
road in exchange for easement rights favoring 
Black Mesa. Consequently, on January 6, 
1967, formal agreements were signed between 
Peabody Coal and Southern California Edi-
son for the purchase of fuel and between 
Black Mesa and Peabody Coal for its trans-
portation. With a thirty-five-year contract 
safely under its belt, Black Mesa began con-
struction of its 273-mile, eighteen-inch, $39 
million slurry line. Operations began late in 
1970; soon the company was handling over 
10,000 tons per day. By 1980 Black Mesa 
Pipeline would be free of debt. 3 0 
Russell was justifiably elated with the re-
sults of SP's involvement in the pipeline busi-
ness, which, he noted wryly, "made good 
money and didn't block any grade crossings." 
He would not rest, however. Noting that there 
had been a tremendous growth in the volume 
of business handled by barge lines as well as a 
concomitantly heavy growth of industry along 
inland waterways, Russell in 1959 approved 
SP's joint application with Illinois Central 
Railroad to acquire the John I. Hay Company 
barge line. This, of course, was consistent 
with Russell's ambition to develop the SP into 
a broadly based and diversified transportation 
complex. Hay's common carrier barge opera-
tions extended over 2,500 miles, principally 
on the Mississippi and Illinois rivers and the 
Gulf's Intracoastal Waterway, connecting Chi-
cago, Milwaukee, and Gary on the north with 
New Orleans, Houston, and Brownsville on 
the south. Its route structure was essentially 
that of the IC, but it also touched the SP or 
Cotton Belt at Saint Louis, Memphis, New 
Orleans, and variously along the Gulf Coast. 
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The SP and IC jointly pledged to establish 
through rail-water and truck-water rates and 
to use their respective sales departments to 
solicit business for Hay. Not surprisingly, 
however, powerful and active opposition de-
veloped. Barge operators, barge associations, 
truckers, and other railroads protested loudly 
that control of Hay by the two railroads would 
lead to destructive competition and higher 
charges for shippers. Santa Fe's E. S. Marsh 
worried about "Southern Pacific extending 
itself into Chicago by water with the pros-
pect of diverting rail tonnage by barge. . . . " 
Marsh need not have worried. Early in 1962 
the ICC ruled against the applicants and, ob-
served a disgusted D. J. Russell, "transport 
diversification, so necessary to the financial 
stability of the railroads . . . suffered a set-
back " 3 1 
Rebuffed in his latest attempt to diversify 
Southern Pacific's transportation business, 
Russell turned to the task of strengthening the 
competitive capacity of the railroad itself. He 
looked close at hand. Through a subsidiary, 
the Southern Pacific Land Company, SP pur-
chased a 10 percent interest in the stock of the 
1,900-mile Western Pacific Railroad Com-
pany and then asked the ICC for permission 
to issue additional shares of authorized com-
mon to exchange on a share-for-share basis 
with holders of WP common. SP argued that 
its control of the Western Pacific would result 
in "an improved transportation service" made 
possible through important economies and 
efficiencies in the operation of the two proper-
ties. The Western Pacific and the Southern Pa-
cific, after all, served a common territory 
in northern California, and WP's main line 
essentially paralleled SP's Overland Route 
into Utah. 3 2 
Exceptions were instant and vigorous. The 
Santa Fe, SP's old nemesis, through one of its 
own subsidiaries, the Chanslor-Western Oi l 
& Development Company, quickly purchased 
20 percent of WP's outstanding stock; the par-
ent thereupon proposed control through a 
one-and-one-quarter-for-one share offer. The 
Great Northern also entered the fray. To pro-
tect its "Inside Gateway," it purchased 10 per-
cent of WP's common. With that, a full 40 
percent of Western Pacific's stock was held by 
the three contestants. The WP itself took a 
dim view of SP's proposal and sided with the 
Santa Fe. On the other hand, SP found power-
ful support elsewhere. The Denver &c Rio 
Grande Western hoped that the WP would re-
main independent but, as its president G . B. 
Aydelott explained, if confronted with a 
"controlled WP," the Denver & Rio Grande 
Western would "definitely prefer that it rest 
with the Southern Pacific rather than the 
Santa Fe." The Union Pacific, the Chicago, 
Rock Island & Pacific, and the Missouri 
Pacific similarly took SP's side. The debate 
heated. WP's F. B. Whitman charged that the 
SP contemplated monopoly, and Santa Fe's 
Marsh argued that SP would "suppress com-
petition." Marsh also reasserted SP's image in 
California as "the Octopus." Russell and the 
SP denied such charges but were put on the 
defensive.33 
Both the SP and Santa Fe mounted massive 
public relations campaigns, but a consensus 
did not develop. Finally, after protracted pro-
ceedings, the ICC on January 27, 1965, denied 
both the SP and Santa Fe petitions, claiming 
that the public interest required "the con-
tinued existence of Western Pacific as an inde-
pendent carrier." Russell privately grumbled 
about the shortsightedness of government bu-
reaucrats and the counterproductive nature 
of regulation, but publicly hoped "that fur-
ther coordinations . . . can be put into effect 
promptly." 3 4 
Strangely, however, the SP was lethargic and 
ineffective in advancing opportunities on its 
eastern flank. The case of the Chicago & East-
ern Illinois Railroad is illustrative. That com-
pany owned a major route south from Chi-
cago that split at Woodland Junction, Illinois, 
with one leg continuing southward to Evans-
ville, Indiana, and the other driving south-
westward to Saint Louis, with a secondary 
route branching from Finlay, Illinois, to 
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Thebes, across the Mississippi River from 
Cotton Belt's terminal at Illmo, Missouri. The 
short (slightly over 900 miles in 1950) C & E I 
had reorganized itself in 1941, after eight 
years of trusteeship, and had enjoyed a brief 
period of relative prosperity during World 
War II, but its long-term prospects were 
clouded by negative alterations in its traffic 
base and by severe competition from all 
modes of transportation. The market value of 
its stock reflected this; it was a clear candidate 
for acquisition or merger. Discussions in this 
regard already had been held by the C & E I 
with the Chicago Great Western Railway, the 
Missouri-Kansas-Texas Railroad, and early in 
the 1950s the Cotton Belt's management rec-
ommended to the parent company that it be 
allowed to acquire the line. The " f i t " was logi-
cal in that the C & E I offered the Cotton Belt a 
direct extension to Chicago from Thebes (one 
that avoided the congested Saint Louis area) 
as well as a competitive route between the im-
portant cities of Saint Louis and Chicago. The 
Woodland Junction—Danville—Evansville 
segment admittedly did not fit into SSW's 
route structure and, noted Cotton Belt's H . J. 
McKenzie, could be sold to the Louisville & 
Nashville Railroad as a logical enlargement of 
that road. In San Francisco, SP officials—es-
pecially in the traffic department—took a dim 
view of the idea. Friendly connections, they 
argued, would be offended by an "invasion" of 
the type Cotton Belt proposed and, since 
much of SP—St. Louis Southwestern's trans-
continental traffic moved via East Saint Louis 
instead of Chicago, acquisition of the C & E I 
"could not be justified on the return that was 
forecast." 3 5 
Other suitors were understandably quick to 
call on the Chicago & Eastern Illinois. The 
Chicago, Indianapolis & Louisville Railway 
(Monon) was followed by the Missouri Pa-
cific, the Chicago & North Western, and the 
Louisville & Nashville ( L & N ) . Cotton Belt's 
archrival, the Missouri Pacific, in 1961 finally 
made a bold move after an earlier false start; 
the Illinois Central Railroad and the Louisville 
& Nashville then made counterproposals. For 
the MoPac and the L & N , ownership or con-
trol of the C & E I represented logical exten-
sions; for the Illinois Central, acquisition im-
plied an opportunity to reduce excess rail 
capacity and eliminate competition. A lengthy 
regulatory examination and legal proceeding 
followed. Eventually, however, the Missouri 
Pacific prevailed, although it was obliged to sell 
the Woodland Junction—Danville—Evansville 
line to the Louisville & Nashville and also to 
grant it joint ownership from Woodland Junc-
tion into Chicago. The Cotton Belt was inex-
plicably restrained in these proceedings until 
the last hour; in the end its protestations went 
for naught. For the SSW—and for the SP as 
well—it was a double blow. The Cotton Belt 
not only failed to expand its own dominion by 
acquisition of the C & E I but, and equally im-
portant, archrival Missouri Pacific gained 
an incalculable advantage over the St. Louis 
Southwestern and its parent by securing for it-
self the Thebes—Saint Louis—Chicago route. 
Conventional wisdom in San Francisco had 
carried the day but, in retrospect, the decision 
was a monumental blunder. 3 6 
The Missouri Pacific proved to be a stern 
and uncompromising adversary on another 
matter of strategic importance for the South-
ern Pacific and Cotton Belt—the proposed ac-
quisition of the Alton & Southern (A&S) 
Railroad. It had been organized on July 8, 
1910, and developed as an important switch-
ing and terminal company connecting with all 
major railroads on the Illinois side of the Mis-
sissippi River opposite Saint Louis and with 
most carriers on the Missouri side via track-
age rights over the city-owned McArthur 
Bridge. By the mid-1960s the Alton & South-
ern owned 138.4 miles of line and yard track 
and operated under trackage agreements over 
an additional 20.1 miles. It served approx-
imately forty on-line shippers and enjoyed the 
prospect of luring more since extensive indus-
trial property abutted Alton & Southern lines. 
Revenues derived principally from switching 
charges and divisions on line hauls; until 
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recent times it had been profitable, and it 
had no funded debt. The Alton & Southern 
was owned by the Aluminum Company of 
America. 3 7 
Acquiring the A & S offered several advan-
tages for the Cotton Belt. Alton & Southern 
handled about 35 percent of all traffic passing 
through the Saint Louis gateway, and its share 
seemed destined to increase with full opera-
tion of its new electronic Saint Louis Gateway 
Yard lying adjacent to Cotton Belt's own tiny 
Valley Junction facility. Ownership of the A & S 
would not only give the Cotton Belt more 
switching capacity but also would give it direct 
connection with fourteen other trunk roads in 
addition to the Terminal Railroad Association 
of Saint Louis, the Illinois Terminal, and Man-
ufacturers Railway (Anheuser-Busch). More 
importantly for the SSW, it would create the 
possibility of moving solid trains including lo-
comotives and cabooses through to primary 
eastern connections—the Pennsylvania Rail-
road, New York Central, Nickel Plate, Wabash, 
and Baltimore & O h i o — " i n a matter of one 
or two hours." With all of this in mind, H . J. 
McKenzie signed an agreement with A L C O A 
on November 30, 1965, for the purchase of 
the Alton & Southern—subject to ICC ap-
proval. The price: $16 mil l ion. 3 8 
The prospect of the Southern Pacific's and 
the Cotton Belt's gaining this important ad-
vantage annoyed several other carriers, in-
cluding the Terminal Railroad Association 
(TRRA) of Saint Louis—itself owned by the 
trunk railroads (including the SSW) serving 
metropolitan Saint Louis and the Alton & 
Southern's chief competitor. On June 14, 
1965, just two days after SSW's own internal 
study team had urged purchase of the Alton 
& Southern, TRRA's president proposed to 
his board that a feasibility study be made to 
determine whether acquisition of the A L C O A 
property "would be advantageous." When 
completed, the T R R A study "was positive" 
and the president had planned to urge his 
board to "make an offer for the A & S " at the 
December meeting. By that time, however, 
news of Cotton Belt's agreement with A L C O A 
confused the issue; nevertheless, he asked the 
board for authority "to acquire the A & S at 
the same price agreed to by the Cotton Belt." 
The resolution failed, but the board did direct 
management to oppose the SSW's application. 
The issue was awkward for H . J . McKenzie, 
who headed the SSW and was at the same 
time a member of the Terminal Railroad Asso-
ciation board, yet his opposition was forth-
right. T R R A handled essentially the same 
number of cars for the Cotton Belt as did the 
Alton & Southern—of westbound business, 
A & S got 55 percent and of eastbound, Ter-
minal Railroad Association received 56 per-
cent including all perishables—but frankly, 
said McKenzie, the latter's service suffered by 
comparison. 3 9 
A new variable was interjected on March 22, 
1966, when the Missouri Pacific announced 
that it had gone before the ICC with an appli-
cation to match Cotton Belt's offer. The Illi-
nois Central and the Chicago & North West-
ern ( C & N W ) also expressed interest. A L C O A 
favored the SSW, but the regulatory agency in 
March, 1968, denied Cotton Belt's applica-
tion for independent ownership. The ICC 
instead favored the MoPac, but only after 
adding a provision that the other aspirants— 
SSW, C & N W , and IC—be allowed to unite in 
acquisition if they desired. Cotton Belt officials 
urged joining the MoPac in ownership; that, 
however, was "overruled" by D. J. Russell, 
who did not like joint ownership arrange-
ments. "When you get into bed with a dog, 
you are bound to get his fleas," he com-
plained. The IC also decided to back out, but 
the C & N W purchased a half-interest. The 
C & N W nevertheless soon found itself finan-
cially embarrassed and offered its holding to 
others. TRRA's management again urged its 
board to seek purchase of the entire Alton & 
Southern; late in 1969 the board instead ap-
proved acquisition of Chicago & North West-
ern's half-interest—but only if Missouri Pa-
cific would also sell its half to T R R A . MoPac 
was not interested. Meanwhile, several officers 
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of both the SP and SSW recommended pur-
chase of C & N W ' s interest to protect the vital 
Saint Louis gateway and to reduce delays on 
through business. Furthermore, warned SP's 
R. D . Spence, the MoPac was certain to seek 
full ownership if Cotton Belt failed to act. Se-
nior SP executives finally changed their posi-
tion, and on September 9, 1970, the Cotton 
Belt offered the Chicago & North Western 
$8 million for its interest in Alton & South-
ern. Approval would come from the ICC late 
in 1972 and on August 1, 1973, the purchase 
would be consummated.4 0 
A l l of this was merely a preview to the main 
attraction. During the course of SP's 1962 an-
nual meeting, Russell received a telephone call 
from Louis B. Neumiller, a member of the 
executive committee of the Chicago, Rock Is-
land & Pacific Railroad. Neumiller asked 
bluntly: "Would the SP be interested in ac-
quiring the Rock Island?" Russell responded 
that the SP would be interested in portions of 
the Rock Island and suggested that the Union 
Pacific might purchase other parts. Earlier, 
Robert A . Lovett, chairman of Union Pacific's 
executive committee, had asked Russell if the 
SP was interested in the CRI&P. Russell had 
given Lovett the same response. Frankly, he 
had no desire to "get into the Chicago and 
northern areas where there was too much du-
plication of rail service," and he did not wish 
to "go head-to-head with the Union Pacific." 
Nevertheless, both the SP and UP undertook 
individual studies analyzing the potential 
value of the entire Rock Island to their respec-
tive systems—apparently without advising 
each other of the fact. When UP's A . E. 
Stoddard heard of SP's study, he called G . B. 
Aydelott of the Rio Grande and exploded: 
"Those SOBS [the SP] are going all over the 
Rock Island with the idea of buying it. By God 
that's our baby," asserted the UP president.4 1 
The Rock Island, older than either the SP or 
the Union Pacific companies, owned a rich 
and colorful history. Chartered on February 7, 
1851, as the Chicago & Rock Island Rail-
road, it reached the Mississippi River from 
Chicago three years later, was the first railroad 
to bridge that formidable waterway (1856), 
and was the third railroad to connect with the 
Union Pacific at Council Bluffs (1869). Its 
route structure eventually included the origi-
nal Chicago—Council Bluffs main extended to 
Colorado Springs and Denver; a strong sec-
ond artery branching from near Davenport, 
Iowa, and angling southwestwardly to Tu-
cumcari and Santa Rosa, New Mexico (the 
Golden State Route); the Choctaw Route, 
running along the thirty-fifth parallel from 
Memphis and Little Rock to Oklahoma City 
and Tucumcari; and a vital vertical-axis route 
from Minneapolis to Fort Worth, Dallas, 
Houston, and Galveston that crossed the origi-
nal main at Des Moines, joined the Golden 
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State Route as far as Herington, Kansas, and 
bisected the Choctaw at El Reno, Oklahoma. 
The Rock Island also owned secondary mains 
from Kansas City to Saint Louis and Little 
Rock to Eunice, Louisiana. Approximately 
one-fifth of its 7,843 miles in 1962 consisted 
of branches.42 
During the twentieth century the Rock Is-
land found itself victimized by opportunists, 
and it otherwise suffered from the cyclical 
economic vagaries that historically plagued 
the Granger roads. It emerged from its latest 
round of bankruptcy proceedings on Janu-
ary 1, 1948, under the capable leadership of 
John D. Farrington, and for a few years all 
looked well for the CRI&P. Freight density re-
mained fairly constant, and the road experi-
enced improvements in gross revenues after 
1956. At the same time, though, it was unable 
to absorb "upward adjustments" in wage rates 
through force reductions, and, as a conse-
quence, the Rock Island experienced a sharp 
curtailment in net income. Problems mounted. 
"Interline received and bridge traffic," espe-
cially in the "manufacturing and miscellane-
ous commodity group," was of crucial im-
portance to the C R I & P but such traffic was 
especially vulnerable to attack by other car-
riers as well as other modes of transportation. 
For the Rock Island's directors, these matters 
came to a head when Farrington died late in 
1961. They then sought suitable marriage 
partners.4 3 
Southern Pacific's exploratory study was de-
livered to Russell on August 1, 1962; its bur-
den was mixed. The study team found the 
Rock Island's physical plant " i n generally 
good order," but its locomotive and car fleet 
was in poor condition. Although the team 
evaluated the entire system, it focused on the 
Golden State Route, which Farrington had fa-
vored in the late 1930s and early 1940s with 
expensive line changes—among them the 
Arkalon Cut-off with a huge new bridge over 
the Cimarron River west of Kismet, Kan-
sas—as well as automatic block signaling be-
tween Herington and Tucumcari. "The pri-
Route structure of the Chicago, Rock Island 
&C Pacific 
mary objective in acquiring the Rock Island," 
argued the study team, "would be to place the 
Southern Pacific in a more fully competitive 
position with the Santa Fe which presently 
has a one-line control of service and rate ad-
justments between Chicago—long terminus 
for transcontinental business—and Arizona-
California." The advantage of being in a posi-
tion to offer competitive and dependable 
service over a road built to SP's standards, par-
ticularly as regards the Tucumcari-Chicago 
route, "is of paramount importance," con-
cluded the team. 4 4 
As senior officers analyzed this document, 
Russell agreed with the Union Pacific to 
jointly study the prospect of acquiring and di-
viding the Rock Island—generally speaking, 
into two segments, north and south. The no-
tion implied gains for each company but also 
presented them with potential liabilities. If 
the idea was implemented, the SP would ex-
tend its line and influence into Oklahoma and 
into the important Kansas City gateway and 
thus establish controlled service between Kan-
sas City and Arizona and California. For its 
part, the Union Pacific would gain crucial 
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Beaumont H i l l , east of Colton, California, always presented challenges. Here a brawny U50 from General 
Electric heads tonnage toward an eventual connection with the Rock Island at Tucumcari. 
gateways at Chicago, Saint Louis, and the 
Twin Cities and thereby add impressive line-
haul privileges to its traditional service areas 
in the Pacific Northwest and Southern Cali-
fornia. On the other hand, the UP would have 
new competition with the SP at Kansas City, 
and the Cotton Belt would be faced with the 
UP at Saint Louis; the SP could expect the loss 
of preferential solicitation at Chicago, Peoria, 
the Tri-Cities, Des Moines, and the Twin 
Cities, and would be dependent on the UP's 
benevolence for service between Chicago and 
Kansas City; and the UP would be confronted 
with high costs of gathering and distribution 
in the Midwest as well as the liability of offer-
ing commuter service in Chicago. Coverdale 
& Colpitts was commissioned by the two 
companies to offer an independent analysis.4 5 
Events moved smoothly at first. On Febru-
ary 28, 1963, the SP and UP agreed that the 
latter would seek to acquire the entire CRI&P, 
subject to ICC approval, and that after the 
merger the southern portion of the Rock Is-
land, i.e., those lines south of Kansas C i t y — 
excluding the Kansas City—Saint Louis line 
but including the CRI&P's historic trackage 
rights over the UP between Kansas City and 
Topeka, would be sold to the SP. The SP would 
also retain rights between Armourdale Yard in 
Kansas City, Kansas, across the river to Kan-
sas City Union Station and would further re-
tain rights necessary for freight interchange in 
the metropolitan Kansas City area. Mileage 
accruing to the UP would aggregate 4 ,265; 
to the SP, 3,585. Subsequent arrangements 
would cover apportionment and acquisition 
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cost of Rock Island's motive power, rolling 
stock, materials, and supplies. Rock Island's 
management concurred in this arrangement 
and so did its shareholders; by the summer of 
1965, 92 percent of C R I & P stock was "de-
posited by owners in acceptance of UP's ex-
change offer." The merger agreement was filed 
with the ICC in September, 1964. 4 6 
If the acquisition and partitioning of the 
Rock Island by the Southern Pacific and Union 
Pacific offered important gains for each, it ap-
peared to be quite the reverse for other car-
riers—many of which mounted active cam-
paigns of their own. The Chicago & North 
Western, the historic eastern partner on the 
Overland Route and, like the Rock Island, a 
struggling Granger, saw its death warrant in 
the SP-UP concordance, for the UP would 
surely shift lucrative Council Bluffs—Chicago 
traffic away from the C & N W to its own line 
if the ICC approved the proposal. (In 1965 
the C & N W was UP's primary connection at 
Council Bluffs, with 29.3 percent of the total 
interchange; Rock Island was fifth, with only 
8.4 percent.) The North Western predictably 
responded with its own plan to purchase the 
CRI&P, and the Santa Fe, hardly bereft, never-
theless sought advantage by asking the com-
mission for the southern portion of the Rock 
Island if the C & N W won over SP-UP. This 
alarmed the SP, which hardly wanted to see 
Santa Fe with any more competitive advan-
tages; it especially did not wish to see it in 
possession of Rock Island's Memphis—Little 
Rock—Amarillo—Tucumcari route. The wa-
ters were further muddied when the Missouri 
Pacific and Santa Fe considered merger and 
when destitute Missouri-Kansas-Texas pre-
sented itself to the SP (and others, most likely) 
as a marriage partner. Eventually, a dozen rail-
roads intervened in the case to one extent or 
another. UP's Arthur E. Stoddard early dis-
missed such opposition as "routine," but his 
assessment could not have been further from 
reality. Indeed, the Rock Island case became 
the vortex of a titanic struggle to sort out sur-
vivors in the Midwest and thus restructure the 
very face of railroading west of Chicago. 4 7 
The hearings held by the Interstate Com-
merce Commission seemed endless. They 
were not concluded until August 22, 1968, 
and a decision from the agency could not be 
expected until during the next decade. Mean-
while, the plight of the Rock Island worsened. 
SP officers had noted in 1962 that its facilities 
were "being taxed to the detriment of con-
tinued useful and economic lives." Rock Is-
land's chairman echoed this assessment early 
in 1965. "Rock Island's problems cannot be 
postponed," said Jervis Langdon. "They are 
here now and must be dealt with . " That 
was not to be the case. The condition of the 
C R I & P continued to deteriorate as the rail-
roads warred among themselves, attorneys 
quarreled, and bureaucrats fumbled. Precious 
time was wasting. 4 8 
Even as the SP attempted to expand its 
domain through the Western Pacific and Rock 
Island cases, it was paring elsewhere. In addi-
tion to the numerous short branches it aban-
doned, SP also reduced its size by terminating 
service over longer segments of line. Included 
were the former El Paso & Southwestern route 
from Benson Junction to Mescal in Arizona, 
and from Douglas, Arizona, to near El Paso, 
Texas, and in western Nevada between Fernley 
and Flanigan. In the latter instance, the SP ar-
ranged for trackage rights between Flanigan 
and Weso, Nevada, over the Western Pacific 
to maintain through service on the Modoc 
Route. Elsewhere, the Inter-California Rail-
way, a wholly owned subsidiary, sold its re-
maining 9.5-mile route to the Mexican govern-
ment in 1964; a year later another subsidiary, 
the Nacozari Railroad, surrendered its line of 
76 miles. In the case of the Nacozari, title had 
been held under terms of a ninety-nine-year 
concession from the Mexican government that 
had been signed in 1899. Meanwhile, on the 
Cotton Belt, the Commerce-Sherman Branch 
in Texas had been abandoned in 1953. 4 9 
Most of SP's narrow-gauge lines had long 
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since been abandoned or standard gauged. 
For instance, the Oakland-Santa Cruz "Pic-
nic Line" had been fully converted to standard 
gauge in 1907. Yet one isolated fragment sur-
vived until i 9 6 0 . This was the 71.5-mile rem-
nant of the Carson & Colorado between 
Keeler and Laws in the Owens Valley of Cali-
fornia. At one time, business over the dusty 
route had been brisk, but it diminished over 
the years. By 1954 triweekly service was ade-
quate to handle tonnage of talc, pumice, dolo-
mite, and other bulk commodities that were 
transloaded at Owenyo, where the "Slim Prin-
cess" connected with SP's standard gauge 
Owenyo-Mojave or "Jawbone" Branch. The 
SP went to the expense of dieselizing the line 
during the mid-1950s, but denouement was 
not far off. The end came on April 30, i 9 6 0 , 
when SP closed the book on its final narrow-
gauge route. 5 0 
On the passage of SP's narrow gauge, one 
devotee wrote: "the amazing thing was not 
that a part of the Old West had vanished, but 
that it had lasted so long." Those similarly 
attracted by SP's passenger operations were 
rarely as circumspect. Indeed, the company's 
policies of reducing staggering passenger 
deficits ($50 million in 1954, $16 million in 
1966) brought a continuing and vocal outcry 
that reflected the public's perception of real or 
imagined loss of traditional transportation 
service. The problem was a result both of SP's 
handling of this sensitive issue and public re-
actionism and nostalgia. 5 1 
The matter demoralized Russell. In 1947 SP 
executives had predicted a handsome return 
on investment for new streamlined trains— 
14.4 percent for the Shasta Daylight, 27.2 
percent for the Cascade, and 35.7 for the City 
of San Francisco—and for a short time those 
rosy predictions held true. One train, the 
Shasta, earned a 21.4 percent return during 
the first three and one-half years of its life. 
And SP's executives had carefully monitored 
the quality of these trains. Early in 1956, for 
example, Russell severely chastised passenger 
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The end came for SP's romantic if unproductive 
narrow gauge in i960. 
and operating officers for mixing Lark cars in 
the consist of the Sunset Limited. There was 
"no excuse" for this, he roared. "It must be 
stopped." Nevertheless, several months later 
when Russell's office car was attached to the 
Sunset Limited, he made a personal inspec-
tion of the train and was appalled to learn that 
there were only nineteen Pullman and fifty-
seven coach passengers on the nine-car train. 
"We have the finest equipment in the country 
and the best schedules on the Sunset Limited, 
but apparently to no avail," he ruefully con-
cluded in a letter to top officers.52 
Not surprisingly, SP's passenger policy took 
a new turn. Russell ordered the prosecution of 
a vigorous discontinuance policy. Ridership 
on most premier trains held up, but there had 
been a steady erosion on most locals and sec-
ondary runs, and the end had come already 
for some trains. N o longer did the Sunbeam 
and the competition's Sam Houston Zephyr 
sprint side by side out of Dallas Union Termi-
nal following their common late afternoon de-
parture. Indeed, all SP passenger service be-
tween Houston and Dallas ended with final 
runs of T & N O ' s Owl on June 7 , 1958. On the 
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The Sunbeam no longer raced the competition's Sam Houston Zephyr out of Dallas Union Terminal. In-
deed, all SP passenger service between Dallas and Houston ended in 1958. 
Pacific lines, the Starlight was combined with 
the Lark on the Coast Line, the West Coast 
was discontinued on the San Joaquin Route, 
and the San Francisco Overland was reduced 
to seasonal service and then discontinued al-
together in 1964. A similar fate befell the 
much-touted Shasta Daylight. As early as 
1956 Russell approved a plan to make that 
train triweekly except for the summer months 
and Christmas holidays; the plan was ap-
proved by the ICC in 1959, but costs acceler-
ated nevertheless and the train rolled its last 
miles in 1966. It was the first of SP's premier 
trains to perish. 5 3 
A corollary to these trends and events un-
folded predictably in the Bay Area when, on 
October 30, 1957, the SP filed for discon-
tinuation of its historic ferry service between 
San Francisco's Ferry Building and the Oak-
land Mole. Commutation had ended a genera-
tion earlier; SP's ferries thereafter had func-
tioned solely as accessory to the company's 
intercity passenger operation. The fleet had 
dwindled accordingly to just three vessels 
after World War II: the Sacramento, Berkeley, 
and Eureka. The Sacramento was retired in 
1955; the Eureka was donated to the San 
Francisco Maritime Museum in 1956; and a 
"new" vessel, the San Leandro, built by the 
Key System in 1923 and later sold, was ac-
quired from the army in 1954 and subse-
quently served in regular assignment. The 
Berkeley provided backup protection. Both 
active vessels required expensive maintenance, 
however, and would have to be replaced in the 
near future. Bus service provided under con-
tract by Western Greyhound would, asserted 
the SP, provide more efficient and desirable 
service in lieu of the twelve daily round trips 
offered by the ferries. Removal of the old 
vessels, however, represented a monumental 
public relations problem. As one officer said, 
"taking them away from San Francisco would 
be like taking sidewalk cafes from Paris." 
Nevertheless, the SP ultimately received per-
mission to substitute buses for ferries; the San 
Leandro made its last revenue tours on July 
29, 1958. The final curtain came down the 
next day when SP hosted an invitation-only 
trip across the Bay. Guest conductor Arthur 
Fiedler led the San Francisco Municipal Band 
in an appropriate dirge, thus ending more 
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The end came for SP's famous ferry service on 
July 30, 1958. 
than a century of ferry operation on the Bay. 
The Oakland Mole predictably fell to the 
wrecker's ball late in 1965 to make way for a 
new deep-water shipping terminal. 5 4 
Before the East Bay said good-bye to the fa-
miliar Oakland Mole, it said hello to new 
mail-handling and express facilities. Head-
end business, mail and express, had always 
been important to SP's passenger ledgers, but 
never more so than in the 1950s and 1960s as 
fewer and fewer revenue passengers boarded 
the trains. Sealed as well as "way" express 
cars filled with a multitude of parcels were 
found on locals and secondary runs; during 
the early summer, solid trains of express cars 
wheeled strawberries from the central coast 
counties of California to eastern markets. Yet 
the volume of express traffic gradually deterio-
rated, in part the result of low-priced parcel 
post service, and eventually R E A Express, 
successor to the Railway Express Agency, 
would face liquidation. While the volume of 
express shipments declined, that of m a i l — 
especially letter mail—increased. Much of 
this was sorted en route by Railway Post 
Office (RPO) clerks, who performed yeoman 
duty aboard the swaying, lurching cars. Dur-
ing the 1950s and into the 1960s, the SP 
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owned nearly one hundred RPO cars, which 
were a normal complement on its locals and 
secondary trains and in some cases on its 
flagship trains, too. Alas, this class of business 
was susceptible to competition from trucks, 
air, and even the rails' own T O F C service. In 
1967 the Post Office Department began a 
nationwide diversion of mail away from pas-
senger trains, and the SP was caught in this 
net. Mobile postal service ended on the El 
Paso & Los Angeles RPO line at the end of 
March; on the San Francisco &C Los Angeles 
and on the San Francisco, San Jose & Los A n -
geles lines late in September; and on the 
Ogden & San Francisco effective October 12. 
En route sorting of mail thus joined the 
Oakland Mole and the Bay ferries as part of 
the company's past.5 5 
For Russell, loss of the mail contracts repre-
sented the "last straw." The "long-haul pas-
senger train has outlived its usefulness," he 
told shareholders in 1967. SP's passenger 
operation was losing alarming amounts of 
money and at the same time the company's 
equipment was rapidly approaching obsoles-
cence; should the SP be required to stay in 
that business, replacement costs would be 
staggering. "The company, therefore, has no 
alternative but to continue to press for discon-
tinuation of passenger operations which are 
not used by the public," Russell concluded.5'' 
This fully aroused SP's critics, who charged 
the company with an array of nefarious prac-
tices. Many accused the SP of actively dis-
couraging patronage in its attempt to elimi-
nate "intercity passenger service at all costs." 
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Others unfavorably compared SP's service 
standards and general philosophy regarding 
passengers to its principal rival, the Santa Fe. 
Some complained that SP advertised its ser-
vice only in a negative fashion ("The Train 
Traveler—A Rare Breed These Days" in Sun-
set Magazine for October, 1965). One pro-
passenger organization even argued that "rai l -
roads still enjoy a monopoly as compared to 
other forms of transportation for the bigger 
part of their most profitable freight busi-
ness," that in SP's case, "shareholders have no 
valid complaint against absorbing passenger 
losses," and that it "should not be permitted 
to get out of the passenger business simply to 
increase the already-large profits of the com-
pany." The same group likewise implied that 
the SP should make massive expenditures in 
new technology to reattract passengers.57 
The complaints in retrospect seem peevish 
and naive. There was no conscious effort at 
SP to drive passenger business away. Rather, 
management decisions were made to gain 
control of costs; in some cases these had the 
effect of downgrading overall service. In that 
sense SP's policies affected business negatively. 
A l l of this followed, Russell vigorously re-
minded, SP's massive expenditures for new 
equipment, a constant and effective advertis-
ing campaign, and aggressive marketing. "The 
handwriting was on the wal l , " he said. "It was 
so obvious that the kind of people who had 
justified the passenger train were gone. A l l 
you had to do was look at the airport." A l -
ways alert to innovative ways to deliver service 
and improve net profits, Russell saw no such 
opportunities in the passenger trade. As a re-
sult, the SP during the 1960s did not consider 
expenditures for new technology because 
there was no apparent potential return on 
such investment. Furthermore, speculation of 
that nature seemed especially foolish when the 
same monies could be expended to improve 
freight carriage with assured return. 5 8 
Any fair-minded assessment urges that SP's 
decision to seek relief from devastating pas-
senger deficits was justified. There was little 
use in quarreling over the origins of the situa-
tion. Indeed, the American railroad industry 
was no longer entertaining the prospect of a 
high-quality passenger market, but instead 
was confronted with the "leftovers." In the 
1960s it was, in fact, confronted with a mar-
ket that was exceedingly price-sensitive, ex-
hibited great seasonal fluctuations in demand, 
and tended to be rooted in small towns. "You 
are not performing an essential service when 
the cost is exorbitant," Russell complained. 
Even the ICC eventually concluded that pas-
senger deficits endangered "the present and 
future welfare of the railroad industry." Nor , 
believed the regulatory agency, would matters 
improve. "If the statistical trends of 25-odd 
years prove any one thing, it is the folly of 
awaiting more fortuitous events." Thus both 
history and logic favored SP's decisions. The 
business world applauded. SP's passenger 
policies represented "fiscal common sense," 
said Forbes.59 
On the other hand, SP's cavalier style and 
abrupt tactics left much to be desired. Stan-
ford Research Institute, which SP hired to 
evaluate the future of rail passenger service in 
the West, suggested that "a slow rate of decline 
in traffic volume purchased at the price of a 
large deficit is not preferable, in economic 
terms, to a faster rate of decline with smaller 
losses." After all, said SRI, "businesses in 
every field continually make decisions to dis-
continue products and activities that are de-
clining and profitless. . . . The railroads also 
have an obligation to their stockholders to in-
vest capital wisely and profitably." Yet SRI was 
not convinced that the railroads had followed 
a uniformly enlightened policy in the pas-
senger train matter. In an oblique criticism of 
the SP, SRI stated that "the 'hard' pursuit of a 
deficit reduction policy practiced by some 
railroads has aroused considerable opposition 
in the segment of the public that is partial to 
railroads. . . . " Consequently, "a hard-line 
policy has been partially self-defeating." SRI 
felt that the industry had inadequately edu-
cated the public " i n the economics of rail pas-
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senger service" and suffered as a consequence 
from the "large amount of misinformation 
current on the subject." The Southern Pacific 
stood condemned on this count. It had failed 
to heed the advice of one of its own publicists: 
"If you anticipate trouble with the commu-
nity you serve, meet it more than half way. 
Give your neighbors the facts; make peace be-
fore they make war." A casualty of SP's "hard" 
approach to its passenger problem, sad to say, 
was the intangible goodwill necessary for the 
ultimate success of any corporation, especially 
one whose only product is service.6 0 
The issue of SP's style and tactics aside, the 
era of privately operated intercity passenger 
trains in this country was nearly over. In addi-
tion to the remaining secondary trains, several 
of SP's "name" trains perished during the 
1960s. These included the San Francisco 
Overland (1964), Shasta Daylight (1966), 
and even the Golden State (1968) and Lark 
(1968). Ridership was awful. During a test pe-
riod early in 1968, a mere 624 persons per 
day boarded SP's long-distance trains. By the 
time the National Railroad Passenger Corpo-
ration (Amtrak) was formed late in 1970, SP's 
passenger listings were down to the daily 
Coast Daylight, San Joaquin Daylight, and 
connecting Sacramento Daylight; the Del 
Monte (to Monterey); triweekly Cascade, 
Sunset Limited, City of San Francisco; and, 
on the Northwestern Pacific, twice-weekly 
service between Willits and Eureka. Amtrak 
took over national intercity operations effec-
tive May 1, 1971, retaining service on the 
Cascade, Overland, Coast, and Sunset routes; 
it purchased some of SP's rolling stock, re-
quired a one-time entry fee of $9.3 million, 
and contracted with SP to provide train 
service. Thereafter SP's only direct financial 
involvement with passengers was its San 
Francisco—San Jose commute operation. A re-
markable chapter in SP's history had closed.6 1 
The company did not dispose of all pas-
senger rolling stock. Some was retained for in-
ternal purposes, particularly for the use of the 
sales and industrial development forces, who 
enthusiastically promoted the advantages of 
SP's "Golden Empire." In this regard, SP con-
tinued to offer land for sale or lease and to 
sponsor industrial parks and other develop-
ment. During the five-year period 1958 — 62, 
an average of 397 industries were located 
along the Southern Pacific—St. Louis South-
western annually, generating an estimated 
$10 million per year in additional revenues. 
The pattern continued throughout the decade, 
and in 1966 alone 598 new industries were at-
tracted to SP's service. The company's efforts 
were systemwide, but were especially effective 
in the Los Angeles Basin, where in 1966 it 
won the Chamber of Commerce's " G o l d 
Shovel Award" for "significant recent contri-
bution to the economy" of that region. 6 2 
Given what the automobile did to SP's pas-
senger fortunes, it is ironic that the company, 
in perhaps its most impressive industrial de-
velopment coup, located every one of General 
Motors' West Coast assembly plants along its 
lines. Automobile business, however, was not 
new to the SP. Entire trainloads of Overlands, 
Dodges, Packards, and Durants had been de-
livered to California during the early 1920s. 
The location of assembly plants, such as GM's 
sprawling Southgate facility near Los Angeles 
a decade later, provided the railroad with 
revenues from inbound parts as well as out-
bound set-up or assembled autos. Other G M 
plants followed at Melrose (near Oakland), 
Van Nuys, and Fremont. In the latter case, 
General Motors initially favored a location 
served by competitor Western Pacific, but the 
SP scrambled to offer an alternative. "The 
Western Pacific cannot afford you," William 
G . Peoples told G M officials. Peoples, who 
headed the sales department, stressed SP's 
strong financial base, its overall expertise, 
and—in conjunction with PMT—its ability 
to provide full-service transportation. In sum, 
argued Peoples, the Western Pacific was weak 
by comparison; only the SP could give G M 
the long-term service it required. Peoples car-
ried the day; the Fremont plant went "on-
line" during May, 1963. 6 3 
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Automobiles—long a staple in SP's traffic base. Oakland, 1959. Photograph by Richard Steinheimer for SP. 
General Motors provided the SP with a 
handsome account, but it also proved to be a 
demanding customer. Traditional boxcars and 
old-fashioned auto boxes were simply in-
adequate for modern purposes, G M told the 
SP. New equipment was necessary for set-up 
autos as well as parts delivery. SP responded 
by experimenting with T O F C in hauling autos 
and by i 9 6 0 was using P M T trailers loaded 
on 85-foot Clejan piggyback cars. At the same 
time it joined other carriers and suppliers 
in testing 85-foot trilevel flatcars laden with 
set-up models. Later in the decade the SP in-
troduced the 89-foot Vert-A-Pak car, which 
carried thirty subcompact Vegas, vertically 
packed in ten compartments. Special equip-
ment was also necessary for parts manufac-
tured in the Midwest and shipped to Califor-
nia. SP's answer was Hy-Cube Hydra-Cushion 
cars that could carry massive payloads and be 
quickly and efficiently loaded and unloaded 
through four sets of doors. 6 4 
General Motors' plants were among thou-
sands located adjacent to SP's tracks or other-
wise served by spurs. Many thousands of 
other manufacturing works or distribution 
centers, however, were located away from all 
rail facilities during the 1960s. These were 
served by SP's rapidly growing T O F C service. 
Fast, overnight T O F C trains whisked trailers 
between San Francisco/Oakland and Reno, 
San Francisco/Oakland and Los Angeles, 
Houston and Dallas, and Houston and New 
Orleans. Piggyback accounted for 5 percent of 
SP's tonnage in 1963; six years later the com-
pany handled 262,500 trailers, more than 
double the figure of i 9 6 0 . Additional growth 
was assured.65 
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Whether auto parts or T O F C , a rising vol-
ume of long-haul business was expedited by 
run-through trains. The first of these resulted 
from agreement between the Cotton Belt and 
the New York Central to run connecting trains, 
with power and cabooses, through East Saint 
Louis from Pine Bluff to Indianapolis. Service 
began on September 7, 1966. Four months 
later, on January 11, 1967, the Pennsylvania 
Railroad—which had been told in advance of 
the SSW-NYC arrangement but had blithely 
shrugged "so what?"—joined in a similar 
operation between Pine Bluff and Enola, Penn-
sylvania. Run-through contracts were also 
forged with the Northern Pacific between Port-
land and Seattle, with the Union Pacific via 
Ogden, and, of course, with the Rock Island 
via Tucumcari. Other agreements followed, as 
the carriers cooperated to develop speedier 
and more efficient means of interchange.66 
Piggyback, trilevel flats, and diesel-powered 
run-through freight trains were but a few of 
the improvements that characterized the first 
one hundred years of Southern Pacific's exis-
tence. The company had good reason to be 
proud of its accomplishments and of the posi-
tive impact that it had made on its vast service 
area. Celebrations were in order. The first of 
these commemorated the centennial of the 
New Orleans, Opelousas & Great Western 
Railroad; together, the state of Louisiana and 
the SP celebrated " A Century of Progress" in 
1952. Eleven years later ceremonies were held 
in Sacramento to mark the one-hundredth 
birthday of groundbreaking for the Central 
Pacific. A l l of this was merely prologue to 
May 10, 1969, when over 25,000 persons 
watched a reenactment of the Golden Spike 
ceremony at Promontory, Utah. Singled out 
for special recognition at the event were more 
than one hundred descendants of the founders 
and builders of both the Central Pacific and 
Union Pacific who were present for the occa-
sion. Elsewhere, the Cotton Belt would honor 
its own centenary in 1977. 6 7 
SP shareholders, who numbered 84,455 by 
1969, had reason to celebrate the present and 
the future as well as the past. After adjust-
ments for the stock split in 1959, annual divi-
dends per share rose from $1.12 in i 9 6 0 to 
$1.80 in 1969. Furthermore, after lengthy re-
flection, D. J. Russell recommended and the 
board of directors approved a plan to restruc-
ture the SP as a holding company that could 
engage in transportation as well as other di-
verse activities. On November 26, 1969, all 
railroad assets, rights, and obligations of the 
" o l d " Southern Pacific Company passed to 
the recently organized Southern Pacific Trans-
portation Company. However, all stock of 
SPTCo was held by a "new" Southern Pacific 
Company, the holding corporation. In effect, 
SPTCo would direct the affairs of those com-
panies related to transportation while, in gen-
eral, nontransportation subsidiaries would be 
managed by the parent. Russell promised 
early efforts to develop nonrailroad real estate 
through "a broad range of urban, industrial, 
and recreational projects over the coming 
year." The future, he implied, was as bright as 
the company's past.6 8 
The vigorous schedule that Russell had set 
for the Southern Pacific during the 1960s 
made it a property that was admired both in-
side and outside the industry. The railroads it 
owned were well managed and in generally 
fine physical condition; the new corporate 
structure and the opportunity to diversify 
outside regulated transportation made the 
company even more attractive. Furthermore, 
Russell, who would face retirement soon, had 
hand-picked an energetic successor to prose-
cute his aggressive management: Benjamin 
Franklin Biaggini. As a result, there was a 
strong sense of optimism at 65 Market Street 
as the 1960s ended. 
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New Directions 
" N o business can stand still. It wil l either 
move ahead to keep out in front of the com-
petitive parade, or it will quickly fall hope-
lessly behind."—Benjamin F. Biaggini 
T H E decision by Southern Pacific's manage-
ment, with the concurrence of the share-
holders, to further diversify the company's 
operations represented relative disappoint-
ment with the financial performance of its rail 
units. Their operating ratio during the 1960s 
had averaged 78.3, and in 1969 the return on 
equity for the company reached 9.1 percent. 
Nevertheless, there seemed little prospect that 
these figures could be improved or even main-
tained. Railroads, after all, remained both 
capital and labor intensive—a problem exac-
erbated by government regulations, counter-
productive laws, and labor contracts restrict-
ing managerial opportunities. Categorical 
disinvestment of rail properties was not an 
alternative; the reallocation of investment 
through diversification was. The upshot was a 
Southern Pacific that, during the next several 
years, sought to redefine its raison d'etre. Suc-
cesses followed; so did disappointments.' 
Diversification, in a very real sense, was not 
new to the SP although its historic focus had 
been on transportation service and to a lesser 
extent on land development. President D. J. 
Russell enthusiastically embraced that phi-
losophy. He had long dreamed of forging "a 
fully diversified transportation company" and 
chafed under unwarranted restrictions that 
prevented the SP from creating "a transporta-
tion supermarket," which would be sure, he 
said, to benefit the public interest. Frustrated in 
his greater goals, Russell nevertheless pressed 
for a policy of diversification within those 
constraints. "Basically," he said, "we have a 
policy of trying to get into businesses that are 
related to transportation—that is what we 
know something about—rather than spread 
out into areas where we are not familiar." 2 
In some cases the association with trans-
portation was not readily apparent. For in-
stance, in 1964 the Southern Pacific Land 
Company acquired the capital stock of the 
Bankers Leasing Company, which owned a va-
riety of equipment including machine tools, 
fleets of motor vehicles, data processing equip-
ment, and railroad freight cars that were 
leased to other firms. Russell, though, saw in 
Bankers Leasing an opportunity to acquire 
railroad "equipment without having to do so 
in the name of the Southern Pacific." Collat-
erally, ownership of the Evergreen Freight Car 
Corporation, established in 1966 specifically 
for the purpose of furnishing freight cars for 
the forest products industry of northern Cali-
fornia and Oregon "under contracts of sup-
ply," was transferred the next year from the 
Southern Pacific Land Company to Bankers 
Leasing. Eight years later Evergreen's inven-
tory totaled 3,1 z8 cars. Bankers Leasing in 
1975 listed 30 percent of its portfolio as rail-
road related; it included, incidentally, the fully 
automated 15-mile Muskingum Electric Rail-
road, constructed for the purpose of hauling 
coal from a mine to a generating plant in 
southeastern Ohio. In 1978 bankers enjoyed 
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pretax net of $5 million on lease income of 
$19.9 million. Acquisition of Bankers Leasing, 
noted Russell with undue modesty, "worked 
out very satisfactorily over the years." 3 
To provide the full-service transportation 
package that Russell envisioned would, of 
course, require that SP reenter the steamship 
business, something he was loathe to do. 
" A desirable alternative," Russell believed, 
was the Southern Pacific Marine Transport, a 
non-vessel-operating common carrier char-
tered late in 1967, for the purpose of handling 
intermodal container traffic moving to or 
from foreign ports. In essence, SPMT would 
offer international shippers a single-billing 
transportation arrangement by consolidating 
lading into containers and utilizing SP's truck 
and rail components to provide overland de-
livery to and from dockside. Ocean move-
ments would be accomplished by various 
steamship companies under contract. The SP 
was one of the first, if not in fact the first 
carrier, to provide such coordinated rail-
truck-ship transport. In 1979, to expand such 
opportunities at several locations, another 
subsidiary—Southern Pacific International— 
acquired the stock of SPMT from the South-
ern Pacific Land Company. 4 
Given Russell's long and deep interest in 
aviation, it was not surprising that the SP in-
volved itself in that enterprise as a part of its 
transportation diversification program. Years 
earlier, Russell had talked to the president 
of American Airlines about the prospect of 
building a canopy over SP's San Francisco pas-
senger station to be used by futuristic vertical-
takeoff aircraft and, of course, the company 
had cooperated with several air carriers by 
selling their tickets at railroad agencies. 
Nothing came of the vertical-takeoff project, 
but in July, 1967, Southern Pacific Air Freight 
was incorporated and began operations on 
January 14, 1971, following approval by the 
Civil Aeronautics Board. A wholly owned 
subsidiary of Southern Pacific Transportation 
Company, SPAF coordinated truck service 
(PMT) with that of established air freight car-
riers to forward shipments on one bill with 
single-carrier responsibility.5 
Other diversification energies focused on 
developing the SP's general service area and 
thus enhancing the potential for the com-
pany's broadening transportation net. Much 
of this was the responsibility of the Southern 
Pacific Industrial Development Company and 
its cousin, the Southern Pacific Development 
Company. Both were established and owned 
by SPCo, the holding company parent, for the 
purpose of engaging in real estate investment, 
development, and management. By 1978 SPID 
had developed over seventy industrial parks 
which it owned and managed. Additionally, 
it actively recruited businesses for another 
30,000 acres of undeveloped or lightly devel-
oped lands under its control. Southern Pacific 
Development Company's efforts centered on 
office-building expansion in cities from San 
Francisco to New Orleans. 6 
The grandfather of SP's diversified subsidi-
aries was the Southern Pacific Land Company. 
Formed on March 6, 1912, for the purpose of 
managing outlying lands of the Southern Pa-
cific Railroad Company, its activities were 
expanded later by acquisition of properties 
formerly held by the Central Pacific Land 
Company. The powers of this subsidiary were 
broadened several times over the years, and 
on March 1, 1970, it was reorganized to em-
brace industrial development and natural re-
sources as well as real estate operations. By 
December 31, 1980, it owned 3.62 million 
acres and held mineral rights for another 1.27 
million acres of deeded lands. Particularly 
noteworthy were SPLC's timber lands in 
northern California and its agricultural hold-
ings in the San Joaquin Valley. Until the SP ac-
celerated its diversification program in the 
1960s and 1970s, the company had almost 
singlemindedly viewed its real estate resources 
as a means to maximize rail traffic. Thereafter, 
however, the holding company embraced a 
philosophy of enhancing the earning power of 
those properties. The land company, man-
aging SP's long-term investment properties— 
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The grandfather of SP's diversified subsidiaries was 
the Southern Pacific Land Company, which, among 
other things, was responsible for the timberlands. 
including natural resource holdings—was 
central to the new policy. Its own subsidiaries, 
acting independently or in joint ventures, 
moved actively on projects as diverse as shop-
ping centers, warehouses, family resorts, 
hotels, and even the development of geother-
mal energy in the Imperial Valley. If there had 
been any reason to doubt the wisdom of the 
new approach, it was dispelled by the result: 
net income from operations of the land com-
pany rose dramatically from $3.9 million in 
1972 to $55.9 million in 1979. 7 
If the roots of the land company were deep 
in SP's history, those of TOPS On-Line Ser-
vices were not. Using the principles and tech-
niques developed through SP's much-heralded 
Total Operations Processing System (TOPS), 
the parent company and an outside manage-
ment consulting firm formed On-Line Services 
late in 1969, to offer data processing and re-
lated communications services to commercial 
and governmental organizations. This sub-
sidiary helped to install TOPS or similar 
systems at home and abroad; clients included 
the Burlington Northern, Missouri Pacific, 
Union Pacific, and British Rail, among several 
others.8 
Another new subsidiary, and one that would 
greatly affect the direction of parent itself over 
the next years, took the form of the Southern 
Pacific Communications Company. SPCC was 
created on January 23, 1970, to provide com-
munication transmission services for business, 
government, and other customers over SP's ex-
tensive microwave system and leased connec-
tions in an eleven-state area (essentially the 
service territory of SP's railroads). Permis-
sion to sell time on its circuits came from the 
Federal Communications Commission late in 
1972. This allowed SPCC to compete with 
American Telephone & Telegraph and Western 
Union, companies that traditionally enjoyed a 
monopoly on interstate telephone and mes-
sage services. Other aspirants, such as Micro-
wave Communications Incorporated (MCI), 
had similar interests, but the SP, with the larg-
est private microwave network in the country, 
already had what one official called "a real 
telephone network in place." Revenue service 
began on December 26, 1973, when SPCC 
sent signals for its first customer. Acquisi-
tions and expansion followed, first into the 
Midwest and then into the East. During July, 
1974, SPCC became the first of the specialized 
common carrier communications companies 
to offer coast-to-coast voice transmissions by 
microwave.9 
This impressive growth continued, and by 
the end of 1976 SPCC had virtually com-
pleted its own coast-to-coast microwave sys-
tem (capacity had been leased briefly from 
competitors east of Saint Louis) and a ma-
jor investment had been made in expensive 
switching equipment required for SPRINT, a 
new private-line service to be inaugurated 
shortly. None of this was without difficulty. 
Start-up costs were staggering and losses from 
operations were constant. Furthermore, A T & T 
retaliated with reduced rates and other road-
blocks that were only gradually removed by 
legal action. Eventually, federal courts con-
firmed the right of specialized common car-
New Directions 
riers like SPCC to provide long-distance tele-
phone services similar to those provided by 
the Bell system. The courts during the mid-
1970s likewise decided that A T & T was obli-
ged to provide local interconnections between 
switch connections owned by the specialized 
carriers and patrons' telephones. SPCC's cus-
tomer base then leaped from 944 to 16,000; 
revenues reflected that happy development, 
with a rise of 90 percent. SPCC reported its 
first profit from operations in 1979. 1 0 
The most visible symbol of the increasingly 
diversified Southern Pacific Company was the 
transformation of its general office property in 
San Francisco from 65 Market Street to One 
Market Plaza. Plans were unveiled in 1971 by 
O. Greg Linde, president of the Southern Pa-
cific Land Company, for two office towers that 
would be joined by a street-level galleria and 
pedestrian mall adjacent to the historic head-
quarters. Construction began two years later 
and occupancy followed in mid-1976. The 
$82 million project was a joint venture of the 
land company and the Equitable Life Assur-
ance Society.11 
Of equal symbolic as well as material im-
portance was the retirement of Donald J. Rus-
sell on May 17, 1972. His mark on the South-
ern Pacific was, in a word, indelible. He could 
point to any number of accomplishments—di-
versification being just one—but for Russell 
the railroad always had been closest to his 
heart. He took justifiable pride in the perfor-
mance of system railways, especially during 
the 1960s, when revenue ton miles increased 
by 51 percent, gross ton miles per train hour 
grew by 49 percent, and revenue tons per car 
rose by 3 5 percent. Russell thought the key to 
his success was "a lot of hard work and God-
given faculty to think a little bit." His prized 
accomplishment, he thought, was "raising the 
overall quality of the property" and "reducing 
the debt of the company." As his successor, 
Benjamin F. Biaggini, put it, "the vision of 
his leadership will have a continuing effect on 
the Company for years to come." Indeed, the 
sterling characteristic of Russell's stewardship 
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Plans were unveiled in 1971 for two office towers 
joined by a street-level galleria-pedestrian mall ad-
jacent to SP's historic headquarters building in San 
Francisco. 
was his ability to make progressive decisions 
on major issues or projects.1 2 
Biaggini's position was at once enviable and 
frightening. The company he now would lead 
was in good condition and well respected as 
a successful business enterprise, but clearly 
in a period of unpredictable evolution. SP's 
"Golden Empire" service area and the gener-
ous traffic mix it offered had enriched the 
company's railroads following the Great De-
pression, but the future was uncertain. For 
that matter, the very fabric of American rail-
roading was in flux. But there were other vari-
ables. SP's success in becoming a leader of the 
rail industry reflected its unwillingness to tol-
erate the status quo; that attitude had bred a 
useful pride and internal confidence which 
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Benjamin Franklin Biaggini's position was at once 
enviable and frightening. 
permeated the corporate culture. That same 
confidence and pride, however, sometimes 
bordered on an aloofness and arrogance that 
rejected ideas and viewpoints not originating 
in or finding favor with the San Francisco of-
fices. It also irritated fellow railroaders and in 
some cases—particularly in California—the 
public at large. Finally, Russell's performance 
would be hard to follow; Biaggini would not 
be able to avoid invidious comparison. 
Born on Apri l 15, 1916, in New Orleans, 
where his father was an inspector for the Pull-
man Company, Biaggini earned a bachelor's 
degree at St. Mary's University in San Antonio, 
and later participated in Harvard's Advanced 
Management Program. His first railroad as-
signment was as a rodman in the engineer-
ing department of the Texas &c New Orleans; 
in 1953 he was appointed to the executive de-
partment at Houston. Biaggini was named 
president of the SP in 1964, and four years 
later assumed additional duties as chief ex-
ecutive officer. Few doubted his ability. The 
president of a connecting railroad said: " H e is 
smart, knows the business, and has a good 
overview." Another railroad president, who 
once had worked for him, especially admired 
Biaggini's speaking ability." 
Because of his geniality and his capacity for 
oratory, Biaggini frequently found himself on 
the speakers' circuit. His themes varied little: 
the importance of railroads in opening and 
prospering the West, the pressing need to de-
regulate the railroads, the value of free enter-
prise "as a bulwark of the American system," 
the obsolescence of the intercity passenger 
train, and optimism regarding the future of 
railroading. 1 4 
Biaggini perhaps felt most strongly about 
deregulation. "The industry's greatest prob-
lem has been its inability to earn an adequate 
rate of return on its investment," he said in a 
1970 address before the National Press Club 
in Washington. This, he maintained, "has 
been the result of strict economic regulation 
and of a national policy that has actively pro-
moted and financed the growth of other forms 
of transportation. . . ." Additionally, he 
fumed, railroads were subject to difficulties in 
changing "rates, service and plant" because 
they were treated as "pure public utilities 
enjoying protected monopoly status while 
in fact they fight to stave off government-
subsidized transportation at every turn." This 
combination of counterproductive measures 
by the 1970s had resulted in the Penn Central 
debacle, left several major roads with severe 
liquidity problems because of decreased work-
ing capital, and spawned a potential crisis in 
the Middle West. SP's railroads were doing 
well by comparison, but their fate depended 
in part on that of others. "Even though we are 
many different companies, we are also an inte-
grated rail system. The failures or disabilities 
of any parts of this system affect the health of 
the whole," warned Biaggini. 1 5 
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Small wonder that Biaggini and most other 
rail executives were pleased as public senti-
ment gradually changed in favor of unshack-
ling the carriers. This took substantive form 
with passage of the Regional Rail Reorganiza-
tion Act (1973) to restructure the bankrupt 
railroads of the Northeast and the Railroad 
Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act 
(1976). The latter included provisions for 
flexibility in rate making and encouraged 
Biaggini and others to plead for equal treat-
ment for all modes of transport. To press the 
issue in 1978, the SPTCo challenged the "ag-
ricultural exemption" that allowed truckers to 
engage in interstate carriage of fresh fruits and 
vegetables without any rate regulation. SPTCo 
asked the Interstate Commerce Commission 
for the same exemption, which, thought Biag-
gini, was compatible with the intent of the 
1976 legislation. The timing was propitious; 
both Congress and the Carter administration 
were receptive to the general notion of de-
regulation. In that mood the ICC agreed to 
SPTCo's request; it augured well for the fu-
ture. And it was none too soon. "We have 
reached the absolute point of choice between 
either letting the railroads earn a fair return 
or else putting the whole country on notice to 
be prepared to pay the staggering bill for na-
tionalization," said Biaggini. 1 6 
Meanwhile, the Southern Pacific Transpor-
tation Company labored hard to better its 
competitive position. An important reflection 
of this was the 560-acre, 5.7-mile long, $39 
million West Colton Classification Yard lo-
cated some 50 miles east of Los Angeles. The 
West Colton facility, which SP touted as "the 
most technologically advanced rail terminal in 
the world," had capacity for 7,100 freight 
cars and was located at the confluence of the 
Sunset—Golden State line and the new Palm-
dale Cut-off. Sophisticated computer and elec-
tronic equipment typified the operation, which 
was placed in service on July 19, 1973. 1 7 
The West Colton Yard, noted Biaggini, would 
assume even greater importance once the SP 
acquired the southern portion of the Rock Is-
land. That case, before the ICC since the mid-
1960s, was yet to be resolved, but Biaggini re-
mained confident. "If the regulators and the 
Supreme Court can approve Penn Central and 
then the Northern Lines [Burlington North-
ern], they pretty much have to approve any 
merger that comes along." The ICC's adminis-
trative law judge did eventually recommend 
granting the SP—Union Pacific applications, 
but only subject to major conditions includ-
ing a "grand design" for substantially restruc-
turing the nation's rail system west of the Mis-
sissippi River. Biaggini objected to this and, 
along with several others, the SP sought to 
dismiss the proceedings. Biaggini also con-
sidered that the physical and fiscal condition 
of the Rock Island no longer warranted the 
original purchase price. Thus, when the regu-
latory body finally on December 4, 1974, ap-
proved the merger of the Rock Island into the 
Union Pacific and concurrent purchase by SP 
of Rock Island lines south of Kansas City, the 
applicants hedged. Officers of the two com-
panies made another hurried inspection of 
Rock Island's road and equipment property to 
determine the cost of rehabilitation, but the 
results were depressing: the cost in 1974 dol-
lars for a five-year program would amount to 
$1.7 to $1.9 billion. This said nothing of ac-
quisition costs, interest, and the like. It was 
the last straw. Both the SP and UP threw in the 
towel and, predictably if sadly, the Rock Is-
land on March 17, 1975, filed a reorganiza-
tion petition under section 77 of the Bank-
ruptcy Act . 1 8 
That did not end SP's interest in the Rock 
Island or at least certain of its parts. When 
the Rock Island threatened an embargo of 
traffic and cessation of all operations, SPTCo 
volunteered to maintain service from Tucum-
cari to Kansas City (the Golden State Route) 
under temporary ICC authority. The SPTCo, 
of course, had a vested interest. Through con-
nections had existed since 1902, when the 
Rock Island and two subsidiary companies 
finished the route to Tucumcari and Santa 
Rosa. Joint solicitation of traffic had persisted 
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SPTCo. 
even after the SP brought the Cotton Belt into 
its fold, and the Golden State Route remained 
the premier funnel for perishable traffic from 
Southern California and Arizona. True, vol-
ume had fallen as trucks took more of the 
perishable business and as the Rock Island's 
plant deteriorated, but loss of the Golden 
State Route would clearly disadvantage SPTCo 
against the Santa Fe and, to a lesser extent, 
the Union Pacific—especially in competing 
for time-sensitive business. To be sure, the 
SPTCo—Cotton Belt route between Los A n -
geles and Saint Louis was important, but it 
was significantly longer (over 400 miles) than 
those of competitors—a comparative liability 
for shippers in terms of delivery times and for 
the company in terms of maintenance, fuel, 
and labor costs.'9 
With those thoughts in mind, management 
and the trustee of the bankrupt Rock Island 
came to an agreement in Apri l , 1978, for the 
purchase of nearly 1,000 miles of line, plus 
trackage rights, from Santa Rosa, New Mex-
ico, to Kansas City and Saint Louis along with 
the Bucklin-Dodge City Branch in Kansas. 
On December 29, 1978, the SP filed appropri-
ate papers with the ICC. If approved, title 
would be held by SPTCo's St. Louis South-
western Railway. The price: $57 mil l ion. 2 0 
Biaggini was characteristically frank re-
garding SPTCo's position. He had rejected the 
idea of seeking the northern segment of the 
Golden State Route from Kansas City to Chi-
cago for several reasons, not the least of which 
was the poor condition of Rock Island's prop-
erty and because it would have resulted in for-
midable opposition from many of the same 
carriers that earlier had plagued the joint SP-
UP application. In this one, however, Biaggini 
thought the SPTCo was favored by "the logic 
of the former case," in which the regulatory 
body had finally agreed that SPTCo could ac-
quire Rock Island lines south of Kansas City 
concurrently with a merger of the Rock Island 
into the Union Pacific. Additionally, thought 
Biaggini, there could be no opposition to 
Cotton Belt's acquisition of the Rock Island's 
Saint Louis—Kansas City line since SSW al-
ready served Saint Louis and thus was not 
asking for a "new" gateway.21 
There was important support. On-line ship-
pers and local governmental agencies rejoiced 
at the prospect of a healthy carrier's taking 
over the lines; the Rock Island's management 
and the court-appointed trustee heartily ap-
plauded; and the railroad brotherhoods ap-
proved. Sale to the SSW would, after all, pre-
serve local service, restore competition on the 
historic transcontinental route, provide jobs, 
and generate tax revenues. For the Rock Is-
land, money from the proposed sale could be 
used to enhance "an income-based reorgani-
zation" and thereby preserve "essential trans-
portation for the benefit of the shipping pub-
l ic . " Collaterally, the Chicago, Rock Island & 
Pacific promised to upgrade Armourdale Yard 
(which it would share with the SSW) in Kan-
sas City, Kansas, as well as the line from 
Kansas City to Chicago so that it could "com-
pete for the added Southern Pacific traffic 
north of Kansas City." The Rock Island like-
wise planned to rehabilitate trackage in Kan-
sas between Topeka and Herington, where 
trains from its surviving Corn Belt—to—Gulf 
"spine line" and Kansas City-Denver line 
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(from Topeka to McFarland) would operate 
with those of the Cotton Belt on property to 
be owned jointly. 2 2 
Reactions among other railroads were 
mixed. Only the Burlington Northern sup-
ported the SPTCo/SSW. The Chicago & 
North Western, Missouri-Kansas-Texas, Nor-
folk & Western, and St. Louis—San Francisco 
all opposed it in one fashion or another, while 
the Illinois Central Gulf, Milwaukee Road, 
Kansas City Terminal, and Western Pacific 
requested "conditions"; the Denver & Rio 
Grande Western sought to preserve the "Cen-
tral Corridor" via Ogden. Major complaints 
came from the Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe, 
which groused that it would lose $56.7 in 
gross revenues, and from the Missouri Pa-
cific, which not only opposed the purchase 
plan but itself asked to acquire the Rock Is-
land's Kansas City—Saint Louis line—one 
that duplicated MoPac's own route in that cor-
ridor. The Union Pacific, SPTCo's historic 
partner at Ogden, was thoroughly alarmed by 
the proposal. It feared that SPTCo would 
divert traffic away from Ogden to Tucumcari, 
insisted on strict adherence to the Central Pa-
cific Conditions and, apparently in retalia-
tion, asked for rights over SPTCo lines to 
serve new customers in far-off Southern Cali-
fornia. On the surface, the Tucumcari case 
seemed minor compared with the earlier and 
abortive Rock Island merger application, but 
in reality it contained a germ adequate to 
spark massive transformation of the industry 
in the trans-Chicago West. Hearings by the 
ICC were concluded on February 6, 1980; a 
decision was promised later that year. 2 3 
A l l of this was a matter of great curiosity 
for the Cotton Belt. Retirement had claimed 
Harold J. McKenzie on October 31, 1969, 
and his successor as president, R. Maurice 
Nai l , followed suit after only a brief tenure. 
Numerous personnel already had been shifted 
from SSW's headquarters at Tyler to loca-
tions on the parent road, and that process 
continued after the departure of McKenzie 
and N a i l ; management decisions thereafter 
came from San Francisco and Houston, since 
the SSW no longer enjoyed a resident chief ex-
ecutive. SP's policy of gradually reducing Cot-
ton Belt's autonomy reminded retired vice-
president W. H . Hudson of "cutting the dog's 
tail off an inch at a time." This, however, did 
not diminish SP's interest in maintaining at 
least the facade of SSW independence—even 
as it increased its actual ownership (to 99.8 
percent of its common and 99.6 percent of its 
preferred stock by 1977). Its chief value as a 
de facto independent entity sprung from the 
fact that although the SPTCo was bound by 
the Central Pacific Conditions to solicit pref-
erentially for the Union Pacific via Ogden, the 
Cotton Belt was not and thus could solicit for 
itself—and indirectly its parent—for the long-
est haul (via Corsicana and East Saint Louis). 
This fact had long troubled the Union Pacific 
and later also bothered the Denver & Rio 
Grande Western because it allowed the SPTCo 
the luxury of internal debate over the net bene-
fit of, say, handling loads from Oregon via 
Ogden or East Saint Louis. The response to 
that question usually hinged on SPTCo's cash-
flow situation at the moment and whether 
it had surplus capacity on the home route 
to East Saint Louis. Admittedly, though, the 
system earned more net dollars per mile via 
Ogden. These same considerations would 
obtain and, in fact, become even more im-
portant should the ICC allow the Cotton Belt 
to acquire the Tucumcari—Kansas City—Saint 
Louis line from the Rock Island. 2 4 
Among other things, the internal debates 
over soliciting and routing traffic via Ogden 
versus Tucumcari also reflected SP's need for 
more sophisticated marketing procedures. In-
deed, the entire concept of marketing was for-
eign to the railroad industry until the late 
1950s, and even then it caught on very slowly. 
The SP was no exception. Its operating de-
partment traditionally calculated what trains 
it could conveniently and economically sched-
ule, and then the traffic or sales department 
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spected Harold J. McKenzie late in 1969. 
attempted to sell the service. In no case was 
the sales force responsible for profitability. A n 
officer of an eastern carrier that was particu-
larly progressive in this regard and who deeply 
admired SP's remarkable car fleet and its well-
known operating skills complained, neverthe-
less, that SP's management had "little or no 
comprehension of the economics involved." 
At best, he said, "SP was the Pennsylvania 
Railroad of the West in terms of pricing and 
marketing." When the SP finally moved, how-
ever, it did so vigorously, hiring an outsider 
who previously had headed Crocker National 
Bank's marketing program. His task, simply 
stated, was to increase market share as well 
as profitability. Yet it was not a simple task, 
for marketing was not simply a matter of 
organization but rather more an internal per-
ception of the very nature of doing busi-
ness. In sum, marketing, properly approached, 
required substantial alterations in the time-
honored practices of several organizational 
areas—changes that ran counter to the cul-
ture of the company and threatened estab-
lished fiefdoms. In the end, tradition won, the 
outsider and many of those he brought onto 
the marketing team left and, as one officer 
observed, "we lost a half-decade in market-
ing." He may have mildly overstated the mat-
ter since the marketing department was not 
actually dismantled and later recovered some 
of its momentum, but the issue demonstrated, 
as one outsider noted, that "logic, reason, and 
economics go out the window when there are 
problems of personality and turf ." 2 5 
In the case of some commodities, modern 
marketing techniques might increase market 
share and profitability, but in others the rail-
road frankly was no match for competition. 
For instance, livestock and L C L shipments to-
gether made up less than one-tenth of one per-
cent of all SPTCo tonnage by 1970. The truck 
was simply superior for the movement of live 
animals, and L C L similarly moved more expe-
ditiously by motor carrier or by freight for-
warders. On the other hand, gains were made 
in traditional categories such as ores, miner-
als, and fuels, manufactured goods, timber 
products, food and farm products, chemicals, 
and others. Commodities such as crude oil , 
sugar beets, cement, iron ore, steel coils, and 
grain were especially subject to efficient bulk 
movement by unit train. Lumber, wood chips, 
and paper products similarly continued to 
supply handsome revenues from mills in Ore-
gon and northern California, and Arizona 
maintained its reputation for heavy tonnage in 
copper concentrates and anodes. A particu-
larly bright spot in SPTCo's traffic mix derived 
from the Gulf Coast region, where volume in 
chemicals jumped from 8.9 percent of SPTCo's 
tonnage in 1970 to 14.7 percent in 1981. 2 6 
Throughout this period SPTCo paid strict 
attention to the needs of the automobile in-
dustry. In 1970 General Motors began unit 
train shipments of auto parts and assembled 
units that had been gathered at the Illinois 
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The motor truck was frankly superior to rail service in the carriage of livestock. Indeed, SPTCo's tariff for 
live animals was canceled before 1970. 
Central's Markham Yard south of Chicago 
from twenty-three of its midwestern plants. 
These trains, headed for assembly plants and 
unloading points in the Los Angeles Basin, 
were handed to the Cotton Belt at East Saint 
Louis and then to SPTCo at Corsicana. This 
arrangement reduced transit time and saved 
money in inventory needs for G M , and it 
saved car miles and reduced equipment needs 
for the carriers. It was mutually advantageous 
and gave the auto maker an excuse to cancel 
other routings and gateways favoring compet-
ing railroads. The Southern Pacific-General 
Motors alliance was further cemented by mu-
tual development of Stac-Pac container cars 
for shipments of Cadillacs (a dozen autos in 
four containers loaded on a standard 89-foot 
flatcar) and in continued use of SP Vert-A-Pac 
cars for Chevrolet Vegas. 2 7 
Substantial growth likewise occurred in 
trailer (TOFC) and container (COFC) volume. 
Piggyback or intermodal traffic grew from 
178,000 units (trailers or containers) handled 
in 1965 to 245,000 units in 1972, when 
SPTCo created a new intermodal traffic de-
partment to coordinate operating and sales 
functions. Overhead or straddle cranes and 
motorized Piggy Packers replaced "circus 
ramps" for loading and unloading at new or 
improved intermodal yards in Los Angeles, 
Oakland, Dallas, Phoenix, Houston, Port-
land, Memphis, East Saint Louis, and Avon-
dale (New Orleans). Dedicated long-distance 
T O F C trains, such as that contracted for by 
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The Southern Pacific paid strict attention to the 
needs of the automobile industry. "Stac-Pac" re-
flected this. 
the U.S. Postal Service between the Bay Area 
and Chicago, made their appearance early in 
the 1970s and grew in number throughout the 
decade. Similarly, two important innovations, 
"landbridge" and "mini-bridge"—port-to-
port and point-to-point rail networks—uti-
lized containers. Landbridge linked ocean 
routes by way of overland rail service between 
ports, e.g., Oakland and Houston; mini-
bridge handled international shipments to and 
from domestic points in similar fashion. 2 8 
Mini-bridge and landbridge both short-
ened transit time by avoiding lengthy voyages 
through the Panama Canal and offered a com-
petitive edge because break-bulk expenses 
were avoided. The entire process implied dras-
tic changes for the ocean carriers and the 
ports they plied. The case of San Francisco 
and Oakland is illustrative. San Francisco his-
torically was the more important of the two 
ports, but labor and work-rule problems, the 
demise of American flag lines, and the desire 
of that city for only "clean industries" com-
bined to diminish its maritime importance. 
On the other hand, Oakland recognized the 
move away from break-bulk shipping to con-
tainerization and planned accordingly. Other 
ports served by the SPTCo—Portland, Los 
Angeles (San Pedro-Long Beach), and Hous-
ton—made the transition to containerization 
rather easily.29 
Change also typified an old subsidiary— 
Pacific Fruit Express—and the transportation 
of perishable products associated with it. PFE 
gradually phased out its ice bunker cars (the 
use of ice as a refrigerant ended in 1971), re-
placing them with mechanical refrigerators. A 
total of 13,252 of these cars were leased or 
purchased between 1953 and 1971. During 
the 1960s PFE also acquired 3,314 refriger-
ated trailers and over a thousand flatcars for 
T O F C service. Piggyback proved especially 
attractive for the movement of lettuce and 
grapes, and the "reefers" wheeled heavy vol-
umes of lettuce, potatoes, melons, citrus, and, 
increasingly, frozen foods. The shipment of 
the millionth carload of lettuce from the Sali-
nas Valley on August 20, 1963, attested to the 
long relationship between PFE and the per-
ishables producers. Yet change was in the of-
fing. The volume of fresh fruits and vegetables 
handled nationwide by railroads and the truck-
ing industry was about equal in i 9 6 0 , but by 
1978 trucks held a seven-to-one advantage. 
This was mirrored by PFE's performance; 
shipments dropped from 232,071 in i 9 6 0 to 
62,083 m I 9 7 7 - consequently suffered 
net deficits beginning in 1971 and, except for 
1975, each year through 1978. Unregulated 
trucks clearly had advantages, including plas-
ticity in operations and rates as well as faster 
transit time (third-morning delivery to Chi-
cago versus fifth-morning by rail). Ironically, 
PFE's efforts in T O F C proved unremunerative, 
and even its attempt to advance efficiency by 
providing higher capacity (130,000-pound) 
rail cars backfired when buyers favored the 
flexibility of smaller shipments.1" 
Joint ownership of PFE by the Southern Pa-
cific and the Union Pacific always had been 
somewhat difficult, and that problem stood in 
bold relief as its market share deteriorated. 
Both owners simply wished to have closer 
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identification with the shippers and producers 
on their respective lines; not surprisingly then, 
they agreed to a split-off and equal division of 
PFE's assets effective Apri l 1, 1978. Under the 
agreement, Union Pacific established its own 
refrigerator car line while the SP retained the 
familiar name of Pacific Fruit Express for its 
"new" subsidiary.3' 
Another alteration in the company's con-
ventional landscape involved the commute op-
eration between San Francisco and San Jose. 
Although its out-of-pocket costs had risen 
regularly after World War II, the SP had con-
tinued to lavish close attention on the pro-
gram. Even in the 1960s when the company 
struggled to get out of the intercity passenger 
business, it pledged to "continue operating 
the best commute service in the country, just 
as long as there is need for it or until it is even-
tually supplanted by some other form of rapid 
transit." To this end, SP had received ten new 
double-decker "gallery" cars in 1955, twenty-
one more two years later, and would receive 
fifteen more in 1968. Not surprisingly, Penin-
sula patrons gave SP's service high marks and 
so did the national media, which compared it 
favorably with other operations in the East 
and Midwest. Festivities properly marked the 
centennial of SP's commute operations on 
January 16, 1964. 3 2 
The same year, however, marked growing 
distress among SP's managers regarding ris-
ing commute deficits. The California Public 
Utilities Commission inexcusably put off deci-
sions on rate increase requests, and eventually 
the SP put the matter before the Interstate 
Commerce Commission. Even after increases 
were finally granted, SP's rail commute rates 
were among the lowest in the nation (round 
trip fare from San Francisco to San Jose was 
$1.75 in 1948, only $3.10 in 1967) and defi-
cits continued to climb, from $670,000 in 
1964 to over $1 million by 1968, while rider-
ship held steady at about 12,000 daily. Mat-
ters came to a head in 1975, after SPTCo 
asked Price Waterhouse & Company, a na-
tionally recognized accounting firm, to con-
duct an independent review of commute costs. 
The Price Waterhouse report concluded that 
the railroad received a mere $4.6 million an-
nually in revenues but lost a staggering $5.3 
million. Biaggini rightly concluded that this 
was an intolerable burden for the equity hold-
ers, but the California PUC was obdurate. 
When SPTCo asked for a fare increase of 111 
percent "to offset losses from operations," the 
California regulators announced that they 
would "not be ready to proceed with hearings 
for approximately 14 months." Ridership fell 
to about 8,000 daily and losses mounted to $9 
million in 1976. In utter despair Biaggini first 
offered to sell the commute line and then of-
fered to purchase 1,000 eight-passenger motor 
vehicles and donate them for vanpools if re-
lieved of the commute operation. Finally, he 
authorized company attorneys to seek "dis-
continuance of passenger service on the San 
Francisco Peninsula." In all of this, the PUC 
had not yet acted on SP's request for rate 
increases, fumed Biaggini. An accommoda-
tion was finally reached, however. On July 1, 
1980, the California Department of Transpor-
tation assumed financial responsibility for 
the commute service; SPTCo agreed to main-
tain operations under a cost-reimbursable 
contract. Consequently the trains continued 
to roll—ironically, to and from a relatively 
new station in San Francisco. The old Mission 
style facility at Third & Townsend was the 
victim of freeway planners; the new one, a 
block away on Fourth Street, had opened on 
June 23, 1975." 
Just as it sought relief from commute defi-
cits, SPTCo also found other areas to trim. It 
filed applications with the ICC to retire over 
700 miles of track during the mid-1970s. 
Most of these were bits and pieces of branches 
around the system, but one was not. On Sep-
tember 10, 1976, Hurricane Kathleen in-
flicted $1.3 million in damages, destroyed 
three trestles, otherwise cut the line at more 
than fifty locations, and threatened the very 
life of the San Diego & Arizona Eastern 
(SD&AE). The road had other problems, how-
Price Waterhouse estimated that SPTCo received $4.6 million annually in revenues from commute opera-
tions, but lost a staggering $5.3 million each year in that service. Small wonder the company wanted out. 
ever, which had not developed overnight. 
Carloads handled had dropped from 33,000 
in 1958 to 20,000 in 1974, while difficulties 
of maintenance and operation on the " i m -
possible railroad" were historic. Operations 
themselves had not been affected in 1970, 
when ownership of the Tijuana & Tecate Rail-
way—a subsidiary that held title to the 44 
miles of route in Mexico—was transferred 
from the S D & A E to the Sonora—Baja Cali-
fornia Railway, part of the Mexican govern-
ment's national system. It merely confused 
matters.34 
Hurricane Kathleen's devastation, however, 
required that SPTCo's management face the 
issue of SD&AE's future earlier than might 
otherwise have been the case. In any event, it 
determined early in 1977 to abandon or sell 
all of the S D & A E except the eighteen east-
ernmost miles from El Centro to an impor-
tant United States Gypsum Company plant at 
Plaster City. Events then took a surprising 
course when on November 1, 1978, SPTCo 
concluded the sale of 108 miles of the road-
way and all of the company's capital stock to 
San Diego's Metropolitan Transit Develop-
ment Board for $18.1 million, less the cost of 
SPTCo's repairing those segments of line dam-
aged by the hurricane in 1976. For SPTCo 
it represented a "sale-donation" that would 
yield a charitable deduction; for San Diego 
it represented an inexpensive opportunity to 
employ the western portion of the S D & A E 
for a new trolley system while leasing the en-
tire line from San Diego to a connection with 
SPTCo at Plaster City to a short-line operator. 
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For the S D & A E , Hurricane Kathleen proved to be one storm too many. 
In that way the San Diego & Arizona Eastern 
survived. San Diego's trolley system would get 
rave reviews, but short-line operators would 
find the rugged route through Carrizo Gorge 
as "impossible" as had the Southern Pacific. 3 5 
Fires and floods were a normal part of busi-
ness on the S D & A E ; challenges to operations 
elsewhere were just as normal for its parent. 
Continued sinking of the tracks in the Sui-
sun Marshes between Benicia and Sacramento 
had plagued the SP early on; the collapse of a 
tunnel closed traffic on the Coast Line for 
sixty days in 1914; the Christmas week storm 
of 1964 knocked out the Northwestern Pa-
cific, SP's Cascade Line, and others; and Hur-
ricane Beulah in 1967 heavily damaged sev-
eral lines in Texas. However unpleasant, SP 
forces handled these crises and others like 
them with aplomb. More difficult were disas-
ters involving lading. An explosion of liquid 
petroleum gas in the Alton & Southern yard 
at East Saint Louis during 1972 produced 
heavy damage to rail facilities and the nearby 
area; a similar explosion occurred two years 
later in Houston's Englewood Yard; and the 
derailment of a Cotton Belt train followed by 
a fire among cars containing hazardous mate-
rials required the evacuation of 1,700 persons 
living in and around Lewisville, Arkansas, 
early in 1978. Worst of all was the devastation 
brought by multiple explosions in SPTCo's 
yard at Roseville, California, on Apri l 28, 
1973. In this case, several cars of bombs des-
tined for Viet Nam blew up. Nearly two hun-
dred persons were injured, but miraculously 
none died in the two-day ordeal. Hundreds 
of claims and dozens of lawsuits resulted; the 
monetary loss to the SPTCo was enormous, 
although neither the company nor its per-
sonnel were guilty of improper procedures or 
sloppy handling. 3 6 
These unanticipated liabilities were all the 
more debilitating given the general economic 
instability of the 1970s and the cash require-
ments necessary for the Southern Pacific to 
prosecute its diversification program. SP's divi-
dends rose from $1.80 per share in 1970 on 
an uninterrupted curve to $2.45 in 1979. This 
index, however, did not represent the whole 
cloth. Neither did the fact that the company's 
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revenues in 1977 exceeded $2 billion for the 
first time. As late as that same year railroad 
operations accounted for 86 percent of the 
Southern Pacific Company's revenues and 71 
percent of its income from operations. SP's 
railroads were obviously central to the hold-
ing company's fortunes—they were generous 
"cash cows" necessary in providing funds to 
"lever up" the communications and land com-
panies. Yet the railroads remained both capi-
tal and labor intensive—the latter element 
increasingly a matter of concern. Labor costs 
for the company's railroads rose 50 percent in 
the first half of the 1970s, and agreements 
pledged them to at least another 40 percent 
increase over the next three years. Unproduc-
tive work rules militated against advances in 
productivity and, as a consequence of energy 
shortages, fuel costs were up 117 percent in 
1974 alone. The result was as unpleasant as it 
was predictable; SPTCo's operating ratio sky-
rocketed to 97.49 by the end of the decade. 
Moreover, the country's railroads were espe-
cially vulnerable to the vagaries of the busi-
ness cycle; this was especially true of SPTCo 
since many of its principal customers were 
themselves susceptible to cyclical impact. Un-
fortunately, there were two severe slumps dur-
ing the 1970s which, in contravention to the 
norm, were accompanied by inflation of se-
vere proportions. During the recession year 
of 1975 SP's working capital dropped fright-
eningly; long-term debt rose to $1.5 billion by 
1979, up from $844.2 million in 1972. Obvi-
ously, SP's diversification program had not yet 
reached full flower, at least in terms of contrib-
uting to net. Rather, it needed even more infu-
sions of cash just when the company's railroads 
were having a very hard time with expenses.37 
Indeed, the devastating recession of 1974— 
75 thoroughly traumatized SP's railroads 
(the holding company at one point had to ad-
vance $53 million to SPTCo for it to meet 
obligations) and that trauma had onerous 
short- and long-term implications. To slow the 
hemorrhage of cash, management postponed 
certain capital expenditures and embraced a 
The nation's railroads in the 1970s remained both 
capital and labor intensive. On the Southern Pa-
cific, operating costs were always an important 
issue because of the rugged nature of much of its 
service area. 
program of "stringent cost control." N o new 
locomotives were delivered in 1976 and 1977, 
and the number of track miles receiving new 
or relay rail dropped to 388 in 1976. Biaggini 
told shareholders that the company's rail prop-
erties were "well maintained," but cuts made 
during the recession hit the mechanical and 
maintenance-of-way departments hardest. The 
locomotive rebuilding program at the Sacra-
mento Locomotive Works was curtailed, and 
ties installed on SPTCo's trackage averaged 
only 812,000 annually during the years 1973 — 
76. (Maintenance engineers argued that these 
properties required 1.2 million renewal ties 
annually.) 3 8 
One officer labeled management's policy as 
"selective negligence"; another said flatly that 
not enough money was authorized for "sys-
tem management and maintenance." Prob-
lems in track structure showed up earliest and 
were the most severe on the Texas & Louisi-
ana Lines, where properties had been under-
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maintained longer. Ironically, the traffic base 
on the Texas & Louisiana Lines, especially in 
lucrative business from the petrochemical in-
dustry, had been increasing, but SPTCo mana-
gers failed to apprehend the volume of that 
growth and the importance of it to the entire 
system. When the national economy turned 
up, the Texas and Louisiana Gulf Coast econ-
omy boomed. SPTCo simply was not in con-
dition to adequately handle the business 
offered. Track conditions demanded volumi-
nous slow orders; crews "died" on line with-
out getting their trains into terminals; traffic 
backed up from Los Angeles to East Saint 
Louis; congestion was so intense that loads 
were "stored" on remote unused track simply 
to achieve fluidity; and customers were driven 
to distraction. A shortage of motive power 
compounded the problem. Newer locomotives 
had been used during the recession while 
older power, as it became disabled, was stored 
as unserviceable rather than repaired. N o w 
the new power needed attention as did the 
old; locomotives from other carriers that 
otherwise might have been leased were not 
available because of the national demand for 
transportation. A total of 1,197 rniles of rail 
were laid and 2.5 million ties inserted during 
the last two years of the decade, the loco-
motive rebuilding program was renewed and 
accelerated, and nearly three hundred new lo-
comotives were received, but in many ways it 
was too little too late. The competition, es-
pecially the Missouri Pacific, profited greatly 
from SPTCo's misfortunes. As one senior of-
ficer would observe, customers and potential 
customers as late as 1982 remained skittish, 
recalling SPTCo's poor performance of the 
late 1970s.' 9 
These problems notwithstanding, Biaggini 
remained confident in the rail industry and 
the place of SP's railroads in it. Merger, he 
concluded, was the proper medicine. Con-
sequently, he vigorously pursued creation of 
the nation's first truly transcontinental system. 
During the early 1970s Biaggini had held 
informal discussions in this regard with 
W. Thomas Rice and Prime F. Osborn of 
the Seaboard Coast Line (SCL) Railroad and 
Hayes T. Watkins of the Chesapeake & Ohio 
Railway to see if a three-way partnership 
might be arranged—replicating, in a sense, 
the nineteenth-century dream of Collis P. 
Huntington. The Chesapeake & Ohio even-
tually dropped out, but in the summer of 1977 
the SP and the SCL each authorized initial 
studies, followed by a more formal agreement 
of a few months later. Biaggini met with Os-
born in March, 1978, and gave the SCL presi-
dent a list of propositions, including the ratio 
of stock exchange and names for senior man-
agement positions and the board of direc-
tors. The burden of Biaggini's list implied that 
SP "would be the dominating or surviving" 
company. SCL officers thought well of SP's 
management and, according to Osborn, re-
garded SP's diversification as "the most attrac-
tive feature" that the San Francisco company 
brought to the potential marriage. Osborn 
promised to study Biaggini's list. Meanwhile, 
the SP purchased 700,000 shares or 4.8 per-
cent of Seaboard Coast Line's outstanding 
stock.4" 
If merged, the SP-SCL would link the Pa-
cific coast with that of the Atlantic by way of a 
30,000-mile railway serving more than half of 
the nation's states. Yet there were problems. 
Definite long-haul advantages would accrue 
for transcontinental traffic, but, because of the 
end-to-end nature of this merger, operating 
savings by way of closing redundant facilities 
would be few. Many at SCL felt that SP's pro-
posal offered little financial incentive and that 
forces at One Market Plaza interpreted the 
word merger as "takeover." Others at Sea-
board were put off by Biaggini's "domineering 
style." In any event, Seaboard's board of direc-
tors rejected SP's offer on May 18, 1978. Biag-
gini attempted to change opinions at SCL and 
SP increased its holdings in Seaboard to 9.5 
percent, but that brought complaints from 
Seaboard and an order from the ICC to termi-
nate stock acquisitions. Seaboard and Chesa-
peake & Ohio soon thereafter announced 
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their own plans for merger. SP voted its shares 
in favor of the plan and then sold its holdings 
in 1980 at an appreciable profit. Biaggini was 
philosophical. Had the merger been consum-
mated, he noted, it not only would have created 
the first transcontinental but it also "would 
have initiated the ultimate wave of them." For 
better or for worse, it was not to be.4 1 
Biaggini's ardor for some kind of expan-
sion was not dampened. Early in 1978 he an-
nounced that SP would acquire the outstand-
ing stock of Ticor, a financial service company 
headquartered in Los Angeles. Ticor, the old-
est and largest title insurance company in 
California, had expanded in recent years into 
mortgage insurance, reinsurance, and finan-
cial and corporate printing. Critics, both in-
side and outside of the company, wondered 
why SP sought an operation such as this, for 
Ticor's fortunes—like those of SP's railroads— 
were subject to the vagaries of the business 
cycle. Nevertheless, Ticor became a member 
of the Southern Pacific family on July 27, 
1979. The cost: $258 million in cash and 
debentures.42 
Biaggini considered that "the 1970s, and 
particularly the last few years of the decade, 
marked a major turning point in Southern Pa-
cific's" long history. Ten years ago, he noted, it 
had been "basically a railroad company with 
outside interests." Now, as it approached the 
1980s the SP was, in Biaggini's words, "a 
strongly diversified corporation." True. But its 
raison d'etre still was not clearly defined and, 
as a consequence, its course was not predict-
able. Would further diversification cause dis-
investment in its rail properties? Would SP 
acquire additional concerns such as Ticor, 
which seemed to have so little similarity to its 
other holdings? Would it sell some of its sub-
sidiaries? The past seemed inadequate as a 
predictor as the new decade began.4 5 
C H A P T E R l 8 
Eye of the Storm 
"Unfortunately, there is no certainty. There is 
only reason and experience to guide u s . " — 
Frederick S. Burbridge 
C O N D I T I O N S faced by the Southern Pacific 
Company during the early 1980s remained in 
a state of flux, partly because its own corpo-
rate direction was inadequately defined and 
partly because of external circumstances over 
which it had little or no control. Interest rates, 
as an example, soared before finally moder-
ating as the country suffered its worst eco-
nomic downturn since the Great Depression. 
For that matter, the very core of the American 
economy was under stress as its base gradu-
ally shifted from traditional heavy industries 
to high technology and service-oriented con-
cerns. A l l of this had a predictably forceful 
impact on the SP and colored the decisions 
of its managers, who faced yet another par-
ticularly vexing matter: The "mega-merger" 
movement that had settled upon the railroad 
industry. 
Mergers were hardly new to the country's 
railroads; SP's own development included a 
bewildering plethora of such consolidations. 
In the twentieth century the federal govern-
ment had encouraged mergers of carriers into 
strong systems through the Transportation 
Act of 1920 as well as the Prince Plan of the 
1930s, but little was accomplished until the 
carriers themselves clamored for combina-
tions as a cure for their collective ailments 
during the late 1950s. Industry leaders such as 
John W. Barriger, president of the Pittsburg & 
Lake Erie, called for "super railroads," and in 
1957 Northern Pacific's Robert S. MacFarlane 
predicted the nation's railroads would be 
merged into "perhaps 25 great systems" within 
fifteen or twenty years. MacFarlane's predic-
tions pointed to fruition during the 1960s. 
In the Midwest the Chicago & North West-
ern swallowed the smaller Minneapolis & 
St. Louis and the Chicago Great Western, but 
more important manifestations occurred east 
of the Mississippi River, where the Chesa-
peake &C Ohio and the Baltimore & Ohio 
formed the Chessie System; the Atlantic Coast 
Line and the Seaboard Air Line emerged as 
the Seaboard Coast Line; the Erie and the 
Delaware, Lackawanna & Western created the 
Erie Lackawanna; and the Norfolk & Western 
brought the Virginian and then the New York, 
Chicago & St. Louis and the Wabash under 
its flag. As impressive as these combinations 
were, nothing in the East compared to the 
new Penn Central, an amalgamation of the 
Pennsylvania Railroad, New York Central, 
and the New York, New Haven & Hartford. 
Neither was the West left out. The H i l l Lines— 
the Chicago, Burlington &c Quincy, Great 
Northern, Northern Pacific, and the Spokane, 
Portland & Seattle—finally pledged their four-
way troth early in 1970 under a new corporate 
canopy, Burlington Northern (BN). 1 
Merger activity subsided dramatically dur-
ing the 1970s, however, following the spec-
tacular failure of Penn Central and the bank-
ruptcy of several other railroads in the 
Northeast. (These finally emerged as Conrail, 
a child of the federal government, on April 1, 
1976.) If the merger movement temporarily 
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decelerated, the problems of the industry did 
not. Focus shifted to the Midwest, where a 
long-anticipated crisis was at hand. The Illi-
nois Central had merged with the Gulf, M o -
bile & Ohio in 1972, but anticipated benefits 
proved disappointing and the "new" Illinois 
Central Gulf quickly became an unwanted en-
tity of the holding company that it had 
birthed. Many other midwestern roads suf-
fered similarly from financial malnutrition. 
The Rock Island, of course, struggled with 
bankruptcy and faced dismemberment, and 
the Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific 
similarly found refuge in the courts and even-
tually lopped off nearly two-thirds of its route 
miles in a desperate attempt to stay alive. It 
was against this backdrop that another round 
of mergers began; many executives agreed 
with SP's Ben Biaggini, who saw the issue 
quite simply: mergers were "a matter of 
survival." 2 
On the other hand, Biaggini soon learned 
that the merger knife was double-edged. The 
term mega-merger became popular during the 
late 1970s, but it might justifiably have been 
used to define both the earlier Penn Central 
and Burlington Northern combinations. The 
SP had taken no official position on the Penn 
Central merger but had labored to protect 
historic traffic patterns via Portland under 
the Burlington Northern plan. Its concerns 
deepened when the mid-sized St. Louis—San 
Francisco was folded into the much larger 
B N (1980), when the Chessie System and Sea-
board Coast Line combined to form the huge 
C S X Corporation (1980), and again when 
Norfolk & Western joined with Southern 
Railway to form the equally formidable Nor-
folk Southern (1982). The most decisive blow 
of all, however, came on January 8, 1980, 
when the Union Pacific—SP's historic partner 
on the Overland Route—and the Missouri 
Pacific—its chief rival in the Texas and Louisi-
ana Gulf Coast region—announced that they 
had agreed in principle to a merger. This 
trauma was compounded shortly thereafter 
when the UP announced that it would also 
seek authority to control the Western Pacific, 
which paralleled SPTCo's portion of the Over-
land Route in California, Nevada, and Utah. 
If approved, " M o p U p , " as it came to be 
called, would spread UP's influence over a 
vast domain from Portland, Oakland, and Los 
Angeles to Chicago, Saint Louis, Houston, 
and New Orleans. It would clearly, as one 
writer observed, represent the "first funda-
mental rearrangement of Western railroading 
since Edward H . Harriman strode the land. " 1 
There was much irony in all of this. Har-
riman, after all, had joined the SP with the 
Union Pacific early in the century, but net-
tlesome government intervention eventually 
undid his handiwork. The matter was further 
confused by the activities of George Gould, 
whose Western Pacific finally constructed its 
line over a route that the Union Pacific itself 
would have used had the Central Pacific not 
made such rapid progress building eastward 
during the late 1860s. Robert S. Lovett, who 
headed the Union Pacific after the SP had 
been separated from it, could have acquired 
the Western Pacific interloper for the UP but 
chose not to "because of the inconsistency of 
such purchase with the obligation under the 
Pacific Railroad Acts for the continued use of 
the Union Pacific and Central Pacific as one 
continuous line of railroad." This notion was 
reinforced in 1923 by the ICC's so-called Cen-
tral Pacific Conditions, which bound the SP to 
solicit preferentially for the UP via Ogden, 
and a year later by an agreement between the 
two historic partners in which the UP prom-
ised to view the Central Pacific Conditions 
as reciprocally obligatory—i.e., it would treat 
the SP preferentially at Ogden. 4 
Union Pacific's merger proposal, if ap-
proved, would disavow the relationship be-
gun more than a century earlier with the driv-
ing of the Golden Spike at Promontory. More 
than that, it would negate the possibility of re-
uniting the former Harriman properties in 
an eminently logical modern-day end-to-end 
merger. W. Averell Harriman, who himself 
had once headed the Union Pacific, thought it 
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"too bad" that a merged SP-UP "couldn't be," 
and SP's D. J. Russell and Ben Biaggini both 
agreed that such a marriage was both reason-
able and desirable. Russell recalled that the 
Southern Pacific had made "very serious stud-
ies" and had held "casual discussions" with 
the UP to that end "over the last 20 years"; 
the benefits, he maintained, had not been 
"justified for the SP." UP's action now, though, 
struck Russell as a "double cross" since it 
sought direct access to the Bay Area by way of 
the Western Pacific—in contravention to the 
Central Pacific Conditions and other collat-
eral agreements. Ben Biaggini took a similar 
position. He was long on record as favoring 
mergers to achieve a "nicely balanced, com-
petitive" rail system for the nation, but he saw 
Union Pacific's effort to merge with the Mis-
souri Pacific and then acquire the Western 
Pacific as "corporate treachery of the high-
est order." From SP's point of view there was 
very good reason to be concerned. Company 
accountants glumly calculated that the huge 
merger would essentially dry up SPTCo's part 
of the Overland Route. Furthermore, said 
Biaggini, there would be "no public benefit 
associated with transferring revenues from 
other railroads to the already embarrass-
ingly rich Union Pacific." Correspondingly, 
the Southern Pacific threw itself into an ear-
nest campaign against the UP-MoPac-WP 
combination, which it branded as "anti-
competitive and otherwise contrary to the 
public interest."5 
Biaggini worried openly that the merger 
might bankrupt the Southern Pacific Trans-
portation Company. On the other hand, UP's 
actions were a predictable response to its 
historic needs. In 1901 E. H . Harriman had 
explained to UP shareholders that gaining 
control of the SP was necessary "to maintain 
and protect the position of the system and to 
safeguard its future against combinations of 
other lines which might divert much business 
by changes in existing channels of transpor-
tation." These same words might have been 
used in the present case by UP's John C. Kene-
fick, for in reality the government-mandated 
split of Southern Pacific and Union Pacific 
after Harriman's death had left the UP depen-
dent on eastern connections at Council Bluffs 
and Kansas City and at Ogden on the west. 
The " M o p U p " proposal, coming eight dec-
ades after Harriman's pronouncement, would 
improve competition by opening new routes 
for more efficient and economical service, 
promised Kenefick. The argument was com-
pelling from a historical as well as contempo-
rary perspective. "Solicitation to secure the 
long through haul is always an effective argu-
ment before the I C C , " Hale Holden had told 
Paul Shoup in 1930. The UP had this and 
other ammunition in its arsenal. It argued for 
parity with those western railroads that al-
ready enjoyed two-carrier transcontinental 
opportunities via Chicago or Mississippi River 
connections. These included, Kenefick noted 
pointedly, the Burlington Northern, Santa Fe, 
and Southern Pacific Transportation Co.6 
Meanwhile, the railroad that Huddie "Lead-
belly" Ledbetter had immortalized as "a 
mighty fine line" met an unfittingly bitter end. 
On August 28, 1979, the Brotherhood of 
Railway and Airline Clerks and the United 
Transportation Union struck the Chicago, 
Rock Island & Pacific Railroad over the issue 
of retroactive pay. Shortly thereafter, the ICC, 
in a highly controversial decision, ruled that 
the Rock Island was "cashless" and ordered 
service temporarily restored under the direc-
tion of the Kansas City Terminal Railway, it-
self owned by the trunk carriers serving that 
city. This peculiar arrangement lasted until 
March 31, 1980, when systemwide revenue 
operations across the Rock Island ended. The 
ICC thereupon authorized several carriers 
to serve specific Rock Island segments under 
temporary service orders. The Cotton Belt, for 
instance, performed such service in Arkansas 
on the Choctaw Route and over the Santa 
Rosa—Tucumcari—Kansas City—Saint Louis 
line while waiting for the ICC to render a de-
cision on its request to purchase that im-
portant trackage. It was, for all parties, an 
For the cities and towns along the Rock Island's Golden State route west of Kansas City, the Cotton Belt was 
clearly a white knight. Operation began under an ICC service order late in March, 1980. The first train at 
Hooker, Oklahoma. 
The first train at Liberal, Kansas. 
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awkward situation; the Rock Island would 
eventually emerge as the Chicago Pacific Cor-
poration after liquidating the assets of the for-
mer railroad company.7 
As events surrounding the ill-fated Rock Is-
land wound their way to conclusion, and as 
the Interstate Commerce Commission wres-
tled with the merits of the Union Pacific case, 
a new variable in the western railroad picture 
burst upon the scene. On May 15, 1980, the 
boards of directors of the Southern Pacific 
Company and Santa Fe Industries announced 
that they had jointly embraced a memoran-
dum of intent to merge the SP into the Santa 
Fe. Casual discussions between Biaggini and 
Santa Fe's John S. Reed had gone on before, 
but the campaign by Union Pacific to expand 
its dominion through the Missouri Pacific 
and Western Pacific now forced these ancient 
rivals into an embrace. Santa Fe Industries 
and its railroad were more profitable than SP 
and its railroads, although SP's combined 
properties boasted larger gross revenues and 
net assets; Santa Fe would be the survivor if 
the merger was approved by shareholders 
and governmental bodies. The initial reaction 
to the merger proposal on Wall Street, how-
ever, was not flattering. Nevertheless, Biaggini 
thought the creation of Burlington Northern 
followed by its acquisition of the Frisco and 
then the massive Union Pacific proposal made 
the matter academic. "There would be no use 
in leaving the Southern Pacific alone and the 
Santa Fe alone to compete with railroads 
the size" of the Burlington Northern and the 
" M o p U p , " he explained." 
The obvious need to unite in the face of 
major railroad restructuring west of the Mis-
sissippi River notwithstanding, major obsta-
cles to a Santa Fe—SP merger remained. One 
centered on SPTCo's persistent interest in ac-
quiring much of Rock Island's Golden State 
Route and, even as Santa Fe's and SP's mana-
gers studied the overall merger proposition, 
the ICC gave its permission for that $57 mil-
lion line acquisition on June 10,1980. SPTCo's 
Cotton Belt, which had been providing di-
On June 10, 1980, the ICC gave approval for 
SSWs acquisition of the Rock Island's Golden 
State line west of Kansas City. The task of renewing 
it would be awesome. Photograph by Jim Johnson 
for SSW. 
The moment of transition. The Rock Island desig-
nation is replaced by the Cotton Belt on the divi-
sion offices at Kansas City, Kansas. Photograph by 
Jim Johnson for SSW. 
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SSW's first train from Kansas City left from the Rock Island's formerly impressive Armourdale Yard—now 
in very great need of attention. Photograph by J. David Ingles for SSW. 
rected service over the route since March 24, 
found business, both local and overhead, was 
initially slack; the sole train dispatched from 
Kansas City on April 1, for instance, handled 
only thirty-five cars, of which more than half 
were empty. There was no disputing the po-
tential of the line, however, and that autumn 
the Cotton Belt committed itself to a massive 
rehabilitation program, using some funds gen-
erated internally and obtaining the remainder 
from a federal loan. This all presented the 
Southern Pacific and its potential merger part-
ner, the Santa Fe, with a conundrum. SP's of-
ficers saw the revitalized Golden State Route 
as essential to survival if the merger with the 
Santa Fe failed, but Santa Fe's John Reed 
was "horrified" at the prospect of sinking 
money into what he considered a redundant 
line should the merger be completed. To make 
it the high-speed route that SPTCo envisioned 
would require the expenditure of millions 
that, said Reed, was "not economically 
justified." 9 
SP's determination to follow through with 
not only acquisition but also with rehabili-
tation of the Golden State Route was hardly 
the sole problem plaguing merger negotia-
tions. In fact, both companies issued terse 
statements on September 12, announcing that 
they had mutually determined to end such 
discussions. Biaggini cited several reasons: 
the management of nonrail properties, benefit 
programs for company officers, and account-
ing problems. Outsiders pointed to another 
element: the clash of corporate as well as indi-
vidual egos.10 
They might not be able to agree to merge; 
nevertheless, the SP and Santa Fe commonly 
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viewed the prospect of a strengthened Union 
Pacific as abhorrent to their individual in-
terests. Both asked that the UP-MoPac-WP 
combination be rejected by the ICC; SPTCo 
estimated its annual loss, if the merger was 
approved, to be $100 million, and the Santa 
Fe expected annual losses of $92 million. 
Nevertheless, the ICC granted UP's wishes on 
September 13, 1982. The SPTCo immediately 
filed suit to stop the merger because, in its 
view, the combination would "destroy rail-
road competition in the West" and because, 
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again in its view, the UP-WP affiliation would 
be "illegal under the Pacific Railroad Acts." 
This legal action and that brought by other 
carriers was of no avail. " M o p U p " became 
a very impressive element on the American 
transportation landscape when the Union Pa-
cific more than doubled its size as a railroad 
on December 22, 1982. " D O N E ! " boasted the 
UP in full-page newspaper advertisements. 
" D O N E , " of course, was in mock reference to 
the message sent from Promontory on May 10, 
1869, when the Central Pacific had met the 
Union Pacific to forge the nation's first trans-
continental rail link. For those at One Market 
Plaza on December 22 , 1982, however, " D O N E " 
could only be translated as " U N D O N E . " 1 1 
The SPTCo was not the only rail carrier 
subject to altered conditions as a result of 
Union Pacific's expansion. Years earlier, the 
Rio Grande had suffered greatly when George 
Gould drained its treasury in construction of 
the Western Pacific, and it had suffered also as 
the result of restrictive policies imposed by 
Harriman and then by the ICC in the Central 
Pacific Conditions. The Denver & Rio Grande 
Western gamely survived, though, and even 
prospered by handling overhead business to 
and from the Missouri Pacific at Pueblo, the 
Chicago, Burlington & Quincy and the Rock 
Island at Denver, the Western Pacific at Salt 
Lake City, and the SP at Ogden. These oppor-
tunities shrank, however, when the C B & Q 
became an integral part of the Burlington 
Northern, when the Rock Island disappeared, 
and when the Western Pacific and the Mis-
souri Pacific became extensions of the Union 
Pacific—Rio Grande's historic competitor. 
Meanwhile, SPTCo had long since become 
the Rio Grande's premier connection, and 
that important association predictably ma-
tured as SPTCo lost its own traditional part-
ner at Ogden and as the Union Pacific diverted 
business to itself from the former Western 
Pacific at Salt Lake City and away from the 
Missouri Pacific's Pueblo gateway. Fortunately 
for both the D & R G W and SPTCo, the Rio 
Grande gained trackage rights concessions as 
a result of the Missouri Pacific—Union Pacific 
merger over the Missouri Pacific from Pueblo 
to Kansas City, Missouri; these implied long-
haul advantages for the Denver company and 
routing alternatives for SPTCo. For that mat-
ter, many considered that the well-managed 
Rio Grande was a logical and proper marriage 
partner for the Southern Pacific Transporta-
tion Company. 1 2 
Another important trackage rights conces-
sion from the Union Pacific proceedings had 
been gained by SPTCo's Cotton Belt. This one 
gave the SSW the right to close the strategic 
gap between Kansas City and Saint Louis by 
using rails of the Missouri Pacific. The Cotton 
Belt, of course, already had its own line be-
tween those points through acquisition of the 
former Rock Island trackage. That route was 
poorly engineered, however, and in wretched 
physical condition. Indeed, Biaggini estimated 
that such rehabilitation would cost as least 
$100 million and add capacity in a corridor 
that already had a sufficiency. The Cotton Belt 
willingly agreed to service the industrial zones 
on either end of the former Rock Island line 
near Kansas City and Saint Louis, but after 
the UP-MoPac-WP merger occurred, the Cot-
ton Belt initiated service across Missouri on 
January 7, 1983. Appropriately, the first train 
to take advantage of the shorter East Saint 
Louis—to—Los Angeles route (via the Mis-
souri Pacific to Kansas City and Golden State 
Route to El Paso) was the famous Blue Streak 
Merchandise." 
None of this was satisfactory as far as the 
Santa Fe was concerned. Among other prob-
lems, the A T & S F took exception to Cotton 
Belt's use of the Missouri Pacific between Kan-
sas City and Saint Louis because MoPac itself 
used Santa Fe trackage for five miles near 
Kansas City and it considered intrusion by 
Cotton Belt trains as "unlawful appropriation 
of Santa Fe properties." Through operations 
prevailed, nevertheless. The Cotton Belt and 
the Santa Fe had also skirmished earlier over 
the fate of Rock Island's Choctaw line along 
the thirty-fifth parallel linking Memphis with 
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Little Rock, Oklahoma City, Amarillo, and 
Tucumcari. That route offered advantages to 
both rivals and, of course, the SSW already 
used the easternmost 65 miles under trackage 
rights to reach Memphis from Brinkley, Ar -
kansas. Purchase of the Choctaw from Ama-
rillo to Memphis would give the Santa Fe ac-
cess to important eastern connections, and 
acquisition of it by SP and SSW would give 
them an air-line route from Tucumcari. SP 
managers had urged acquisition of this line 
several years earlier, and it would have fallen 
to the SP had the abortive U P - C R I & P merger 
occurred; however, little serious consideration 
was given the Memphis-Tucumcari line by SP 
officers after the Rock Island went bankrupt. 
That hardly meant that SPTCo looked with 
favor on Santa Fe's interest. Indeed, there 
was great relief at One Market Plaza when 
AT&SF's John S. Reed announced that his 
company had decided to withdraw from con-
sideration and when late in 1982 the SSW 
took possession following purchase of the seg-
ment from Brinkley east to Memphis. 1 4 
Other events surrounding Santa Fe Indus-
tries were of note to the rail industry at large 
and to the SP in particular. The first of these 
involved a change in management. John Reed, 
whose devotion to the railroad was well docu-
mented, retired in Apri l , 1983, and was 
replaced by John J. Schmidt, whom many 
considered more interested in the holding 
company's other subsidiaries. Under Reed, the 
holding company had functioned more or less 
as an offshoot of the railroad, but Schmidt 
soon changed the management structure to 
make Santa Fe Industries "a true holding com-
pany." Nevertheless, Schmidt—whether he 
wished it or not—remained actively involved 
in railroad matters. On March 1, 1983, the 
Norfolk Southern (NS) announced that it had 
acquired 4.2 million shares, or 5 percent, of 
Santa Fe Industries' common stock. NS, itself 
a new creation springing from the merger of 
the Norfolk &C Western and the Southern, 
stated that the purchase was for "investment 
purposes," but the implication was that NS 
was projecting a truly transcontinental struc-
ture; it connected with the Santa Fe at Chi-
cago, Peoria, and Kansas City. On the other 
hand, Santa Fe shortly made headlines of its 
own when on July 27, 1983, Schmidt reported 
that Santa Fe might seek to acquire govern-
ment-owned Conrail, with which it connected 
in Illinois at Chicago, Peoria, and Streator and 
in Indiana at Logansport. A Santa Fe—Conrail 
combination would create an impressive trans-
continental route and seemed logical on its 
face; Conrail was Santa Fe's most important 
connection with over one-third of its inter-
change volume. Whatever the result of this ma-
neuvering, Santa Fe seemed destined to play a 
major role in the mega-merger movement.15 
That process was predictably accelerated by 
passage of the Staggers Act, signed into law by 
President Carter on October 14, 1980, and by 
the antiregulatory mood of the ICC and the 
federal government at large. For many years, 
SP managers had argued for such even-handed 
federal regulation of transportation and in re-
cent times Ben Biaggini had been among the 
industry's most outspoken advocates of de-
regulation. When the ICC removed regula-
tions governing the carriage of fresh produce 
by rail—after a major push by SPTCo—the 
industry properly hailed it as a harbinger of 
even better times to come. True enough. The 
Staggers Act, although it stopped short of 
wholesale deregulation, nevertheless substan-
tially eased the regulatory burden on the rail-
roads, and it provided significant changes in 
rate-making procedures, legalized contract 
rates, established new cost-accounting prin-
ciples, and streamlined abandonment and 
merger standards, among other things. 1 6 
None of this, however, was without dif-
ficulty. Like many of the nation's carriers, 
SPTCo was not adequately prepared for the 
new environment. As the chief executive of 
another carrier said, "it was strong for the 
principle of deregulation, but weak on the 
practice." Competition, especially for con-
tract business, proved unexpectedly keen, and 
although SPTCo locked up several important 
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agreements and although ton miles were in-
creased, net profits deteriorated. Traffic mana-
gers for major shippers were bemused by the 
way SPTCo and others sorted through the 
new circumstance. One said, "If a railroad 
moves freight at a loss today, it is usually be-
cause it is deliberately implementing a short 
range strategy to capture traffic or because it 
is not yet used to competing in the market 
place." There were other problems. Single-line 
service, always desirable from the carriers' 
point of view, became even more so as a result 
of Staggers. Previously, the railroads had been 
protected from antitrust action in the process 
of making joint rates, but under deregulation 
they had reason to worry about prosecution 
by the Justice Department when they sought 
to negotiate rates on point-to-point shipments. 
The easiest way to avoid such legal difficulty 
was, of course, to own the track from origin to 
destination. Short of this, and in an attempt 
to force shippers to accept, as much as pos-
sible, single-carrier service, SPTCo and other 
large railroads closed traditional gateways 
and raised rates via others. Customers were 
justifiably nervous, and eventually the carriers 
modified their positions. Still, competition re-
mained intense.17 
Competition was not restricted to rail com-
panies; most, in fact, was with other modes. 
The volume of intercity freight traffic trans-
ported by rail carriers had dropped from 74.9 
percent in 1929 to a disappointing 35.8 per-
cent in 1982, although the number of tons 
handled nearly doubled over the same years. 
Trucks, waterway operators, and pipelines 
had exacted devastating tolls on the railroads. 
The Staggers Act, of course, significantly re-
duced artificial restrictions on the inherent 
efficiency of steel-wheel-on-steel-rail trans-
port, but modal competition was clearly not 
going to disappear simply because of pro-
gressive legislation. The American railroads 
had dieselized, purchased thousands of high-
capacity cars, dumped their money-losing 
passenger service, and trimmed branches. Yet 
they remained an asset-rich, cash-poor, high 
labor—cost industry with clearly inadequate 
returns on investment. Other than gaining 
productivity-enhancement contracts from the 
railroad brotherhoods or reducing investment 
in property, the only immediate opportunity 
for improvement seemed to be further effort 
in the merger field.1" 
Speculation was rife. Rumors circulated 
that the Southern Pacific would acquire all or 
a part of the Illinois Central Gulf, that it 
would purchase the Denver & Rio Grande 
Western, that SP would merge with Burlington 
Northern, or that the C S X Corporation would 
purchase SP. Many observers freely predicted 
that the next major merger would create the 
country's first truly transcontinental road, but 
others agreed with Hayes T. Watkins of CSX, 
who saw no financial advantage to such an ar-
rangement—"although that may eventually 
come." On the other hand, none doubted that 
combination of Union Pacific with the Mis-
souri Pacific and Western Pacific had so im-
proved Union Pacific's economy of scale that 
another round of mergers was inevitable. Se-
curity analysts uniformly agreed that SP's rail-
roads especially had been hurt by " M o p U p " ; 
indeed, many referred to the expanded Union 
Pacific as "an unstoppable monster." The 
Santa Fe, too, had been hurt by " M o p U p , " 
and John Schmidt admitted late in 1982 that 
Santa Fe Industries was "taking a hard look" 
at merging the A T & S F with another railroad. 
He predicted early action on the matter. At 
SPTCo a comprehensive merger study under-
taken for the company by an outside firm was 
completed in the same year. Biaggini, in a re-
flective mood, thought SPTCo was the victim 
of cruel irony since it had been a leader in the 
campaign for deregulation and had laid the 
groundwork for the mega-merger movement 
but, to date at least, had not benefited thereby. 
Its options, sadly, were now severely re-
stricted. "We would not want to be the one 
left out in the West," said Robert D. Krebs. 
Biaggini was more direct. "We do have to find 
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a permanent home for our railroad," he told 
those attending the annual stockholders meet-
ing in 1983. 1 9 
While storms of merger rumors surrounded 
the industry during the first years of the 
1980s, nature's storms and operating prob-
lems plagued SP's railroads. The winters of 
1981—82 and 1982—83 brought awesome 
snowfalls to the Sierra; for the first time since 
record keeping began in 1878, Norden experi-
enced over 600 inches of snow two years in 
succession. Moreover, the snowfall in 1982— 
83 was the second highest, with a total of 796 
inches. Dealing with this required the service 
of spreaders, flangers, and even the rotaries; it 
also resulted in heavy expense. To the south-
west, rainstorms early in 1983 knocked out 
both the Coast and San Joaquin lines for two 
weeks and forced massive and expensive re-
routing of trains over competing lines. Un-
seasonable downpours that autumn also in-
flicted heavy damage on the main line and 
various branches in Arizona. The SPTCo's his-
toric annual storm damage cost was approxi-
mately $5 million; in 1983 it was over $30 
mill ion. 2 0 
A perennial problem, but one that grew in 
scope and expense, was the Salt Lake fill. 
Company engineers had properly calculated a 
rate of consolidation (the rate at which the fill 
would compact over time under passing ton-
nage) that required constant applications of 
ballast and grooming by maintenance forces. 
These calculations were confused, however, as 
the wet cycle returned and as the lake rose. 
In 1983 and 1984 heavy snows followed by 
record rains resulted in run-offs that raised 
the lake to an alarming level. Since the lake 
lies in a natural basin devoid of usual outlets, 
only evaporation can reduce its level, but the 
summers proved relatively cool and less than 
normal evaporation occurred. The difficulties 
were then compounded by periodic high-
velocity winds that whipped fearsome waves 
against the fill, causing serious erosion. Rail-
road forces responded by raising the track, 
unloading riprap, and "sinking" hundreds of 
redundant boxcars to form a seawall along 
the fill. The cost was enormous, and even then 
the Overland Route was out of service with 
disappointing frequency.21 
More devastating by far was the vicious 
economic storm that swept the country early 
in the decade. Indeed, the "Reagan Recession" 
of 1 9 8 1 - 8 2 was by almost all standards the 
worst economic downturn since the Great De-
pression. As always, the country's railroads— 
which must provide transportation on de-
mand and cannot warehouse their products— 
mirrored the fate of the general industrial 
economy. The management of SPTCo—per-
haps recalling its counterproductive program 
of storing unserviceable locomotives and trim-
ming expenditures during the recessions of the 
1970s—bravely continued an active program 
of maintenance, repair, and rehabilitation, 
and Biaggini put on a happy face for the 1982 
stockholders meeting. But all was not well. 
Just a few days later, SPTCo announced sub-
stantial force reductions and subsequently 
confirmed an early retirement plan for eligible 
personnel. Furthermore, senior officers were 
even obliged to deal with unfounded rumors 
that the company was "about to declare Chap-
ter 11." Such rumors were predictable, how-
ever, given the depressingly long lines of idle 
locomotives and cars; eventually over 20 per-
cent of SPTCo's locomotive fleet—including 
several recently rebuilt and other brand-new 
units—was stored along with more than 
20,000 freight cars. Elsewhere within the 
holding company, Ticor's title insurance busi-
ness suffered greatly as a consequence of the 
recession in the housing industry. There was, 
however, at least a small silver lining since SP's 
communication company, pipelines, land, and 
natural resource units maintained profitability. 
The holding company's profit for 1982 was 
$120.1 million, but SPTCo suffered stagger-
ing operating losses of $51.9 mil l ion. 2 2 
Southern Pacific's officers underestimated 
the length and depth of the recession, but as it 
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began to ebb, Biaggini maintained that the 
company, "leaner and stronger" as a conse-
quence, was on the threshold of a bright fu-
ture. Not everybody agreed. Critics noted that 
SP in 1982 dropped to twelfth place among 
the nation's transportation companies (mea-
sured by operating revenues). For that matter, 
some securities analysts spoke darkly of SP as 
"the Penn Central of the West," and Forbes, 
which had given the company an unflattering 
assessment in 1979, wondered rhetorically 
three years later if SP was "doomed." When 
Standard & Poors Corporation lowered debt 
ratings on certain obligations of both SP and 
SPTCo, the worst seemed confirmed. 2 ' 
The reasons for SP's unpleasant predica-
ment were complex. Its pretax net stagnated 
during the 1970s because the company had 
failed to generate adequate cash flow from 
earnings and depreciation to finance the heavy 
capital spending programs for its diversifi-
cation. Consequently, the SP had borrowed 
heavily; outstanding debt nearly doubled and 
interest charges nearly quadrupled. This, in 
part, reflected the plight of SP's railroads, 
which during the same decade had seen their 
market share drop disappointingly from 20 
percent to only 13 percent. The problem for 
SPTCo was made all the more obvious by the 
recession of 1981 — 82 when its historic traffic 
base eroded badly because of reduced copper 
mining activity in Arizona, the severely de-
pressed housing and real estate market, and 
the unanticipated shutdown in 1982 of Gen-
eral Motors plants at South Gate and Fremont 
(Melrose had closed earlier, leaving only Van 
Nuys in production). Unable to adequately re-
duce costs, SPTCo saw its train-hour expenses 
accelerate and its rate of return plummet. 2 4 
The chief executive obviously has impact 
on the company he heads by way of his rela-
tive capacity, values, and style; it was no less 
so with SP's Benjamin Biaggini. As a conse-
quence, much of the criticism that SP received 
centered—rightly or wrongly—on Biaggini 
himself. Nobody doubted his leadership abil-
ity. He was characterized by one writer as 
"an imperial presence, a towering monolith of 
a man." Yet others called him "unyielding," 
"aloof," " r ig id , " and "uncompromising." Spe-
cifically at issue were Biaggini's unpredict-
able and explosive personality, his age (he was 
sixty-six in 1982), his salary ($699,200 in 
1981), his unwillingness to decentralize au-
thority, his active political involvement with 
wealthy conservative Republicans, and ulti-
mately the very course he had set for SP.2 5 
These issues or difficulties notwithstanding, 
those who thought Biaggini or the company 
he headed would roll over and play dead were 
naive in the extreme. For instance, Biaggini 
shrewdly announced a shift in management 
personnel that was of both material and sym-
bolic importance. In mid-1982 Denman K. 
McNear, who had served as president of 
SPTCo since 1976, was promoted to chair-
man and chief executive officer of SP's rail-
roads and replaced as president by Robert D. 
Krebs, who formerly served as vice-president 
of operations. McNear, fifty-six, had joined 
the SP in 1948 after earning a degree from the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology and 
serving in the navy; Krebs, forty, graduated 
from Stanford and then took a master's degree 
from the Harvard Business School before ac-
cepting employment with the SP in 1966. N o 
personnel changes were made at the hold-
ing company, where Alan C. Furth remained 
president. With the SP since his graduation 
from the University of California at Berkeley, 
Furth had headed the law department when 
he was named president of SPCo in 1979. 2 6 
Krebs set out to improve SPTCo's service, 
efficiency, safety record, and internal commu-
nications and to make SP's railroads more 
"commercially driven" enterprises. Indeed, 
said Krebs, "the commercial side of the house 
is where the game will be won or lost." In a 
sense, he was reflecting on the relative advan-
tages of SP's competition, which he charac-
terized this way: the Burlington Northern, 
"market oriented"; the Santa Fe, "able to 
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compete on price because it produces ton 
miles at lower costs"; the Union Pacific-
Missouri Pacific, "less a bridge carrier and 
more an originating carrier"; and trucks, "the 
greatest enemy of all because they have stream-
lined to lower costs." For a variety of reasons, 
he noted, SPTCo found it harder to "control 
traffic." Moreover its customers and poten-
tial customers were increasingly sophisticated 
and now bathed in the luxury of a "buyer's 
market." The only product SP's railroads 
had to offer, Krebs insisted, was service— 
"rai l freight transportation." Krebs understood 
that to survive in the era of deregulation 
SPTCo would need to emphasize a combina-
tion of service and pricing that would be ag-
gressively marketed by its sales force. "We are 
going to put emphasis on our salesmen to help 
drive the company," Krebs promised. This in-
cluded domestic opportunities as well as for-
eign, the latter promoted in conjunction with 
Southern Pacific International. Particular at-
tention was accorded to SPTCo's international 
connections at Eagle Pass, El Paso, Nogales, 
and elsewhere in an attempt to accelerate busi-
ness opportunities with neighboring Mexico. 2 7 
A n obvious requirement for the success-
ful implementation of SPTCo's "service and 
pricing" policy was power, equipment, and a 
physical property adequate to facilitate the 
free flow of traffic. New and nearly new loco-
motives had been stored during the recent re-
cession and were gradually returned to service 
as the economy improved. Meanwhile, the 
Sacramento Locomotive Works continued to 
rehabilitate and improve heavy road units 
under a program that vastly extended the ser-
vice life of locomotives at two-thirds the cost 
of new power. This allowed SPTCo to forgo 
acquisition of additional locomotives until 
1984, when fifty units were authorized in 
an order split between General Motors and 
General Electric. It was much the same with 
SPTCo's car fleet. Except for "doublestack" 
container flats and an experimental fiberglass 
hopper car, little was done to expand the roster 
of rolling stock. Instead, the company gradu-
ally drew on its inventory of stored equipment 
and, in some cases, made important modifica-
tions. Much of this work was done at Rose-
ville, California, where heavy car maintenance 
and rehabilitation were concentrated after the 
move from Sacramento in 1980. Interestingly, 
the Roseville facility, under contract from a 
leasing company, converted 1,400 outmoded 
multilevel automobile cars to intermodal flat-
cars; these were then leased back to SPTCo as 
intermodal business increased.2" 
Krebs pressed hard for increased system-
wide track maintenance while rebuilding the 
Golden State Route. Work crews carried out a 
massive program that soon made SP-SSW a 
worthy competitor in the important Kansas 
C i t y - L o s Angeles corridor. Welded rail, bal-
last, ties, and upgraded signaling—includ-
ing C T C between Herington and Topeka (83 
miles)—allowed the St. Louis Southwestern to 
raise authorized speeds to 60 and 70 miles per 
hour. Moreover, after Armourdale Yard in 
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N o new power was required until 1984, when an order was split between General Motors and General 
Electric. Photograph by GM. 
Kansas City was renewed, track gangs turned 
to the business of bringing SPTCo's E l Paso-
Tucumcari line, which had been neglected as 
traffic there evaporated because of Rock Is-
land's hardship, up to standards. The rewards 
were heartening. Early in 1985 the Cotton 
Belt routinely handled a half-dozen through 
manifest and T O F C trains plus grain drags 
and locals in and out of Kansas City each 
day. Veteran railroaders, many of them for-
mer Rock Island employees, understand-
ably rejoiced as the Golden State Route rose 
phoenix-like to reclaim its former status as 
one of SP's "Great Routes West." 2 9 
Additional improvement programs had be-
gun earlier and still others were under consid-
eration. For example, extensive track and yard 
rehabilitation in the Gulf Coast area had com-
menced in 1979 and was accelerated in the 
years following. Small wonder. Despite the 
fact that 38 percent of system carloading came 
from the Texas & Louisiana Lines, much of 
SPTCo's track in Texas and Louisiana had 
been in need of work. Happily, as general 
manager L. G . Simpson observed, all primary 
routes and Houston's massive Englewood Yard 
eventually received attention. It was of more 
than symbolic importance. As the recession 
of 1981 — 82 ended, Krebs announced that 
SPTCo would make "a real commitment to 
the future" by launching a three-year "new 
ra i l " program aggregating 900 miles. Krebs's 
view was echoed by D. M . Mohan, vice-
president for maintenance: "We have made a 
firm commitment to the railroad business, 
and we are going to invest more in plant to 
be competitive for service-sensitive traffic." 
Numbers told the story. In 1976 SP had 2,650 
miles of slow orders; by the end of 1983 the 
number was reduced to 1,100. At the end of 
the same year, 6,314 miles of SPTCo's main 
track had been laid with continuous welded 
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General Electric's contribution to the 1984 split order for new locomotive power is shown here by engine 
no. 7769. Photograph by GE. 
rail, and Krebs proudly forecast that "a l l of 
the core routes" would be " i n shape"—with 
good ties and rail—by the end of 1985. The 
railroads' communication net would also be 
" i n shape." Their microwave communications 
system grew from 7,839 miles in 1976 to 
8,672 in 1985. 3 0 
Krebs understood that all of this was neces-
sary if SP's railroads were to compete for time-
sensitive traffic such as auto parts, assembled 
automobiles, and TOFC/COFC. Although 
auto production in California had been cur-
tailed by plant closures during the first part of 
the decade, the Golden State remained the 
country's premier auto market, and distri-
bution patterns mirrored this fact. SP's rail-
roads still hauled parts to the G M plant at 
Van Nuys and, with the temporary absence of 
other assembly capacity in California, a grow-
ing volume of set-up autos to that state from 
domestic manufacturers. Ironically, many rail 
cars handling parts and autos from the east 
were reloaded at Benicia and Long Beach with 
foreign parts and foreign-built autos destined 
for interior assembly plants and distribu-
tion points. These included the products of 
Nissan, Honda, and Toyota, among others. 
Additional alterations in previous patterns 
further reflected this international flavor. Gen-
eral Motors automobiles assembled in Mex-
ico began arriving by the trainload at Eagle 
Pass, Texas, for nationwide delivery during 
the autumn of 1984, and G M joined with 
Toyota in a promise to reopen the Fremont as-
sembly plant." 
It was much the same with piggyback busi-
ness, which not only moved in greater volume 
each year but also with increasing directional 
balance. The impressive national growth in 
TOFC/COFC quickened following deregula-
tion, although T O F C profitability was further 
diminished by cutthroat competition. The 
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SP's articulated "doublestack" carried two forty-foot containers on each car. 
Santa Fe—historically disadvantaged in Cali-
fornia by comparison to SPTCo, which served 
the majority of the state's shippers by way of 
direct spots—effectively embraced piggyback 
to " r a i d " SPTCo territories far from its own 
rail lines. With an extensive inventory of con-
ventional equipment and direct spot trackage, 
however, SPTCo became the disadvantaged 
carrier when customers chose flexibility and 
smaller shipments during the harsh recession 
of 1981 — 82. The SPTCo fought back, though, 
with new equipment, more facilities, and 
lower rates. As a result, its intermodal busi-
ness rose by nearly 55 percent in 1982—83. In 
1983 alone, piggyback contributed 18 percent 
of rail freight revenues; on the Tucson Divi-
sion fully 50 percent of all crew starts were for 
such intermodal runs. 5 2 
Much of this traffic—and less exotic car-
goes, too—moved via a growing number of 
"dedicated trains." Some were laden exclu-
sively with American President Lines contain-
ers, others with paper products from the 
Crown Zellerbach Corporation, and others 
were unit trains of coal, aggregates, or grain. 
Some were named: Salad Bowl Express (Fres-
no/Salinas-Chicago), Golden State Piggy-
back Express (Oakland-Chicago), and West 
Coast Super Pig (Portland—Los Angeles). 
One, the Texas Overnight Piggyback Express 
(Houston—Dallas), featured a single loco-
motive trailing fifteen trailer flats and was op-
erated by a two-man crew. Most were solely on 
SP's railroads, but some were run-through 
operations like that between Seattle and Los 
Angeles (with Burlington Northern) and Oak-
land and Saint Louis (with Denver & Rio 
Grande Western via Kansas City). Indeed, as 
relations with the Union Pacific soured, the 
Rio Grande became SPTCo's favored connec-
tion at Ogden—providing an integral link with 
Chicago (via Denver and the BN) and Kansas 
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The rehabilitation of the Golden State Route was impressive in the extreme. Photograph by Jim Johnson for 
SSW. 
City—Saint Louis (via Herington, Kansas, or 
Kansas City and the SSW). 3 3 
Not to be forgotten in all of this was the 
operation of Amtrak passenger trains on cer-
tain of SPTCo's major routes. Its performance 
on behalf of Amtrak during the 1970s was 
lackluster at best and likely reflected the views 
of Biaggini, who said in 1970: "The long dis-
tance passenger business is dead, and we ought 
to give it a decent burial." Biaggini expected 
the federal government to come around to the 
same view in time. "It is just as wrong for the 
taxpayers of the United States to support a 
service that isn't needed as it is for the South-
ern Pacific," he maintained. Biaggini's views 
and those of other like-minded rail executives 
notwithstanding, Amtrak survived and even 
showed signs of vitality. SPTCo-Amtrak re-
lations reached their nadir in 1979 when 
congestion on the Sunset Route frazzled the 
nerves of all concerned. Amtrak sued the SP 
The results of the rehabilitation were impressive, 
too. Photograph by Jim Johnson for SSW. 
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In 1985, SPTCo's microwave system linked the 
general office with outlying points over an 8,672-
mile network. 
over delays to its Sunset Limited, and Krebs 
admitted that there was an unfavorable atti-
tude toward the operation of passenger trains 
at One Market Plaza. Yet Krebs was not an 
ideologue. He was quick to point out that 
Amtrak provided SPTCo with regular and re-
liable income—a fact that was especially 
appealing during the "Reagan Recession." 
Moreover, Amtrak sweetened the pot by add-
ing an incentive payment codicil to pro-
mote on-time performance. Because of these 
factors and because of SPTCo's improved 
maintenance, the on-time statistics improved 
from 75.4 percent in 1979 to 96 percent by 
mid-1982. For its part, Amtrak purchased 
new locomotives and new passenger cars of 
all types, and when the first run of the re-
equipped Sunset passed through the tiny vil-
lage of Liberty, Texas, one woman who enthu-
siastically greeted the trains each day released 
several balloons in ceremonial salute. Those 
aboard rejoiced at the spectacle. Perhaps they 
understood implicitly what the editor of Ameri-
can West wrote shortly thereafter: "There's just 
no substitute for seeing the country by train," 
for "rolling across the country on the train a 
sense of time, history, and heartland reveals it-
self in the constantly changing scene." 5 4 
Just as it sought to improve some prop-
erties, SPTCo's management simultaneously 
sought to rid itself of others. During the 1970s 
SP's railroads abandoned nearly 800 miles of 
line, but the process accelerated in the follow-
ing decade when another 1,400 miles were 
dropped by mid-1984. This included about 
140 miles abandoned on January 1, 1980, in 
South Texas, but service to the lower Rio 
Grande Valley was maintained by way of 
trackage rights over the Missouri Pacific from 
near Victoria to Harlingen. Another 200 
miles was cut in East Texas, while in Califor-
nia the SP was able to drop the historic Alta-
mont Pass line between Niles and Tracy when 
operating rights were secured over the nearby 
Western Pacific. At the same time, SPTCo 
management analyzed every one of the com-
pany's branches to determine current and po-
tential profitability and then classified each as 
to retention and improvement, sale, or aban-
donment. Among those that SP hoped to sell 
were the Austin, M i n a , and Lakeview branches 
in Texas, Nevada, Oregon, and California." 
The Northwestern Pacific presented an-
other opportunity for sale or abandonment. It 
had a long record of providing more by way of 
scenery than net profit, a problem that stood 
in bold relief following a devastating fire that 
closed a long tunnel at Island Mountain, be-
tween Willits and Eureka, on September 6, 
1978. SPTCo officers thereupon considered 
the prospect of abandoning nearly 65 miles of 
line from near Willits through the difficult Eel 
River Canyon while instituting rail-barge op-
erations to serve the Eureka area. Business on 
the N W P and on the parent road was brisk at 
that time, however, and SPTCo decided to 
spend several million dollars to repair the tun-
nel. Meanwhile, ten locomotives and nearly 
500 cars (including 386 loads) were stranded 
north of Island Mountain. Because of an acute 
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equipment shortage, SPTCo arranged a spec-
tacular "over hill and dale" evacuation of sev-
eral locomotives and a seaborne removal of 
rail cars while repair crews restored the tunnel. 
Trains again rumbled over the entire length of 
the N W P after several months, but the deci-
sion to reopen the line was questionable at 
best. Business dropped precipitously during 
the recession of 1 9 8 1 - 8 2 , but nature main-
tained its constant assault on the property 
with slides and washouts. Krebs announced 
the inevitable in Apri l , 1983: The North-
western Pacific would seek abandonment of 
the northern portion of its railroad. A n emo-
tional and often acrimonious debate followed, 
but in the end rail service to California's north 
coast was preserved late in 1984 when 162 
miles of line above Willits was sold and turned 
over to operation by a new short line, the Eu-
reka Southern Railroad.' 6 
Krebs was confronted with numerous addi-
tional problems and opportunities. Many of 
these centered on SP's traditional patterns of 
management and style of doing business. The 
company's senior management had long em-
braced the "heroic boss" syndrome, and the 
company's internal procedures were clearly 
militaristic. Moreover, SPTCo's corporate cul-
ture still pledged allegiance to the past and 
continued to define the company as a "rai l -
road" rather than a "customer-oriented trans-
portation firm." Because he was youthful and 
not as yet entrapped by the "this-is-the-way-
we-have-always-done-it" mentality, and be-
cause of his educational background, Krebs 
could promote substantive changes in the way 
SP's railroads conducted their business. In 
particular, he was in a position to modify the 
traditional product-orientation in favor of a 
marketing and sales approach, to ease the 
confrontational style of labor-management re-
lations, and to improve SPTCo's image within 
its service area. None of this could be easily 
accomplished, however, since traditions and 
values transmitted from generation to genera-
tion can not be rewritten by decree. Krebs 
faced a tricky task. 
The new president of SPTCo often com-
plained that company officers tended to get so 
wrapped up in the railroad business that they 
forgot the customer. This problem was con-
firmed by a study commissioned by SPTCo 
that showed that shippers compared rail ser-
vice unfavorably with trucks and that they 
similarly compared SPTCo's service unfavor-
ably with that of its principal rail competi-
tors. Changes clearly were required. Personnel 
shifts in marketing and sales included the ap-
pointment of an outsider to head the area, and 
Krebs himself increasingly made it a point to 
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In 1984, 162 miles of N W P line above Willits was sold to the Eureka Southern, a new short-line railroad. 
call on customers. SP's railroads also prom-
ised improved reliability on a dock-to-dock 
basis, reflecting Krebs's insistence that cam-
paign verbiage—"the customer is k i n g " — 
translate into reality. 3 7 
Problems in the relationship between man-
agement and labor were not unique to SP's 
railroads, but were as great there as on any 
American rail property. Ironically, the gulf be-
tween the two had widened even as the car-
riers agreed to higher wages, greater benefits, 
and better working conditions. Indeed, by 
1983 average total earnings and fringe levels 
exceeded those paid to workers in all other 
transportation modes. During the year pre-
ceding, wage increases for the railroads ag-
gregated 9.7 percent, but for the trucking 
industry only 2.6 percent. These mirrored ear-
lier agreements such as that of 1975 which 
increased wages and benefits by 41 percent 
over three years. Figures for selected crafts 
suggest the pattern. Clerks in 1923 were earn-
ing $4.83 a day; by 1950 their daily rate had 
risen to $14.97 and by 1980 it had sky-
rocketed to $64.05. Daily rates of pay showed 
a similar pattern for locomotive engineers, 
who in 1919 earned $7.28, in 1954, $14.08, 
and in 1980, $76.06. Track laborers in 1920 
were paid $0.50 an hour; their daily wages in 
1953 were $13.20 and in 1980 had risen to 
$64.16. During the era of regulation these in-
creases could generally be passed on to cus-
tomers, but that was not the case after passage 
of the Staggers Act. Furthermore, the striking 
growth in wages and benefits was not accom-
panied by simultaneous gains in productiv-
ity. In other words, the railroads generated 
more ton miles per train mile by way of more 
powerful locomotives, larger cars, and longer 
trains, but higher wages, improved benefits, 
and frequently counterproductive work rules 
negated any gain in net production. To be 
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sure, technological advances and shifts in traf-
fic routing left SPTCo in 1983 with approxi-
mately 2,500 redundant employees, cost-
ing the company more than $100 million 
annually. 3 8 
As the 1980s unfolded, most rail managers 
saw the situation clearly: Without a more pro-
ductive labor force, the rails were doomed to 
play a reduced role in serving the country's 
transportation needs. This was especially true 
for SPTCo—surrounded as it was with larger 
and stronger rail carriers that could deliver 
freight at lower cost, menaced by an aggressive 
trucking industry, and faced with a drastically 
altered traffic base. Urged on by W. J. Lacy, 
vice-president—transportation, R. D . Breden-
berg, general manager, and others, Krebs set 
out to improve employee communications and 
morale, to further stress safety, and to other-
wise gain the trust of workers by acknowledg-
ing the importance of every employee in a 
team effort necessary to survive and prosper. 
To this end, Krebs and other senior officers 
held a series of productive "no holds barred" 
discussions with employees around the sys-
tem, funded a variety of internal communica-
tions projects including division newsletters 
and magazines, and pushed forward with 
employee physical rehabilitation and drug-
dependency assistance programs. Most im-
pressive in terms of departing from previous 
wisdom was SPTCo's "Transportation Prob-
lem Solving" program, which centered on em-
ployees' interacting with management to find 
ways of making SP's railroads more competi-
tive. The idea was not without its detrac-
tors among management and labor officers 
alike, but the energetic conviction of both 
Lacy and Bredenberg that SPTCo was "com-
mitted to finding a way by which employees 
can help run the railroad" eventually carried 
the day. "TPS" thus became a provocative, but 
productive, means of changing hidebound tra-
ditions by involving more and more of 
the railroad family in decisions of common 
importance. 3 9 
The one problem that seemed to defy re-
habilitation was SP's public image. Even be-
fore Frank Norris visited "the Octopus" epi-
thet at its doorstep early in this century, the 
company labored against adverse and incor-
rect impressions of its purposes and actions. 
These sadly became integral parts of western 
folklore, to be repeated by succeeding genera-
tions of writers and others who invented his-
tory to satisfy strangely perverse needs. This 
was especially the case in California, where 
many insistently recalled Norris's work as 
valid historical gospel instead of memorable, 
if muckraking, fiction. Not all, of course, suc-
cumbed to this mythology. The Los Angeles 
Express in 1915 had noted that the service of 
the SP made "al l of its agents ministers to our 
welfare." A few months later another Califor-
nia newspaper similarly had noted the sym-
biotic relationship between the carrier and its 
service area: "More power to the Southern 
Pacific Company and may its earnings in-
crease, for its prosperity spells prosperity for 
the workingman and its deficit spells poverty," 
intoned the Yolo Independent. Respected Uni-
versity of California professor Stuart Daggett 
early in the 1920s similarly viewed the SP as a 
powerful machine for the promotion of indus-
try and commerce on the Pacific Coast and 
further observed that public opinion in the 
Golden State was generally well disposed to-
ward the SP, in part because of "the efficiency 
of its technical staff" and in part because of 
"the excellence of its service compared to 
other roads." Yet such praise seemed to matter 
little. Even in the 1980s, those who found 
themselves in disagreement with the SP in-
voked The Octopus and employed terms and 
phrases like those Norris used in his novel: 
"the mighty Southern Pacific," or "corporate 
leviathan," the "arrogant, greedy and thought-
less railroad," managed by "modern-day 'rob-
ber barons' . . . [whose attitude] . . . is 'the 
public be damned. ' " 4 0 
The task of rebuttal was clearly difficult, but 
SP's response was often impressive in scope as 
well as imagination. Its railroads gave consid-
erable support to the California State Rail-
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road Museum at Sacramento and, to help 
celebrate the nation's bicentennial, assisted in 
operation of the Freedom Train, headed by 
former SP steam locomotive 4449, a GS-type 
donated to the city of Portland during the late 
1950s. This handsome locomotive also drew 
the resplendent Louisiana World's Fair Day-
light from Portland to New Orleans and back 
in 1984. Several hundred persons rode the 
sparkling, steam-powered train that was seen 
by thousands more. It had a wondrously uni-
fying effect on all races and ages; every face 
turned to and lit up with an expression of ap-
preciation and awe. As a result, SP's managers 
were forcefully reminded that Americans have 
always had a love affair with trains, if not al-
ways with the railroad companies that operate 
them. On another front, the Southern Pacific 
Company served as one of the official spon-
sors for the 1984 Olympic Games held in Los 
Angeles. It was historically appropriate, since 
the SP had similarly supported the 1932 
Olympics, also held in the City of Angels. 
Finally, early in the summer of 1983 SPCo 
launched an impressive advertising campaign 
on national television and in the print media 
to create a greater public awareness of its di-
versified nature.4 1 
The first subsidiary thus showcased was 
Southern Pacific Pipe Line, a stellar performer 
in any season. SPPL had gradually expanded 
its capacity with larger diameter pipe, addi-
tional pumping equipment, and new gather-
ing lines. A major new artery between the Bay 
Area and Fresno along a SPTCo right-of-way 
entered service in 1984, bringing SPPL's petro-
leum product mileage to 2,668. Barrel miles 
rose from 23.8 billion in 1974 to 33.4 billion 
in 1984, but the cost of delivering product re-
mained amazingly low—only 2^ per gallon 
between Los Angeles and Phoenix, and 2.2^ 
per gallon between the Bay Area and Reno. It 
was much the same for Black Mesa Pipeline, 
SPPL's coal slurry operation, which in 1983 
alone moved a record 4.8 million tons of coal 
with 99 percent reliability. A l l of this brought 
a smile to the face of W. Theo Eskew, presi-
dent of SPPL, who pointed to an enviable 
operating ratio of 53 cents to the dollar and 
a dramatic increase in income from opera-
tions—$53.4 million in 1984 compared with 
$19.0 million a decade earlier. 4 2 
The Southern Pacific Land Company repre-
sented another glittering jewel in the corpo-
rate crown. Its activities ranged from ethanol 
production and geothermal power to the de-
velopment of mineral-bearing properties, in-
dustrial parks, agricultural lands, and other 
physical assets. The land company's most 
spectacular venture, however, was its proposal 
for the redevelopment of former rail proper-
ties in the China Basin area of San Francisco. 
Plans for "Mission Bay" called for a dramatic 
"city within a c i ty"—a balanced mix of shops, 
offices, residential complexes, light industries, 
parks, and open spaces across nearly two hun-
dred acres. As such, the venture represented 
one of the nation's largest privately funded ur-
ban development packages. Aggressive man-
agement paid off as the land company's in-
come from operations jumped from $62.4 
million in 1980 to $79 million in I 9 8 2 . 4 ' 
Another steady performer was Bankers 
Leasing Corporation, which, noted the SP, 
had one of the industry's most consistent rec-
ords of profitability. Income before taxes in-
creased from $10 million in 1980 to $21.1 
million in 1982 and nearly tripled between 
1978 and 1982. This represented, Bankers 
Leasing managers liked to point out, a profit 
of nearly $600,000 per employee. Small won-
der that Bankers Leasing proudly anticipated 
an even rosier future. 4 4 
The same mood did not prevail at Pacific 
Motor Trucking and SPTCo's other regional 
trucking affiliates. By 1971 they collectively 
served shippers along 27,000 miles of highway 
routes and represented the nation's second-
largest common carrier truck line (measured 
by intercity tonnage handled) as well as the 
country's largest railroad-owned truck sub-
sidiary. P M T and the others had been estab-
lished years before as handmaidens of SP's 
railroads, but ownership of them by those 
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railroads resulted in severe government regu-
lation that inhibited efficiency and reduced 
competitive capacity. Gross revenues in 1970 
exceeded $100 million, although net was a 
mere $2.7 million. Future profits were even 
more elusive, as P M T and the others struggled 
under the burdens of regulation, inadequate 
rate increases, more costly fuel, expensive 
Teamster contracts, restrictive work rules, bal-
kanized operations, the closing of G M auto-
assembly plants in California and, finally if 
ironically, partial deregulation of the trucking 
industry. The ICC eventually eased restric-
tions so that P M T was finally able to inter-
connect its Oregon and Northern California 
routes with others serving Nevada, on the one 
hand, and Southern California and El Paso, 
on the other. Yet to come, strange to say, was 
permission to meld P M T operations with 
those of the Southern Pacific Transport Com-
pany of Texas and Louisiana and the Cotton 
Belt's Southwestern Transportation Company. 
That came on December 31, 1981, but by 
then P M T , the surviving entity, was awash in 
red ink. 4 5 
The task of restoring P M T to profitability 
fell to Alan D. DeMoss, who in 1981 left 
SPTCo to head the ailing subsidiary. DeMoss's 
chore was not enviable; P M T sustained losses 
of $39.8 million for the years 1981 — 82. Dur-
ing 1982, however, P M T was reorganized; its 
work force was eventually pared to under 
2,000, excess equipment was sold off, and in 
1984 its large and historic less-than-truckload 
By 1971, P M T and SPTCo's regional affiliates 
formed a massive route structure in the West. But 
all was not well with the operation. 
branch was eliminated. At the same time, Pa-
cific Motor Transport—a dormant subsidi-
ary of SPTCo—was reactivated as an essen-
tially nonunion company. Problems remained, 
though, as DeMoss sought profitability for 
P M T in the era of deregulation. Especially 
troublesome was PMT's "long tail of em-
ployee liability"—workman's compensation, 
pensions, health protection, early retirement 
obligations—which had to be met from oper-
ating income. Nevertheless, DeMoss happily 
reported a net of $3.5 million for 1984 and pre-
dicted further progress in the year following. 4 6 
The case of the Pacific Fruit Express Com-
pany was similar. After the split-off in 1978, 
PFE's management quickly reduced system fa-
cilities and centralized repair at Tucson. Prof-
itability, absent for much of the 1970s, re-
turned in 1979 and aggregated $33.5 million 
over five years. Problems persisted, however, 
since cyclical loadings resulted in excess ca-
pacity for PFE during more than half of each 
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PMT's president, A . D. DeMoss, stands beside a 
shiny new addition to that operation. 
year and finding return loads for its mechani-
cal refrigerator cars was always difficult. Fur-
thermore, despite deregulation, the company 
found it difficult to match the advantages of 
flexibility offered by over-the-road truckers. 
This was reflected ultimately in PFE's ledger 
books. It suffered a small net loss in 1984 and, 
in the year following, PFE's management de-
termined to further reduce equipment and 
personnel. The policy, in fact, represented a 
desperate effort by this historic subsidiary to 
survive. The prospects were d im. 4 7 
The mood at Southern Pacific Communica-
tions Company, largest of SP's nontransporta-
tion subsidiaries, was predictably more up-
beat. By the end of 1980 SPCC was handling 
60,000 long-distance calls per day, was ex-
panding its microwave operations, and was 
planning a network of communications satel-
lites; S P R I N T was coming of age. In 1981 its 
200,000 customers enjoyed rates that were 20 
to 50 percent lower than those offered by the 
American Telephone and Telegraph Company; 
the prospect of further growth was bright. 
Moreover, SPCC and similarly oriented firms 
scored major gains against A T & T in 1982 
as the consequence of antitrust litigation 
that resulted in the eventual breakup of that 
huge complex. SPCC's customer base in 1982 
jumped to 900,000 in forty-five states. Profits 
reflected this, escalating from a pretax loss of 
$23.4 million in 1980 (due in part to un-
authorized use of the system) to a pretax in-
come of $19.3 million in 1981 and an im-
pressive $73.1 million in 1982. 4 8 
Biaggini was understandably pleased. "In 
10 years, the communications company will 
be bigger than the railroad in terms of invest-
ment, sales and profits," he told shareholders. 
To maintain this impressive growth, however, 
would require massive infusions of capital—a 
commodity required in similar volume by SP's 
railroads. This posed a dilemma, since SP's 
debt structure was already a matter of con-
cern, and income from operations was not 
likely to provide requisite capital for the vo-
racious appetites of the company's two largest 
entities. At the same time, changes resulting 
from court orders requiring A T & T to divest 
itself of local operating subsidiaries posed 
problems of another type for that company's 
major competitors, especially General Tele-
phone & Electronic Corporation, A T & T ' s 
nearest rival. Given the respective needs of SP 
and G T E , few were surprised on October 1, 
1982, when Biaggini announced that the board 
of directors had agreed to sell Southern Pacific 
Communications Company and some of its 
own subsidiaries to G T E . The price: approxi-
mately $740.5 million in cash plus SPCC's out-
standing debt of $318 million. The arrange-
ment, when completed on June 15, 1983, 
provided important fleshing-out for G T E and 
gave it immediate entry into the intercity 
telecommunications industry through acquisi-
tion of S P R I N T ' S long-distance transmission 
facilities. 4 9 
There was similar news from Los Angeles-
based Ticor, another wholly owned subsidi-
ary of the Southern Pacific Company. One of 
the nation's leading sources of title insurance, 
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mortgage insurance, and financial printing ser-
vices, Ticor was hard hit by the recession of 
the early 1980s. It had pretax earnings of 
$39.1 million in 1979 but had only $53.0 mil-
lion of pretax income during the three-year 
period from 1980 through 1982. Prospects 
for improvement hinged on recovery of the na-
tional economy, especially the real estate mar-
ket, but that segment remained disappoint-
ingly sluggish. This was a disappointment for 
Biaggini and deprived the SP of much-needed 
profits. Relief came on February 1 , 1984, how-
ever, when SP completed the sale of T icor— 
less one subsidiary, Constellation Reinsurance 
Company—to the new T C Holding Corpora-
tion, which arranged a leveraged buyout. The 
price was $271.3 million, or $10.8 million 
above what SP paid for i t . 5 0 
The sale of both the communications com-
pany and Ticor obviously changed the very 
fabric of the company. SP's railroads were 
again the corporate centerpiece, and proceeds 
from the sale of the two subsidiaries benefited 
the treasury by over $1 billion. Furthermore, 
the dramatic growth in capital expenditures 
for the communications company and the rela-
tive decrease in the amount available for the 
railroads was obviated by the sale of SPCC. It 
augured well for SPTCo and, in the view of 
most outside analysts, for the holding com-
pany as well. Biaggini considered that the SP 
now was "leaner and stronger" and ready for 
a "new future." Dividends held steady at 
$2.60 per share from 1980 through 1982, and 
SP's stock split two-for-one in 1983. This 
good news spurred many brokers to signal 
"buy orders" to clients while simultaneously 
speculating on the destiny of the Southern Pa-
cific Company. 5 1 
What was its future? Speculation was ram-
pant within the company and without. Mean-
while, Robert Krebs charted a course for 
SPTCo that took a dry-eyed view of its com-
petitive circumstance and that promised an 
upgraded property as well as improved service 
and operating efficiency. Additionally, Krebs 
insisted that SPTCo concentrate its efforts on 
single-line and interline corridors where it 
could best compete. These included: (1) Los 
Angeles to Kansas City, Saint Louis, and Chi-
cago; (2) Los Angeles to Houston, Memphis, 
and New Orleans; (3) Oakland to Kansas 
City, Saint Louis, and Chicago; (4) Portland 
to Oakland and Los Angeles; (5) Houston to 
Memphis and Saint Louis. He likewise tar-
geted T O F C , grain, timber products, chemi-
cals and petroleum, and coal for increased 
marketing and sales promotion. This implied 
that the Southern Pacific would attempt to go 
it alone. Some observers, however, thought 
that these plans were mere posturing and 
speculated that Biaggini would soon attempt 
to sell all of SP's rail assets and point the com-
pany in a new direction. Others argued that it 
would be impossible to find a buyer willing to 
pay book value for these rail properties. Most 
concluded that Biaggini would use some of the 
monies gained from the sale of SPCC and 
Ticor to improve the holding company's bal-
ance sheet and then seek logical acquisition in 
the rail field—perhaps the Rio Grande or the 
Illinois Central Gulf. A few mentioned SP 
as an integral element in some gigantic com-
bination; active rumors linked SP with CSX, 
for example. There remained yet another op-
tion, one considered earlier: a combination of 
the Southern Pacific Company with Santa Fe 
Industries.52 
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"The new company will combine basic trans-
portation, natural resources, real estate and 
financial services, offering shareholders a 
broader-based enterprise and affording cus-
tomers, employees and the communities we 
serve greater opportunities than either com-
pany might be expected to achieve alone."— 
Southern Pacific press release, 1983 
T H O S E who arrived for work early at the gen-
eral office building in San Francisco on M o n -
day, September 27, 1983, were greeted by as-
tonishing news: trading of Southern Pacific 
Company stock on the New York Exchange 
had been temporarily halted. What did it 
mean? Soon another bit of information floated 
from floor to floor: trading of Santa Fe Indus-
tries stock similarly had been stopped. The 
implication was that the SP and Santa Fe 
would try another hand at the merger table; 
confirmation followed with joint announce-
ments later in the day. Throughout the build-
ing and, indeed, across the breadth of the 
sprawling Southern Pacific property there 
were mixed feelings among all hands, who im-
mediately desired knowledge of the details. 
Biaggini promised a face-to-face meeting with 
SP's San Francisco officers and a press confer-
ence on the morrow. 1 
The chairman's message for those who gath-
ered in the galleria of the building was both 
upbeat and reassuring. A "business combina-
tion" of SPCo and Santa Fe Industries for the 
purpose of creating a new holding company— 
Santa Fe Southern Pacific Corporation— 
would bring together "complementary" prop-
erties and most importantly, he promised, "a 
merger of equals." The combined railroads, 
for instance, would "utilize the most efficient 
routes between commercial centers" and 
"would be strong enough to compete with 
trucks." This would not require massive aban-
donment of lines and yards, Biaggini pre-
dicted. Much had changed since the earlier 
discussions with the Santa Fe in 1980, he 
noted, and now the two companies were moti-
vated by a sense of urgency. The Southern Pa-
cific and the Santa Fe were stronger in 1983 
than they had been three years earlier, Biag-
gini thought, but competitive pressures flow-
ing from Union Pacific's merger with the Mis-
souri Pacific and additional acquisition of the 
Western Pacific were overpowering factors for 
both. Biaggini and Santa Fe's new chairman, 
John J. Schmidt, had held passing conversa-
tions earlier, but formal merger discussions 
did not begin until September 1; the two had 
come to an agreement on the twenty-fourth. It 
is necessary to "seize the opportunity when it 
comes along," Biaggini declared.2 
The proposed combination represented a 
very impressive $5.2 billion plan that would 
create, among other things, a 25,000-mile 
railroad—third in size behind Burlington 
Northern and C S X Corporation. Each share 
of SP's common stock would be exchanged for 
1.543 shares of common stock in the new 
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Officers of the Santa Fe Southern Pacific Company, 
announced December 23, 1983. 
company; shares of Santa Fe Industries would 
be exchanged on a ratio of 1.203 f ° r Officers 
of the Santa Fe Southern Pacific Corporation 
would be John J. Schmidt (SFI), chairman and 
chief executive officer; Robert D. Krebs (SP), 
president and chief operating officer; W. John 
Schwartz (SFI), vice-chairman; and, Alan C. 
Furth (SP), vice-chairman. Biaggini would re-
tire once the merger of the .holding companies 
occurred; merger of the railroads would re-
quire permission from the Interstate Com-
merce Commission and thus would take longer 
to accomplish. 3 
As it developed, the combination of the 
Southern Pacific and the Santa Fe Industries 
took place "at the close of business" on De-
cember 23, 1983. The new Santa Fe Southern 
Pacific Corporation, shareholders were told, 
derived from "two strong compatible com-
panies, rich in resources and rooted in the na-
tion's history, with sound strategies for a dy-
namic future together." In a time of massive 
industrial mergers it proved to be what For-
tune called "the biggest deal of a l l " for 1983. 4 
Meanwhile, the Southern Pacific Transpor-
tation Company found itself in a peculiarly 
awkward state. Its common stock was placed 
in an independent voting trust when the South-
ern Pacific Company, SPTCo's parent, became 
part of the Santa Fe Southern Pacific Corpora-
tion. At the same time, the parent gave SPTCo 
$150 million to cover contingencies during 
the period prior to merger of the railroads—a 
pittance, some at SPTCo thought, since most 
of the parent's resources once had been those 
of its railroads. Simply stated, during the pe-
riod of trusteeship SPTCo would "stand alone 
without the support of the parent," as SPTCo 
chairman Denman K. McNear put it, or, as 
controller Eric L. Johnson said, SPTCo on its 
own had to "generate funds adequate to pro-
vide service and maintain capital programs." 
A positive cash flow was essential; there would 
be no "sugar daddy" on which to lean. At the 
same time, SPTCo needed to prepare for 
merger with the A T & S F while, under penalty 
of law, it was obligated to compete earnestly 
with its potential partner.5 
Documents weighing no less than forty-one 
pounds were filed with the Interstate Com-
merce Commission on March 22, 1984. What 
the Santa Fe Southern Pacific (SFSP) Corpo-
ration sought was authority to control the 
Southern Pacific Transportation Company 
and its subsidiaries through merger of SPTCo 
and A T & S F into a new, wholly owned subsidi-
ary of SFSP—the Southern Pacific & Santa Fe 
Railway. Immediately prior to that merger, if 
approved, the St. Louis Southwestern Railway 
would be merged into SPTCo. In addition, 
SFSP sought authority to acquire control of 
Pacific Motor Trucking and SPTCo's other 
trucking arms. Under revised regulatory law, 
the ICC was obliged to render a decision by 
early autumn of 1986. 6 
After some initial hesitation, investors came 
to look generally with favor on SFSP. Many 
saw it as did Dean Witter Reynolds, which ad-
mired SFSP's enormous assets, low long-term 
debt, and amazing potential that could be ex-
ploited by "management drive and initiative." 
Dean Witter called Santa Fe Southern Pacific 
"a sleeping giant." 7 
Others viewed it similarly—but in a nega-
tive context. The Union Pacific Corporation, 
for instance, noted that the proposed South-
ern Pacific & Santa Fe would operate 90 per-
cent of all Class One rail lines in New Mexico 
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and 100 percent in Arizona, and that it would 
account for 90.1 percent of all rail tonnage 
originating in California and 78.7 percent ter-
minating there. This, said the UP, would be 
"seriously anti-competitive unless the ICC im-
poses conditions to preserve competition." 
Several state and local governments favored 
the merger, but only with conditions of the 
type suggested by the UP. Not surprisingly, 
then, several railroads asked for concessions if 
the ICC agreed to merge SPTCo and AT&SF. 
These included the Union Pacific (nearly 2,000 
miles of trackage rights from El Paso to South-
ern California and into the San Joaquin Val-
ley); the Denver & Rio Grande Western (pur-
chase of SPTCo's Overland Route from Ogden 
to Roseville, purchase of the Modoc Route to 
Klamath Falls, and various trackage rights 
in Oregon and California); the Kansas City 
Southern (trackage rights and acquisitions 
in Texas and Louisiana and single-line rate-
making authority); and the Missouri-Kansas-
Texas (extensive trackage rights over the 
SPTCo and Cotton Belt in Texas and Kansas).8 
A l l of this brought an irate response from 
John J. Schmidt. Given the recent history 
of the ICC in approving mergers, e.g., the 
Northern Lines (1970), Burlington Northern-
Frisco (1980), and Union Pacific—Missouri 
Pacific—Western Pacific (1982), there could be 
little doubt that the SPTCo-AT&SF applica-
tion would be granted. On the other hand, the 
UP-MoPac-WP decision had carried with it 
important concessions granting right of entry 
to Kansas City by the D & R G W and use of 
MoPac's track between Kansas City and Saint 
Louis by the Cotton Belt. This suggested that 
corollary concessions in the Santa Fe South-
ern Pacific case might be anticipated, but 
Schmidt described the collective demands by 
Union Pacific, Denver & Rio Grande Western, 
Kansas City Southern, and Katy as "oppor-
tunistic and unwarranted." They were, in fact, 
"unacceptable" and threatened to undermine 
the entire application. Schmidt was emphatic 
that burdening the merger with the excessive 
conditions would result in the holding com-
Southern Pacific 
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As SPTCo's traditional sources of traffic eroded, 
gains were made in intermodal sales. But even 
these were soft at mid-decade, and margins were 
extremely thin. 
pany's jettisoning either one or both of the rail 
lines. That was a serious matter, since few 
observers thought either SPTCo or A T & S F 
could survive alone in the harsh competitive 
environment of the late 1980s. 9 
Indeed, the initial experience of the South-
ern Pacific Transportation Company under the 
independent voting trust seemed to demon-
strate that likelihood. In 1984 SPTCo handled 
more carloads than in either of the two years 
preceding, and its operating income reached 
$51.2 million but its operating ratio remained 
dangerously high—98.1. Adequate productiv-
ity, alas, was elusive. Moreover, SPTCo's tra-
ditional traffic base—forest products, auto 
parts and assembled autos, copper, and agri-
cultural commodities—continued to erode 
and remained under competitive attack. Even 
T O F C loadings soon dropped off. Conse-
quently, during the first quarter of 1985 
SPTCo suffered a disappointing operating loss 
of $26.3 million. Cost-reduction programs 
were instituted but, in many cases, these hin-
dered SPTCo's ability to maintain service lev-
els adequate to hold or attract new business. It 
was, in a phrase of the time, a "Catch -22 . " 1 0 
When Lord Cornwallis found it necessary 
to surrender to George Washington at York-
town on October 19, 1781, his regimental 
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These intermodal transports are loading at SP's Golden Pig T O F C facility. 
band chose to play what it considered an ap-
propriate tune: "The World Turned Upside 
D ow n. " For Cornwallis and his troops—and, 
indeed, for the entire British empire—defeat 
by the colonial rebels reflected a world run 
amok. It was much the same for the Southern 
Pacific and those who directed its affairs 
or worked for that company in the 1980s. 
" H o w strange that a long-haul, Sunbelt, land-
holding, Harriman-oriented colossus could be 
acting as caboose instead of locomotive in the 
final season of merger maneuverings!" opined 
David P. Morgan in Trains for December, 
1984. "Nobody," he suggested, "buys Espee; 
Espee buys other railroads." Morgan was re-
flecting on SP's historically strong position in 
the industry as well as the reality of its situa-
tion 115 years after the celebration at Pro-
montory. Biaggini had pledged and Schmidt 
had affirmed that merger of the Southern Pa-
cific Company and the Santa Fe Industries 
would be a "combination of equals," but as 
the merger took its course, few doubted a new 
reality: the Santa Fe was "more equal" than 
the SP and would be the dominant partner. 
The ghosts of Collis P. Huntington, Edward H . 
Harriman, and Julius Kruttschnitt must have 
recoiled at the idea; the world was truly up-
side down. Among those of SP persuasion 
there was a pervasive feeling of anxiety mir-
roring astonishment that the sun might, in 
truth, set on the Southern Pacific." 
Indeed, the Southern Pacific may very well 
pass from the scene. If it happens that way, the 
enormity of the void will be astonishing not 
just because of its size and the fact that it has 
been a part of the national landscape so long, 
but because it has had such a dramatically 
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If merger is approved, the Southern Pacific will live on—in bold new dress. 
positive influence on American transportation 
history and on its far-flung service area. Over 
SP's long and colorful life, it has made money 
for its owners; has given direct employment to 
tens of thousands and indirect employment to 
many thousands more; paid millions of dol-
lars in local, state, and federal taxes; and has 
served the manifold needs of countless pa-
trons. Moreover, since the inception of the 
first predecessor more than a century and a 
quarter ago, SP's railroads have done as much 
as any carrier in furthering the American 
westering process—a national goal of great 
dimension, it should be remembered. So the 
ghosts of Huntington, Harriman, and Krutt-
schnitt can be at rest—easily at rest, for the 
Southern Pacific enterprise has been a signifi-
cant, exciting, and productive adventure. 
Moreover, should the merger of the SP and 
Santa Fe rail units be executed, as anticipated, 
SP's railroads will join the holding company 
they birthed and live on as a part of the Santa 
Fe Southern Pacific Corporation—in bold 
new dress. 
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